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PREFACE 
 
Publication „Risks of Processes and Their Management “is released on the basis of 
information and recommendations from two international conferences (Risks of business 
processes 2015 and 2016), which held in Děčín on the Czech Technical University ground 
and were organised in co-operation with the Jan Evangelista Purkyně University located 
in Ústí nad Labem. Papers presented on both conferences showed the new findings 
connected with: identification and analysis of risks in territory and in businesses; 
management of important risks; and trade-off with risks under conditions of security 
systems with accent to solution of safety of businesses, infrastructures and territory.  
By this way, it was collected the sum of new theoretical, technical, organisational and 
methodical findings for support of effective, practical and powerful systems for    pulling 
off the risks at conditions normal, abnormal and critical. This was supplemented by 
information on crisis management and on experiences from putting off the critical 
situations (operation crisis plans for response to emergency and crisis situations, problems 
of adequacy of maintenance, qualified response to businesses´ accidents, natural disasters 
etc.) that showed the change of targets and management structure at critical situations.  
Evaluations of mentioned papers and their conclusions showed that the powerful 
public protection is intimately connected with safety of entities technological and social, 
and in particular with critical infrastructure safety that ensures pursuing the basic State 
functions, namely at crisis conditions. Therefore, on their ground it originates the 
project with the goal to summarize the relevant results, to underline new knowledge and 
to show the road forward. The project result is the present book that contains seventeen 
chapters split to fifth parts.    
Great thanks belongs to authors of chapters for effort to apply integrated view on risks 
in different sectors of human activities and their partial domains, which enables to 
compare approaches, methodologies and key techniques and procedures that are 
connected with work with risks. From human security and development reasons it does 
not go on different make-believes with risks based on theories, but on effective 
procedures targeted to risks´ control so they might not cause serious damages to humans 
and decline of human civilisation.  
Great thank belongs to reviewers ……., who help me to improve the present book.  
Specific acknowledgement and thank I express to Dipl. Ing. Lucie Povolná from the 
Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem for help with groundworks 
collection and to Mgr. David Borovička from the Czech Technical University in Prague 
for technical works connected with the publication issue.  
I am indebted to the Czech Technical University in Prague, and especially to the 
Associate Professor, Dipl. Ing. Václav Jirovský PhD., the head of department of security 
technologies and engineering for chance of present book processing. 
 
 
Praha, March 25, 2017                                                                          Dana Procházková 
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Chapter 1  
 
OUTLINE ON RISK, RISK MANAGEMENT AND TRADE-OFF WITH 
RISKS* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
For ensuring the human security and development, the safe human system is necessary 
[1-3]; the human system has different levels – village, city, organization, business, region, 
State etc. For ensuring the humans´ lives in a safe space there is necessary to manage and 
trade-off with risks properly on all mentioned levels, i.e. to apply the measures and 
activities targeted to the existence, security and development of human system. The basic 
tools of human society for achievement of these objectives are the human society 
governance and the correct application of knowledge and experiences connected with 
trade-off with risks respecting the public interests. In this respect the great role plays the 
management and engineering disciplines, the aim of which is to arrange the human 
security and sustainable development.  
The present cognition [3, 4] shows that humans need to take care on public assets: 
human lives, health and security; property and welfare; environment; critical technologies 
and infrastructures, Figure 1. The tool that is aimed to mentioned targets is an integral 
(complex) safety. To reach just mentioned targets, the problems on several levels: 
technical, functional (organisational, operative), tactical, strategic and political (Figure 2) 
have been solved by a way that solutions on all levels have been interconnected.   
 
 
Fig. 1.  Human system public assets. 
 
 
*Author: Assoc. Prof., RNDr. Dana Procházková, PhD., D.Sc. Czech Technical University in 
Prague, Praha, Czech Republic, prochazkova@fd.cvut.cz 
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Fig. 2. Levels on which security problems should be addressed. 
 
State of art of problems´ solution, according to knowledge, summarized in works [4-
6], is the following:  
- each object under consideration is a system, i.e. it is characterized by elements, 
linkages and flows, 
- the system vulnerabilities are also caused by linkages and mainly by flows of energy, 
information, material, finances etc. among the system elements that cause couplings; 
mentioned couplings create often interdependences that are often the causes of 
failures and often by a cascade failure of several partial systems at occurrence of 
extreme (beyond design, severe) disasters, Figure 3. The nature of interdependences 
is physical, cyber, organizational and territorial [5].   
 
Fig. 3. Impacts in the human system at extreme disaster; anthropogenic measures and 
activities ensure the protection of public assets only for disasters with size smaller than 
design disaster; only at defined nuclear facilities there are carried out measures and 
activities against selected beyond design disasters. 
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The recent cognition [3-6] shows that the present world and its objects are represented 
by a model denoted as a system of systems i.e. several overlapping systems that are open 
and fulfil certain functions. They are interconnected by linkages and flows which create 
mutual interdependences that under some conditions cause specific vulnerabilities. A 
system according to its core means more than only a sum of parts, and therefore, the stress 
is put on: a study of interactions and associations; non-linear thinking; interactions; 
inductions; feedbacks; and experiments or realistic simulations. E.g. feedbacks cause the 
non-linearity in the system behaviour and cause that the behaviour is not predictable, and 
therefore, it is not possible to use the common prognostic methods for the identification 
of possible system states. The consequence is an occasional occurrence of unexpected 
situations that threaten the humans, and it is difficult to get over them. 
The complexity of systems with which we work in practice is different. According to 
work [6] four types of system configurations are used; they are: simply organized units; 
composite systems; complex systems; and set of overlapping systems.  
Behaviour of simply organized units is clearly given by structure and properties of 
units and it is described by analytic functions. The composite systems are understood as 
a representation of elements that are organized and connected in a certain way and 
because of proper structure they fulfil certain functions. Their behaviour is described by 
results of statistical solutions based on analytic functions, the parameters of which are 
variable in a certain interval, which are a reflection of various possible states / variants of 
system behaviour.  
The complex systems have many components (often systems too) that interact together 
and are organized in several levels [6], which causes that we observe: suddenly emerged 
behaviour features that is not possible to obtain from the knowledge of components’ 
behaviour, it is the so-called emergence; hierarchy; self-organization; and various 
management structures, which all together seems as a chaos, and therefore, in their 
description there are random and epistemic uncertainties. The complex systems behaviour 
is described by results of simulations taking into account the existence of epistemic 
uncertainties.  
The system of systems (SoS), i.e. a set of several overlapping systems (often complex 
systems). It is very complicated, and therefore, its behaviour can be only obtained if a 
multidimensional and inter-dimensional approach is applied and it is based on simulation 
of variants by multi-criteria procedures.  
Since the solution of many problems in practice means to consider the complex 
systems and the SoS, the system thinking is the fundamental principle of research if we 
deal with safety. The system thinking means: to see both, the whole and the details at the 
same time; to focus on the dynamics of processes; to pay attention to relations, 
associations and interactions; to take into account the roles of feedbacks; to consider the 
relativity of possible situations; and to think in a long-term way. 
At management and engineering solution of complex systems and systems of systems, 
it is then necessary to use the multi-criteria approach and in a case of system of systems, 
it is also necessary to consider the cross-sectional risks that are the causes of emergent 
interdependences originating at certain conditions, and therefore, to their detection the 
attention of engineering disciplines is concentrated at system design. At their problems´ 
solution the tools are based on: the theory of chaos; theory of fuzzy sets; complexity 
theory; and theory of possibilities – set of references to their derivation is in books [5, 6].  
In case of SoS management, we need also to respect the basic requirements, i.e. co-
existence of overlapping systems [7]. For human goals fulfilment, it is necessary to 
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arrange the co-existence of important systems, minimally social, environmental and 
technological systems that create the human system. 
Regarding to present view of the UN, EU and public interest [1-3], the ground for 
human being is a conservation of existence, security and potential for development for 
humans. In this context in practice, the following terms are used: 
Security is the state of system at which the occurrence of harm or loss on system assets 
(protected public interests etc.) and the system itself has an acceptable occurrence 
probability (it is almost sure that harm and loss do not arise). It means that it ensures a 
certain stability of system in time and space, i.e. a sustainable development which means 
that the system is well protected against internal and external disasters of all kinds. 
Safety is a set of human measures and activities for ensuring the existence, security 
and sustainable development of system and its assets. Its measure is the effectiveness of 
appropriate measures and activities at ensuring the system assets security and sustainable 
development. 
Secured system is the system, in which the system and its assets are not threatened by 
disasters, the origin of which is inside and outside of system, including the human factor. 
Safe system is the system, in which the system and its assets are not threatened by 
disasters, the origin of which are inside and outside of system, including the human factor, 
and the system does not threaten itself and its vicinity not at its critical conditions. 
Human system safety management is the management of human system directed to 
human system safety, the product of which is the security and sustainable development 
of all public assets. 
The engineering is a set of disciplines that realise the tasks determined by management 
procedure into practice.  The risk is for engineering practice expressed as probable size 
of losses, damages and harms on followed assets that are caused by a given disaster with 
specified size (the size of normative hazard) and that are rescheduled for a certain time 
unit (usually 1 year) and a certain object or a certain site. The risk engineering was the 
20th century phenomenon and on its base there was set up in developed countries the 
groundwork for human development that is quite resistant against to traditional disasters, 
namely natural ones; human, animal and plant diseases; technology failures; and social 
disasters.  
According to definitions used by the UN, Swiss Re, World Bank etc. the risk 
engineering:  
- is the systematic use of engineering knowledge and experiences for the optimization 
of protection of human lives, environment, property and economic assets, i.e. for the 
optimum reach of security and sustainable development of human system, 
- has a main purpose to reduce all types of harms and losses by the means of aimed and 
qualified trade-off with risk.   
It is necessary to note that at present practice the risk engineering has not yet been 
interpreted by an explicit way and different concepts are not often distinguished.  
It is necessary to consider that risk engineering is not a static discipline because it has 
been developed in time. The problem of present specialists, mainly oriented to 
calculations, is that they do not distinguish the different concepts, and in some cases such 
ignorance is a cause of incorrect solutions (e.g. if they use standards and norms for 
secured system and the correct solution of problem requires standards and norms for the 
safe system because the failure of system has a great potential to damaged assets being in 
system and in system vicinity); see lessons learned from recent important accidents [6, 
8].   
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2.  Risk 
 
The term “risk” has origin in the middle Ages. There are different definitions of risk 
for each of several applications [4]. The widely inconsistent and ambiguous use of the 
word is one of several current criticisms of methods to manage risk.  Risk is the potential 
that a chosen action or activity (including the choice of inaction) will lead to a loss (an 
unfavourable outcome). The notion implies that a choice having an influence on the 
outcome exists (or existed). Potential losses themselves may also be called "risks".  
The present concept has been developed since 30s of last century. According to present 
standards for strategic management, the risk expresses the probable size of unfavourable 
and unacceptable impacts (losses, harms and detriment) of disasters with size of 
normative hazard on system assets or subsystems related to a given time interval (e.g. 1 
year) and a given site; i.e. it is always the site specific [4].  
The risk partly depends on the hazard and partly on the vulnerability of assets in a 
given site (i.e. on the sensitivity of each individual asset in a given place against to disaster 
manifestation in a given site). It expresses a possibility what it might be happen [4]. From 
this fact it follows that for each management it is important to know the risk, namely in 
comprehensible expression. In practice of public administration, it is certified the risk 
expression in a form that by risk analysis and assessment it finds that on specific section: 
- there is necessary 5 million a year for remedy of harms caused by existing risk, 
- each ten years ten persons die in a consequence of given disaster, 
- each five years the property damages caused by disaster exceed 5 billion EURs etc. 
The typical risk properties are the random and epistemic uncertainties (epistemic 
uncertainties = vagueness). If we want to manage the risk, we need to identify, analyse, 
assess it and after this to decide, what we can do, in dependence on our possibilities – 
knowledge, staff, technical means and finance sources. For this, we need to use a lot of 
different methods, tools and techniques and also principles of good practice (good 
engineering practice) [4].    
In practice we work with three types of risk: the partial one that is only related to 
disaster impacts on one asset; the integrated one that is related to disaster impacts on 
several assets – e.g. sum or other aggregation of impacts´ rates; and the integral (systemic) 
one that is related to disaster impacts on the entity that is understand as a system. The last 
concept is necessary for solution of safety and security, the structure of which is complex, 
i.e. the system of systems, Figure 4. 
As we said above, the principal attributes of each risk are uncertainty and vagueness. 
We divide their sources into three groups, namely to the variations originating at: usual 
system process life cycle at normal conditions in the vicinity (uncertainties); real changes 
of system process life cycle in the time and space that affect occasional extreme values 
occurrences – we consider normal and abnormal conditions - (uncertainties and 
vagueness); variable system process life cycle that is caused by process changes in time 
and space, induced by outside causes or by critical conditions (vagueness). 
The data uncertainty relates to the dispersion of observations and measurement; i.e. a 
random uncertainty. It may be included into assessment and prediction by mathematic 
statistics apparatus. The vagueness relates to both, the lack of knowledge and information 
and the natural variability of processes and actions that caused disasters. For processing 
the vagueness, the mathematic statistics apparatus is insufficient and therefore, it is 
necessary to use the recent mathematical apparatus that offers e.g. extreme values theory, 
11 
 
fuzzy set theory, fractal theory, dynamic chaos theory, selected expert methods and 
suitable heuristics based on the existence of several variants of solution.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Scheme of complex systems – 1, 2,… are the processes being under way in 
mentioned entity. 
 
Because in each entity: several disasters are the sources of risks; each disaster 
scenarios depends on the entity momentary conditions and on the real disaster properties 
that pre-determine the real forms of disasters´ scenarios. These facts need to be considered 
when we want to ensure the safety and the security.  
Let k is the number of possible disaster scenarios for the object / location / area, pi   is 
the occurrence probability of the i-th disaster scenario, i = 1,2,..., k,  ci is the overall impact 
of the i-th scenario disaster, i = 1,2, ..k. to the assets, then the risk R associated with the 
disaster with respect to the assets in a given place is determined by relationship 
 
         k 
R =   Σ   pi    ci  . 
        i = 1 
 
If we relate the risk to just one asset, i.e. human life and we consider that today's 
acceptable probability of human casualty is 10-5 in case of individuals and 10-3 . N-2 in case 
of group of persons, where N is the number of affected individuals [4].  
In the selection of specific measures and actions to ensure the safety objectives we are 
considering contemporary targets, which means to achieve likelihood of occurrence of 
human casualties at 10-6 at individuals 10-4 N-2 at groups of people, where N is the number 
of affected individuals [4]. Number of vulnerable people is calculated according to 
formula 
 
N = S . h . fs  ,  
 
where S is the affected area in ha, h is the density given by the number of persons per ha, 
fs is the correlation factor when only part of the territory is inhabited. 
In terms of risk as a proportion of total damage, the total values of assets´ risk are 
dimensionless quantities (a number between 0 and 1 or between 0 and 100, depending on 
the chosen scale) related to the chosen time unit. On the basis of representative set of 
empirical disaster scenarios and corresponding calculations of losses and damages in a 
particular area it is possible to calculate the average total risk associated with disaster in 
a given area [4]. 
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3.  Present work with risk 
 
Work with risk is expressed by model shown in Figure 5 [4, 6].  It starts with definition 
of concept of work with risk (system characteristics, determination of assets, specification 
of aims), on the basis of which the risks are identified, analysed, assessed, judged, 
managed, traded-off and monitored.  The criterions determine the conditions at which the 
risk is acceptable, conditionally acceptable or unacceptable. The aims in real case are 
selected from further given possibilities: to reduce risk to certain level; to secure the 
system, i.e. to ensure system security; to ensure safe system, i.e. to ensure security for 
both, the system and its vicinity. The feedbacks denoted in Figure 5 are used in case if 
the monitoring shows that the risk level is not on required level; firstly, it is used the 
cheapest feedback 1; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge harms immediately 
it is used the feedback 4 that means the change of concept of work with risks.  
 
Fig. 5. Process model of work with risks, numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote feedbacks. 
 
If we want to trade-off with any risk, in the first, we need to identify it and after this 
to analyse it. Both steps need to be carefully performed because each inaccuracy in the 
given steps cannot be rectified in the following. For the steps mentioned, the professional 
knowledge of problem solved is the fundamental. The effective methods are What, If 
analysis, Check List analysis, Event Tree analysis etc.; the use of each method depends 
on the level of problem knowledge and on the target of risk analysis [4]. E.g. risk analysis 
procedure for the use in disaster prevention contains according to the following parts: 
- risk analysis definition and determination of study depth, 
- description of considered system, object, equipment and the delimitation of its 
boundaries, 
- identification and description of disasters, i.e. sources of risk, 
- relative evaluation of disaster´ criticality (hazard assessment) and selection of relevant 
disasters for further study, 
- identification of possible disaster impacts on considered system and its vicinity,  
Process model of work with risks
Identification         Assessment             Management      Monitoring
Analysis Judgement Trade-off
CRITERIONS    AIMS
1
2
3
4
FEEDBACKS - 1, 2, 3, 4
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- compilation of possible disasters scenarios, in which unacceptable impacts can occur 
and selection of representative disaster scenarios, 
- estimation of risk amount / size / rate), 
- risk presentation. 
Risk amount / size / rate is a numerical value; e.g.: the number of deaths caused by 
disaster (a year); numerical function giving for each N in a certain interval the probability 
of that as a consequence of some technological accident in a year to an M or more deaths 
in technology vicinity. The function describes the relationship between the occurrence 
probability and consequences of given disaster that has certain nature.  For risk 
representation, there is used e.g. risk matrix, number as one-dimensional amount, mean 
death measure, risk isolines (individual risk), f-N curve (societal risk) [4].   
The acceptable risk is the amount of serious harms or jeopardy for human lives and 
health, home animals, environment or damages arising from existence and possible 
realisation of disasters that is acceptable for person / group of persons and for society. 
The risk acceptability depends on social, economic and political factors, and also on a 
perceived profit arising from the positive activity of risk sources (disasters) from the 
viewpoint of analysis of costs and profits for society [4].   
The risk is a measure of unacceptable impacts caused by an expected disaster on public 
assets (generally considered assets because in practice, we use different risk analysis 
targets) in a given site. In the business domain the protected assets (interests) are also a 
safe business, profit, competitiveness and the like. With regard to these assets, the 
disasters are also the following phenomena: market failure; lack of finances / suitable 
technologies / qualified human sources; incompetent management of business; loss of 
competitiveness; external natural and other disasters that have impacts on business; 
intended damage of business outside / inside; and failure of links with vicinity / public 
administration. 
The assessment of human (or other) system risk means the judgement of disasters´ 
impacts by help of one or more criteria that reflect the value scale of human society.  Some 
of the criteria may be even qualitative and some of them are incommensurable [4].  
Assessment process structure depends on facts: 
1. What is assessed? 
2. When it is assessed, to which moment in time it is assessed? 
3. How, i.e. on the basis of which criteria, it is assessed? 
General knowledge sets that when we want to assess something, we need to determine 
the assessment targets, the set of criterions and the scale used at assessment. The 
assessment generally represents an exertion of certain criteria, rating functions or 
preferences. It is used in several senses: 
1. The first sense means to follow the process by help of process monitoring or 
observation. 
2. The other means the comparison with some appointed limit. 
3. The third one means the comparison with some appointed limit and thinking out all 
the more or less probable consequences, i.e. the impacts and the profits. 
The last sense supports the negotiation with risks. The system assessment means the 
application of certain suitably selected criteria set or rating functions to the defined 
system. It means that we assume and specify certain behaviour in time and space, certain 
responses on possible reactions etc. The criteria, we divide into: 
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- internal, i.e. such, that ensures the assessment of appropriate system (they take note 
of system only), i.e. its quality, viability, fitting the certain targets, needs, demands 
and the like, 
- external, i.e. such, that ensures the assessment of system as a part of a broader system 
(they take note of system and of its vicinity), i.e. viability, material and energy 
demands, sources, human aspects, environmental impacts, social impacts and the like, 
- criteria tied up with a time trend, i.e. with possible changes of assessment in time or 
with changes of a system function in time (i.e. it is considered expected dynamic 
behaviour of system in time). 
From the given facts, it follows that the assessment has several qualitative levels, 
namely: 
- the simplest level is the comparison of real data value, quantitative or qualitative (e.g. 
data on the level of quality), with a certain strictly defined limit or model (that the 
following phenomena aroused or did not arise). The comparison with the limit is used 
when the surveillance is directed to the check-up of certain item quality or to the 
determination whether it is necessary or not to start a specified regulation or warning 
measures. The comparison with parameters of certain model is more typical for 
observation nets that have one of aims to identify phenomena in domains, which they 
cover, 
- the impact assessment goes partly from data and partly from collected findings. It 
represents a tool for the complex and systematic investigation of disasters or planned 
actions. For this assessment type, there is important the reference level that may be 
represented by: original (present) conditions; conditions that will originate without 
any activity; some marginal or target (covetable) conditions; ideal conditions. There 
are systematically followed relations described as the chain of causes and impacts 
(disaster scenarios) and they are determined by impacts of the first order in cases in 
which it is possible to directly distinguish the cause. At data processing, they are used 
the predicative methods that are mostly based on: exact calculations; statistical 
formulas; experimental observation and mathematical modelling; expert approaches 
based on judgements, analogies and experiences; or quantities scoring, i.e. at 
incommensurable quantities, they are used methods of multi criteria analysis, i.e. e.g. 
the decision matrixes, 
- the hazard assessment means the determination of disaster size on a certain level of 
credibility in a certain time interval and in a certain site (the time interval size and site 
dimension depend on the physical nature of followed disaster). For its determination, 
there are used the specific methods of mathematical statistics based on the great 
number theory, 
- the risk assessment means to use the methods by which from hazard characteristics 
(size and occurrence probability) and site characteristics probable size of damages is 
determined.  
At work with risks, it is necessary to consider that processes under way are not only 
characterised by one criterion, and therefore, it needs to be used the multi criteria 
approach. 
The risk assessment is possible to carry out only on the basis of real, true and tried-
and-true data sets on a given phenomenon that are valid for a correctly defined system 
and correctly defined time interval [4].  The target is to ensure the decision-making that 
supports the benefit for the human system. Therefore, it needs to be used the tested set of 
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criterions that guarantees the objectivity, the independence and the impartiality of 
assessment.  With regard to these viewpoints we divide the criterions into: 
- objective and subjective; in the objective ones, there are such criteria, the limit 
(comparative value) of which is created by current measurable units that are 
detectable by lab experiments, calculation or economic prudence, 
- criterions of advantages and beneficial effect (the higher, the better) or the criterions 
of costs, losses and content of contaminations (the lower, the better), 
- cumulative criterions that are characterised by the relation of mutual 
complementarities, i.e. they are mutually supplemented and supported. The higher 
performance of one is connected with the higher performance of the other and vice 
versa. The extreme cumulative criterions are such criterions, in which the 
performance of one is conditioned by the performance of the other; the criteria of such 
type warp the result and therefore, they need to be put out of the criterion set, 
- alternative criterions are given by the relation of mutual competition perhaps, they are 
antagonistic. The higher performance of one indicator is connected with the reduced 
performance of the other and vice versa.  The extreme alternative criterions are 
absolutely eliminated and therefore, they must be put out of criterion set, 
- independent criterions are given by indifferent or variable relations. 
The assessment methods from the viewpoint of approach to matter-of-fact problem we 
separate to: deterministic methods; probabilistic (stochastic) methods; engineering 
judgement; analogy; model; and aggregation of several criterions (multi criteria 
assessment). 
The deterministic approach is based on a precondition that each phenomenon is the 
inevitable consequence of conditions and causes. The approach consists of fact that there 
is determined the vagueness of all input parameters and that from the safety reasons, there 
are considered marginal (usually most unfavourable) values in a given real case. Just the 
determination of marginal values is the critical activity of this approach. By use of 
different data sets and the application of different assumption sets, there are mostly 
obtained results that are substantially different; i.e. the output value from one procedure 
does not lay in the interval of deviations obtained by the other procedure. This approach 
is used in designing [3-4, 9].    
The probabilistic approach is based on a precondition that the occurrence of each 
phenomenon has a certain random uncertainty, i.e. possibility of random phenomena 
occurrence is estimated with a certain value of probability. From the set of variants the 
creation of which is the critical activity of this approach, there are determined 
representative values as median or median +  ( – the standard deviation). 
For the assessment of phenomena and processes that have random uncertainties and 
vagueness (i.e. the epistemic uncertainties) they are, at present, used the computations 
based on the fuzzy set theory or the possibility theory [9] that combines analytical 
approach with expert methods.  In the case of experts´ use, it is necessary to solve the 
problem who is an expert. With regard to discussion in world conference ESREL2011 in 
Troyes, the expert is a person who: has the knowledge; is neutral; has the competences; 
is capable to guess with the support of object matter and to reach the acceptable 
consensus. In some countries as the USA, there is the legal rule containing the 
requirements that the expert must fulfil. 
At multi criteria assessment, it is possible to use the methods, tools and techniques 
supporting the creative thinking, e.g. Delphi method, SWOT analysis, brainstorming, 
panel discussion, decision supporting systems etc. [4].  Their use needs to be prudent and 
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careful, in order that the results bear confirmation of purpose in a value scale selected for 
criterions chosen for a given problem solution.  For the selection of criterion sets (the 
order of criterions is usually important), for the establishment of scale characteristics and 
for the judgement of correctness or inaccuracy of outputs, it is necessary to use the 
empirical (experience) databases.    
At risk assessment there is necessary to fulfil the following requirements: 
- performance of assessment in the demanded depth and quality and in harmony with 
the accepted methodology, 
- completeness, 
- to include the recent knowledge of science, 
- estimation of uncertainties and vagueness at an extrapolation use, 
- united expression of risk characterization, 
- transparency of the process performance of risk assessment. 
If the risk assessment does not fulfil these requirements, it needs to be returned to re-
processing. The involved situation arises when the risk assessment was done with the use 
of present scientific knowledge, but there is the lack of data for risk characterisation or 
the output is burdened by too big error. In this case, it is necessary to decide to postpone 
the decision with note that it will be performed again as far as additional data will be 
obtained [4].   
For risk determination we use two basis approaches, namely: 
1. Determination of hazard from disaster H and return period τ (in years) is performed 
by methods based on the theory of large numbers, theory of extremes, theory of fuzzy 
sets, theory of chaos, theory of fractals etc. [4].  According to a site vulnerability in 
an investigated land (e.g. around a given site: square 10 x 10 km; circle with radius 
of 5 km) the whole damage on all assets is determined for the H denoted by S, usually 
expressed in money. Risk R connected with the given disaster in a given site is 
determined by the relation 
 
      R = S / τ 
 
The result is very clear: e.g. “the risk from a given disaster in a given site is X EURs 
and for town it is MX EURs”. 
2. Determination of disaster scenario for the disaster with size corresponding to 
maximum expected disaster (it is possible with regard to demands of norms to use the 
probable size of expected disaster, or the value of standard size of determined disaster 
or at least unfavourable disaster) is performed; the exact scenario compilation 
methods [4] are used. According to data for a given land it is determined: 
- the value of whole damage on all assets in the area SS (the method for SS 
determination is described [4] usually expressed in money according to amount 
of assets and their vulnerability to the impacts of a followed disaster in the 
affected area, usually normalised to a certain land unit S, 
- the occurrence frequency of maximum expected disaster, normalised to one 
year, f according to the professional data from databases or expert opinions. 
Risk R is given by relation 
 
          R = S * f. 
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The result is in the same form as in the foregoing case. This case is often used for 
technological and other disasters for which we have not good long-term catalogue 
(this shortage the EU want to remove by paying the special attention to the 
compilation of the MARS database. 
 
4.  Present risk management 
 
If we want to manage risk, we need to identify, analyse, assess it and after this to decide 
what we can do, in dependence on our possibilities – knowledge, personnel, technical 
mean and finance sources. For this, we need to use a lot of different methods, tools and 
techniques and also principles of good practice (good engineering practice). According 
to [4] there are distinguished the management methods for:  
- risk reduction in closed system considering only the technical causes of risks, 
- risk reduction in closed system considering the technical and human factor causes of 
risks, 
- ensuring the system security without respecting the system vicinity security, 
- ensuring the system safety – system and its vicinity are safe, 
- ensuring the system of systems (SoS) safety – overlapping systems and their vicinity 
are safe).  
The present concept of risk management used in strategy management has been 
developed since 50s of the last century. As it was above mentioned, the risk partly 
depends on the hazard and partly on the vulnerability of assets in a given site. It expresses 
a possibility what it might happen.  From this fact it follows that for each management it 
is important to know the risk, namely in a comprehensible formulation. It means that the 
quality of risk management depends on both the approach followed and the quality of 
decision.  
From daily life experiences, data and knowledge summarised in professional 
publications mentioned in [3, 4, 9] it follows that situations, in which each human occurs 
and which each human solves in each moment represent to him / her the necessity of 
doing the decision. The deciding can relate to matters that are vitally important  (the 
change of the way  of life and that like), or to daily details (whether to go in an overfull 
metro / not to go in an overfull metro; cross a road when the lights are red / do not cross 
a road when the lights are red and that like).  
Sometimes the decision takes a lot of time for deciding (e.g.  while solving the working 
or other problems), sometimes it is necessary to decide immediately (in the situations 
with a direct threatening to life, real risk of a delay and that like).  We adjudicate 
something either on our behalf (and on ourselves, what I do, what I do not do) or on behalf 
of our subordinate workers / persons (in harmony with their interests, but also against 
their interests). The decision can only be the result of arbitrament of one person, it can, 
however, be also the output of collective intellect. The decisions may be accurate but also 
false. The consequences of decisions can have the different rate of weight for both the 
arbitrary subject and its vicinity. 
According to data in professional literature and experiences from practice concerning 
the human behaviour in different situations, the human reactions to external (also internal) 
inputs are very various. They can have the form of unconditioned reactions, as 
“automatic”, inherent ways of reaction to inputs (e.g. the wince at an unpleasant input), 
facultative reactions (e.g. in the form of habits), or purposeful  action controlled by will.  
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In psychological literature, we mostly meet with difficulties in the deciding connected 
with will and volitional processes, thinking, purpusefull behaviour, pertinetly in 
connection with the fight of incentives (while solving the internal conflicts). In the 
process of human manners purpuseful control, not only the deciding over a selection 
among the different incentives and targets is used but also over a selection between the 
alternatives to negotiate – not to negotiate. The person also adjudicates at selection of 
means and procedures in order to reach the aim, in situation requiring the interruption or 
the stop of activity. The capability to deal with problems correctly, prudently and in time, 
belongs  to the basic conditions of a practical activity and creative thinking, and it is 
simultaneously the important component of a human personality. 
At ensuring the complex safety with an accent to the protection of persons and 
properties, it is necessary to achive the right decision or at least such decision that will 
not lead sooner or later to destruction, namely_in case of a decision under the stress. The 
decision in this concept becomes the social process. In this process, there are the human 
intellect and certain inherent (natural, tacit) human knowledge and skills put forward. In 
the forefront, they manifest the human properties as:  
- responsible approach to the problem and the results of its solution regarding the public 
or other assets,  
- moral properties as a discernment, sense for commitment and consistency,  
- the ability: to analyse the problem or situation; to take an attitude for creative 
approach to the problem solution; to know the art of the foreseen of the further 
development,  to use analogy and the like, 
- and also the capability to use experiences and social skills that enable to regulate the 
activity and  his / her behaviour or the behaviour of the subordinate humans.  
Just given facts form the characteristics of human factor and  of well-conditioned 
managemental worker and it might be considered at the work with human sources. It 
means that the selection of managemental workers in all organisations might be 
performed with the aim of respecting the knowledge, capabilities, skills and experiences 
and not according to the political affiliation, colour of coat or other subsidiary features. 
Regarding to all above, the human factor is the  aggregation of human properties, 
capabilities, experiences that have in a given situation influence on the safety, 
productivity, effectivity and reliability of system, on which they act upon and they are 
evaluated from psychological, physiological and physical viewpoints.  
The present cognition and proposition given above show that human factor cannot be 
considered only as a negative human manifestation. It is a present reality that positive 
manifestations of a human factor are currently seeked by the type of system management 
that is directed by  knowledge – knowledge management; the human with his / her ideas 
is considered as an inestimable human capital. Given facts mean that human is the most 
critical and simultaneously the most capable part of each system. 
The short description of procedure of risk management is shown in Figure 6. You can 
see basic important steps. Very important step is the decision if the risk is acceptable or 
unacceptable. Regarding the reality that the determination of the acceptability level is 
always very problematic and it depends on the situation in society, the risk management 
lean on two additional levels, namely: the insignificant one and the unacceptable one. 
Between these two levels, there is the domain of risk, which is acceptable with certain 
measures.  
If risk is lower than the insignificant level, no measures and activities are required, in 
contrary, if risk is higher than the unacceptable level, it is immediately necessary to take 
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measures and activities for its reduction. The proposed measures and activities need to be 
further investigated from the viewpoint of their demands on economic, political and social 
domain; in particular, with the use of following analytical procedures: economic analysis  
- "cost-benefit analysis"; legal analysis investigating the possibilities of the harmonisation 
of different variants with the legislation; political analysis investigating the possible 
political consequences following from the decision; and analysis of the public opinion. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Model of risk management in territory. 
 
The analytical component of risk management is a scientific matter and its output is 
the proposal of several variants of a problem solution as groundwork.  The part of all 
variants needs to be the proposal of mechanisms (Control Options) enabling the effective 
realisation of proposed measures. This step may be understood as the administrative one 
but it needs not to be underestimated or skipped because it is sufficiently known that each 
good mentioned executive measure without effective check-up and appropriate sanction 
has no effect. 
The final step is the decision of the implementation of measures for risk reduction, 
eventually of the further following of the problem. It is necessary to accept the decision 
whenever, namely in case when it is evident that risk assessment will not give further 
results in sufficient time interval. It is necessary to accept the decision also in the case 
when the result of risk assessment is burden by great errors that follow from present 
scientific cognition and they cannot be reduced in a necessary time. 
In practice two risk management models [4] are usually used:  
- classical risk management (Figures 6 and 7), 
- safety management, i.e. risk governance for security and sustainable development 
(Figure 8). 
The Figures 6 and 7 are sufficiently expressive that we do not discuss them in details.  
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Fig. 7.  Detail description of processes: disaster risk analysis; risk assessment; risk 
reduction; and response and renovation. 
 
Figure 8 (part a) shows that the result of safety for followed system is a consensus for 
all considered disasters because each disaster type affects, owing to its nature, the system 
and its protected assets differently.  Because the human factor failure, especially  
in risk management belongs to disasters, i.e. phenomena that damaged the human system 
from a certain size. With regard to the typical risk properties like uncertainties and 
vagueness, as was shown above, it is necessary at deciding on risk, to use more possible 
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variants of real human system behaviour and multi-criteria deciding by the help of experts 
with verified qualification [4]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. a) - Model of safety assessment in territory (RRD(i) – risk from the i-th relevant 
disaster; b) – Model of safety management in territory.  
 
 
From Figure 8 (both parts) it follows that the result safety for followed system is a 
consensus for all considered disasters because each disaster type affects, owing to its 
nature, the system and its protected assets differently.  
For human safety and for human system safety (i.e. territory, organisation, plant) we 
need to manage the integral risk including the human factor, i.e. to find the way of cross-
section risks management and to concentrate the investigation on interdependences and 
on critical spots with a potential to start the system cascade failures, domino effects, 
strange behaviour etc., and on the basis of such site knowledge to prepare measures and 
activities ensuring the continuity of limited infrastructure operation and of the human 
survival.  
Evaluation of present knowledge shows that one of number of causes are 
interdependences inducing the cascade failures in the human system or in its part are the 
human errors (intentional or involuntary) in management and in deciding. Therefore, we 
need to do all measures in managerial and engineering activities to avert human failures, 
namely at decision-making. Because consequences of errors originating at decision are 
often huge, the great attention is concentrated to work with risks at present [6, 8].  
 
 
 
a) 
b) 
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5.  Present trade-off with risks 
 
In daily practice, the getting over the risks is the duty of all participants. The qualified 
activities are ensured by engineers who arrange co-ordinated implementation of measures 
for prevention, preparedness (directed to mitigation of severe impacts at risk realisation), 
response and renovation. The often used characteristic of engineering’s work with the 
risks is:  
- it considers multi-fields and cross-sectional disciplines that use both, the general and 
the specific methods, tools and techniques (specific ones are either simple or complex, 
complex ones represent well-ordered use of several general or simple methods, tools 
and techniques), 
- it uses methods, tools and techniques logic, technological, financial, managerial and 
deciding because their integral part is a decision on technological problems, costs and 
time planning, 
- it deals with tasks that connect the trade-off with risks for human system safety 
ensuring and the requirement of non-trivial solution of problems by use of multi-
criteria methods, tools and techniques.  
In all procedures it needs to be respected that assets and causes of risks have different 
natures that cause incommensurability of criterions and reasons, which only allows 
application of multi-criteria methods, tools and techniques that are suitable, i.e. correct 
and valid for a given problem target.  
From the methodical viewpoint at selection of methods, tools and techniques they need 
to be respected: data quality; structure of problem that is solved and requirements on 
quality of results; which means specially to test both, the data quality (accuracy, 
completeness, homogeneity, bearing witness to a given problem [4]), and the qualification 
of experts if they are used (IAEA, OECD, World Bank etc. have strict criteria for 
judgement of expert qualification) [6].     
Methods for determination of risk size need to respect both, the nature of phenomena 
that are their sources (i.e. characteristics and physical nature of disasters) and the 
parameters of medium in which phenomena affect. There are used methods based on the 
mathematical statistics, theory of extreme values respecting the random, sporadic and 
irregular great events occurrence, fuzzy sets theory, approaches of operational analysis 
etc., that inherently assume the certain model of phenomena occurrence, and methods 
based on scenarios that are simulated or empirically obtained [4].  
For trade-off with a security risk, we use the safety management system (shortly SMS), 
concepts [9]. In the SMS we consider two cases, namely either the risk realisation is still 
substantially the same or it is significantly different. In the first case, we consider from 
safety reasons either the worst case (such approach is found in the standards based on a 
deterministic approach to safety provision) or we admit random uncertainties resulting 
from the momentary local and temporal conditions of assets and as a representative 
variable for risk management we use the mean value obtained by evaluating the possible 
alternatives (arithmetic mean, median, median + σ, where σ is the standard deviation, the 
probable mean value).  
The other procedure is now commonly considered in the preparation of documents for 
strategic management (the alternative scenarios for the risk realisation and their 
occurrence probabilities are determined; and the mean and its dispersion are derived from 
them by a clear mathematical approach); we can find it in the norms and standards based 
on a probabilistic approach. In cases when we take into account the existence of 
23 
 
vagueness in data we need to use the combination of analytical and heuristic approaches 
that offers different theories; overview is in [6].     
Strategy of management for negotiation with risks 4 is:  
- part of risk is reduced, i.e. the risk realisation is averted by preventive measures,  
- part of risk is mitigated, i.e. the non-acceptable impacts are reduced or averted by 
prepared measures and activities having the mitigating effects as warning systems and 
another measures of emergency and crisis management, 
- part of risk is re-insured,  
- part of risk for which there are prepared resources for response and renovation,  
- part of risk for which there is prepared contingency plan, i.e. it is used for part of risk 
that is low frequent and too difficult governable. 
At present work with risk, the risk is understood as the potential that a chosen action 
or activity (including the choice of inaction) will lead to a loss (an undesirable outcome). 
Now in practice there are used five types of risk management / engineering of systems [4, 
5], i.e.:  
- classical risk management and risk engineering, 
- classical risk management and risk engineering including the human factor, 
- security management and security engineering, 
- safety management and safety engineering, i.e. risk governance / trade-off for security 
and sustainable development of system, 
- safety management and safety engineering determined for system of systems (SoS). 
Figure 9 shows the overview; the detail characterization is in [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Concepts of management and trade-off with risks and their targets arranged 
chronologically according to introduction in practice. 
 
It is evident that each more advanced type keeps the higher demands on knowledge, 
tools, times, finance, personnel qualification etc. For each management and each 
engineering concept there has been developed a certain set of standards and norms for its 
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use in practice [5].  For different assumptions of concepts, the results of their applications 
in practice have not been the same; their capability to ensure human system safety, i.e. 
human security, existence and sustainable development, is different. 
For each risk management and risk engineering type based on negotiation with risks 
there are standards and norms. Because the demands of various concepts are different, 
the standards and norms are different, the results are different and requirements on data, 
knowledge, material, technology, finances etc. are different.  
Owing to provident handle with sources, forces and means, it is necessary in real cases 
to decide which concept is sufficient for a given problem solution. At deciding the role 
plays the risk size and the level of problem solution. The results of research [6, 9] show 
that at problem solution on: 
- strategic level, it is necessary to use the system of systems safety management and 
system of systems safety engineering that fulfil demands of social engineers, technical 
engineers and environmental engineers, 
- tactical and functional levels, it is necessary to respect the strategic concept 
recommendations and at site specific immediate problems´ solution it is   possible to 
use the system safety management and system safety engineering because the 
character of solved problems is not so fundamental from the long term viewpoint, 
- technical level it is necessary to respect the recommendations of all higher concepts, 
i.e.  strategic, tactical and functional ones and for site specific immediate problems´ 
solution it is possible to use the system security management and security engineering 
if character of solved problems is not so fundamental from the time viewpoint, 
- political level, it might be respected the strategic solutions, because politicians usually 
influence the strategic issues so public interests might be respected.  
At solution of emergency situation there is lack of time, information and knowledge, 
and therefore, it is justified the reaction using the concept of management and engineering 
trade-off with risk directed to secured system and at critical cases only concept of 
management and engineering trade-off with risks directed to technical aspects. 
The assessment of criticality of individual systems (sectors) of critical complex facility 
parts and the whole critical complex facility is not trivial matter because under different 
conditions the sectors and their whole have a different role - active, reactive, critical or 
damping (not additive); e.g. the existence of several variants of electricity supply to one 
site decreases the energy facility criticality but it increases expenses etc. 
With regard to knowledge summarized in [9], the basic principles of safety technological 
complex facilities are: 
- to apply the principles of inherent safety, 
- to create a management system that has the basic control functions, alarms and responses 
of operator processed in the way, so that the system was maintained in normal (steady) state 
under normal conditions, 
- to create a special control systems based on safety and protective barriers that keep the 
system in a safe state also at changing the operating conditions and prevent origin of 
undesirable phenomena, i.e. the system carries out the objectives as well as at abnormal 
conditions, 
- to create special safety-oriented control systems that will keep the operation also at a greater 
change of operating conditions or they have the capability to ensure the operation after the 
application of corrective measures (clean-up, repair ...), i.e. there are measures for the in-
side emergency response, mitigation, and to return to normal operation, i.e. the system 
carries out the objectives as well as at critical conditions,  
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- to create special safety-oriented control systems which, in the case of loss of control of 
system and harmful impacts on the system and its surroundings, shall ensure the application 
of mitigation measures on the system and its surroundings, i.e. there are   measures inserted 
in system to ensure that the system can be restored, and that the losses and damages caused 
in the area have been minimized, i.e. they provide measures for the off-side response. 
System supercritical conditions are the conditions for which the system was not designed, 
which can lead to situations that threaten the system itself and vicinity of the system.  
It is necessary to apply the All-Hazard-Approach [10] and Defence-In-Depth concept 
[9]. In the professional area the layers mentioned above shall be regarded as protective barriers 
(so-called "protection in depth – defence in depth) and at the resolution of the facilities from the 
point of view of safety, it is used the security feature that the facility has a single stage or to a 
five-degree protection in depth. Individual safety management systems ensure the application 
of the technical, operational and organizational measures and activities that are designed to 
either prevent the initiation of chains of harmful phenomena, or stopped them [9]. 
 
6.  Challenges for getting the control over risk 
 
Recent FOCUS project outputs [5] show that the main EU problems, i.e. the EU 
vulnerabilities are the following:  
- all hazard approach is not systemically applied – risk from some disasters is neglected, 
- some disasters are underestimated – risk is lower than it is in reality, 
- systemic, strategic and proactive management is not implemented into practice – it is 
only determined partial or integrated risk – omission of cross-sectional risks caused 
by linkages and couplings in system, 
- gaps in risk management – list of criterions or targets of management are incorrect, 
- errors in trade-off with risks – incorrect measures are used, 
- research does not determine priority orientations, its targets are influenced by 
politicians or lobbies, 
- application procedures and orientation of strategies are not regularly verified, 
- reasonable strategy for disaster management is missing, 
- the disaster management does not often respect disaster life cycle; accent to problem 
solving is missing, still only a lot of discussions on problems, 
- lack of resources, 
- lack of instrument for ensuring the EU finance stability; and lack of management 
supporting the public protection and sustainable development.  
Mentioned gaps influence the level of control of risks in daily practice. The remove 
of these gaps or at least the mitigation of their criticality is the challenge in improvement 
of get over the risks. 
The most serious challenge is connected with world dynamic changes in time. This 
reality very significantly influences the human capability for getting the risks under 
control, so acceptable conditions for human lives and existence of public assets might be 
preserved. Since 50s of last century, the data from all prognostic polygons in the world 
have been showing the relevant changes in processes, the products of which are the 
disasters. It means that we need to concentrate to the linkage between the process 
variabilities and the risks.     
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7.  Target of publication 
 
Regarding to above given facts, this publication summarizes the examples of dealing 
with the risks of processes being in existence in the human system, which are variable in 
space and time. On the basis of present knowledge and experiences, it proposes the super 
processes for management of risks that are connected with the human activities that can 
lead to organisational accidents.       
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Chapter 2  
 
RISKS OF DRINKING WATER FAILURES* 
 
1. Introduction  
  
The significance of water for humans was emphasized with declaration of “European 
water chart” issued in Strasbourg on the May 6, 1968 [1]. The declaration contained 
twelve points:  
1. There is no life without water. The water is a treasure indispensable to all human 
activity. 
2. Fresh water resources are not inexhaustible. It is essential to conserve, control, and 
wherever possible, to increase them. 
3. To pollute water is to harm man and other living creatures which are dependent on 
water. 
4. The quality of water must be maintained at levels suitable for the use to be made of it 
and, in particular, must meet appropriate public health standards. 
5. When used water is returned to a common source it must not impair the further uses, 
both public and private, to which the common source will be put. 
6. The maintenance of an adequate vegetation cover, preferably forest land, is imperative 
for the conservation of water resources. 
7. Water resources must be assessed. 
8. The wise husbandry of water resources must be planned by the appropriate authorities. 
9. Conservation of water calls for intensified scientific research, training of specialists 
and public information services. 
10. Water is a common heritage, the value of which must be recognized by all. Everyone 
has the duty to use water carefully and economically. 
11. The management of water resources should be based on their natural basins rather 
than on political and administrative boundaries. 
12. Water knows no frontiers: as a common resource it demands international co-
operation.  
The human body consists of 70 % water, some flora even 90 %. The clear water at 
atmospheric pressure and room temperature is colourless and without smell. The prime 
physical properties of water are given in Table 1. 
Because the life and health of humans strongly depend on water, the network of 
drinking water supply is one of basic infrastructures which belong to the critical 
infrastructure [2] in all developed countries [3-8]. 
The term “critical infrastructure” is introduced in the Czech legislation by the Law No. 
240/2000 Coll., and described by the Government Ordinance No. 432/2010 Sb. Present 
paper deals with technical look, when we consider the critical infrastructure as a set of 
elements, links and flows, where the elements may be the liner and point structures, 
processes or management [3].  Set of all parts together and set of them  
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interdependencies, then provides a certain service, necessary for the operation or survival 
of human system [2-4]. This problem has to be solved also for communities, which 
introduce the concept of "smart cities".  
 
Table 1. Prime physical properties of water. 
  
Molar mass 18.175 905 g/mol 
Melting point 273.15 K (0 °C) 
Boiling point 373.15 K (100 °C) 
Density 0.99997 g/cm3 (4 °C) 
Refractive index 1.33 
Surface tension 0.073 N/m (20 °C) 
 
We have to especially recognize the close interconnectedness of individual systems in 
case of risk management [9], and safety management of critical infrastructure and 
individual infrastructures [4], which make up the critical infrastructure and which we 
describe by models "systems of systems". The put out of operation of one system, one 
infrastructure then sooner or later has a harmful effect on the functioning the other 
infrastructures that form the critical infrastructure [3, 4]. The criticality of certain 
infrastructure is then so high that their put out of operation means fast disruption and put 
out of operation of other services, namely even the most critical ones. At infrastructures 
with very high criticality it is required especially quick response in a sufficient scale [4].  
From these reasons, the failures of certain infrastructures are included in the category 
of critical disasters, for which it is necessary to prepare the response on the level of crisis 
management [2]. As it was above mentioned, the supply of drinking water network is one 
of such infrastructures. We will deal with the causes of drinking water supply failure, the 
possible impacts and the conditions for cope with the emergency situations. 
  
2. Critical infrastructure and its components  
  
Critical infrastructure includes a series of infrastructures; and the supply of drinking 
water is one of elementary part of critical infrastructure [3]. We can explore properties of 
selected infrastructure from the perspective of external links on other protected interests 
of human system and on other infrastructures. For each infrastructure it is important 
internal topology of networks and processes. 
The most of studies, which deal with critical infrastructure failure, describe blackout 
connected with electricity infrastructure. The comparison of drinking water supply failure 
and electricity infrastructures failure is shown in Figure 1. The failure of both mentioned 
infrastructure leads to the serious losses and damages to human health within a few days. 
In Figure 1 infrastructures are divided on hard elements (hardware), soft elements 
(software) and human resources.  
The hardware is formed by physical construction, liner and point, necessary for the 
operation of given service provided from the source, through the transport up to the 
distribution. The hardware is mainly threatened by natural disasters, technological 
accidents or attacks. The hardware could potentially themselves provide the service, but 
not in the required form and functional range.  
Services need software elements for working in the required range and quality. 
Software consists of processes, controls and monitoring. The processes are carried out 
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either cyber or human support staff.  The disruption of software can be caused by a failure 
of other infrastructure (electric, cyber) or by a human error (routine in the execution of 
process, wrong management processes).  
Even in the case that we would be technologically able to build an autonomous 
infrastructure just from hardware and software (cyber elements), the infrastructure could 
not without the human factor meet the requirements, which are imposed on it in the long 
term. The last part of the infrastructure, namely the human resources, has an influence at 
defining the structure of network (both, the physical and the procedural). Human 
resources are necessary for response to changes in progress of human system, new 
demands and new threats. Last but not least many routine processes we are not able to 
adequately automate. Human resources are vulnerable to all the disasters [9].  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Diagram of impacts of critical infrastructures failures on the elements of other 
critical infrastructures, a) electricity supply failures), b) drinking water supply failure. 
 
When we return to Figure 1, we see a comparison of impacts of failure of electrical 
power supply and failure of drinking water supply. We can identify the impacts on the 
protected interests of all types in both cases, namely on all types of infrastructures. In the 
case of failure of electricity network, it goes on put out of operation of software elements 
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of all the other infrastructures, which will be out of operation immediately or within a 
few hours. The failure of drinking water supply has a slightly slower impact; however, it 
directly affects the people and it put out of operation the other infrastructure through 
human resources within a few days. 
 
3. Topology of drinking water supply network 
  
While the character of software elements and human resources can be completely 
different for different companies and different regions, the hardware part of infrastructure 
is similar everywhere in basic aspects. It has the resources, transport elements and 
distribution elements. Parameters, that define the properties of hardware of infrastructure 
of drinking water supply, are a lot. We will focus only on the main two parameters. The 
first parameter is located in domain of drinking water sources, the other in domain of 
transport – i.e. the network topology. 
The basic sections of drinking water sources are on surface sources and underground 
sources, which can be further divided according to parameters like area, depth, volume, 
quality and so on. Each of two types of resources, ground and surface, has its advantages 
and disadvantages. The economic benefits of underground resources were recently 
preferred.  
We can point at several differences from the perspective of risk analysis. Groundwater 
need less treatment then surface water. Groundwater sources have less probability of 
contamination, although due to very low protection occasionally smaller sources 
contamination occurs for example due to road traffic accidents [10, 11]. Cleaning of 
pollute groundwater resources is currently not technologically possible.  
The main advantage of surface water sources is their renewability, that is associated 
purely with precipitation, and it is not dependent on the ratio of seeped and flow away 
water. 
Transmission networks are composed mainly of pipeline in addition to the elements 
that ensure the water pressure in system. The network topology is fundamental feature of 
distribution network, where we know the three variants of topology, Figure 2 [12].  
The cheapest option is to construct a branched network, where ever places of water 
distribution system are brought only by one pipeline [12, 13]. At the branched network it 
is the high probability of total collapse of network at simple faults. A loop network is an 
opposite of the branched network, and it supplies the water to all points of loop network 
from two directions. The costs for constructing the circuit network are high, but the 
disruption only its part requires the coincidence of many circumstances and the disruption 
of entire network can only be caused in reality by intent.  
The best solution for practical use seems to be the combined network of loops and 
branches, which brings advantages of both networks at proper design and management; 
i.e., reasonable costs and high resistance at the level of main part of network. The ratio of 
combination of loops and branches depends on the objectives of network. The objective 
of drinking water distribution in the Czech Republic is the combined network. The risk 
of major failure is shifted to the domain of water resources in combined supply system. 
However, existed networks in the Czech Republic are mainly branched networks and 
change depends on finance. 
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4. Causes of drinking water supply failure  
  
Vulnerability of infrastructures to damage is quite high. Many causes and processes 
can lead to the disruption of network [3, 4]. To some of causes, for example, to occurrence 
of natural disasters it is not possible to defeat. The main problem of many countries there 
are the causes which are entirely in the hands of public administration and owners of 
water supply network, namely construction, maintenance and monitoring of pipelines.  
Causes of water supply failures can be separated by several ways; i.e. according to: 
elements that are disturbed; the size of impacts; region of origin of failure; characteristics 
of failure. The causes corresponding to last mentioned reasons are shown in Figure 3, that 
is constructed on data from [12] with the help of Ishikawa diagram [9]. The backbone of 
fish bone in Figure 3 is the drinking water supply network and the causes of water supply 
failures are demonstrated in six different branches.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Models of three variants of drinking water supply network topology: a) branch, b) 
loop and c) combined. 
 
The wrong construction is a group of causes, which have origin in designing or in 
building phases of pipelines. Incompetent designer or attempt for the lowest costs on 
building and construction can lead to origin of many frequent breakdowns, high repair 
costs, or to the low efficiency of required services. 
Surrounding subterranean environs affects permanently on network by its spreading 
and shrinking in dependence on various geomorphological conditions. The probability of 
disruption is then given by structure, material aging and the quality of maintenance of 
pipelines. Other problems there are natural disasters, which may reach different sizes and 
cause varied damages on infrastructure. Pipelines are resistant to smaller disasters, 
however, severe disasters damage seriously infrastructure, and therefore, it is necessary 
to have prepared in the frame of crisis plan the different variants of alternative sufficient 
water supply [2, 14]. Influences of environment cannot be prevented in any way. 
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Infrastructures interdependencies are discussed in paragraph 2. The failure of certain 
infrastructures may cause a critical situation, and similarly as at natural disasters it 
requires the sufficient high-quality crisis plan. Critical infrastructure protection is a 
necessary part of modern crisis management. 
Human error has several dimensions. It includes errors at designing or at building the 
structure [9], which have their own branch in Figure 3. In mentioned Figure we can see 
the human errors during the operation of network. Human errors can also arise during the 
management, e.g. bad estimate of water consumption.  The increase of drinking water 
demands is necessary to foresee, because building the new water resources is time 
consuming.  
Human errors connected with routine operation are caused by violation of technical 
norms, standards and determined procedures. Technical problem is caused by routine 
human error, if ordered procedure is not kept. If the procedures have been kept, then it is 
a mistake of management at setting the operation regime. In the Czech Republic problems 
are primarily connected with organizational accidents [2, 4], i.e. the persons in 
management do not ensure his / her responsibility. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Ishikawa diagram for the drinking water supply failure 
 
The pipeline failure is the most common cause of drinking water supplies disruption. 
The main causes are incorrect structure, age and maintenance quality. If someone of these 
three factors is failing, the pipeline cracks and damages occur as consequence of common 
phenomena. 
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Contamination can be divided into intentional and unintentional. Water resources are 
one of the possible targets of terrorist attacks, which can cause great damages. In the case 
of highly toxic substances it may also come to the pollution of entire network through 
small source of pollution. It is, therefore, important to protect the perimeter of resources 
and above all, to monitor the water quality supplied to the network [15].  
Relatively common in recent years it has been the unintentional contamination. Its 
causes are drought and high temperatures, poor documentation, an accident during the 
transport of dangerous goods, storage of hazardous substances and harmful things near 
the water sources, which happened in recent years in the Czech Republic [11].  
Contamination of water source may cause a critical situation also in the case of durable 
drinking water supply infrastructure. 
 
 5. Data and methods used in the research of drinking water supply failure 
  
For monitoring the impact of drinking water supply failure it was selected the part of 
Central Bohemia. This region is divided into several districts with different area and 
different number of inhabitants. Districts can be described by several numbers in Table 
2. Districts are named according to municipalities with district administration. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of individual districts, number of municipalities, number of 
inhabitants and area. 
 
District Municipalities Inhabitants Area (km2) 
Kladno 48 122 000 351 
Rakovnik 83 55 000 896 
Slany 52 40 000 369 
Melnik 39 43 000 457 
Kralupy 18 31 000 131 
Neratovice 12 31 000 113 
All 252 322 000 2317 
 
The number of drinking water supply system incidents in individual districts according 
to [16] is in Table 3; graphically shown in Figure 4. 
 
Table 3. Statistics of water supply network incidents in individual districts. 
 
Year Kladno Rakovnik Melnik Slany Kralupy Neratovice 
2008 263 325 64 0 81 9 
2009 192 95 77 3 54 7 
2010 101 126 106 67 15 21 
2011 107 111 69 4 23 21 
2012 319 301 170 5 64 36 
2013 139 223 68 3 14 3 
All 1121 1181 554 82 251 97 
 
For our research we use data on the layout of re-sources and on the network topology 
[16, 17]. From the safety reasons we only show the rough model of distribution network, 
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Figure 5, which we created from detail real data. The mentioned figure shows that we 
consider combined net-work with two water sources that has in internal part the branched 
networks. It means that there are all problems of network types, the combined and the 
branched, plus even more problems.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Statistics of water supply network incidents in individual districts. 
 
Our network includes two sources; the primary source A is a source of underground 
water, 80% all water. Source B is a surface water source and it provides 15% all water. 
The rest is covered with smaller resources. The predominance of underground resource 
corresponds to the situation, when the underground water is cheaper than surface water. 
New knowledge and experiences on hydrological changes and recent droughts supports 
returning to higher portion of surface water [16, 17]. 
The impacts of a critical failure of drinking water supply are locally specific and 
depend on the scenario, which led to the failure. At all critical failures, the citizens have 
lack of drinking water. At research of drinking water supply critical failure impacts we 
use the “What if” analysis modified for the needs of security problems in an integral and 
systemic conception of reality. We followed two possible cases, namely the large 
disruption of distribution network and the large contamination of source by highly 
dangerous substance. 
Any contamination has several concentration levels, from which there are derived 
human health damages, or losses of human lives. In the case of highly toxic substances it 
may get to human life threat even at the dilution in the huge quantities of water, and 
therefore, to the danger of all consumers of water from contaminated infrastructure. It is 
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not essential, where the contamination occurred, if in main source, secondary sources, the 
water tank, the piping. It is also necessary to take into account that after the put out of 
operation of infrastructure it can be very problematic the decontamination of whole 
network.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Combined network of drinking water supply with two main water resources, A – 
underground 80% of all water and B - surface 15% of all water.  
 
The network may be out of function in the case of insufficient response for several 
days, which is from the perspective of physiological needs of human too long. 
 
6. Impacts of the selected scenarios of drinking water supply failure 
 
We selected two scenarios, disruption of distribution network and contamination with 
toxic substance. Disruption of distribution network is presumed on connection of main 
source. Contamination describe situation, when substance with high toxicity get to water. 
Contamination does not be necessary in place of main sources. 
  
6.1. Disruption of distribution network 
 
Large water sources are always a critical part of the drinking water supply 
infrastructure. Criticality of the main pipelines is very high in the case of the branched 
network [12], but it is not so high for the combined network. Although our supposed 
network in Figure 4 is combined, we have only one line between the main source A (80%) 
and the rest of the network. Criticality of source connection is the same as criticality of 
source itself, if connections are not more than one. We assumed the disruption of such 
connections in the first scenario. It is necessary to note that pressure of water needs not 
to fall below a certain amount for the proper functioning of network. At outage of 80% 
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on input the pressure drops very quickly, water will not be available in all networks 
without the introduction of tough regulation on output, though not all sources would be 
knocked out [17]. The impacts of disruption of distribution network are in Table 4. 
  
Table 4. The impacts of disruption of distribution network for drinking water supply; 0 - 
time of disruption, 12 h - 12 hours after disruption, 24 h – 24 hours after disruption, 3 
days and 7 days - 3 or 7 days after disruption. 
  
Public assets Impacts 
Lives and 
health of 
humans 
0 h: 
12 h: light dehydration of persons’ dependent on the supply of drinking 
water from the water supply network (those who do not have access to the 
water packed), leading to damage of health and lives of people with a 
higher vulnerability on lack of drinking water, i.e., particularly persons 
for long time ill, patients in hospitals, older persons and children.  
24 h: dehydration of all persons’ dependent on supplies of drinking water 
from the water supply network (those who do not have access to the water 
packed). The lack of water affects headache and reducing the blood 
pressure.  
3 days: increasing the dehydration. Persons with increased sensitivity to 
lack of fluid can died. Most of population suffers from dehydration 
symptoms, such as headache, pressure decrease, increase in heart rate and 
other physiological manifestations. Dehydration is already affecting the 
people who were frontloaded by bottled water. At all residents of affected 
area, it is starting to show the stress from emergency situation and it is 
also getting worse mental state. The deteriorating level of hygiene. 
7 days: severe dehydration causing death of inhabitants. 
Human 
security 
0 h:  
12 h: 
24 h: the increase of tension in the society. 
3 days: as a result of the decline in the quality of emergency services it 
goes to increase of possibility of origin of other disasters.  
7 days: the loss of all internal security features, and it leads to big increase 
of possibility of further disasters origin. 
Property 0 h:  
12 h: property damage by fire. 
24 h: disrupting the functionality of machines and equipment that are 
dependent on the supply of water. Damage of property caused by fire. 
3 days: the origin of unrest within the society leading to the looting and 
destruction of property. Property damage caused by fire, the likelihood of 
which increases due to the degradation of society. 
7 days: property damage by huge long-term fires. 
Public good 
(welfare) 
0 h: 
12 h: interruption of work activities in the private and the public sphere. A 
forced holiday due to failure of compliance with the requirements in the 
labour code. The unavailability of restaurants and cultural facilities.  
24 h:  
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3 days: the deterioration of situation in human society. Negative effect on 
the perception of territory in the future. 
7 days: as a result of disintegration of society due to mental and physical 
health of population the term public good loses its meaning. 
Environment 0 h:  
12 h: 
24 h:  
3 days: due to the affection of civic discordances and disruption of 
emergency services it increases the possibility of origin of further 
disasters affecting the environment, e.g. fires, waste water. 
7 days: the increase of impacts of unresolved calamities on environment. 
Water supply 
system  
0 h: a significant worsening in the functioning of drinking water supply 
infrastructure. 
12 h: the depletion of storage network systems, water towers. 
24 h: 
3 days: Out of function of all systems of drinking water supply 
infrastructure. 
7 days: degradation of mechanical parts of system of drinking water 
supply network (the elements of system are not in conditions on which 
they have been designed). 
Emergency 
services 
(police, fire-
fighters, 
paramedics) 
0 h: a sudden drop in pressure in the water line, the failure of some 
sources of water designed for extinguishing fires.  
12 h: the worsening the conditions of patients in hospital devices. The 
worsening the availability of medical rescue services due to the transfer of 
patients outside of the affected area. 
24 h: 
3 days: the decline of physical possibility of emergency services workers 
caused by dehydration. The gradual attacks of staff of emergency services 
in the wake of deteriorating situation in the human society. 
7 days: malfunction of internal components of infrastructure.  
Transport 
network  
0 h:  
12 h:  
24 h: possible formation of traffic jams as a result of migration of 
population from the affected area. 
3 days ago: origin of traffic jams on road network as a result of 
evacuation of population. The failure of internal elements of territorial 
railway network. Disruption of pipeline elements of transport 
infrastructure as the result of social unrest. 
7 days: malfunction of all elements of transport associated with human 
activities. Damage to the mechanical elements of transport infrastructure 
as the result of secondary disasters, e.g., traffic accidents, fires, riots, etc.  
Other basic 
services and 
critical 
infrastructures 
(informational, 
financial, 
0 h:  
12 h: non-availability of basic services, e.g. educational institutions, 
governmental (public administration) and financial services.  
24 h: loss of packaged liquids in stores and distribution centres. 
3 days: malfunction of internal elements of the basic infrastructures and 
critical services.  
7 days:  
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energy, social, 
State) 
  
 
6.2. Contamination with toxic substance 
 
The second scenario deals with the contamination of smaller scale source B (15%) on 
Figure 4; i.e. surface source. If target of contamination it is not only source itself, but 
whole network, the contamination could be done almost everywhere (secondary sources, 
main pipelines). Quantity level of toxic substance to water volume determines the 
consequences in scenario. We presume the hazardous substance with very high toxicity, 
where small concentration can lead to high consequences. The impacts of contamination 
by toxic substance are in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The impacts of contamination by toxic substance; 0 - time of contamination 
occurrence; 12 h - after 12 h of contamination origin, 24 h – after 24 h of contamination 
origin, 3 days and 7 days -  after 3 or 7 days of contamination origin. 
  
Public assets Impacts 
Lives and 
health of 
humans 
0 h: the first humans drinking the contaminated water, which started bad 
processes in the human body.  
12 h: heavy damage to the health which is dependent on the character of 
used chemical, the first casualties.  
24 h: number of casualties reaching a disastrous amount. The social 
tension starts. 
3 days: stress and worsening of mental status of the survive humans in the 
affected area, and also in the extensive vicinity of affected area. Distrust 
in the central source of drinking water, which may cause panic and social 
unrest. Dehydration causing headaches and lower blood pressure. 
7 days: at all the population it is seen the stress from emergency situations 
and it is also worsened its mental state. The deteriorating level of hygiene. 
Dehydration is already causing serious health complications.  
Human 
security 
0 h: poisoning by contaminated water in the vicinity. 
12 h: poisoning by contaminated water from network in the whole area. 
24 h: the increase in tension in the society.  
3 days:  
7 days: a decline in the quality of emergency services may lead to the 
origin of other disasters.  
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Property 0 h: contamination of property, the function of which is associated with 
the supply of water in the vicinity, e.g. household equipment, workplaces 
equipment, machines.  
12 h: contamination of property, the function of which is associated with 
the supply of water in the area, e.g. stocked household equipment, 
workplaces equipment, and machines. 
24 h:  
3 days: the lack of water for fire-fighting as a consequence of 
disconnecting the water supply. 
7 days: the danger of unrest within the human society which lead to the 
looting and destruction of property. Property damage caused by fire, the 
occurrence likelihood of which increases due to the degradation of 
society. 
Public good 
(welfare) 
0 h:  
12 h: interruption of work activities in the private and the public sphere as 
the consequence of human deaths.  
24 h: worsening the situation in the human society, the panic induced by 
the number of victims. Negative effect on the perception of territory in the 
future. 
3 days ago:  
7 days: to fears of poisoning the dangerous substance it adds the fear from 
a long-term interruption of drinking water supply. 
Environment 0 h: contamination of water in the Klíčava water reservoir, the lower 
reaches of Klíčava stream, the Berounka River. 
12 h: the contamination of further water streams (in the river basin of 
Vltava River and Elbe River), contamination of rivers banks. The death of 
aquatic fauna and possible necrosis of flora.  
24 h: death of animals that use surface water sources in the affected area.  
3 days: 7 days:  
Water supply 
system  
0 h: contamination of drinking water source in the Klíčava water 
reservoir, contamination of adjacent network for drinking water supply. 
12 h: contamination of entire circuit of network for drinking water supply. 
24 h: shut down of affected system of drinking water supply. 
3 days ago:  
7 days: degradation of  mechanical parts of system of drinking water 
supply (the elements of the system are not in a status for which they have 
been designed). 
Emergency 
services 
(police, fire-
fighters, 
paramedics) 
0 h:  
12 h: the extreme load of health care by humans with symptoms of 
poisoning, and dying, e.g., hospitals, paramedics and medical rescue 
service. Increasing demands on the maintenance of public order. 
Affecting the human resources from the emergency services. 
24 h: outage of some sources of water for firefighting. 
3 days ago:  
7 days: the decline of physical capabilities of emergency services workers 
caused by dehydration. 
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Transport 
network  
0 h:  
12 h: 
24 h: huge panic is caused by the formation of traffic jams that originated 
on roads as a result of mass evacuation of population from affected area. 
The outage of internal elements of territorial railway network. Disruption 
of linear elements of transport infrastructure as result of social unrest. 
3 days, 7 days  
Other basic 
services and 
critical 
infrastructures 
(informational, 
financial, 
energy, social, 
State) 
0 h:  
12 h: non-availability of basic services, e.g. educational institutions, 
governmental (public administration) and financial services.  
24 h: loss of packaged liquids in stores and distribution centres. 
3 days ago:  
7 days: malfunction of internal elements of basic infrastructures and 
critical services. 
 
6.3. Discussion 
 
The drinking water supply failure is one of possible critical disasters on the territory 
of the Czech Republic. Duty of ensuring the drinking water supply even in emergency 
situations is holding from the 80s of last century according to the law No. 274/2001 Sb., 
on water supplies and sewerages also in emergency situations, but it cannot be in the long 
term.  
The failure of critical infrastructure, where the drinking water supply failure has a high 
criticality, threatens always a number of other protected assets. Possibilities, leading to 
drinking water supply failure are a number, and they have varied relevant impacts and 
have also different occurrence probabilities. This work presents the impacts for two 
different causes. Sources of drinking water are the key components of infrastructure, but 
further critical points can occur, when network topology is wrong or week. 
The first scenario deals with the pipeline accident, which ensures the water 
distribution. The pipeline cracks are relatively common phenomena, which can be caused 
by various causes. The second scenario deals with the contamination of water source. The 
contamination of water source is one of terrorist attacks scenarios. But, the contamination 
may also occur in other ways, accident during the transport of dangerous substances, or 
bad management of hazardous substances, e.g. during the storage. Both phenomena have 
already occurred in the Czech Republic, fortunately without critical consequences. 
When the impacts of both scenarios are compared, we see the differences mainly in 
the first hours, where the impacts of contamination are faster. The impacts of both 
scenarios become similar after exceeding one day. The prevention of serious impacts in 
the first hours of contamination requires the high quality monitoring (fish, physical 
parameters). Monitoring needs to be implemented in all critical sites, not only to the 
resources. The situation sharply changes after crossing one day in the case of both 
scenarios. The defeat of emergency situation in 24 hours is associated with relatively 
small impacts on the protected interests. Exceeding one day, however, leads to a critical 
situation. The next limit 5-7 days is then given by particular time during which the healthy 
human is able to endure without water [17]. 
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7. Conclusion  
  
The research was directed to identification of impacts of drinking water supply failure. 
We have identified two basic problems in managing the situation on the basis of carried 
out research. The first one is the issue of responsibilities [12]. Many top public 
administration workers do not know or does not admit all types of responsibilities 
associated with their position in public administration. This may lead to a delay in the 
response itself, which it is fatal especially in the case of contamination. The second 
problem is the robustness of response to the drinking water supply failure. As mentioned 
above, the drinking water infrastructure failure is identified as one of the possible 
disasters that may induce a critical situation, and therefore, it is processed contingency 
(type response) plan for it [2]. 
On the analysis of actual drinking water supply failures in the Czech Republic in recent 
years [12], some of response activities, e.g. informing the population, warning the 
population, emergency supply, rapid restoration of network, are not robust enough. Many 
of territorial units (communities) are able to solve the demands only in the case of small 
accidents of water series. Real response plans for the critical failures, however, have not 
been set up yet.  
The concept of "smart cities" needs to take account the facts given above and it needs 
to include the plans for a high-quality and quick response to all life sustaining 
infrastructure failures, to which indisputably the infrastructure ensuring the drinking 
water supply belongs. 
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Chapter 3  
 
RISK MANAGEMENT DIRECTED TO SAFETY OF METRO 
CONTROL SYSTEMS* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Transportation is created by huge network of traffic routes, facilities, support systems 
and traffic vehicles in various modes and kinds. The transportation infrastructure is one 
from the most important infrastructure that ensures the main functions of territories and 
States; it is very important for human survival at critical situations. Therefore, many parts 
of transportation system belong to the critical infrastructure. The transportation 
infrastructure criticality is determined according to its importance and vulnerability in 
selected entity and it is changed with the entity size; certain transportation infrastructure 
is important for municipality serviceability, but it is not important for the State and vice 
versa [1]. Therefore, the risk is comprehended in system concept, which means that the 
integral risk is considered. 
From this reasons, the risk management targets consider both, the public assets and the 
transportation mode assets (traffic vehicle, building, traffic road, support systems, control 
systems including human factor, or even logistics services, transportation of goods and 
people). The present goal of risk management is the safety (or at least security) of human 
system (that represents our world); its assets and their interfaces. This goal has been 
reached by measures performed by humans; it goes on averting or reduction of losses and 
damages of public assets. For this aim, it is necessary to consider system interfaces, for 
example the impacts on transportation infrastructure consecutively damage the humans 
and disrupt the entity economy [2]. 
 The research of urban guide transportation management system takes into accounts 
the recent advanced approaches and techniques of risk and safety engineering [1-19]. The 
metro system makes up one of important transportation infrastructure in bigger and 
capital cities. According to present knowledge, the metro system is a part of critical 
infrastructure, and therefore, it is need to pay attention to its safety and security [19, 20].  
The target is the metro safe operation. From this viewpoint, the management and 
control system is important, because it determines the quality and performance of metro 
system [20]. It is characterized by interdependencies among systems of various natures 
which are monitored and managed by people or automata using the control system. The 
further given issues are the following: 
- the list of technical and cyber assets of metro, 
- the most important priority risks affecting the metro management system operation, 
- critical spots of cyber infrastructure in the metro management and control system, 
- vulnerabilities of selected public assets on the common cyber threats, 
- the results evaluation and proposal on measures. 
From the integral risk management point of view, the use case of risk management in  
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the metro operation mainly deals with the phase of risk control, i.e. implementation of 
certain measures. It starts on the lower level - from the risk identification trough the risk 
analysis, assessment, evaluation, control, coping with risks up to monitoring in which 
there are prepared the corrective measures [12]. 
 
2. Safety management systems in transportation domain 
 
The safety management systems are the systems of process and project management 
based on the TQM principles [5]. The safety management systems are possible to divide 
into three categories [4, 5]:  
- vertical one – problem solution level: political; strategic; tactical; operative; and 
technical, 
- horizontal one - problem solution domain: mode of transport; type of infrastructure; 
nature of the system under consideration; other domains, 
- conditions of operation - criticality level: normal conditions (concentration to 
prevention); abnormal conditions (vigilance, readiness); critical conditions (response 
and recovery). 
So the safety management system might be effective, it shall be introduced in all 
mentioned levels and domains. For illustration, we give an example of safety management 
system that considers three up to five levels of criticality of entity that is affected by 
disaster with different size.  
In the model on Figure 1, it is shown the top level management on strategic level that 
on the outcomes from the risk management process establishes the requirements and 
criteria for the safety management at lower levels, i.e. in selected critical entities and 
areas.  
 
 
Fig. 1. General model of management of safety of facilities of critical infrastructure [3, 
6].  
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On the entity level there are applied the safety management systems on the basis of 
knowledge from lower levels of problem solution, i.e. there are established the plans for 
management of safety with measures, which are implemented within the appropriate level 
of safety management system in the Defence-In-Depth approach [6]. The feedback to the 
top management is in the form of monitoring and continual assessment and improving 
the system operation, for which it is necessary inter sectoral communication through 
various fields [4, 7], is also shown there. 
Present trends in the area of safety science and risk engineering are based on the above 
mentioned principles, namely with considering the system complexity that follows from 
the nature, properties and uncertainties of socio-technical and cyber-physical systems [2, 
4, 7, 8]. 
Safety management systems in the transportation domain are particularly defined by 
European guidelines and then by appropriate national legislation. The legislation is 
divided for each mode of transportation domain and it is mostly brief or unclear, because 
it is too much generic or it only considers some of risks. 
In industrial domains and in safety management terms of references, especially in 
quality management systems based on process and project management (TQM), it has 
been introduced the processes of risk analysis based on standard ISO 9001 [16] that were 
enhanced with requirements on quality and safety of products in the domain. 
For electrical, electronic and programmable devices (E/E/PE) in industry domain, the 
international standard IEC 61508 [17] on functional safety has been introduced. Its 
approaches and mentioned standards for management systems are refined and enhanced 
with specific standards in each appropriate industrial domain. Their analysis shows that 
only very short group of items is assigned to critical infrastructure. In this case, the 
operator needs to introduce at least basic principles of crisis management; the operator 
has also duty to provide the appurtenant data to municipality for processing the off-site 
crisis plans. 
The safety management system also includes the special part that is concentrated to 
tasks of cyber security. Process of ensuring the information security is based on protection 
of important assets of cyber (information) system by the way, that the required level of 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) is ensured for important information 
[18]. In information technologies the CIA according to [18] means: information is not 
available or cannot be revealed by unauthorized individuals, entities or processes 
(Confidentiality); property describing the accuracy and completeness (Integrity); 
accessibility and usability of information on the request of authorized entities 
(Availability) [19]. Therefore, some subjects, such as owners or operators of critical 
informational infrastructures or operators of critical infrastructures, have duty to 
introduce the information security management system. These subjects may also require 
such system according to [18] from their suppliers. 
Above mentioned facts imply the claim that current transportation systems are mainly 
secured in terms of functional safety. However, it is the fact that inconvenient events with 
sizes greater than design ones can occur, i.e.  cyber-attack or other disasters can lead to 
system abnormal up to critical conditions, which severe endanger its surrounding, Figure 
2. 
In rail transportation, the Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [20] introduces both, the CST – Common Safety Targets and the CSM – 
Common Safety Methods [21]. Each technical, operational or organizational change is 
subjected to strict documentation, assessment and justification it terms of factors 
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influencing the safety according to the CSM; the risk management methods are used. Any 
rail operator is obliged to introduce the safety management system with considering the 
normal and abnormal conditions. Indeed, it does not consider the critical conditions. The 
railway accidents shall be announced to national The Rail Safety Inspection that 
investigates accidents and proposes safety measures. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Relation among safety and security of system [10]. 
 
The safety management system in the railway industry domain is based on high rate 
of quality assurance in the IRIS standard (International Rail Industrial Standard by 
UNIFE) and it applies the requirements on the system life cycle in accordance with EN 
50126 [22]. Each change (technical, organizational and in management system) in the 
railway system is, therefore, subjected to risk evaluation with target, whether the change 
affects the safety or not. According to result of evaluation, the proposal of appropriate 
measures is performed. The standard EN 50126 [22] defines the railway system life cycle 
including the determination and demonstration RAMS (Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety) properties and the life cycle costs (LCC) that take into 
consideration also the system operation, maintenance, renewal up to disposal.  
The RAMS properties apply the system approach that divides the system into several 
layers. Each of such layer contains own functional subsystems, and on the basis of risk 
analysis it assigns the functions and safety functions. In terms of railway domain, the risk 
is expressed by relationship:  
 
Risk = frequency x consequence.  
 
The risk mitigation is performed by ALARP / ALARA approaches [22]. Functions, 
the malfunctions of which have severe impacts, or functions that mitigate the analysed 
risks are called the safety related functions. The safety related functions have assigned 
the safety integrity levels (SIL) from 1 up to 4 that are determined according to the 
tolerable hazard rate (THR), Table 1. 
For the safety related functions, the protection measures are applied, which are similar 
to measures recommended by the industrial standard EN 61508 [17]. The protection 
measures are expressed by requirements focused on HW (hardware) according to EN 
50129 [23] or SW (software) according to EN 50128 [24]. There are also requirements 
for the safety case elaboration. The 0 safety integrity level is used for the SW (software) 
47 
 
in the rail domain that is not related to safety, but it establishes minimal requirements for 
quality assurance. 
 
Table 1.  Relationship of THR to safety integrity level according to EN 50129 [23]. 
 
Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) per hour, 
related to system function 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
10-9 ≤   THR < 10-8 4 
10-8 ≤   THR < 10-7 3 
10-7 ≤   THR < 10-6 2 
10-6 ≤   THR < 10-5 1 
 
 
3.  Data on technical and cyber assets of metro 
 
We step by step describe the technical and cyber assets; we do not discuss the human 
sources that are also very important, but they create other separated issue. We pay the 
special attention to Urban Guided Transportation Management and Control System 
(UGTMS) and to safety related legislative requirements. 
 
3.1. Technical assets  
 
Beside the public assets (human lives and healthy, property and places including 
construction, well fare) which are interconnected with the metro system, the metro system 
has following groups of technical assets [26]. 
Technological parts and some support subsystems of controlled system include the 
assets: 
- energy devices (transformer substations and distribution transformers), 
- communication equipment (communication cables, VHF connection with trains; 
passengers’ information systems including automatic check-in; communication 
systems for passengers and staff; CCTV, telephone, public address; clocks and fire 
alarms; protection systems and signalling), 
- machinery (escalators; pump stations in nodes in stations and between them; 
elevators; workshops and warehouses maintenance stations), 
- air-conditioning, 
- mobile machines and devices (rolling-stock; devices and substances for cleaning, 
including the containers, cleaning machines, ladders, scaffolding for cleaning the 
lighting systems; fire protection equipment), 
- next important equipment (security keys and alarm buttons; equipment for fire alarm 
start; traction devices and lighting; track devices, the main water shut; moving stairs, 
plates, signal panel for machinery devices; closing equipment (shutters)). 
The control system involves the following assets: 
- train dispatcher (surveillance and control of trains); and operation control centre 
(OCC) nodes, station nodes, nodes for automatic route setting system, 
- energy dispatcher, 
- technology dispatcher, 
- lighting system dispatcher, 
- communication and protection systems dispatching, 
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- fire dispatching, 
- depot dispatching for train services and maintenance. 
For a model metro station, the control system involves station, which has also assets 
as: 
- station nodes of control system, 
- station node for automatic route setting, 
- station nodes for connection of energetic and technological dispatching, 
- station nodes for central lighting control system, 
- station interacting with dispatchers (communication, protection, operation, fire men). 
In the railway practice context, the protection system is primary understood as system 
that is needed to mitigation of risks connected with the train operation. It has following 
main assets: 
- station protection systems, 
- wayside protection systems, 
- train protection systems. 
The metro stations´ assets are also: 
- energy flow, 
- information flow, 
- central dispatching and station nodes of control system, 
- central dispatching and station communication units, 
- station nodes of control system and protection systems, 
- station nodes of control system and communication system, 
- protection systems and technologies (on the track and on-board) 
- telephone connection between central dispatching (OCC) and station, 
- telephone connection between central dispatching and trains. 
 
3.2. Cyber assets 
 
The metro management and control system depends on information technologies. The 
information systems show the observed features of metro using the linguistic 
communication language and it can serve to the making up the information about the 
observed object. Process of information origination, origination of information system, 
new object or modification of original object is assembled from following sub-processes, 
respectively sets and their relations [27], which are described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Information origination process according to [27]. 
 
No. Process / set Affected items / 
nodes 
Used information 
technologies 
Process  
inputs 
Process 
outputs 
1 Object identification object, observer physical receptors 
(sensors) 
observed  
condition 
(physical) 
quantities 
of  object 
signals 
2 Observation 
statement 
observer, language 
(syntax) 
sampling, 
quantization, 
coding / encoding  
signals data  
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3 Communication 
between the source 
and receiver  
of message 
language (of 
observer resp. 
system of data 
acquisition), 
message receiver 
telecommunication, 
transmission  
and communication 
systems 
data data 
4 Interpretation set, 
information 
origination 
language (of 
observer resp. 
system of data 
acquisition, 
message receiver),  
information set (see 
item 6) 
ontology, language data information 
5 Relations hips of 
functions 
and structural 
arrangement 
of object,  
integrity verification 
information  (see  
item6),  
the object 
actuator of system,  
action information 
system 
object, 
information  
information 
correctness, 
change of 
object 
6 Information set  
in set of information 
systems 
information 
systems 
information 
systems 
information information 
7 Interpretation 
process 
information  (see 
item 6),  
the object 
signalizing and 
representation 
technology,  
artificial 
intelligence  
information image of 
object,  
new object 
 
Regarding the nature of our task connected with the distributed transportation system 
with geographically distributed remote system nodes in the city, it is appropriate to give 
relations, which describe the quality of information transmission in the transmission 
medium (see item No. 3 in Table 2). Thus, we consider the control system with feedback 
that is expressed in Figure 3 in accordance with [19, 28, and 29].  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Relationships of control system in the cyber-system [19]. 
 
50 
 
The cyber-system represented in Figure 3 exhibits the specific qualitative properties, 
such as the information power and the information security, i.e. to their confidentialities, 
availabilities and integrities. Both of them, the information power and the information 
security, are described in detail in [19]. Information technologies, with connection of 
hardware and software, serve to performing certain functions that are further described. 
 
3.3. UGTMS 
 
The description of metro system general function follows from the description of Praha 
metro management and control system (ASDR) [28, 30] and the European standards on 
functions and parameters of Urban Guided Transportation Management and Control 
System (UGTMS) [31]. From the technical viewpoint, the metro system can be divided 
into three main parts: control; controlled; and protection systems. They have mutual 
interconnections and some common inputs and outputs. Information from planning the 
operation process (as timetables, duty rosters etc.) is the input into the system. The system 
output is the ensuring the transport performance in required quality and in given 
transportation mode, and the mitigating the disasters´ impacts in protection mode [19]. 
According to executed functions given in [31], the management system (UGTMS) is 
divided into several levels regarding to the problem solution level (operation planning, 
operation management, supervision, trains´ control) and the degree of automation (from 
GOA 0 up to GOA 5; from manual train operation up to fully automation operation - 
Unattended Train Operation ATO) [31]. 
Table 3 contains the general description of metro system according to [14, 30] and also 
assigned technical and functional blocks and interfaces according to UGTMS [31]. 
 
Table 3. General model of metro system [14, 30, 31]. 
 
Parts Assignment of blocks and interfaces of 
UGTMS 
Inputs Outputs 
Management 
and control 
system 
Core of UGTMS (operation control system, 
wayside devices, on-board systems, data 
communication system), 
Management (central human-machine 
interface (HMI), 
local human-machine interface, wayside 
devices, interlocking, operation planning), 
Information and telecommunication 
systems (audio communication, 
communication with staff, passenger 
communication), 
Stations (CCTV surveillance, passenger 
information systems, audio 
communication), 
Train (HMI with train staff, rolling stock 
diagnostics (for maintenance), train 
condition (in terms of operational 
capability), fare collection (location 
vicinity, 
operation 
planning, 
controlled 
system METRO 
protection 
systems, 
controlled 
systems METRO 
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information), CCTV surveillance, audio 
communication), 
Maintenance (maintenance depot systems), 
Traction power supply (traction power 
supply management). 
Protection 
system 
Stations (fire detection/react to detected 
fire, platform-to-track intrusion detection 
system (passenger on the track), platform 
doors and/or platform end doors, interfaces 
with other equipment (emergency handles, 
emergency call devices, equipment for 
detection/closing of unprotected areas, the 
check button “the train is ready to depart”), 
Train (equipment for detection of obstacles, 
derailment, fire or smoke, equipment for 
detection/closing of unprotected areas, 
emergency handle, release of doors / 
emergency button), 
Infrastructure (detection of broken rail, 
detection of fire or smoke, intrusion 
detection system). 
vicinity, 
management 
and control 
system 
controlled 
system 
Controlled 
system 
METRO 
Information systems,  
Stations (supporting equipment 
(elevators/escalators)), 
Train (doors, traction, brakes, equipment 
that connects the train (electrical inter-
vehicle jumpers), interfaces with other 
systems (lighting, heating, ventilation, air-
conditioning (HVAC), batteries), passenger 
information system), 
Infrastructure (tracks, tunnel ventilation, 
interface with other equipment (pressure 
doors)), 
Traction power supply (high-voltage 
switch) 
vicinity, 
protection 
system, 
management 
and control 
system 
management and 
control system, 
quality of 
operation and 
transport 
performance, 
mitigating 
impacts of 
disasters. 
 
Specific features of Praha metro system are described in detail in [14]. Functions, 
functional relations and general requirements on function execution of UGTMS are 
defined in the standard [31]. Requirements are appropriately marked for each degree of 
automation as mandatory, conditioned or optional.  
Above mentioned functions and divisions we use for definition of high level 
requirements on the system in terms of references. They do not provide the detail 
description of affiliations of functions, parameters of individual subsystems, demands on 
safety of partial systems and whole system (integral safety - quality). Mentioned 
properties need to be specified according to local demands and conditions of related and 
superordinate systems, including the connections to surface transportation, geological and 
climatic conditions, and hazard rate from all relevant disasters, etc. 
52 
 
Because we also deal with issues of cyber safety, we focus on demands and features 
of UGTMS core, which is the most critical part of management system and its interfaces; 
it is on: operation control system; wayside devices (it includes point transmission between 
the track and train); on-board systems (it includes localization, speedometers, time 
measurement); data communication system (it includes data transmission between the 
wayside devices and operation control system, and communication between wayside 
devices and trains). 
Figure 4 shows the relation between the cyber security management of system, 
compiled according to EN 62290 [31] and real scheme of information infrastructure in 
metro [19, 28, 30]. The UGTMS system segmentation shown on the left site is according 
to management level (operation planning, operation management and supervision, train 
control).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Model for cyber security management of the system according to EN 62290 and 
real scheme of information infrastructure in metro [19, 28, 30, 31]. 
 
Real organization of system for the Praha metro traffic management, the dispatcher 
workstations are connected with central system nodes (in this level they are shown also 
other interfaces with other technological or facility systems). The central nodes are 
interconnected together to proper communication infrastructure with station and way side 
subsystems. Red points on the figure right side mark the critical communication interfaces 
and transmission medium according to data in [19, 28]. The designation Cat. 1-3 means 
the category of transmission system according to the railway standard EN 50159 [32].  
At certain rate of abstraction, according to Figure 4 it is possible to enhance the 
classification of cyber-physical system with blocks of UGTMS and parts of ASDR 
management system for transportation operation of metro Praha:  
Managing centre
System
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1. Managing centre – operation management and supervision – central nodes of ASDR 
(resp. control nodes in stations). 
2. System – train operation – station systems, interfaces and communication access 
points on the track, on-board communication units, on-board computers. 
3. Communication environment A, B according to Figure 3 – system of data 
communication – network of dispatcher centre, network of station and wayside nodes, 
wireless transmission system. 
The metro functions shall be also performed and supported by other interconnected 
systems of technological, physical and human nature. Any part of metro system has 
fittings and flows, the disruption of which could lead to malfunction and an accident. 
Therefore, we are looking for important part criticality, it means for assets, which have 
certain rate of importance and vulnerability. Due to system complexity we have created 
model of metro station based on data on real metro operation in Praha capital [19, 28, 30]. 
 
3.4. Safety related legislative requirements 
 
The ground for ensuring the safe metro and its safe operation is the correct technical 
background that includes the sitting, technical implementation design, building, 
construction and operation [5]. The greater requirements, the greater demands on 
knowledge, material, construction and operation are. Therefore, it is necessary to codify 
all relevant requirements. The Czech Republic legislative takes over the European Union 
technical demands on product, the Act No. 90/2016 Coll., on conformity assessment of 
product when it is made available on the market [33] or the Act No. 22/1997 Coll., on 
technical requirements on products [34]. From the legislative it follows that each product 
before introduction on the market needs to take the conformity assessment with the 
legislative regulations, stipulated and selected harmonized standards. 
The legal rules assign the duties on work with information, thus the information 
systems need to carry out the specific legislative demands and to ensure the security 
demands of domain for which the information system is designed. The example is the Act 
No. 101/2000 Coll., on personal data protection [35], the Act No. 365/2000 Coll., on 
information systems for public administration [36], the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., on the 
protection of classified information and security capability [37] etc. 
The standards specified by legislative include the real requirements for given product 
purpose, resp. system, and all subjects participated on the given system life cycle need to 
respect these standards. Other harmonized standards (mainly taken on from foreign 
wording) or other specific standards are not mandatory, but by their using the certain 
system parameters systems are improved. 
The technical standards establish both, the requirements on management systems (i. e. 
standards introducing the process and the project principles of TQM [4, 14]) and the real 
technical requirements on products. The examples are the standards on management 
systems belonging to set ISO 9000 [16], on quality management systems, ISO/IEC 20000 
[38], on IT service management (that implements parts of ITIL concept), ISO/IEC 27000 
[18], on information security management systems, or EN 50126 [22] on case of railway 
systems for the specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). The standards stipulating the requirements on 
products, resp. systems are EN 62290 [31] or EN 50159 [32].   
Systems for management of urban tracked transportation in the Czech Republic are 
governed by Act No. 266/1994 Coll., on rail system [39] and also by related notices and 
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executive regulations. In these legal rules, it is the list of determined standards, namely 
including the EN 50126 [22] standard and other ones, as EN 50129 [23], EN 50128 [24]. 
Due to reality that the metro system in Praha belongs to critical infrastructure, it needs 
to fulfil the demands of other acts, Act No. 240 Coll., on crisis management [40], Act No. 
181 Coll., on cyber security [41] from the viewpoint of cyber-physical systems. From last 
one it follows that the operator of such system needs to use such tools, which ensure: 
- limitation of physical access to network and equipment of industrial and control 
systems, 
- abatement of interconnections and remote access to network of industrial and control 
systems, 
- protection of individual technological assets of industrial and control systems against 
to use of known vulnerabilities, 
- renewal of operation of industrial and control systems after the cyber security incident. 
On the basis of present knowledge, the first two requirements can be resolved by 
technical measures. The other two are ensured at current practice by existing railway 
methods; by fulfilment of determined railway standards. 
It is the fact that the present railway standards are oriented to technical and functional 
safety (except several specific areas given in standard EN 50159 [32]). It means that they 
consider neither the critical conditions of systems, nor the extreme disasters, which can 
cause them the serious losses and damages. To such disasters, the possible cyber-attacks 
belong. It is indeed the truth that it has been designated many standardization 
commissions which have been dealt with the cyber security in the railway domain, but 
applicable and proven methodologies are still not available, everything is generated by 
method trial and error. 
With regard to described situation, the railway practice follows the standards on 
ensuring the cyber security from other sectors. They, however, need to be implemented 
by specific parameters of railway domain [1]. The examples are standards: ISO/IEC 
27000 [18], EN 15408 [42] or ISA/IEC 62443 [43]. 
Respecting the legislative and standards in force, the railway operators ensure the 
certain level of safety (quality of whole safety) and security of products appointed for 
specific needs and areas. If we consider the complex cyber-physical system as system of 
systems with many linkages and couplings, and primarily with subsystems at interfaces 
of various sectoral mediums, the mentioned requirements of legislative and standards are 
insufficient. Therefore, in practice, it is necessary to look for solutions that exceed the 
legislative requirements [3, 44]. 
 
4. Methods used for data processing  
 
Considering the principle Defence-In-Depth, described for complex technological 
facilities [6], we shall mostly concentrate to the management units that keep the sufficient 
level of safety at normal, abnormal and critical conditions. Safety management system of 
metro (SMS) has the central control system and controlled systems, Table 3. It is very 
complex distributed system that involves controlled, control and protection subsystems, 
their interdependences, operation states and conditions. 
In previous works, we have crated the model metro station and its security plan that is 
based on integral safety [14]. On basis of model and using methods of risk engineering, 
we have identified common protected assets and elaborated the risk management plan on 
priority risks. The priority risks have been determined by comparison of: normative 
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requirements that respect the principles of All-Hazard-Approach and Defence-In-Depth 
that have been created for complex technological systems [14, 20], with the real state in 
the Praha metro that corresponds with legislative requirements – described above. 
Although we consider the integral safety, this part deals with safety of cyber-physical 
system, the metro management and control system that is categorized as the processes 
information system according to [19] and which is affected by all information 
technologies from Table 2 and. We deal with the real system that was not built according 
to the current law and standards. Due to the risks connected with the change of complex 
system, it is not simple to change the present cyber-physical systems and socio-
technological systems; within some system we can improve one from critical parameters 
but it leads to decrease of safety for other one. On the other side the system is changing, 
day to day, from the view of system, and also from the view of super ordinary side, like 
the whole transportation infrastructure, government, city, the State etc. We need to react 
on the new technological, organizational, and legal demands [28]. The issue is to trade-
off with the priority risks in terms of control system and information flow. 
In management and engineering disciplines, there are special tools by which we 
identify, analyse, assess, manage and trade of with risks of various kinds including the 
cross-sectional ones. On the basis of present knowledge and experience on behaviour of 
advanced complex technological facilities [5, 28, 30], we need to take into account that 
there might be occurred sooner or later some disruptions of management and control 
system cyber safety. Of course, according to present knowledge and experience, there are 
several disasters that can disturb the system safety [44, 28, 30], and therefore, the complex 
solution is very wide-ranging [28]. 
Due to the complex structure of followed system we need to consider the non-structure 
problems. Therefore, for their research we choose the case study method and the What-If 
method modified for solution of security problems [12, 16]. The What-If method is in our 
work divided into pars of evaluated assets and impacts of possible common incidents. On 
the basis of: critical judgement of What-If results; results obtained in the SESAMO 
project [45]; experiences from practice; and respecting the demands of cyber act (law No. 
181/2014 Col.) in force, which is based on standard ISO/IEC 27001 [18], we propose the 
improvement for both, the safety and the security of metro supervision and management 
system [28]. The case studies deal with the disruption of cyber safety of metro supervision 
and management system, the model of which is shown in Figure 4. They are focused on 
the most priority sites of system [28, 30]. 
On the basis of critical judgement of data in documentation [28, 30], there are 
identified three vulnerable sites, explored in the case studies. The vulnerable sites make 
up the interface with the surrounding, between the close system, in which there is ensured 
multiple physical protections and security, and a vicinity of system that is accessible for 
several stakeholders.  
  
5. Priority risks and measures for their mitigation 
 
The most important findings of the previous research related to the present work are 
that humans are secured very little; control, energy and information flows, air 
conditioning, machinery, communication and next equipment have higher security; and 
the mobile machines and devices, next important equipment, construction (property) and 
places are more secured [20, 26]. According to [20], following items are danger, they 
have high or very high probability and high severity:  
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- failures in processes and human errors in all levels of safety management system 
(according to Defence-in-depth), 
- execution of mutually influencing functions in term of mutual links and flows 
between secondary and superordinate systems, 
- faults in dependences between levels of safety management system (SMS): flawed 
methodology for hazard identification and risk analysis within the higher levels of 
SMS; misunderstanding of requirements and information from other level of SMS; 
missing input information, 
- other unpredictable events and human factors (internal, external factors or malicious 
attacks). 
The generic recommended measures are [25]: 
- to introduce quality / safe and monitored processes of maintenance and operation, 
which are introduced in the station operation rules, 
- to apply the security, plan at the design, construction and management of changes, 
which is targeted to elimination of system failures and to have a plan for the cope with 
system failures in the operation, 
- to introduce periodic training, examination and exercises of staff; the confirmation 
function of E/E/PE from [17] and feedbacks, 
- to ensure the safety by the high quality of the installed systems according to the 
requirements of [16, 22], 
- to carry out regular audits, evaluation of competences and to ensure the independence 
of solved teams, etc. 
 
6. Selected cyber risks and countermeasures for their mitigation 
 
We concentrate only on three originators of cyber risks that we revealed on the basis 
of data in the operation documentation [28, 30]. For these phenomena we construct 
impacts by the What, If method. It goes on: 
- the impacts of penetration through the interface, denoted in Figure 4 as “Operation 
planning”, 
- the impacts of penetration through the interface denoted in Figure 4 as “Train 
operation”, 
- the impacts of penetration through the air transmission information between train 
driver or on-board systems and station controller, Figure 4 [28].  
Each of cases has specific features. In first case, it is the interface with opened network 
from the view of the supervision and control system. The second case deals with problem 
of different safety integrity levels (SIL) in the view of functional safety, and moreover it 
could be exploit after disruption in first case, it means, more sophisticated attack that is 
not usually considered in the context of the functional safety domain. The third case study 
considers the open environment, there attacker can handle with transmitted messages or 
he can penetrate closed system. 
From the safety reasons, it is necessary to ensure the high quality of protection, which 
means to understand the severity of least unfavourable security incidents, and therefore 
we take into account the boundary issues. The results of What-If method application are 
in Table 4; it contains the security incidents impacts on public assets and on the metro 
assets obtained by assessment of the most critical unfavourable cyber security incidents. 
It was used the scale with the four degrees: insignificant; marginal; critical; and 
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catastrophic, which is in detail characterised in documentation [28] and that goes from 
the standard EN 50126 [22]. 
 
Table 4. Impacts of disruption of the system cyber safety on public and metro assets [28]. 
 
Assets Impacts 
Case study 1 – (threats: system disruption, loss of system integrity, loss or even taking 
control) 
Human lives, 
health and 
security  
 
Employee: marginal; only indirect impacts caused by confusing the dispatcher 
and his wrong decision. 
Passengers: marginal; only indirect impacts caused by confusing the 
dispatcher and his wrong decision. 
Humans outside the metro: insignificant; catastrophic only in the case of more 
sophisticated terrorist attack, series of commands (improbable). 
Property  
 
Metro: marginal.  
Public: marginal; it follows from panic and size of danger of minor thefts. 
Environment Insignificant. 
Welfare Marginal; panic and possible discredit. 
Metro 
transport 
Significant; direct impacts on train movement, worsening the transport and 
delay. 
Finance  and 
other losses  
Metro: significant; loss of profit due metro operation stoppage, harm on 
goodwill. 
Public: critical; loss of transport possibilities 
Case study 2 (threats: system disruption, loss or even taking control) 
Human lives, 
health and 
security  
Employee: critical; single fatality or severe injury. 
Passengers: catastrophic; fatalities or multiple severe injuries. 
Humans outside the metro: critical; it follows from panic and movement of 
many people. 
Property  
 
Metro: Critical – loss of major system. 
Public: Marginal; it follows from public and size of danger of looting. 
Environment Insignificant. 
Welfare Marginal; panic and discredit in the high range. 
Metro 
transport 
Significant – direct impacts on train movement, worsening the transport and 
delay. 
Finance and 
other losses  
Metro: significant; loss of profit due metro operation stoppage, harm on 
goodwill. 
Public: critical; loss of transport possibilities 
Case study 3 – (threats: system disruption, loss of system integrity, loss or even taking 
control) 
Human lives, 
health and 
security 
Employee: marginal; only indirect impacts caused by confusing the dispatcher 
and his wrong decision. 
Passengers: marginal; only indirect impacts caused by confusing the 
dispatcher and his wrong decision.  
Humans outside the metro:  insignificant; catastrophic in the case of more 
sophisticated terrorist attack,  
Property  
 
Metro: marginal.  
Public: marginal; it follows from panic and risk of minor thefts. 
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Environment Insignificant. 
Welfare Marginal; panic and possible discredit. 
Metro 
transport 
Significant; direct impacts on train movement, worsening the transport and 
delay. 
Finance and 
other losses 
Metro: significant; loss of profit due metro operation stoppage, harm on 
goodwill. 
Public: critical; loss of transport possibilities.  
 
Because the entire control and controlled system in metro is formed by distributed 
structure with number of system nodes, and most commands or dispatcher actions are 
conditioned by correct information and set of acknowledgement messages sent in various 
ways, we considered the Bayesian theory described in chapter [19, 28] based on the cyber 
system given by Figure 3. The theory points to information availability and integrity, 
which are in the case of such real-time systems more important than confidentiality. For 
understanding the problem, we give three case studies. On their base we propose the 
optimum improvement the system from the viewpoint of safety and security [28].  
The critical evaluation of the results in [19, 28] shows the vulnerable sites at metro 
cyber safety. For reduction of revealed vulnerabilities and cyber safety improvement we 
use the provisions in legislation. The measures enforced by the legislative need to be 
mainly implemented in the interfaces of metro supervision and management system with 
other parties. Because the legislation, norms and standards in force only involve the 
common organization and technical measures, it is necessary to improve them. It means 
to establish the sufficient and effective risk management – at all levels of a problem 
solution, monitoring and measures for improving safety [19, 28]. Beyond the scope of 
given measures, it is also necessary to introduce in the top level safety management the 
united terminology and correctly defined scales for assessment of assets criticalities, 
interdependences criticalities and risks in system concept. 
Therefore, the owners and operators of system such as metro and metro management 
and control system shall at least ensure following tasks: 
- manage public assets with interdependences, it means to establish risk management 
in terms of integral safety (top level safety management based on All-Hazard-
Approach and with consideration of Defence-In-Depth), to evaluate assets criticalities 
and protect the most critical assets (active and passive safety, security plan of system), 
- manage and supervise other stakeholders (subcontractors, vendors etc.) due to 
ensuring high level of availability, it includes well assigned requirements and 
responsibilities to next subjects in terms of dependability and safety parameters, 
organizational demands (well implementation of IT standards on information power 
and safety / security, the TQM principles such as COBIT, ITIL, ISMS, ICS security 
etc. with clear communication matrix) [19], 
- define the most important functions, their CIA parameters and manage them 
(including reliability, availability, maintainability and safety and/or security; RAMS), 
analyse vulnerabilities mainly at interfaces with systems of different nature; the matter 
also includes to establish not only technical parameters, but also well-established 
common criteria and scales for risk management through all stakeholders 
(requirements and responsibilities for these parameters on all subjects), 
- check all important monitoring activities, whether they are sufficient, take into 
consideration the time correct and valid report to users on system faults, be aware 
different meanings of some terms in different industrial fields, 
59 
 
- supervise the information power mainly under construction of the system, because 
changes during operation are time consuming, expensive, it subjects to change 
management and safety assessment, it could bring new vulnerabilities and errors due 
to interdependences, 
- audit system accuracy in defined range, because all activities consumes certain 
resources, the system is facing trade-offs between benefit, costs and safety; the cost 
benefit analysis shall be performed. 
The mentioned points above exceed legislative requirements, because they are 
multidisciplinary and they oblige more subjects. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Real world is full of uncertainties and diverse events, which may occur either by 
graduated way or imminently with severe diverse impacts. Human capabilities are limited 
to certain set of knowledge. Thus it appears that regarding the real world uncertainties, 
people are not able to prepare on all events which endanger human security. Human 
intervention into real world at development of new technologies, its installation and 
interconnecting, changes the world and makes it more complex – difficult. It means that 
the human being introduces new uncertainties and endangers. We are not able to protect 
against all hazards, but we can effort to introduce new hazards as least as possible, and 
also to prepare people on unexpected events with the only aim – to ensure human security 
and survival. 
For ensuring the certain rate of safety, we introduce safety management systems with 
(SMS). The main assumption for well performance of the SMS is that it is applied at all 
management levels in both, horizontal and vertical dimension and where the effective 
communication and propagation of common management targets to lower levels is 
ensured. Particular SMS areas shall bind on requirements and targets of higher layers 
(political at the State level or whole continent or world), so that it might react on context 
of surrounding systems in the best way. It needs to ensure the management system at the 
highest level (top level), propagate them into lower levels, to keep interdisciplinary 
communication, to establish monitoring and to enforce appropriate measures. The 
mentioned system with considering of different risk management and perceiving the risk 
in various transportation domains is described above. 
The work provides comprehensive overview of safety management and risk 
management issues from both, general layer and with focusing on the railway system. 
The approach of proactive SMS with consideration of integral risks is introduced into the 
use case present in the work. The use case builds on ongoing research of the safe metro 
operation and at this paper it focuses on cyber safety of urban guided transportation 
management and control system. Unfortunately, neither there is available nor tool or 
standard, which would specify the procedure for security practices in this specific field 
of cyber systems. The IT method [19, 28] or method from the field of industrial control 
systems [43] can only be used provided that they complied with the railway specifics, 
resulting from the requirements to ensure the functional safety of all interfaced 
equipment; availability, cyber security, interoperability and scalability of the data 
communications infrastructure are attributes that need to be maintained during the system 
life cycle. 
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Chapter 4  
 
EVALUATION OF RISKS IN TRANSPORTATION OF ITEMS 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
It is very important to compare the risks in transportation of goods in multimodal 
transport. Today, multimodal transport is preferred because by combining a number of 
separate transportation modes, one can transport goods at great distances, even at a global 
scale. Multimodal transport is defined as transport using two or more transportation 
means. This means that trans-loading of goods occurs, and can occur several times. And 
it is at these times when risk is higher, both of damage and theft.  
In order to simplify trans-loading, containers are used which can be used on all 
transportation types. This eliminates the risk of damage to the goods while handling 
during the trans-loading.  At the same time, however, demands on securing the container 
grow, as this security must meet the conditions of all transportation means which will be 
used during the course of transportation. Damage to the transported goods can be a highly 
risky affair, such as when carrying hazardous goods and in this case protection must be 
secured to prevent any danger to human health or life, damage to the environment, or 
theft of the goods. It is necessary to mention the importance of the human factor as a risk 
during the transportation of goods. It is necessary to evaluate it together with the other 
risk factors that occur during transport. 
It is essential to compare and assess the system of checks and identify weak points                    
in the safety and security of goods in the multimodal transportation process [1].  
 
2.  Background research and solution concept 
 
When resolving problems, it is necessary to identify risks for certain types of 
transported goods and determine the types of danger during transportation.  
 
2.1 Types of transported goods 
 
In order to ensure an optimal transportation method, one must differentiate between 
various types of transported goods due to weight, size and shape [2]. There are four types 
of transported cargo: 
1. Container - the optimal method for transporting goods. In containers, goods are 
protected from the weather and a number of other factors by steel walls. The 
standardised container size is convenient for multimodal transport, since its 
dimensions correspond to requirements for sea vessels, lorries and railway carriages 
(e.g. electronics, food, consumer good, etc.). 
2. Liquid bulk (no packaging) - transportation is secured using large tankers or through 
pipelines (e.g.: crude oil, petrol, light fuel oil, vegetable oils, etc.). 
 
* Authors: Assoc. Prof., Dipl. Ing.  Helena Bínová, Ph.D., Dipl. Ing.  Daniela Heralová, Czech 
Technical University in Prague, Praha, Czech Republic, binova@fd.cvut.cz, heraldan@fd.cvut. 
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3. Dry bulk (no packaging) transportation is secured within the hold of ships, train 
carriages or lorries (e.g.: grain, coal, iron ore, cement, sugar, salt, sand, etc.). 
4. Breakbulk - transportation can occur in containers or within the cargo hold                                 
of the transportation means. The goods are often packaged on pallets or in crates (e.g. 
paper, wood, sacks of cocoa, bulky and oversized objects, etc.). 
 
2.2 Types of transport modes and related risks 
 
During transportation, goods are subject to various dangers and they must be secured 
against damage and against endangering third persons if necessary (e.g. release of the 
cargo, etc.).  
Newton’s First Law applies in transporting goods, and this reads: ‘An object that is at 
rest relative to an appropriately selected frame of reference will remain at rest. ‘In an 
inertial reference frame, an object either remains at rest or continues to move at a constant 
velocity, unless acted upon by a force’ [3]. We can distinguish five basic modes of 
transport: road, rail, see, inland waterway and air. 
 
Road transport 
During movement of the transportation means, vertical movements caused by impacts 
and vibrations from the road reduce the force of friction to as low as zero. When using 
road transport, the following risks can appear: 
1. Securing cargo – it is a good idea to use immobilising methods. Frictional forces 
depend on the joint properties of the cargo and the trailer cargo space with which it is 
in contact [4]. Additional immobilisation methods are used to prevent tilting and 
tipping. Attention must be paid to the location of the centre of mass.  
2. Load distribution – if the transportation means is partially loaded or unloaded during            
the course of the journey, a change in the load distribution occurs. 
3. Dangerous goods, i.e. items which have the properties of being flammable, corrosive, 
explosive and others – during transportation, the safety of people, property and the 
environment may be put at risk. 
4. Cargo with limited shelf-life – special conditions must be observed to ensure that no 
changes to the goods’ properties occur. Temperature, humidity and other values must 
be checked. 
5. Theft of cargo or cargo including transportation means – this applies to road, rail and 
sea transportation. Theft can also be undertaken using GPS signal interferences, 
followed   by the lorry being stopped and the goods being stolen [5]. 
 
Rail transport  
When using the railway transport, the following risks [6] can appear: 
1. Impacts as a result of train composition - during this activity, individual carriages                    
or groups of carriages are pushed together and coupled. Carriages going down                          
from the humps are stopped by buffers and if there is an error impacts may occur, 
which represent a marked deceleration. Containers are not designed for this kind of 
stress, and should not be subjected to this kind of acceleration. 
2. Dangerous goods – in rail transport, the carriage of dangerous goods must be 
undertaken in accordance with RID - Reglement concernant le transport international 
ferroviaire marchandises dangeroeuses. 
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3. Cargo with limited lifespan – railway transport is more danger than road and air 
because it is significantly slower. 
4. Theft of cargo - theft can occur when a train is stopped, or even when it is moving. 
Compared to road transport, the risk of this is very low. 
 
Sea transport  
A key factor here is the values of acceleration which can be anticipated in sea transport, 
dependent on the shape of the ship, its support, centre of mass and its ability to stay afloat 
and similar parameters which determine the behaviour of the ship on the sea [6]. 
When using maritime transport, the following risks can appear: 
1. Heaving – i.e. the upwards and downwards acceleration of the boat along its vertical 
axis. If the troughs of waves predominate, the ability to remain at sea level goes down 
and the boat falls; if the crests of wave predominate then the boat rises. This constant 
oscillation has a marked impact on containers and their contents. 
2. Surging and swaying – if the bow of the vessel is on one side of the crest of waves, 
and the stern is on the other side, then the ship’s hull can be subjected to marked 
torsion. 
3. Rolling – the movement of the ship from side to side. Roll angles can reach                      
up to 45° or more. If containers are insufficiently secured, this situation is very 
dangerous. 
4. Vibration – goods are subjected to pressures from the extreme low-frequency 
vibrations caused by sea conditions and high-frequency technology and vibrations                               
of propellers. This risk can and must be eliminated by the use of packaging adapted               
for sea transport. 
5. Dangerous goods – carriage is undertaken in accordance with IMDG - International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code. 
6. Cargo with limited lifespan – the carriage of perishable goods is danger due to the 
longer duration of sea transportation. 
7. Theft of cargo; pirates are the main danger here. According to the International 
Maritime Bureau, most ships are attacked in the waters of Nigeria [5]. 
 
Inland waterway transport 
In terms of acceleration, inland waterways are considered a very safe transportation 
means. Nevertheless, also here the following risks can appear: 
1. Cargo is usually subjected to lower forces than during road transport. Boats’ diesel 
engines may cause low-frequency vibration, higher frequency vibrations which could 
cause damage to cargo can be eliminated using packaging, i.e. appropriate dampening 
materials [6]. 
2. Dangerous goods - during inland waterway transport, dangerous goods are carried                 
in accordance with the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage                         
of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways of 2000. 
 
Air transport 
A very particular method for transporting goods, mainly small consignments [7]:  
1. Scratched and damaged packaging – especially when handling material during sorting 
and other operations during transportation. 
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2. Crushing - if external forces act on the sides, walls or corner of the package. Stacking, 
impacts, vibration, equipment for handling material create compressive forces which 
may result in damage to goods. 
3. Climatic conditions - high and low atmospheric pressure can have fatal consequences 
for cargo. High and low humidity can cause condensation or corrosion. Temperature 
differences ranging from -62°C to 71°C, which may affect the properties of the goods 
packaging. 
4. Handling consignments - using cushioning materials, damage caused by impacts 
during handling of parcels can be eliminated. 
5. Impacts - during handling and carriage. Many kinds of goods require a certain level                  
of protection against impacts. 
6. Vibration - occurs in all types of transportation means. Suitable cushioning materials 
can be used to eliminate the negative impact of vibrations on goods. 
7. Dangerous goods – carried in accordance with the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation of 1945. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) uses                       
the Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR). 
8. Theft of cargo – this may occur during loading into the aircraft or during storage. 
Most cases involve minor theft. The most danger time is when the cargo is loaded 
onto a lorry. 
 
3.  Data description and methods  
 
3.1 Protecting transported goods from damage and theft 
 
The below detailed information on securing goods is applicable to all kinds of transport 
as a result of the use of multimodal transport [3, 8].   
Table 1 shows the methods of protecting goods against damage, including possible 
elements that can be used for this purpose. This is the basis for the selection of a suitable 
method of securing. More detailed information is presented below.  
1. Use of the following elements implies from the Table 1: 
2. Interlocking or bracing - wooden beams, strips and other elements are fitted in to fill 
any gaps between cargos.  
3. Lashing - steel straps, chains, steel rope, textile straps, rope and other securing 
materials. 
4. Gap filling - wooden strips, cardboard which can be used for very small gaps, boards 
and single wooden beams for small gaps and pallets for larger gaps. 
5. Locking - locks should be regularly checked for wear, damage and operational 
defects. 
 
Table 1. Protecting transported goods from damage. 
  
 Method for 
securing goods 
Description 
1 
interlocking or 
bracing 
the cargo is located so it is at one level against solid 
structures, bracing is undertaken between the cargo and 
container and between individual parts of the cargo 
2 lashing 
lashing parcels prevents them from moving in a longitudinal 
or transverse direction or rising out of the cargo space or 
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turning over; tension in the ropes reduces safety force, 
depending on circumstances friction forces can be increased. 
3 gap filling 
gaps can be longitudinal or transverse and should be filled in 
an appropriate manner if there is no better way to secure the 
goods. 
4 locking 
cargo containers such as ISO containers, swap bodies etc. 
with weight greater than 5.5 tons should only be carried on 
transport means equipped with locks 
 
 
Protection from theft varies according to specific transport type. It is also necessary to 
identify risks of theft of goods during the use of various modes of transport, and proposals 
for measures are also specified in the comments in this Table. These data are very 
important in proposing a combination of modes of transport – the types risks are specified 
in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Protecting transported goods from theft; data in [9] were adapted by authors. 
 
 Transport type Danger 
1 road transport theft of part of goods or whole lorry 
2 rail transport theft of part of goods or whole carriage 
3 sea transport theft of containers in port 
4 air transport minor theft, trespassing 
 
Use of following measures to prevent theft implies from the Table 2: 
1. Road transport - irregular departure time from warehouse, closed goods hold, 
protective escort for valuable goods, electronic monitoring systems tracing and quick 
turnaround. 
2. Rail transport - security company/inspector at tranship points and shunting yards, 
areas or empty containers in different sections to goods, areas for transhipment or 
train shunting closed without open access. 
3. Sea transport - containers are equipped with a BIC - Bureau International des 
Containers - serial number. 
4. Air transport - camera systems, guarded docks, guarded warehouses, security 
services. 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of data transfer when using smart containers. RFID - smart 
containers - are used in multimodal transport. This type of container is equipped               
with sensors and systems for data monitoring and reporting. One of the systems used is 
RDIF - Radio frequency identification. Chips can be tuned to various frequencies, e.g. 
125 kHz, 134 kHz and 13.56 MHz. Authorised persons can acquire information on 
movement of goods in the container, condition of goods, any unauthorised intrusion by a 
third party. Temperature can be controlled remotely according to need and in real time 
for containers equipped with satellite reception [10]. 
One of the possibilities for eliminating the risk of theft or monitoring damage to 
containers is to use a container that is equipped with sensors and a system for monitoring 
and reporting data.  
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Fig. 1. Information transmission diagram when using SMART containers [11]. 
 
 
3.2 Securing the quality of transported goods 
 
Securing the quality of transported goods is one of the key requirements – if a change                    
in the required parameters of the goods were to occur, they would be spoilt and thus their 
transportation would also become redundant. Due to the large number of types of goods 
and many risks, only selected information is detailed here, thus partial risks [6]. 
In Table 3 there are specified the types of goods divided according to the type of 
sensitivity, including identification of impacts that are determining for the given type                
of goods. This is an important requirement that the transporter must ensure. Additional 
information is specified in the comments to this Table. 
Additional information regarding Table 3 on measures to mitigate the risks for selected 
type of goods is: 
1. Items sensitive to temperature (temperature-sensitive goods). 
2. Transport and carriage temperature - optimal product storage temperature which when 
observed will ensure maximum lifespan 5 - 20°C. 
3. Carriage with controlled temperature – heating - solidification range 24 - 19°C, 
temperature during travel > 24°C. 
4. Carriage with controlled temperature – cooling and/or freezing - required 
temperatures during loading, travel and unloading; refrigerated containers. 
5. Items sensitive to humidity (hygroscope and sensitivity of materials of humidity). 
6. Hygroscope - relative humidity 60 to 70 % - optimal storage conditions for most 
hygroscopic goods. 
7. Materials sensitive to humidity - slight adsorption of water vapour quickly causes 
major changes at low relative humidity. 
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8. Items sensitive to biotic activity. 
9. Biotic changes and their consequences - changes caused by microorganisms, 
biochemical conditions, pests. 
10. Items sensitive to contamination. 
11. Dust contamination - gaps filling with dust, abrasive dust, chemically active dust, 
infectious dust. 
12. Dirt contamination - moisture is a vehicle/means for contamination with dirt, goods 
in canvas bags are sensitive. 
13. Contamination by fats/oils - leaves stains on fabrics, penetrates the surface or surface 
layers of goods, oil impregnation may result in spontaneous heating and combustion. 
 
Table 3. Selected types of goods and possible risks.  
 
 
3.3. Control processes 
 
For procedure of control processes, it is necessary to identify risks during transport of 
items, and to evaluate protection methods. Protecting transported goods is divided into 
protection from damage (‘safety’) and protection from theft (‘security’).  
When planning security measures, so-called weak points must be eliminated. One 
hundred percent protection cannot be guaranteed because it would be excessively 
expensive. As such, it is more efficient to secure a security system so that the weak points 
of different types of security are always at different points (eliminating a domino effect). 
In order to propose an optimal combination of modes of transport for transporting 
goods, it is necessary to assess and compare flexibility, speed, reliability and other 
properties of individual modes of transport – they are specified in Table 4. It is also 
necessary to assess the advantages and disadvantages of using individual modes of 
transport - they are specified in Tab. 5. When processing this data, it is appropriate to use 
risk analyses and expert methods. 
Data from the practice obtained during visits of logistic centres, ports, transhipments 
and container terminals, afterwards processed by expert methods were used for 
processing   the Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
 Type of goods Risk Identification 
1 
items sensitive to 
temperature (temperature-
sensitive goods) 
d
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transport and carriage temperature 
carriage with controlled temperature – 
heating 
carriage with controlled temperature – 
cooling and/or freezing 
2 items sensitive to humidity 
(hygroscope and 
sensitivity of materials of 
humidity) 
hygroscope 
materials sensitive to humidity 
3 
items sensitive to biotic 
activity 
biotic changes and their consequences 
4 
items sensitive to 
contamination 
dust contamination 
dirt contamination 
contamination by fats/oils 
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Table 4. Selected properties of modes of transport; data from [11] were adapted by 
authors. 
 
 Type 
DOPR
AVY 
Flexibility Speed Reliability Other properties 
1 road high average average 
very dense network of highways and roads; almost 
any place is accessible; transportation for short, 
medium and long distances  
2 rail average average average 
dense network in the Czech Republic, but partially 
technically inadequate; freight trains; possibility of 
transportation of large cargo at a time; need for 
reloading;  
3 sea low low average 
limited network of sea routes; large capacity of 
ships – possibility of transportation of large 
quantity of cargo at a time, even different cargo; 
transportation of goods with lower priority  
4 air low high high 
limited network of air routes; transportation of 
goods with high added value; quick to spoil or 
fragile; rescuing of human lives; low risk of 
damage; dimensionally smaller shipments; large 
distances 
 
Table 5. Advantages and disadvantages of the use of modes of transport; data from [11] 
were adapted by authors. 
 
 Type 
DOPRA
VY 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1 road  
 “door to door” transportation; 
reloading only exceptionally; 
flexibility 
high rate of transport externalities; congestion, 
high accident rate; increasing truck traffic 
problems 
2 rail 
speed over long distances; 
economically advantageous; 
possibility of transporting large 
quantities of cargo at a time  
limited time possibilities of transport; breaks 
during transport caused by the necessity to free 
up the route; difficulties in tracking goods  
3 sea  
low transportation cost; possibility 
to transport large quantities of 
goods;  
 
 
long transport times; necessity of reloading in 
ports; waiting in front of ports; risk of theft at a 
port; climatic effects; danger of pirate raids; risk 
of corrosion; inability to land at any port – 
shallow depths in some ports;  
4 air  
speed; reliability; minimization of 
losses; minimization of damage; 
tracking goods without problems 
 
high transport costs; time-consuming inspections 
at airports during customs clearance; limited 
cargo capacity for dangerous goods; limited 
cargo capacity for heavy loads; limited cargo 
capacity for oversized loads  
 
3.4. Protection from damage  
 
Since applied forces have different values for different types of transportation, there 
are also different requirements for securing loads. In designing a method for securing 
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goods from damage, all types of transportation which will be used during the course of 
the journey must be considered, and the goods must be secured in such a manner as to 
meet the highest demands. The Table 6 gives values for forces in different types of 
transportation.  Knowledge of this data is important for making a decision on the type of 
the method of securing transported goods. The highest demands are seen in railway 
transport, which arises from the value specified in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Forces acting in different types of transport [12]. 
 
 Transport type Forwards Backwards Sideways 
1 railway transport 7 kN 7 kN 2.9 kN 
2 road transport 7 kN 2 kN 2 kN 
3 sea transport 1.5 kN 1.5 kN 2 kN 
 
Tying ropes using loops is not permitted for transport by rail (in accordance with 
Directive UIC9), and it is therefore not possible to use this securing method throughout 
the duration of the transport. All the elements by which tying and strengthening is secured 
must be regularly checked due to their depreciation, and their replacement and elimination 
must be secured. 
Containers are exposed to impacts, and therefore deformations. During impacts, 
abrasions on their walls occur, and thus not only a breach of the anti-corrosion protection, 
but also to loss of strength and stiffness of container walls. If a container or its walls are 
damaged by corrosion deformations and thus it does not meet safety conditions in terms 
of handling and protection of goods, it must be eliminated. 
From this perspective, it is suitable to use “smart containers” disk protection against 
damage, which has a built-in warning system that informs about a change in the 
environment inside the container, thus preventing damage to the transported goods. An 
operator who monitors the conditions in individual containers can remotely change the 
conditions for goods (temperature, humidity, etc.) if they are unfavourable, thus 
preventing damage to the transported goods in the shortest possible time. However, the 
question of economic cost remains, as equipping all of the containers with “container 
safety equipment (CSU)” would be costly, and they are therefore only used in justified 
cases. 
 
3.5. Protection from theft and external attack (security) 
 
 Protection measures are important in terms of protection from theft and also in terms                  
of the possibility of a terrorist bomb or biological attack. Another reason is to prevent 
human smuggling, and possibly limiting the spread of disease. After unloading, the 
container must be fumigated, i.e. to destroy pests. 
When transportation begins, the container is loaded with goods, sealed and locked, 
although during transportation it may be opened a number of times, mainly at customs 
where there is a suspicion the consignment is not in order. 
Containers are inspected using scanners which can display an image of the goods like               
an X-ray image. If there is any suspicion, the container must be opened and unloaded.  
If there is a suspicion that the container contains electronic equipment which could be 
a part of an explosive device, the area must be evacuated and a police pyrotechnics unit 
must be called in. The use of mobile telephones and other electronic devices must also be 
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restricted. Table 7 gives risks and preventative measures for different types of transport 
[13]. 
If damage or theft of goods, or another attack occurs, this means that all the inspection 
elements set up in the system have failed. Most inspections at control points are 
undertaken visually by an authorised worker or customs agent. It follows that the human 
factor is very significant [14, 15]. 
For using the risk analysis, it is necessary to identify possible risks for individual 
modes of transport in the largest scope possible. Selected partial risks are specified in 
Table 7, including the proposed measures for prevention or reducing the consequences. 
 
Table 7. Selected risks for different transport types; data from [11] were adapted by 
authors. 
 
 Transport 
TYPE 
Risk type Proposed measures 
1 road transport 
traffic 
accident 
observe breaks, electronic safety systems (adaptive 
cruise control, automatic braking, lane support 
systems, micro sleep detection) 
theft of goods 
parking at frequented rest sites, passenger, GPS 
system, sealed cargo 
robbery passenger, automated assistance call system 
2 
railway 
transport 
theft at 
shunting yard 
use an electronic seal with GSM/GPS for valuable 
consignments, seals 
3 sea transport 
weather 
conditions 
propose new routes, extended transportation duration 
theft at port 
use an electronic seal with GSM/GPS for valuable 
consignments, camera system at port 
pirates propose new routes, eliminate risky waters 
 
4 air transport 
terrorist attack scanner, thorough inspection of people and luggage 
bad weather flight delay, delay of hours 
minor theft Seals 
 
 
3.6. Risk analysis 
 
The risk analysis determines the critical points in the process of inspecting goods                       
as protection against damage and theft. A risk is defined as any factor that may negatively 
affect the protection of transported items. This means any event that may affect, with a 
certain probability, the inspection process at the time when goods are loaded. They can 
be divided into essential (significantly influencing process) and less significant or 
negligible. The risk factor is more significant the higher the probability of its occurrence, 
and the higher the intensity of its negative impact on the given process. The basic 
procedures of the risk analysis are - determination of risk factors and assessment of the 
significance of their impact, risk assessment and risk management (proposal of measures 
to reduce risks). The evaluation consists of evaluating a partial risk, i.e. one asset; Table 
8. 
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Table 8. Evaluation of risk factor. 
 
Probability of occurrence of risk factor 
(P) 
 
Intensity of impact of risk factor occurrence (D) 
 
1 unlikely  1 negligible 
2 improbable 2 small 
3 very likely 8 large 
4 almost certain 16 critical  
 
Risk = probability x impact (P x D): risk is acceptable for P x D = 1 to 8, risk is 
conditionally acceptable for P x D = 16 to 24 and risk is unacceptable for P x D = 32 to 
64. 
It is necessary to include factors whose occurrence is certain with a critical impact 
upon its occurrence, and whose negative impact may even be critical, although the 
probability of occurrence is low. For these reasons, a linear scale is chosen for probability 
of occurrence of a risk and a non-linear scale for evaluating the negative impact of a risk.  
It is necessary to emphasize the fact of very risky situation which can occur in unlikely 
occurrence, but with critical impact. Although the probability of occurrence is very low, 
it is necessary to evaluate this case carefully.  
 
3.7. Waiting Time 
 
The waiting time in the queue is an important indicator for truck operators. While the 
truck with a container waits in a queue, it is usually idling. That leads to wasting of fuel 
and economic loss for the operators, not to mention unnecessary engine emissions. 
Average Checkpoint Waiting Time - let us consider the total waiting time in the queues                 
for the whole checkpoint. According to the simulation output, there is typically negligible 
waiting time for Case 1 (not even reaching 1 second) and Case 3 (range 1.76 – 5.08 
seconds). However, for the case of 100% container screening (Case 2), the average 
waiting time increases rapidly with increasing arrival rate, ranging from 0.5 minute to 
6.76 minutes [16]. Figure 2 shows graphs for all cases; the results for Case 1 are the same 
as for Case 3.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Average waiting time in the queue [16]; Case 1 = Case 3. 
 
Maximum Average Checkpoint Waiting Time - however, we should also focus on the 
values of maximal average waiting time in the queue. In Arena, this was the highest 
average waiting time among the 100 replications in a simulation run, for a certain 
container arrival rate. Figure 3 shows graphs for all cases; the results for Case 1 are the 
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same as for Case 3. As it can be seen from plots at Figure 3, the maximum average waiting 
time in Case 2 starts increasing rapidly at the arrival rate of 12 containers per hour (2.4 
minutes), eventually reaching 25.28 min. This is already quite significant. Should such 
case apply, the container terminal operators ought to analyse their traffic statistics to 
determine whether such arrival rate is occurring frequently or not. If the answer is yes, 
adding a checkpoint lane for NII station should be considered. For comparison, a 
simulation with the same setting for 20 containers per hour but with 2 NII lanes was 
conducted, which led to decrease of maximum waiting time to 0.7061 seconds, effectively 
eliminating the queue (reduction by 97.21%). Other measured parameters showed a 
similar trend [16].  
 
Fig. 3. Maximal average waiting time in the queue [16]; Case 1 = Case 3. 
 
3.8. Procedure of control processes 
 
The procedure during control processes is shown in the following images:  Figure 4 – 
for export and Figure 5 for import alternatives. These diagrams show a clearly evident 
procedure that must be adhered to in checking processes in order to minimize risks. 
 
4.  Results 
 
Workers in the logistics chain play a key role, but it must be noted that in the modern 
world, where there is a large volume of transported goods, inspection of containers 
involves random spot checks. Figures 6 and 7 shows a so-called Swiss Cheese Diagram, 
where every hole in each slice of cheese represents a minor failure, or negligence in 
carrying out duties at a specific inspection point. An important point here is that an 
individual failure in and of itself should not impact on the security of the goods in the 
container. Where these ‘minor failures’ align, however, a serious situation can occur. As 
such, it is essential to set up the inspection system to ensure the holes in the cheese do not 
overlap. 
In practice, often certain elements of the inspection are left out if there is not a specific 
suspicion about the goods transported in the container. It is in these situations where the 
risk of theft/smuggling may be higher. 
If the system is not continuously monitored and if any weakness (weak points) is not 
found on time, a critical situation will arrive very likely. Therefore, it is necessary to set 
up the system in a way that any weaknesses are not linearly arranged. This method is 
suitable for application at the input and output controls of transported goods. 
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Fig. 4. Scheme of control processes – export. 
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Fig. 5. Scheme of control processes - import. 
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Fig. 6. Swiss cheese model – increased risk; data from [16] were adapted by authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
Fig. 7. Swiss cheese model – decreased risk. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
When determining the transport routes and logistics systems, the danger of damage 
and theft to the carried goods must be considered with partial risks as an integral part of 
doing so of the transportation process. 
One-hundred percent security against damage and theft cannot be guaranteed due to 
the high financial costs and the necessity to secure technical and technological resources 
Security is, however, ever more important and due to the ever greater use of 
multimodal transport, risk and safety assurance is a very topical issue. The aim is to 
achieve optimum securing so that risk factors cannot exist in succession. 
Safety and transport, “safety” and “security”, is an increasingly important factor in 
deciding on modes of transport in the transport system. 
It is important to note that every transport means places different demands on security 
measures, and as such the security and protection of consignments must meet the highest 
of these demands. 
In protecting goods from theft and damage, the following are important packaging 
(sufficient packaging), insurance (for damages that the shipment can cause, or for damage 
to shipment), seals (can be characterized as identification of whether the shipment was 
 
 
 
 
inspection during loading, 
recording, photo documentation  
customs scanner  
physical customs inspection  
physical inspection 
upon unloading 
accident 
 
 
 
 
inspection during loading, 
recording, photo documentation  
customs scanner  
physical customs inspection  
physical inspection 
upon unloading 
accident 
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handled, but in no way can they prevent direct damage or attack by a third party) and 
loading into the container (ensuring that the cargo does not move or get damaged). 
The human factor should not be underestimated; it must be considered a high risk 
factor. People can fail because of errors or negligence, or if they have an indifferent 
approach to goods being damaged. Not all cargo is checked, and it is therefore not 
possible to check every container. 
The use of RFID technology provides great opportunities. Some of the safety devices 
can be installed in a container and it can be monitored in real time. In combination with 
various other sensors, the container acquires the “Smart Container” statute. However, the 
price of this equipment will always be the decisive factor – even considering the nature 
of the transported goods. 
When designing security measures, security costs must always be included                                
in the transportation price, and optimum cost-effectiveness must be achieved. 
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Chapter 5  
 
ECONOMICAL AND TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF MACHINERY 
ENTERPRISE AND SYSTEM RISKS CONNECTED* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Economic progress and growing competition place great demands on technical and 
economical standards of engineering enterprises. High-efficiency efforts and optimal use 
on the market requires vast co-operation and business relationships between supplier and 
customer subjects. To expand business while starting it and in many cases also when 
investing into its upgrade calls for somebody else´s capital. 
For many enterprises and financial institutions, it is necessary to have an objective 
instrument for economic and technical evaluation (rating) in such a situation [1]. To fulfil 
this goal there was an initial prerequisite: to gather and upgrade optimal list of specialized 
literature and references or their parts which would correspond with the topic of the thesis. 
Practical layout of the topic represented the creation of functional and easily presentable 
enterprise rating model for the SME including the methodology for domestic and 
international comparison. 
The evaluation of the SME, which brings academic and practical aspect of solving this 
issue, is not available as a whole at this point. This has become intent for the scientific 
research.  
In connection to the above, there were defined the goals as following: 
1. To suggest and evaluate an easily usable and functional rating model for the SME for 
this country while using academically well-known methods, statistically valid 
financial data of anonymous engineering enterprises and their ratings during an 
observed period of time. 
2. To suggest and evaluate an easily usable and functional model for the abroad SME 
while using the domestic rating model of the SME and international rating for the 
countries during an observed period of time. 
The hypothesis, which would correspond with the above mentioned intention and 
which would measure the results of the thesis against the respected Rating of SME 
validated by the Czech National Bank, was as following: 
„It is possible to create a new, simpler model of the SME evaluation with less input 
data than it is typical for the SME Rating. The ability of the new model will be close to 
the SME Rating in its quality. “ 
Following the research and technical findings that the professional literature focused 
on the evaluation rating models of the SME (including the methodology of domestic and 
international comparison), contained the solution of this issue only partially, the authors 
tried to fill in this gap in the present condition of the economical evaluation of the SME. 
 
 
 
*Authors: Dipl. Ing. Petr Kocour, Ph.D., Assoc. Prof., Dipl. Ing. Karel Sellner, PhD., 
University of J. E. Purkyně, Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic. petr.phk@email.cz, 
sellner@fvtm.ujep.cz 
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2.  Background research and solution concept 
 
Procedure schedule of tasks and targets to be solved was as following, Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Procedure schedule of tasks and targets to be solved. 
 
 
In compliance with the procedure schedule there came the solving of tasks and targets 
in those steps: 
- calculation on the basis of models IN99 by the Neumeiers and the 
AspektGlobalRating, 
- meeting of the goal 1 – creating and evaluating domestic rating model for the SME, 
- ratings of selected European countries following the Standard & Poors´s and 
Moody´s, 
- meeting of the goal 2 – creating and evaluating international rating model for the 
SME. 
 
 
3.  Data description 
 
3.1 Calculation on the basis of models IN99 by the Neumeiers and 
AspektGlobalating 
 
The company CCB – Czech Credit Bureau, a.s. provided the authors with the 
statistically validated database of figures from the financial statements covering the 
periods of 2009 to 2011 showing 21 anonymous domestic SME which do their business 
Legenda:
*
The goals of the dissertation work which represent the new contribution to the researched issue.
Database  from 
Financia l 
Sta tements*
Eva lua ting Domestic 
Ra ting Mode l
Part 1 - domestic Part 2 - international
Publicly available figures and information. The calculation proces and methodology for the SME Rating of the countries are the know-how
and the trade secret of the companies SPM.
Publicly unavailable figures and information which were provided for the dissertation work by the company CCB – Czech Credit Bureau, a.s. 
The calculation process and methodology for the SME Rating are the know-how and the trade secret of this company.
Publicly available figures and information. These are academically well-known and publicly published models including the calculation 
process and methodology.
Statistically validated database of financial figures for the period of years 2009 to 2011 of 21 anonymous domestic SME operating in the 
machinery field. 
Goal 1 Goa l 2
Eva lua ting Inte rna tiona l 
Ra ting Mode l
Ratings of se lected 
European Countries in 
accordance  with Standard 
& Poor´s a  Moody´s (SPM)
Mode l IN99 andAspekt 
Globa l Ra ting 
(IN99AGR)
Rating SME (R)
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in the machinery field (they are labelled as 28 and 33 following the first two positions of 
economic activities classification CZ-NACE, which has been used in the Czech Republic 
since 2008 and which replaced the branch classification of economic activities called 
OKEČ). The number of financial data (variables) which are the input figures for 
calculation of the Domestic Rating KMEP as per the section 2.2 was in total 15 [4]. More 
detailed information for the variables is in the Annex 1. 
The obtained results were very good [11]. It is possible to say that with the IN99 there 
was a practical result gained each time (i.e. in the single years 2009 to 2011 in 21 cases 
out of 21 cases) and with the AspektGlobalRating almost each time (i.e. in 2009 in 20 
cases out of 21, in the years 2010 and 2011 in 21 cases out of 21). 
The results were then matched (harmonized) within the intervals into seven rating 
levels, following the same principle as with the SME Rating [4]. Then it was possible to 
carry out their comparison with the SME Rating, which could be graphically represented 
in the single years 2009 to 2011, see graphs in Figure 1. 
The authors worked with the figures using the mathematical and statistic apparatus. It 
is possible to say that during the period of the years 2009 and 2001 the rating of the SME 
oscillated within the interval of figures of the IN99 and the AspektGlobalRating with the 
probability of 85 to 85.71 %. This provided a proper space for generalization and creation 
of pattern for domestic rating of the SME. Here originated a simple and practically usable 
formula. 
 
3.2. Meeting of the goal 1 – Domestic rating model for the SME 
 
Within the framework of meeting the goal 1 there was a rating model (see the Pic. 1) 
formulated, which the authors named as the Domestic Rating KMEP (KMEP is the 
abbreviation of the Management and Economics Department of his faculty in Ústí nad 
Labem), and which they wrote as a mathematical formula: 
 
2
99
9.0
alRatingAspektGlobIN
tingKMEPDomesticRa

                                          (1) 
 
It is necessary to round the formula results according to the rules to whole numbers, 
unless there is a level of default in the evaluated enterprise and the use of the criteria O.K. 
or K.O. 
The validity and accuracy of the formula results has been verified on the figures used 
from the financial data database of 21 anonymous SMEs from the machinery field (i.e. 
on the qualitative data set). For the single years of 2009 to 2011 there is the graphical 
illustration of the results against the validated SME Rating, enabling the comparison with 
the use of the benchmarking method. For further details, see also the Annex 1. 
The validated sets of qualitative (non-financial) data of SME from the machinery field, 
nor from any other field, are not publicly accessible. Selected figures are systematically 
gathered and handled only by banks and financial institutions for their own use as they 
offer the leasing, factoring, forfaiting, credit insurance, etc. [5]. The same thing is true 
also for the benchmarking, and this is why the authors could only process the initial and 
basic methodology in this field. 
The evaluation of technical standard of an enterprise is basically completely dependent 
on the willingness and trust of particular partners, next also on the voluntary providing 
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and publishing of relevant figures which are (same as the financial data) very sensitive in 
any competitive settings. 
While the evaluation of economical standards of an enterprise comes out of the figures 
from the financial statements and it is possible to work with them directly using the 
mathematical and statistic apparatus, the evaluation of technical standards is primarily 
necessary to be done by an expert or by a group of experts, i.e. by qualitative description 
which would be to a certain degree subjective. Next is usually used a point system which 
evaluates the single factors (criteria). 
The developed methodology (instruction) of calculation for Domestic Rating KMEP 
and the rating methodology of non-financial (qualitative) criteria of the SME from the 
machinery field based on the benchmarking, with the evaluation suggestion of the five 
factors described into particular criteria using the point system of evaluation, are 
following [8]: 
1. Factors of economic and branch setting. 
2. Factors of business activity and management.  
3. Factors of sale and purchase. 
4. Factors of production. 
5. Other factors. 
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Fig. 1. Comparison of ratings based on IN99 and AspektGlobalRating with the SME 
Rating. 
 
The goal 1 was met in the domestic evaluation of financial and non-financial figures 
of the SME, or rather the machinery enterprise. Compared with the Rating of SME, the 
new methodology is less time consuming and simpler for the programmers because it 
works with a lower number of the input data. Practical benefit of this new rating model is 
its methodology and the fact that the model shows a high accuracy of 95% against the 
reputable product – the SME Rating. 
 
3.3. Ratings of selected European Countries 
 
The ratings of world countries including the Czech Republic are published on the 
ČNB´s web page. These ratings were determined by the international rating agencies 
Standard & Poors´s and Moody´s [10] (Tables 1 and 2). Based on this information there 
was a chart of selected European countries ratings created. 
 
Table 1. Rating evaluation of selected European countries as of 25th March 2015. 
 
Moody´s Standard & Poor´s 
Investment Levels   
Aaa 
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Netherlands, Austria, 
Sweden 
AAA 
Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Great Britain, 
Sweden 
Aa France, Great Britain AA 
Finland, Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium, France, 
the CR, Estonia 
A 
The CR, Estonia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Malta 
A 
Ireland, Slovakia, Poland, 
Slovenia 
Baa 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Ireland, Latvia, Romania, Spain 
BBB Malta, Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Spain, Italy 
Speculative Levels    
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Ba Croatia, Hungary, Portugal BB 
Romania, Croatia, 
Hungary, Portugal 
B  B Greece 
Caa Greece, Cyprus CCC Cyprus 
 
Table 2.  Ratio of country ratings. 
 
 
 
3.4. Meeting of the goal 2 – international rating model for the SME 
 
Within the Framework of meeting the goal 2 there was a rating model (Figure 1) 
formulated which the authors named as the International Rating KMEP and which they 
wrote as a mathematical formula: 
 
100
)100(1
.
ingIndexCountryRat
tingKMEPDomesticRaMEPnalRatingKInternatio

 ,     
                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
The results of the formula 2 are necessary to round according to the rules to whole 
numbers unless there is a level of default, the use of the criteria O.K. or K.O. 
The Rating Index of a country is expressed by the index in %, from which the SME 
comes and in which the Domestic Rating KMEP was calculated. See the following table 
with examples which were used for the formulation of general formula version. This 
formula was next harmonized by intervals into the 7 rating levels. 
It was not possible to verify the results of the formula 2 because the data file of 21 
anonymous SME contains only domestic data about the enterprises, but it doesn´t 
contains the international figures and comparisons. It is possible to state that there has not 
been developed any publicly available validated database of needed figures in order to 
verify the results with the mathematical and statistical apparatus. We can see a similar 
result in the basic evaluation methodology of quantitative (non-financial) criteria of 
machinery enterprises. The same situation is also with the benchmarking and that is why 
the authors could only develop the initial basic methodology. 
Following the two input figures, i.e. from the formula 1, the Domestic Rating KMEP 
and the rating evaluation of the selected European countries, the authors created a matrix 
Moody´s 
and 
Standard    
& Poor´s
Country 
Index 
Ra ting 
in %
Aaa 1 100
Aa 2 85
A 3 70
Baa 4 55
Ba 5 40
B 6 30
Caa 7 20
Ca 8 10
C 9 5
D default 0
Top Level
Average Level
Speculative Level
Harmonized into 7       
Ra ting Leve ls
Delayed Level
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of total resulting figures with a brief recommendation – the legend for its use with the 
International Rating KMEP (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Matrix of final figures for International Rating KMEP in total. 
 
For the Matrix of final figures on Figure 2 it is possible to recommend the following: 
1. If the SME or a country from which the SME comes from are evaluated by one or 
double rating level 7 (see the grey colour), it is desirable for the evaluator to pay 
caution because it is very probable to certain that there will be the criteria O.K. or 
K.O. applied within the risk speculative level. 
2. It is also recommended to pay caution with higher probability to apply the O.K. or 
K.O. criteria if the evaluated SME or the country it comes from, is evaluated by double 
rating level 6. 
The goal number 2 was fulfilled by the proposal of evaluating methodology for the 
international comparison of the SME. Although it was not possible to verify the result´s 
accuracy by the comparison of International Rating KMEP with the SME Rating, because 
the SME Rating is used only within the domestic scale but it is possible to assume that 
this new evaluating methodology will be beneficial for the corporate and academic 
institutions. There is also an indication in which possible direction the scientific research 
and the follow-up practical application in the company practice might go. 
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4. Method 
 
For the processing and comparison (evaluation) of this work results there was used a 
validated database of financial (quantitative) figures from 21 anonymous domestic small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) observed for the time period of years 2009 - 2011 which 
was provided by the reputable company CCB – Czech Credit Bureau, a.s. 
Next there were used the following methods of scientific work to solve the given goals 
and hypothesis [9]: 
- comparison of index and ratings in the economic and financial calculations, 
- analysis and synthesis of the above mentioned, including the mathematical and 
statistical methods of processing, where the result of the work was the formation of a 
problem to be solved, i.e. the creation of a domestic and an international evaluation 
model of SME with an accent on its performance activity in the machinery industry. 
In total the procedure of given issues in the work included also the use of a scientific 
method of induction and deduction, i.e. deduction of a general conclusion based on much 
knowledge about single items and vice versa, because these two approaches are closely 
linked together. 
 
4.1. Risks of economic and technical evaluation of enterprises 
 
It is necessary to allow for some risks in any human activity. This of course applies 
also for the machinery enterprises. The basic areas of risk are most of all the operational 
risks, economic risks, quality risks, the human resource risks, IT risks, legal and 
legislative risks. The risks usually involve the damage, the fact that the expected result is 
not coming or that the result is not reflecting the objective reality. The last mentioned 
aspect is usually taken into consideration while evaluating the machinery enterprises 
rating [5]. It then becomes the system risk, the consequence of which could be the 
lowering of accuracy and credibility in the economic and technical evaluation, 
incidentally also obtaining an incorrect result. Single components of this integral risk are 
subsequently analysed and there are taken measures to eliminate the risk. 
Before we talk about the causes for the risks in this area, let´s mention reasons and the 
importance of the machinery enterprise rating evaluation. Assessment of the company 
rating is usually required because of internal reasons or it is needed because of the external 
conditions [6]. 
The internal reason is mainly the need to know the company´s position on the market 
in comparison with the similar companies in the given or in analogous segment. It is 
possible to use the positive results in marketing and in economic and contractual dealings 
[8]. 
The external reasons to define the company rating are usually the market subject’s 
requirements for the knowledge about the company position, its economic health and its 
business vitality (perspective). This often corresponds with the requirements of the 
financial institutions when they deal with granting or restructuring the credits or the bank 
guarantees [8]. Next to the risk investigation, the risk of the bank guarantee, etc. the 
financial institutions require also the knowledge of creditworthiness and rating of a given 
company. Also the state institutions that provide in the well-founded cases the grants 
require the knowledge of the company position on the market and of its economic results. 
A similar situation is also in the field of the grant applications for the projects using the 
EU structural funds. Next reason can be the requirement of the customer within the 
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supplier-customer relations. Especially significant enterprises require an evaluation and 
selection of their suppliers during a time line and this periodic monitoring is included into 
the contractual documentation. Reaching of the required rating is necessary but not 
sufficient condition for making a contractual agreement. In some cases, there is a sanction 
for provable stating of incorrect or incomplete data for the enterprise rating determination. 
The risks during the enterprise rating determination and their usage within the 
domestic and international scale are mainly the following [12]: 
- inappropriate and non-objective methodology of the enterprise quality determination, 
- non-objective or incomplete input data, 
- evasion of the processed evaluation results to the third subjects. 
 
4.2. Inappropriate or non-objective methodology 
 
As there was already given the evidence in the previous text, the method suggestion in 
the domestic scale was checked and with the objective validated input figures it showed 
the results with the 95% accuracy against the reputable product – the SME Rating. One 
of the risks while determining the enterprise rating could be the usage of non-verified 
methodology or usage of subjective evaluation which operates on the assumption of 
randomly or improperly chosen resource materials. 
 
4.3. Non-objective or incomplete input data 
 
Non-objective or incomplete data represent the greatest risk while determining the 
enterprise rating. It is caused mainly by two facts. The first is that according to the 
Accounting law no. 563/1991, which is up-to-date in force, is the enterprises divided into 
four groups: the micro enterprises, small enterprises, medium enterprises and big 
enterprises. Legally obliged to have audited financial statements containing the balance 
sheet, profit and loss account, and next the cash flow, are only the medium and big 
enterprises. These enterprises also have to publish the annual report in the given extent. 
The micro and the small enterprises are legally obliged to audit the financial statements 
only in the case that they exceed two of the required criteria set by the law in the given 
year, i.e. total assets, net total turnover and the number of employees. The quantification 
of values for these criteria is specified in the law. 
It is obvious that a higher objectivity of the input data while determining the enterprise 
rating is guaranteed with the medium and big companies while with the micro and the 
small enterprises there is a risk of non-objective and incomplete figures which will affect 
the total evaluation result. 
Even more difficult situation is with the non-financial (qualitative) criteria. The 
resource materials are not defined by the law at all. That is why there is a great risk that 
the data for the determination are going to be incomplete or less non-objective. Another 
risk is the fact that the mutual interconnections of financial and non-financial criteria for 
the total evaluation have not been firmly set and verified yet. 
A similar situation has been so far also with the suggestion of methodology for the 
international enterprise rating determination. Within the given framework and following 
the actual scientific and research condition there has been processed a scheme of Complex 
KMEP Rating. There are more detailed figures in the Annex 2. 
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4.4. Evasion of the processed evaluation results to the third subjects 
 
Taking into consideration the risk of the evasion of the evaluation results of machinery 
enterprises functioning in a market setting there is a possibility of considerable economic 
loss with long-term consequences. With reputable institutions, organizations and rating 
agencies this risk is greatly minimalized though. 
 
4.5. Measures for the risk minimization 
 
The measures for the risk minimization of rating evaluation in machinery enterprises 
are possible to summarize into the following points: 
- to use only the reputable organizations and agencies with verified methodology of 
evaluation for determination of machinery enterprise rating, 
- to pay attention to the completeness and truthfulness of the resource materials and put 
this requirement into the evaluation determination contract, 
- to finish and verify the evaluation methodology according to the non-financial 
criteria, 
- to consider the possibility of legislative adjustment to the effect that there will be a 
legal obligation to audit determinative economic figures also for the micro and the 
small enterprises, 
- to enshrine the obligation of confidentiality in the evaluation results used in contracts. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The authors worked with the figures using the mathematical and statistic apparatus. It 
is possible to say that during the period of the years 2009 and 2001 the rating of the SME 
oscillated within the interval of figures of the IN99 and the AspektGlobalRating with the 
probability of 85 to 85.71 %. This provided a proper space for generalization and creation 
of pattern for domestic and international ratings of the SME, which are simple and 
practically usable formulas. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Economic and technical evaluation of enterprises involves also risks. Therefore, the 
risks have to be mentioned, specified as well as processed based on their priority, 
probability and importance to occur. 
The new evaluating methods (The Domestic Rating KMEP and The International 
Rating KMEP) are based on the company financial data (quantitative figures) and they 
are structured the way so they allow also for the quantitative aspect of companies on the 
non-financial factors base (economic setting and branches; business activities and 
management; sale and purchase; technical and technological production facilities; others). 
The hypothesis which was as following „It is possible to create a new, simpler model 
of the SME evaluation with less input data than it is typical for the SME Rating. The 
ability of the new model will be close to the SME Rating in its quality. “, was in the goal 
number 1 proved. 
Compared with the SME Rating, The Domestic Rating KMEP provides the verified 
results with an average accuracy of 95 %. This discovered accuracy was verified by the 
90 
 
mathematical and statistical apparatus on the validated database of financial figures from 
21 SMEs for the period of years 2009 to 2011. 
With the non-financial data (qualitative part) it was not possible to verify and find out 
the accuracy of this new method aspect due to the absence of needed non-financial data. 
The qualitative part of the enterprise evaluation has been academically proposed within 
the framework of the thesis based on the 5 evaluating criteria from which 4 are evaluated 
by points and they have assigned the balance of 0.25 and in one criteria it is possible to 
use the O.K. or K.O. rule. With the qualitative part of the enterprise evaluation it is 
supposed that the evaluation is primarily done in the expert way. In order this evaluation 
to be more objective, it is recommended to be done by a group at least 2 to 3 expert 
specialists. 
The aim of this work was also to make accessible the method which would enable the 
practical usage, quality improvement and also increased the enterprise transparency and 
comprehensibility of the complexity in the enterprise evaluation process. 
The scientific and research activity within the framework of this work was also the 
identification of the next continuing course of the research. It possible to see it in the area 
of continuous collecting of enterprise data, i.e. respective time lines of domestic enterprise 
data as well as the international data. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 -Financial data (variables) which are the input figures for The Domestic Rating 
KMEP calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Order 
Number 
Name of data
1 TOTAL ASSETS
2 Current Assets
3 Short-term Debt
4 Short-term Financial Assets
5 Equity
6 Debts
7 Short-term Debts
8 Bank Loans and Credits
9 Turnover
10 Sales of own Products and Servises 
11 Depreciation of Long-term Tangible and Intangible Assets
12 Operating Profit/Loss
13 Cost Interests
14 Income Tax
15 Profit/Loss of the Accounting Period
Figure from the Line enters the Calculation of the Domestic Rating KMEP in part 1 (calculation IN99).
Figure from the Line enters the Calculation of the Domestic Rating KMEP in part 2 (calculation AspektGlobalRating).
Figure from the Line enters the Calculation of the Domestic Rating KMEP in parts 1 a 2 (calculation IN99 and AspektGlobalRating).
Financial data (variables), which are the starting figures for calculation of the Domestic SME Rating                                                                                                
Note for the column name "Data Order Numer", which marks in colour the figure according to the Financial Statement:
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Annex 2 – The Scheme of Complex Rating KMEP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Notes for the Above Mentioned Scheme:
1 is processed in the dissertation work as a proposal of methodology of the SME and the accuracy of its result was compared against the reputable SME Rating, which expert guarantor is the 
CCB - Czech Credit Bureau, a.s. from the multinational group seated in Bologna, Italy. 
1 and 2 are processed in the MS EXCEL 97 in the dissertation work attachment which is not publicly available.
For 3 a 4 are not available the validated databases of figures and their time lines for the SME. 
*) Financial (quantitative) part and non-financial (qualitative) part, i.e. economic and technical aspects are the integral part of the complex evaluation of the SME where there is necessary to 
bear this fact in mind and fully abide it in order to gain the maximum objective result of the domestic or/ and the international SME evaluation.
Weight of 65 to 75 % Weight of 25 to 35 %
For 4 there are available the ratings of the sovereign countries and their time lines from the reputable agencies e.g. Moody s´ and Standard & Poor s´ from the USA.
Scheme of the Complex Rating KMEP
2. It is possible to describe it in the qualitative expert way and only later within the framework of e.g. benchmarking work with the mathematical and statistic apparatus. There is not a validated 
database of the non-financial figures and their time lines for the SME available.
1. T he  Domestic Ra ting KMEP               
- financia l (quantitive ) part*
2. T he  Domestic Ra ting KMEP               
- non-financia l (qua lita tive ) part*
3. T he  Complex Domestic 
Ra ting KMEP
4. T he  Complex 
Inte rna tiona l Ra ting 
KMEP
1. It is possible to work with the mathematical and statistic apparatus directly. There is a validated database of financial figures and their time lines for the SME available.
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Chapter 6  
 
RISK ASSESMENT OF PROJECT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF VIDEO 
TOLLING FOR FEE COLLECTION SYSTEM WITHIN ROADS 
NETWORK OF CZECH REPUBLIC AS PART OF REGULATORY  
IMPACT ASSESSMENT* 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The aim of this article is to present the results of the risk analysis, which is an 
obligatory part of the RIA in the case of legislative acts in the Czech Republic. The 
process, which is the subject of the risk analysis, is the implementation of the video tolling 
for the fee collection system within the roads network in the Czech Republic. The risk in 
the context of this article is understood as a possible unacceptable impact on the interests 
of any subject affected by the regulation and any chance or probability that a person or 
something will be harmed or experience an adverse effect if exposed to a hazard. 
 
2.  Background research and solution concept 
 
Initially, the RIA process need is explained and then the application of RIA in the 
Czech Republic is summarized. The risk analysis as a part of RIA is described and 
justified. 
 
2.1. The need of RIA justification 
 
Governments need to work systematically to ensure that the regulation they develop 
and implement is of high quality, since the costs to society of poor quality regulation are 
substantial.  Poor quality regulation increases compliance costs for business and other 
groups, leads to unnecessary complexity and associated uncertainty as to regulatory 
obligations and reduces the ability of government to achieve its objectives. 
RIA is a process of systematically identifying and assessing the expected effects of 
regulatory proposals, using a consistent analytical method, such as benefit/cost analysis.    
RIA is a comparative process: it is based on determining the underlying regulatory 
objectives sought and identifying all the policy interventions that are capable of achieving 
them.  These “feasible alternatives” must all be assessed, using the same method, to 
inform decision-makers about the effectiveness and efficiency of different options and 
enable the most effective and efficient options to be systematically chosen.  According to 
the OECD [1]: “...RIA’s most important contribution to the quality of decisions is not the 
precision of the calculations used, but the action of analysing – questioning, 
understanding real-world impacts and exploring assumptions”. 
 
*Authors:  Dipl. Ing. Olga Mertlová, Dipl. Ing. Milan Dont, Czech Technical University in 
Prague, Praha, Czech Republic, olga.mertlova@fd.cvut.cz, milan.dont@sfdi.cz 
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RIA should be integrated with a public consultation process, as this provides better 
information to underpin the analysis and gives affected parties the opportunity to identify 
and correct faulty assumptions and reasoning.  RIA is now used in virtually all  
OECD countries and in many developing countries. 
Regulations usually have widespread effects:  they affect many different groups in 
society and the effects may be of many different types.  Many of the effects are “hidden”, 
or at least are difficult to identify when a regulation is being considered. RIA can help to 
ensure you have a good understanding of who will be affected by a regulation and how. 
By using RIA, you can help to improve the decision-making process that shapes the 
final regulation.  In particular, RIA helps to promote systematic decision making and a 
comparative approach to policy decisions.  RIA requires you to ask: 
1. What, in general terms, is the problem to be addressed?  
2. What is the specific policy objective to be achieved? and 
3. What are the different ways of achieving it? 
The authorities should ask these questions before proposing to make a regulation. 
Starting with these questions, it can be ensured that as many different practical ways of 
achieving the objective as possible is identified. Then the authorities can get closer to the 
identification of the best option. 
According to work [1] “RIA has developed quickly, and an increasing proportion of 
laws and other regulations affecting citizens are being shaped by various forms of RIA. 
Although only two or three OECD countries were using RIA in 1980, by 1996, more than 
half of OECD countries had adopted RIA programmes. By end-2000, 14 out of 28 OECD 
countries had adopted universal RIA programmes, and another 6 were using RIA for at 
least some regulations. As well, RIA is increasingly being applied to primary legislation, 
where in the past it has principally been used in relation to lower level rules. This will 
necessarily have a major positive impact on its potential contribution to regulatory 
quality. “ 
 
2.2. The RIA in the Czech Republic 
 
In the Czech Republic RIA has been applied since 2007 in case of all the generally 
binding legal regulations prepared by the ministries and other state central administration 
authorities pursuant to the Government’s Legislative Rules, including implementation of 
the EC/EU legislation, which accounts for a major portion of the prepared legal 
regulations [2]. There are only few exceptions from the obligation such as the state 
budget, and final state account, special cases (Government’s Legislative Rules [9], Part 
Four, Articles 17 through 19), emergency legislation, crisis situations, general procedural 
rules, etc. Whenever any of the above-mentioned exceptions are applied, this must be 
expressly mentioned in an explanatory report to the draft legal regulation. 
The RIA rules [3] are given by the Government of the Czech Republic and the rules 
determine the process and the methodology undertaken by the ministries and the other 
central government authorities. 
Existence of a problem does not necessarily mean that measures have to be taken, 
particularly so at the level of state administration. Some problems may be of a more or 
less theoretical nature, marked by low probability of their occurrence. That is why it must 
be immediately explained in this opening section of the RIA why state intervention is 
crucial for problem solution, if that problem is real. The most cogent reasons for state 
intervention are the threat to health or security of the population or the threat of damage 
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to the environment. State intervention may also be justified by a long-standing “market 
failure “, caused, for instance, by insufficient or unbalanced approach taken by some 
market actors towards information, lack of competition on the market or side 
effects/externalities. State intervention may also be justified by the need to ensure “public 
welfare/public assets „that cannot be safeguarded by individuals themselves. The risks 
assessment part of the RIA should deal with the justification. 
 
2.3. Risk analysis as a part of RIA 
 
A quantitative risk assessment is an obligatory part of the RIA and it has a specific set 
of definitions set out in the respective rules. These are affected by the specific features of 
the risk analysis in the context of the regulatory process assessment. 
 
2.3.1. Risk definition in the context of RIA 
According to [4] we should any source of potential damage, harm or adverse effects 
on something (e.g. the environment) or someone. The same source gives that risk is the 
chance or probability that a person or something will be harmed or experience an adverse 
effect if exposed to a hazard. Hazard is a function of the inherent properties of the 
agent/event in question whereas risk is a function of both the hazard and of the potential 
likelihood and extent of being exposed to the hazard. In other words, while hazard 
represents an abstract danger, risk expresses the combination of the level of hazard and 
the likelihood of its occurrence. In today’s society, where potential risks are numerous 
and inter-related, risk can be identified on the basis of a wide range of evidence including 
past experience, monitoring data, expert opinions, etc. Note that risk may not be related 
exclusively to the problem itself but also to the alternative measure(s) to reduce the initial 
risk. 
 
2.3.2. Risks treatment and the regulation 
The public response, often encouraged by the media, to a perceived risk (be that a risk 
emerging over time or a specific incident) is usually to call for regulation. The process 
can be characterized as a “regulatory spiral”, summarized as follows [5]: 
1. The perception of a risk emerges. This can be progressive over time, such as the risks 
following a specific incident (such as a terrorist attacks). 
2. A public debate follows, often based around headlines and incomplete or biased 
information, resulting in a call for ‘something to be done’, which is amplified by the 
media. 
3. Instinctively, the public looks to the authorities to manage the risk. Responding to this 
public pressure, the authorities or politics make ambitious claims that they can solve 
the problem and steps in with a regulatory response, rarely considering the trade-offs 
involved. 
4. As a result, the role of the authorities as risk manager is reinforced. 
5. When the regulations are implemented, they may fail to solve all the problems and 
also, bring with them unintended consequences. 
6. With good implementation, some hazards are prevented, but other hazards are not 
prevented and problems persist, leading to calls for more government action. 
7. Because of more regulation, people complain that liberties and enterprise are 
diminished and criticize the ‘nanny state’. 
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8. Governments are blamed for interfering and acting unreasonably and, as a result, the 
national level of frustration grows.  
(If we are not careful), authorities may seek to address issues of frustration and 
disengagement through more regulation.  
The conclusion we can make is that each regulation should be carefully assessed not 
only from the view of effectiveness and efficiency, but also with the consideration of the 
“regulatory spiral” and the respective risks. 
The process of the RIA application is designed to eliminate the drafting of such new 
regulation, which is not immediately needed. 
 
2.3.3. Risks evaluation as a part of RIA 
According to [6]: „An analytical method that is gaining ground in OECD countries is 
quantitative risk assessment, which allows regulators to understand more clearly the risks 
for humans or the environment from a particular factor, and the contributions of a 
regulation in reducing the risk. Quantitative risk assessment improves the capacity of a 
government to focus on the most important risks and reduce them at lowest cost, while 
identifying those risks that fall below a threshold justifying government action. Risk 
assessment has rapidly become among the most high-profile and controversial regulatory 
issues in the OECD area, and has become one of the most frequent sources of trade and 
investment disputes.” 
Evaluation of risks associated with failure to resolve the problem is an obligatory part 
of bot the so called small RIA and the big RIA (connected with higher volumes in the 
field of the quantitative or qualitative impacts). In the case of the big RIA, an evaluation 
of costs and benefits should be performed and the risk analysis should be included. 
The RIA should describe the problem concerned not only by the goals attained, but 
also by the risks posed by the inactivity. 
As the RIA Methodology says, that always at least 2 options must be determined, each 
of the options must be described not only according to the overall goals, but also 
according to the risks connected with the implementation and enforcement, and the 
compliance costs of the regulation on the part of the stakeholders. It is likewise necessary 
to assess risks posed by the implementation of proposed options. 
As a part of the costs and benefits analysis, the RIA should weigh the risks connected 
with the implementation and ascertain how they affect the actual amount of costs and 
benefits. 
The RIA should assess the risks posed in case of failure to solve the given problem. 
It is likewise possible to employ techniques for the evaluation of changes in the risks 
posed by the emergence of an event. This is enormously useful and truly necessary when 
evaluating many impacts on the environment or health. Many policies will, for instance, 
seek to reduce risks of diseases and death. It is hardly possible to ascribe monetary values 
to life as such or to lives of other people. Due to this reason, change in risks is used, since 
nobody would exchange one’s life for a specific amount of money; most people will be 
willing to choose between different safety precautions and devices sold for different 
prices offering different levels or security or different modes of crossing the street as 
compared with saving time. That is why you can fix a value, which people ascribe to 
small changes in risks. 
As part of the procedures for evaluating risks, the risk of the emergence of an 
undesirable event and its potential repercussions for the individual and society, should 
such an event really occur, are also assessed. Risk evaluation may later be used for the 
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specification of options available for reducing or eliminating that particular risk and/or 
its consequences. 
In order to perform a risk analysis, you need: 
- to identify the risk, 
- to evaluate the likelihood of its emergence, 
- to assess potential impact on the proposed solution, if a specific risk does occur. 
Scientific evaluation of risks makes a decisive contribution to regulatory decisions, 
especially in the field of public health and security, environmental protection, use of 
resources, creation of wealth, innovation and national security, while signalling whether 
a specific policy is likely to rationalize the process of limiting risks in a significant 
manner. 
The RIA risk analysis can bring severe negative aspects: 
1. Impacts of risks may be different and need not be mutually proportionate (i.e. need 
not be projected into a single draft), 
2. Usually, it does not estimate costs that are likely to arise, if an undesirable event 
occurs, 
3. It does not take into account profits and impacts, save for the risks associated with 
proposed measures for the solution of risks and/or their consequences, 
4. This method should not be employed as the only starting point when deciding whether 
to accept a specific measure or when determining the type of measure to be adopted. 
 
3.  Data description  
 
The data used for the RIA performance consist of full description of current state of 
roads fees in the Czech Republic including the regulatory and legislative framework, the 
scope of the tolled roads, and description of the target state and the goals of the new 
charging system. 
 
3.1. The fees charged for motorways and selected class 1 roads in the Czech Republic 
 
In the Czech Republic using of the motorways and selected class 1 roads by the motor 
vehicles with the highest permissible weight till 3.5 tones has been charged by fees since 
1995. The regulation is given by the Act No. 13/1997 Coll., On the Road Network, as 
amended [7]. The obtained money becomes an income of the State Fund of Transport 
Infrastructure [8], which is responsible for issue and distribution of the so-called coupons. 
Motorways, which are marked with a road sign as a motorway, determined by an 
Implementation Regulation, can only be used by a motor vehicle with at least four wheels, 
upon the payment of a fee for the use of a motorway. 
The fee can be paid for a whole calendar year, one month, or ten days. The fee is paid 
prior to the use of a motorway by a motor vehicle.  The payment of the fee is documented 
by a valid two-part coupon, one part of which is completely attached to the interior side 
of the clear glass of the windshield of a motor vehicle, in the lower right hand corner 
(from the driver’s perspective), so that the driver’s view is obstructed as little as possible 
and the coupon is visible from outside of the vehicle. 
The Ministry of Transport and the State Fund of Transport Infrastructure have 
concluded recently that the way of payment of the fee should be changed. As a suitable 
option of the time-based fee collection is an implementation of an electronic charging 
system (so called video tolling), which would enable to collect the fee in a reliable and 
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continuous way with high efficiency. The automatic control system would bring a 
preventive effect and a repressive effect of the fine enforcement. The roads users would 
be provided by a modern, user friendly tool including environment for payments 
realization. 
The vehicle would be identified by its unique identification mark. The video detection 
of the registration marks of the passing vehicles would enable many times more effective 
permanent automatic control of the payments for the individual vehicles. The system 
would be able to accept on-line payments of the time-based charges. 
 
3.2. Scope of the time-based fees 
 
The list of the roads and motorways, which are subject to fees as to January the 1st, 
2016 is in the Annex 2 of the regulation of the Ministry of Transport No. 383/2016 Coll. 
[9]. The list represents the following 1015 km of roads (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The list of the charged road sections as applicable from the January 1st, 2016. 
 
Road No. Section  Length (km) 
D0 Modletice – Praha, Slivenec (exits 76–16) 23.0 
D1 Praha, Chodov – Kývalka (exits 2–182)         180.0 
D1 Holubice – Kroměříž, west (exits 210–258) 48.0 
D1 Kroměříž, east – Říkovice (exits 260–272) 12.0 
D1 Lipník nad Bečvou – Ostrava, Rudná (exits 298–354) 58.0 
D2 
Brno, Chrlice – state border (exit 3 to km 61)  
(in opposite direction from Lanžhot, odpočívka) 
58.0 
D3 Mezno – Čekanice (km 62 to exit 76) 14.0 
D3 Měšice – Bošilec (exits 79–109) 33.0 
D4 Jíloviště – Háje (exits 9–45) 36.0 
D5 Praha, Třebonice – Beroun, east (exits 1–14) 14.0 
D5 Beroun, west – Ejpovice (exits 22–67) 45.0 
D5 
Sulkov – state border (exit 89 to km 151)      
(in opposite direction from Rozvadov, odpočívka) 
62.0 
D6 Jeneč – Nové Strašecí (exits 7–32) 25.0 
D6 Jenišov – Jesenice (exits 131–162) 31.0 
D7 Kněževes – Knovíz (exits 3–18) 15.0 
D8 Zdiby – Řehlovice (exits 1–65) 65.0 
D8 
Knínice – state border (exit 80 to km 92)       
(in opposite direction no fee) 
12.0 
D10 Stará Boleslav – Bezděčín (exits 14–39) 25.0 
D10 Kosmonosy – Ohrazenice (exits 46–71) 25.0 
D11 Jirny – Hradec Králové, Kukleny (exits 8–90) 82.0 
D35 Sedlice – Opatovice (exits 126–129) 4.0 
D35 Mohelnice, jih – Křelov (exits 235–261) 26.0 
D35 Holice – Lipník nad Bečvou (exits 276–296) 20.0 
D46 Vyškov, východ – Prostějov, jih (exits 1–21)  21.0 
D46 Držovice – Olomouc, Slavonín (exit 26 to km 39) 13.0 
D48 Bělotín – Bělotín, east (exits 1–3)   4.0 
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D48 Frýdek-Místek – Žukov (km 47 to exit 70) 19.0 
D52 Rajhrad – Pohořelice, south (exits 10–26) 17.0 
D55 Hulín – Otrokovice (exits 16–32) 16.0 
D56 
Ostrava, Hrabová – industry zone – Frýdek-Místek 
(exits 40–51)    
12.0 
 
3.3. Description of target 
 
The proposed change aims to replace the contemporary paper motorway coupons by 
the electronic version, which would be linked up with the unique vehicle ID. There will 
be no paper or physical form of the electronic coupon. 
The vehicles will be equipped neither by any technical device nor label proving the 
payment of the time-based fee. The fee will be paid at a retailer or via electronic ways 
and the payment will be registered in a central database. The vehicles exempted from the 
payments will be registered in the central database too. 
The goal of the regulation change is to offer an on-line tool for payments of the fee to 
the users (internet sale, mobile applications, etc.). These accesses can reduce costs needed 
for the temporary system of payments, printing and distribution of the coupons. The users’ 
comfort would be improved, especially for the occasional and foreign user of the charged 
roads. Also, the number of the violations of the duty to pay the fee should be reduced 
(including mitigation of the risk of falsification of the coupons). 
 
3.4. Goals of the new charging system 
 
Implementation of the electronic coupons in the time charging system should achieve 
the following goals: 
1. Reliable and continuous way of toll collection.  
2. High efficiency of the toll collection. 
3. Preventive effects of the continuous automatic system of vehicle control on the tolled 
roads. 
4. Repressive effects of the automatic system of enforcement of the fines for the 
violations of the duty to pay the fee. 
5. Modern and user friendly tools and environment for the payments of fee. 
6. Reduction of the current costs of the toll collection. 
The goals cannot be achieved in the temporary toll collection system, which uses the 
paper coupons. 
Achievement of the listed goals can bring following benefits: 
1. Higher comfort for the tolled roads users: 
- expansion of the possibilities of buying the electronic coupon – electronic way,  
- no need to glue the coupons, fill in the registration marks, removal of old coupons, 
- immediate possibility to buy a new coupon via a mobile phone (just before the toll 
road is used), 
- no risk of buying two coupons for one vehicle and one period – protection of the 
user, 
- no need to keep the receipt of payment. 
2. For the recipient of the revenues: 
- higher income from the distribution, 
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- effective way of collection of the fee, reduction of the share of non-paying users 
of the tolled roads, 
- reduction of complaints and claim for replacement of coupons, 
- on-line information on the progress of the sale, 
- swift payments on the income accounts, 
- no need of prints of reserve coupons, no need for logistics and distribution to the 
retailers, no need of disposal of the old coupons, 
- variability of the system. 
 
3.5. Explanation of the need for regulation change 
 
The regulation given by the law no. 13/1997 Coll. [7] brings a complex rule concerning 
the time charging of the vehicles including the roles of individual subjects. The current 
wording of the legislation stipulates that the coupons are used in a paper version. 
To achieve the goals described above the change of the legislation is inevitable. An 
alternative solution in this case is only the “zero” option, which means the conservation 
of the current state. 
The proposed change of legislation would not bring any new obligation for the users 
of the tolled roads; only the current obligations would be transformed technically and 
procedurally. 
 
4.  Methods 
 
The methods used to pursue the risk analysis are chosen and performed according to 
the regulatory environment in the RIA sector. 
 
4.1. The methods given by the government methodology 
 
The risk analysis is an obligatory part of RIA and the way of assessment is undertaken 
by the “Methodology of the risk evaluation within the Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA)” [10]. The document defines the risk and the relation between the risk, the event 
and the negative impact. It describes the way the probability and the impact of the risk 
and event and the sources of risks are identified. 
The methodology states that within the RIA the evaluation is performed in order to 
assess the risks of preservation of the status quo (without the regulation) and the risks of 
the possible options. These two evaluations are performed separately within the RIA 
report.  
The risks of the status quo are assessed within the justification of the regulation. The 
risks of the possible options are assessed within the evaluation of the costs and benefits. 
 
4.2. The risks of status que preservation 
 
This part of the RIA should describe the risk, which would result from the inactivity 
and the preservation of the status quo. These risks are specific, because they are closely 
bound to the reasons of the proposed regulation. Usually these risks become part of the 
discussion about the need for the change and the need for the regulation. 
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4.3. The risks of possible options 
 
The individual options of the proposed regulation can bring uncertainty concerning 
their possible negative impacts (risks). These risks stem mainly from the evaluation of 
the individual options’ impact.  
Since the individual proposed options usually have not been tested in real life, the 
consultation phase is very important as a part of these risks identification.  
 
4.4. The risk assessment process 
 
The process of risks evaluation is recommended to be undertaken as follows and is 
shown in detail in Figure 1: 
1. Risk identification. 
2. Assessment of the degree of risk using the determination of the risk parameters - the   
       probability of the negative impact and the degree of the impact. 
3. The analysis of the possibility of reduction or elimination of the risks. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The risk assessment process 
 
4.4.1. The risk identification 
The risk identification is a crucial step of the process. The RIA usually presents a 
complex problem and the omission of risky facts is prevented by maximization of 
consultation with all the participating stakeholders and specialists. 
The methods of risks identifications are: 
1. Consultations – the parties, which are best qualified to identify the risks, should be 
questioned and consulted.  
Risk identification
•What happens if the status quo is preserved?
•What risks are expected?
•What happens if the indivindual options are implemented?
•What risks are expected?
Assesment of the risk importance paramenters
•What is the probability of the event with a negative impact?
•What would be the extent of the impact?
Analysis of possibility to minimise or the eliminate the risk
•What is the influence of the risk on the assessment of the suitability of the
assessed option?
•Can the risk be minimised in order to enable the option to be evaluated a a
suitable one?
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2. Evaluation of impacts of possible options – the method of progress analysis can be 
used. The evaluator designs sequence of individual events and the possible progress. 
If an uncertain impact is identified it is assessed as a risk. 
3. Lists of typical risks review – the checklists are used in this method for the individual 
options. The best practice is used as a part of this method. 
Numerous complementary methods (e.g. SWOT analysis) can be used for the RIA, if 
it helps to identify the relevant risks. 
 
4.4.2. The risk classification 
For the RIA purposes the risks can be classified as follows: 
1. Legal risks – usually inconsistency of the legal status with other legislative acts 
(national vs. European), 
2. Material risks, 
- economical risks – financial impact on individual subjects, 
- ecological risks – negative environment impacts, 
- social risks – impact on different social groups and increase of inequality in 
society, 
- safety risks – safety of the stakeholders influenced by the regulation, 
3. Political risks – can be prevented by wide consultations and negotiations. 
 
4.4.3. The risk evaluation 
The identified risks are evaluated from the view of their occurrence probability, scope 
and the scale of the impact and the time horizon of the occurrence of the event. The result 
of this analysis determines which risks are important enough to be treated further. 
Probability of the event says the possibility of its occurrence. The probability is 
expressed in percent from 0 % to 100 %. If a probability of an event is higher than 0 there 
is a risk. In some cases, the exact numeric evaluation is not possible. We can only assess 
whether the probability is low or high.  
Apart from the probability we have to assess the intensity of the impact of the event. 
If it is possible the impacts are evaluated as a quantity (e.g. financial amount in CZK). In 
other cases, we assess the scope via qualitative methods. Since there is the uncertainty 
factor, the respective methods can be used (e.g. sensitivity analysis or intervals 
assessment). 
The evaluation scale for assessment of the level of probability and impact is shown in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Evaluation scale. 
 
Probability  Impact  
Very low 1 Very low impact 1 
Low 2 Low impact 2 
Middle 3 Middle impact 3 
High 4 High impact 4 
Very high 5 Very high impact 5 
 
As a result of the probability and impact assessment we can determine the risk degree, 
which results in the strategy of the risk treatment.  The risk matrix is used as a tool of the 
risk classification (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Caption – risk classification. 
 
 
Very low 
impact 
Low impact Middle impact High impact 
Very high 
impact 
Very high 
probability 
5 
low risk 
10 
middle risk 
15 
high risk 
20 
high risk 
25 
high risk 
High 
probability 
4 
low risk 
8 
middle risk 
12 
middle risk 
16 
high risk 
20 
high risk 
Middle 
probability 
3 
low risk 
6 
low risk 
9 
middle risk 
12 
middle risk 
15 
high risk 
Low 
probability 
2 
low risk 
4 
low risk 
6 
low risk 
8 
middle risk 
10 
middle risk 
Very low 
probability 
1 
low risk 
2 
low risk 
3 
low risk 
4 
low risk 
5 
middle risk 
 
If the risk assessment results in the “low” degree, the RIA does not require undertaking 
further steps. The risk and the respective evaluation steps must be described only. In the 
case of the “middle” and “high” risks, the risk has to be treated further by the RIA. 
The RIA requires determining the risks, which are serious enough to decline the 
respective option and to find possibilities to minimize or eliminate risks in order to find 
a suitable option. 
 
5.  Results  
 
The “zero” option, which assumes the conservation of status quo, is assessed according 
to risks, which are identified and evaluated. The performance of this part of the risk 
analysis expects a comprehensive description of current state and its comparison to the 
projected system. 
 
5.1. Identification of risks of the status quo 
 
The following risks were identified for the “zero” option: 
- risk of falsification of the paper coupons, 
- risk of high transaction costs connected with the paper coupons handling, 
- risk of non-using of the modern tools for sale and payments, 
- risk of unavailability of the paper coupons, 
- risk of destroying, losing or theft of the paper coupon, 
- risk of double buying the coupon on the side of users, 
- risk of burdening of the environment by the disposal of the paper coupons, 
- risk of low effectiveness of the fee collection. 
 
5.1.1. Risk of falsification of the paper coupons  
The actual system shows many cases of the falsification of the paper coupons. The risk 
of this fact is a reduction of income, which is higher when higher number of fake coupons.    
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The future losses could be hundreds of millions CZK, since the newly discovered fake 
coupons are characterized by a high quality. 
 
5.1.2. Risk of high transaction costs connected with the paper coupons handling 
Another aspect of the current state is the need of the physical production, storage, 
distribution, exchanges, further production and disposal of the paper coupons. These costs 
could be eliminated by the implementation of the modern technologies.  
The risk of the current state is a conservation of costs connected with the physical 
existence of the coupons and missing the opportunities of the new technologies, which 
could eliminate these costs. 
 
5.1.3. Risk of non-using of the modern tools for sale and payments 
The current state brings a user-unfriendly environment, which cannot benefit from the 
modern tools for sale and payments. 
 
5.1.4. Risk of unavailability of the paper coupons 
A parallel impact of the current state is a risk of unavailability of the coupons in the 
case of selling out, limitation of the distribution network by the opening hours, limitation 
for the foreign users, who cannot buy the coupons abroad. 
 
5.1.5. Risk of destroying, losing or theft of paper coupon 
The existence of the paper coupon brings a risk of destroying or losing the coupon (for 
instance a theft or a broken front glass of the vehicle). 
 
5.1.6. Risk of double buying the coupon on the side of users 
The current system does not prevent the users from buying two coupons for one car 
(by accident, wrong coordination of users, etc.). 
 
5.1.7. Risk of burdening of environment by the disposal of paper coupons 
An ecological aspect of the physical existence of the coupons is a need to dispose the 
expired coupons. Each period (year) requires the distributor to hold a reserve volume of 
coupons in the distribution system, which has to be disposed after the period, is over. 
 
5.1.8. Risk of low effectiveness of fee collection 
The current state brings a risk of a low effectiveness of the fee collection. There is no 
technical possibility to implement an automatic vehicle control system in the current state. 
There is only a random control of the vehicles realized by watching the vehicles, which 
has only low preventive impact on the discipline of users. 
 
5.2. Evaluation of identified risks of status quo 
 
The above identified risks are evaluated according to the RIA methodology consisting 
of the Evaluation scale (Table 2) and the Risk classification (Table 3).  
The individual risks are identified according to the methodology processes and each risk 
is evaluated in the terms of occurrence probability and impact size (Table 4).  
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Table 4. Evaluation of individual risks. 
 
 Probability Impact Total 
Risk of falsification of paper coupons 4 4 16 
Risk of high transaction costs connected 
with the paper coupons handling 
4 5 20 
Risk of non-using of modern tools for 
sale and payments 
5 3 15 
Risk of unavailability of paper coupons 4 4 16 
Risk of destroying, losing or theft of  
paper coupon 
3 3 9 
Risk of double buying the coupon on 
the side of users 
2 2 4 
Risk of burdening of environment by 
the disposal of the paper coupons 
5 5 25 
Risk of low effectiveness of fee 
collection 
5 5 25 
 
The results of the risk analysis were presented as a matrix (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Matrix of evaluated risks. 
 
 
Very 
low 
impact 
Low impact Middle impact High impact 
Very high 
impact 
Very high 
probability 
    
- risk of low 
effectiveness 
of the fee 
collection  
- risk of 
burdening of 
the 
environment 
by the 
disposal of 
the paper 
coupons 
High 
probability 
   
- risk of 
falsification 
- risk of 
unavailabilit
y of the 
paper 
coupons 
- risk of high 
transaction 
costs 
connected 
with the 
paper 
coupons 
handling 
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Middle 
probability 
  
risk of 
destroying, 
losing or theft 
of the paper 
coupon 
 
risk of non- 
using of the 
modern tools 
for sale and 
payments 
Low 
probability 
 
risk of double 
buying the 
coupon on the 
side of users 
   
Very low 
probability 
     
 
The conclusion of evaluation is that some of listed risks are evaluated (Table 4) with 
the result “high” or “middle”. The aim of selection of the best option (which was the stage 
following the evaluation) is to eliminate the most serious risks.  
The RIA process does not require a plan of processing of the identified risks nor a 
proposal of actions to be taken. Only the identification, analysis and evaluation of risks 
of the “zero” option were subject of the process. 
 
6.  Order of options 
 
When dealing with the question of the future system of the time charging of the roads 
in the Czech Republic, the order of options obtained by the Feasibility study [11] is: 
1. OPTION 0: current solution via „paper „coupons.  
2. OPTION 1: technical solution based on the identification of vehicles via video 
identification of the registration mark. 
3. OPTION 2: technical solution based on the identification of vehicles via microwave 
DRSC on-board unit. 
4. OPTION 3: technical solution based on the control of the payment of the time 
charging via the satellite on-board unit. 
5. OPTION 4: technical solution based on the identification of the vehicles via the 
coupons with RFID chip. 
 
6.1. Brief description of analysed options 
 
The Feasibility study [11] provides a detailed evaluation of each option. The option 0 
represents conservation of the current state for the future. This option was used as a 
comparison basis for evaluation of the other options. The option 1 provides a new 
technical solution to detect and control the time charging for the use of toll roads by 
vehicles weighing less than 3.5 tones. The vehicle will be registered in a central database 
with its unique the registration mark and the state of registration. The control will be 
carried out by automatic camera system recognizing the registration marks of the vehicles 
and the subsequent comparison with the records time charges in the central database. 
The option 2 provides a new technical solution to detect and control the time charging 
of the fee for the use of toll roads by vehicles weighing up to 3.5 tones. Vehicles in the 
system of charging time will be fitted with an electronic on-board unit (OBU). It is 
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proposed to use the units, using short-range microwave communications at a frequency 
of 5.8 GHz, dedicated to telematics applications in transport. 
The option 3provides a new technical solution to detect and control the time charging 
for the use of toll roads by vehicles weighing less than 3.5 tones. Vehicles in the system 
of time charging will be fitted with an electronic on-board unit (OBU). It is proposed to 
use units employing satellite GNSS positioning and mobile telephony GSM / CN. 
The option 4 provides a completion of the technical solution of time charging based 
on coupons with the possibility of electronic control without having to stop the vehicle, 
reduce speed or use a dedicated lane. The motorway coupons in the paper form will 
contain the security features on RFID identification chip that enables electronic checking. 
 
6.2. Estimating the order of options and a selection of recommended option 
 
The Feasibility study [11] recommends the following order of proposed options:  
1. Option 1 – Video tolling.     
2. Option 0 – Paper coupons.  
3. Option 4 – RFID.    
4. Option 2 – Microwave.   
5. Option 3 – Satellite.  
The option of using video detection was evaluated from the view costs of operation, 
technical solutions, requirements of users and system implementation. In the used 
methodology, the video technology was evaluated as the most suitable. 
 
6.3. The affected entities 
 
During the RIA elaboration, there were consultations performed in order to detect the 
most suitable option, which will be acceptable for all respective stakeholders. 
The affected stakeholders are the following authorities and entities: 
1. State Fund of Transport Infrastructure and Ministry of Transport. 
2. Ministry of Finance and Customs Administration. 
3. Ministry of Interior. 
4. Police of the Czech Republic. 
5. Roads and Motorways Directorate of the Czech Republic. 
6. Citizens, entrepreneurs. 
7. Disabled persons. 
The most affected groups are the citizens and entrepreneurs. The other authorities will 
be affected by technical or procedural changes of the current processes. 
A benefit of selected option falls primarily on citizens and businesses, which can use 
an electronic method of payment, without having to purchase, posting or removal of a 
paper coupon as it is currently. With the ability to pay the fee using electronic sales 
channels the distribution network can expand. 
For entrepreneurs, the change brings simplification of the process of payment for the 
entire fleet of vehicles of the entity without requiring physical posting coupons. 
In terms of state revenues is the positive impact of a much better opportunity to control 
and enforcement of the obligation to pay time fee. At the same time the very existence of 
a more robust monitoring system works preventively against violations of the obligation 
to pay the fee and time can bring increased revenue. 
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The new obligation may be negatively perceived by the persons exempted from the 
payment.  Regular registration in the database of exempted people (and their specific 
vehicle) will be required. Without the registration of exempt vehicles into the system it 
cannot be operated in the charged network until the fee is paid. Unregistered vehicle 
would be recorded as a vehicle committing a breach duty to pay the fee. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The risk evaluation is an obligatory part of the RIA to the new legislation or legislative 
change. The methodology of RIA risk assessment was used in the case of the proposal of 
the law no 13/1997 Coll., which is proposed to be changed in order to implement new 
system of the time fee collection on the charged roads and motorways in the Czech 
Republic. The selected option of the fee collection should answer to the highest risks 
identified by the risk analysis of the “zero” option. The performed RIA resulted into the 
recommendation of the video detection system for the purpose of the operation of the 
tolled roads in the Czech Republic. 
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Chapter 7  
 
EMPLOYEES FLUCTUATION RISKS AND HOW TO MEASURE 
THEM* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Risk can be seen from different points of view and can affect different systems [1]. 
Long-time existing company can face many problems and risks. From minor ones like 
bankruptcy of one of many possible suppliers to major one like technological shift in 
current industry and with this connected decline of quantity of sold product and 
decreasing of companies’ revenue. This paper aims on soft part of the system (a company) 
risks and also benefits connected with process of selecting employees with probable 
intention to leave the company. 
In case a key employees leave the company this could result in threat to an 
organization's operations, development of new products or services and innovations of 
introduced ones. Also know-how, important business contact and information can be lost. 
The organization's survival depends upon their readiness and supporting tools in the face 
of these threats. 
European economy is still in good condition [2]. Unemployment rates are quite low 
and companies suffer from understaffed professions like programmers, general 
practitioners, dentists and medical staff in general but also qualified labour force. In this 
situation could loose of one or group of key leading employees result in existential 
problems of the company. Companies must be ready to this inevitable development. 
Getting to know own employees, their value and values, their importance for the company 
is one way how to improve quality of decisions made about these employees. 
Research [3] showed that more that 20% of respondents plan to expand their business 
in 2017. This means that additional employees will be needed and as shown previously 
Czech Republic has quite small supply of qualified unemployed workforce. 
Solution of this situation can be requalification of unemployed applicants but this 
could be costly and also takes time to successfully receive necessary skills. Opposite side 
of this approach is that the success rate of requalification could be lower than estimated 
and costs of this activity were totally unacceptable. 
On the other hand, making contact with unsatisfied employees of different company 
(or competitor) and offer them to change employer is easier but ethically discountable. 
One could say that this approach can start or escalate competition between these 
companies as the result of headhunting of scares employees not available on the job 
market. 
 
2. Background research and solution concept 
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) goals are to reveal, describe and analyse the relations 
among e.g. individuals or organizations. Different tools (e.g. social network  
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metric, sociogram, matrix) can be used to represent social network structure e.g. the nodes 
and connections between them and compare different networks. 
Moreno laid foundations of Social Network Analysis when he observed the 
interactions within small social groups and he has developed a system of communication 
and interaction records which were published in his work in 1934 [4]. He is also one of 
the first researchers who introduced a graphical representation of social networks and 
who has created a sociogram. 
If we separate the form and the content of the communication it is possible to identify 
and to compare the structure of various social groups, and to create the models of their 
relations based on mathematical analysis of the networks [5]. 
Figure 1 shows example of a social network within a company. Every point represents 
an employee, colour represents that this point belongs to a group and line shows that these 
two employees are connected and they exchange information. Detail description of these 
connections is possible by using different metrics and values (e.g. number of interactions, 
duration, etc.). 
 
Fig. 1. Example of one possible layouts of sociogram. Where points represent employees 
and their colour represents group, in which they belong. Line represents connection 
between two employees (this sociogram shows that every connection works both ways). 
 
For every node and network, a number of parameters can be observed, e.g. closeness 
centrality, clustering coefficient, degree, durability, eigenvector centrality, intensity, etc. 
[6]. 
Graph level measures express the structure and characteristics of the network. Every 
node has sets of metrics too (e.g. centrality express position of a node within the network, 
degree is number of nodes directly connected to concrete node, etc.). 
Degree centralization indicates if there is big difference between nodes degrees. If 
every node in the network has the same number of connections to other nodes degree 
centrality is 0. 
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The density of a network describes how many connections are within the network and 
how much nodes we have. If the network is well connected (e.g. every node is directly 
connected to 50% of other nodes within the network) information spreads quickly, on the 
other hand low density makes it hard for information to be communicated. 
Average centrality in combination with other metrics values can describe and reveal 
additional information about structure of the network (e.g. there is a few well connected 
nodes and rest of them is with low degree). 
To gather, process, measure, calculate and evaluate there is number of tools. Some of 
them offer free or low cost use for scientific purposes (e.g. NodeXL, Gephi). Also much 
more expensive tools are available with specialized functions (e.g. ONASurveys). 
List of software for social network analysis could be found for example in [7]. 
Study of Carboni and Ehrlich shows that individuals close to the core of a team 
outperformed more peripheral individuals, but only to the extent that teams were high-
performing or had been together longer as a team [8]. The research results also coincide 
with a general discussion on the implications for human resources theory and practices 
targeted at improving individual performance outcomes. 
To be able to map the social network easily we need sufficient source of data. The 
work of Kazienko et al. lists main data sources [9]. There are several cheap and fast 
sources of information about structure of the social network within the company. Mainly 
e-mail communication, instant messaging records, information about meetings and phone 
calls could be used to get brief image about how the social network of the company could 
look like. 
Additional tools could be used to get more accurate Figure of actual social network 
structure. Questioners for employees about their contacts and frequency of the contact 
could be also used. Connections like meeting at lunch, smoking room or out of work 
activities could be discovered when we use a questionnaire. 
Newer statistical approach how to reconstruct the network when e.g. detailed 
information (e.g. exact time) is not available in the log files of the tracked events are 
mentioned in the work of Corallo et al. [10]. Some files might not include time range 
when a given user participated to a given activity. Set of matrix and heuristic methods 
can use to reason probable structure of the network. Agent-based simulation could be also 
used to predict structure of a group [11] showed that it is possible to use CLUS-SOCI (an 
agent-based and CLUStering tool for simulating SOCIograms) to train the program to be 
able to predict actual structure of groups based on set of training data. 
 
3.  Data description 
 
Data used to validate the research were acquired from different systems. E-mail 
network was used as a background, mainly information about who is writing to whom 
and what is the subject of the message (form: Sender, Receiver or Receivers, Subject). 
Blind carbon copies were also included. As additional data are used exports form logs of 
company’s instant messaging system and also data from attendance at meetings. 
Company managers selected 15 employees for parallel questionnaire information 
harvesting. The questionnaire was focussed on work satisfaction, revenue and desired 
benefits. Last phase consisted of structured interviews with highlighted employees by the 
initial analysis. 
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4. Method of research 
 
Set of processes using social network analysis to identify important employees within 
social network of the company was prepared. These important persons, together with key 
employees connected with research and development and also with unique skills or know-
how should be focused, periodically gathered information about their attitude towards the 
company and current work position. 
 
4.1. Creation of social network map 
 
Figure 2 shows process of social network map creation. 
 
Research 
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processing data
Research end
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Records
E-mails
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sufficient?
Search for 
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Evaluating 
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Social 
network 
model
Additional 
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Data Source
Interviews
Final 
conclusions
Directed 
Interviews  
Records
 
 
Fig.  2.  Process of creation of a social network map. 
 
The process starts with information sources description and evaluation of their quality. 
This process and evaluation is feasible only if certain level of quality of information 
sources has been met. Otherwise additional costs to prepare, distribute and evaluate large 
volume of questioners with possible inaccuracy of responses must be expanded. Selected 
sources are mined to receive information about who is communicating with whom. Based 
on these records, we can create social network model. To evaluate if the model is covering 
real structure of the network we can ask a sample of employees if recognized connections 
are all they have within the company or we missed some of them. To validate the model 
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of the network it is possible to perform interviews with sample of employees. If we 
discover that our model missed more that small amount of connections (depends on 
structure of the company, number of employees, etc.), there should we a meeting with 
responsible project team and they should search for the reasons why the model is not 
sufficient. Most common reasons are company culture and unofficial meetings which are 
not covered by electronic devices (e.g. smoking room). This is necessary for decision, if 
it is possible to effectively improve the model and if so, which data sources and methods 
should we use. 
 
4.2. Evaluation of social network map and additional data sources 
 
Figure 3 shows process of Social network evaluation. We can use the social network 
map as input for social network analysis methods. After structural analysis we can choose 
appropriate additional methods of analysis to improve results reasoned from the input 
data. There is group of classical method describing network, nodes and groups within 
social network based on mathematical analysis; another approach is based on heuristic 
analysis of the network.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Selection and performance of selected method or methods. 
 
 
The heuristic analysis will be preferred in case, that the source data are not complete 
(e.g. are not describing whole networks or we have incomplete records of 
communication) and it is necessary to predict probable structure of missing nodes or 
nodes which are described insufficiently. Results of the analysis should include 
information about social network position of each evaluated employee (e.g. his or hers 
Eigen vector, degree, centralities, etc.), results of evaluation by his or hers superior, 
colleagues and subordinates. Also job description and job history should be included. As 
additional sources of date could be used overview of available job positions at 
advertisement servers (in Czech e.g. www.prace.cz, www.jobs.cz, etc.). 
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4.3 Process of evaluation, group distinction by probable risk of leaving a company 
 
Result of this evaluation should be an index from 0 to 1 where employee with low 
(approximately from 0 to 0.2) is likely ready to leave the company. Employee who scores 
from 0.2 to 0.8 (boarders not included) might leave but he or she will probably need 
bigger incentive and employee with index near 1 has probably no intentions to accept 
offer from another employer. Part of equation is weight of each factor (sum of these four 
weights must be 1). 
First part of index is social network position. Because every company’s social network 
is more or less unique and due constant changes of environment major changes over time 
can occur we should compare an employee to his or her kind (same work position or same 
department, etc.). We can calculate social network position of each employee and order 
them by result of clustering coefficient or different metrics within the network. The group 
of employees with highest values will score 1 to 0.8. 
Second part of index is internal evaluation of the employee. Based on his or her 
evaluation by co-workers and also background like education, job history, etc. Again, 
employees with highest overall score (qualified, with great score from colleagues, etc.) 
will receive 1. Employees not meeting the criteria will score less. Another factor is that 
employee who commutes every day for two hours is more likely to accept a good job 
offer near his or hers home than employee living nears his work place. Important part is 
self-evaluation of the employee, connected with job satisfaction, career options and 
promotion. 
Third part of index is connected with job positions available for this employee by other 
companies. This evaluation goal is to find out how easy it is for the employee to find 
another job with same or better position. 
Last part of index is reserved for special and additional points reserved for factors not 
included in three previous parts of the index like unique skills not included in internal 
part of the evaluation. 
 
The index is possible to calculate as: 
 
𝐼𝑛 = 𝐴 × 𝑆𝑜𝑐 + 𝐵 ×  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝐶 × 𝑂𝑢𝑡 + 𝐷 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 
 
where:  In is the index of employee’ stability, Soc is the social network position, Inter is 
the result of internal evaluation of an employee, Out is the result of overview of available 
work positions outside of the company, Special is additional points (unique skills, know-
how, etc.), A, B, C, D are weights of each factor, sum of weights is 1.  
This index combined with other methods of human resource management should 
highlight employees which are important to the company stability (e.g. those who provide 
important information to the rest of the cluster or group, with unique skills or important 
knowledge) and also could easily leave the company.  
The management of company should make decision to offer seminars, training or study 
break to these employees who score high index score and also during interviews/self-
evaluation express desire to improve their skills, receive new certification related to their 
position or express concern that they lack new skills which could help them to work more 
efficiently. 
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5.  Demonstration of the index 
 
Presented index was tested since late 2016 on data from a middle size company 
operating mainly in Prague and Brno, Czech Republic. 
Based on presented processes social network model of employees’ interactions was 
assembled. The model was successfully tested after 10% of randomly chosen employees 
and two key employees (with highest Eigen vector) within the company were interviewed 
to confirm conclusions made based on the model. Only minor deviations were discovered 
(e.g. assumed connection between two employees was stronger than was expected 
because of recent events). 
Second part was calculation of additional relevant metrics of social network and every 
node. Additional data were linked to every employee (e.g. work position and its 
description, qualification (level of education, education classification), distance from 
home address to his or hers work place and duration by car, public transportation and on 
foot (in case they live less than 4 km from work place, etc.)). 
Portal www.jobs.cz and one private head hunting company was used to find number 
and quality of job offers for every group of employees (from less qualified employees to 
top managers and data architects of the company). Available LinkedIn profiles of the 
company employees were also checked for changes and possible signs that the employee 
is possibly looking for a new job (function of hidden availability for possible employers 
was intentionally not tested). 
For every employee of company, a set of more than four hundred criteria was created. 
Tens of thousands values in total were in the final version of tables for the whole 
company, most of them generated by scripts, imported and transformed from a company’ 
system or public system. Some of the values (e.g. results of employee evaluation from 
their superior etc.) had to be done manually. Some of the values (e.g. there wasn’t found 
any LinkedIn profile, the employee was in the company just a few months and no previous 
evaluation was available, etc.). Last part of the index (Special) was inserted by direct 
superior of evaluated employee in first week of December 2016 based on prepared manual 
(e.g. recent actions of the employee which are not included in the previous reviews). 
Last part of the calculations consisted of final check of values for extreme values and 
possible errors and then the score for every employee was calculated for every part and 
the final value of the index has been calculated (weights of A, B, C, D were set after 
discussion of top managers to 0.2, 0.5, 0.2 and 0.1). 
Several red flags raised and marked 6 employees with score 0.2 and less at the end of 
the research. 
These employees could be or even might be open to accept an offer from another 
employer and it will be probably difficult to replace them with sufficient replacement in 
weeks or even months. 
One of them commuted 1 hour and 48 minutes every day had history of changing 
employers and is at non-crucial position. Hers direct supervisor refused to take any action 
to prevent her from leaving the company. 
Another discovered employee already left the company before the research result was 
delivered. 
Result showed that rest of them were from same crucial department of the company. 
In case these four employees decide to leave, the company will be in existential troubles 
because the department will lose two thirds of the employees with specialised skills and 
knowledge. This information let the managers to update crisis scenarios to reduce 
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possible vulnerability and impact (to find possible supplier in case they need to replace 
their function) and also prepared a package of incentives to improve the department 
loyalty. 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
Presented sets of processes and the index could help with discovering which employee 
could be both important to the company and ready to leave it. In case the company wants 
to prevent that or postpone this certification or additional education could be offered as 
well as partial work from home or other benefits. 
Framework to estimate returns in training of an employee is presented at [12]. They 
found that an increase in training investments is significantly linked to an increase in 
revenue per employee. Also, those large firms benefit more from training. 
Research by [13] showed that the provision of company training is largely determined 
by firm-specific factors, such as human resource management practices. 
Survey of HAYS Company at 2016 showed that 69% of employees in Czech Republic 
are expecting salary increase after they change their employer and 62% further career 
advancement [14]. From employers’ point of view 73% of companies is offering language 
courses and 64% offer further education of their employees (certification, etc.). 
On the other hand, there is real risk that new skills could improve value of the 
employee at job market and there will be stronger pressure from him or her to increase 
his or her salary and work conditions. 
Problem of migration of labour force to Germany and Austria is also one of the 
concerns of the employers. This risk of loose qualified labour force is probably higher in 
the border regions. Several larger cities (e.g. Brno, Plzeň, Most or Ústí nad Labem) are 
within every day or work week commute range with much more interesting work 
positions, with better work condition and financial perspectives. The employee can get 
self-confidence to try working abroad after receiving language courses. This could result 
in undesired situation which could end up in higher salary. 
Focussing right employees for additional language or specific training could enforce 
their loyalty to the employer and sign that the employee is important to the company. 
Also the process of learning could bring change of environment for the employee and 
break the day to day routine. 
Another possible risk of this process of choosing the right employees is that unhappy 
employee is skipped and this will trigger his or her process of leaving the company 
without suitable replacement. 
 
7.  Conclusions  
 
Problem of evaluating employees and risk of leaving their company without having 
proper replacement is quite serious when we consider current situation at the job market. 
Crucial employees must be discovered and the company should offer them several 
benefits like additional training, benefits or special care. The prepared set of processes, 
which should help to evaluate and choose employees with high risk of leaving their 
current company, has been demonstrated. These processes use among other things 
methods of social network analysis to identify attributes of employees describing their 
social network position, internal and external sources of data and information as well. 
Main benefits of selecting employees for direct offers to improve their work satisfaction 
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could enforce loyalty of the employee, improving his or her skills and thru this work 
performance. Additional benefit of a future trainings could be chance to meet other people 
from the company and improve social network position within the company. 
Main part of this chapter could be seen in results of the applied research in a company. 
The research took almost two months and successfully identified employees with high 
risk of leaving the company. Based on the results management of the company took contra 
measures like additional packages of benefits for selected employees. Also human 
resources and how the company is working with them started to be an issue. 
Risks of not only further education but also flexible working hours or home office 
could be seen in the fact, that some employees could be missed during the selection 
process, also investments to the employees could not return to the company in case the 
new skills are not practiced and not related to his or her work or new freedoms are 
misused. One of the major concerns these days is also migration of work force to different 
company of even to different country due higher standard of living and career 
opportunities. 
Every company must consider this delicate topic with caution. Like every decision in 
human resources management this could start chain reaction with massive consequences. 
In 2017 there are already signs that European economy has reached peak and in years 
to come there is growing concerns of economic decline. This will almost certainly change 
job market situation and importance of employee migration as well. 
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Chapter 8  
 
ASSESMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN ENTERPRISES 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The current economic environment bringing permanent fears of the globalisation 
effects emphasises more and more the need to change the understanding of the security. 
The traditional perception of security as a state linked with the ability to ensure forces 
and means for defending the country’s territory against armed conflicts is retreating. The 
security is becoming a system phenomenon which enlarges understanding the national 
security in relation to preserving the quality of life as well as the economic stability of the 
state [1]. The stability should not be perceived solely from the point of view of the need 
to protect the country’s sovereignty but also from preserving adequate life conditions. 
Not only the state but also other economic subjects that operate inside of it perceive the 
security more and more from the economic point of view and it is of primary importance 
for them to ensure the resources (monetary, material and personal ones) which would give 
them a feeling of security [2]. This is also the reason why it is necessary to perceive the 
security as a complex consisting of components which overlap and affect each other. This 
paper will characterise one of the components, namely the economic security which can 
be perceived as [2]: 
- the security of the economic subjects, processes and relations between them,  
- the sustainability of the given processes and relations between the economic subjects 
in terms of fulfilling the requirements of economy.  
The object of the economic security can be – an individual or a small social group, an 
enterprise, the regional self-government and the state. The international perception of the 
economic security adds here also the economic and integration groups but also the global 
economics.  
This chapter deals with the economic security of an enterprise. Based on the available 
information about a selected group of companies we will state the boundary values of the 
economic security in four basic areas characterising the financial situation of the 
companies from the selected line of business. 
 
2.  Background research and solution concept 
 
The economic security of an enterprise is influenced by a complex of factors affecting 
the enterprise in the same time. These factors result in risks. Risk can be defined as: “Risk 
is a condition in which there is a possibility of an adverse deviation from a desired 
outcome that is expected or hoped for [3]”. 
Risks can be classified as internal and external ones. The internal risks result from 
activity of the enterprise itself and consist of items such as an unsuitable structure of  
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capital and assets, insolvency, inability to maintain the ownership structure, of capital and 
assets, insolvency, inability to maintain the ownership structure, the character and  
development of the transformation process, intentional or unintentional errors caused by 
employees, process and management failures, shortages and errors in the area of 
concluding contracts, information explosion, etc. [4, 5] The external risks impact the 
enterprise from its surroundings. Here, they belong to competition, disruption of 
confidentiality, accessibility and integrity of information, corruption, situation on the 
financial market, exchange rate risk, act of sabotage, espionage [6], demographic and 
educational structure, industrial accidents, geophysical and climatological phenomena, 
etc. [5]. All of mentioned risks affect the enterprise goals. 
The majority of the known definitions of the enterprise [7, 8, 9, and 10] show directly 
or indirectly that one of the main goals of the enterprise is to achieve profit. This requires 
from the enterprise to have a sufficient amount of financial means for performing the 
entrepreneurial activities and to utilise the means in such a way that its return will be 
ensured, i.e. the adequate profitability. 
However, under the means for performing the entrepreneurial activities we do not 
think solely the monetary means in cash or other financial assets but also the work and 
physical capital. The task of the enterprise is to select and utilise the employees and 
manufacturing equipment in such a way that will ensure the highest productivity of work. 
But here we have to take into account the fact the excessive utilisation of these 
manufacturing factors can cause their failure and losses of property, health or even 
people’s lives.  
The resources the enterprise utilises for performing its activities are at the same time 
the resources of its economic security [11]. They can have both tangible and intangible 
form. 
The intangible resources of the enterprise economic security are created by the human 
abilities, information, utilising the technologies, patents, licences, know-how but also the 
enterprise’s reputation. From the point of view of the economic security the human 
abilities and information are considered to be the most important resources. Due to their 
character and because it is impossible to assess them financially, it is a very complicated 
thing to state criteria for assessing the enterprise economic security. The enterprise can 
determine e.g. the optimal number of employees but is not able to enumerate what 
financial resources are to be invested to e.g. the development of technologies for the 
economic security not to be threatened. 
The financial tangible resources of the economic security arise inside the enterprise or 
the enterprise achieves them from the external environment. For the economic security it 
is important for the enterprise to be able to ensure a sufficient amount of the financial 
resources in such a way it will be able to perform the entrepreneurial activities, to pay its 
liabilities to the business partners, banks, insurance companies, the state and in the case 
of emergencies to be able to ensure putting the enterprise to the original state. 
The typical natural tangible resources of the enterprise economic security are – the 
buildings, manufacturing and other equipment, transport means, estates and inventories, 
in other words the tangible components of the long-term and short-term property utilised 
in the framework of the entrepreneurial activities or which ensure the premises for their 
operation. From the point of view of the economic security it is important for the natural 
resources to be deployed in the enterprise in such a way they will enable to achieve the 
highest possible savings and their utilisation will be as high as possible. 
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The natural tangible resources of the enterprise economic security represent (from the 
balance point of view) the capital and property of the enterprise and their values are 
reflected in the financial statements. Therefore, the financial and economic indicators [12] 
– we will be dealing with them also in the analytical part of this paper – are the most 
important means which enables revealing the symptoms of a negative development in the 
area of the enterprise economic security. However, enterprises have to manage all partial 
risks resulting from corporate assets (tangible or intangible) in the terms of economic 
security.  
 
3.  Data description 
 
The Slovak Republic is an export-oriented country and the automotive industry is its 
key line of business covering more than 40 % of Slovakia’s industrial production. Due to 
this fact we chose companies ranked according to the classification of the economic 
activity SK NACE to the sub-group 29.10.0 – Production of Motor Vehicles. 175 
companies performed this activity in Slovakia by 1st August 2016 and 77 of them 
published their financial statements and number of employees in the Register of Financial 
Statements. 
The analysis was carried out for the financial year 2015, i.e. from 1st January 2015 to 
31st December 2015 based on the financial statements published on the web site of the 
Register of Financial Statements established by the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak 
Republic [13]. Through determining the time span we reduced the number of the analysed 
companies to 62 and it represents more than 35 % of all enterprises dealing with 
production of motor vehicles. We removed one enterprise from this group of enterprises 
– it was declared bankrupt and its economic results would have distorted the values of the 
indicators achieved. It was also necessary to exclude 20 enterprises, the economic results 
of which did not enable calculating all financial and economic indicators. 
 
4.  Method 
 
One of the criteria which can be implemented for determining the general criteria of 
the enterprise economic security is the comparison method. The comparisons can be as 
follows: 
- with the plan when the really achieved results are compared with the planned ones, 
- in time when we monitor the development of the selected indicators for a certain time 
period, 
- in space when the results of certain selected enterprise are compared with others. 
The third method, the so called intercompany comparison which states the values 
typical e.g. for a certain line of business and subsequently they can be modified regarding 
other characteristics of the observed object of the economic security, e.g. the time period 
or it is possible to make the planned values more accurate is the most suitable one for 
stating the criteria of economic security. 
The intercompany comparison enables revealing reserves in the companies´ activities 
in such a way they show the differences of the companies´ activities and shows those 
enterprises whose resoles are worse or better.  
One of the methods enabling to realise the intercompany comparison is the method of 
the indicators´ variability. Its basis is the symptom of a certain state of the enterprise. A 
symptom can be a certain system of indicators and on the basis of their 
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changeability/variability it is possible to identify the strengths or weaknesses of the 
enterprise [14] and also the areas threatening the enterprise economic security. 
For us to be able to realise the comparison procedure, it is necessary to set a system of 
indicators which characterise the activities of the compared enterprises as 
comprehensively as possible. A determinative criterion for their selection is the 
possibility to compare them with other companies of the same line of business. Therefore, 
it is necessary to choose such indicators which can provide the same information of all 
conditions being compared. Usually they are the value indicators (absolute or 
proportional ones) but we can also use the natural indicators (e.g. the number of 
employees in operation per one manager or a manufacturing device, etc.). It is also 
important for the compared companies to have the quantitative characteristics (e.g. the 
achieved turnover, the number of employees, the total assets, etc.).  
Due to the fact that we have available only the financial statements, we decided solely 
for identification of financial risks affecting enterprise economic security. They conduct 
the system of eleven indicators which contains the proportional indicators characterising 
the liquidity (the equations 1and 2), the activity (the equations 3 – 5), the indebtedness 
and the financial structure (equations 6 – 7) and profitability (the equations 8 – 11) of the 
companies in the group. The following equations were used for their calculation [15]: 
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iesLiabilitCurrent
FundsInvestedsEquivalentCashCash
RatioCash

  [-]   (2) 
360
SalesNet
InventoryAverage
PeriodConversionInventory   [days]   (3) 
360
SalesNet
ceivablesReAverage
PeriodConversionceivablesRe   [days]  (4) 
360
SalesNet
iesLiabilit
PeriodConversioniesLiabilit   [days]    (5) 
EquityTotal
DebtTotal
RatioLeverageFinancial   [-]     (6) 
EquityTotal
EquityrShareholde
RatiofinancingSelf   [-]    (7) 
100
Sales
FlowCash
Salesof%inFlowCash   [%]     (8) 
100
EquityrShareholde
ofitPrNet
EquityonturnRe   [%]    (9) 
100
AssetsTotal
ofitPrNet
AssetsonturnRe   [%]     (10) 
100
EquityTotal
InterestsofitPrNet
InvestmentonturnRe 

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The maximal and minimal value achieved in the group of the compared companies is 
detected for each chosen enterprise. The minimal and maximal value of the indicator 
defines the variation range of the companies included in the group. 
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Subsequently the values of each indicator are ranked from the minimum to maximum 
and the median is determined.  
In the next phase we determine the quartiles. The value of the upper quartile is 
determined by the value of the indicator in the enterprise which determines those 
enterprises whose indicators move between the median and maximum. We achieve the 
value of the bottom quartile in a similar way. It corresponds with the value of the 
enterprise indicator which determines the place of the companies achieving lower values 
of the indicator than the median. The range between the upper and bottom quartile is 
called the quartile range or also the standard zone. In a very simplified way we can say 
that the value of the upper and bottom quartile represents the boundary values of the 
enterprise economic security on the base of financial risks. But, it is necessary to consider 
system relationships with other partial risks, which could affect determined boundaries. 
It is suitable to depict this method graphically for a complex comparison of the 
particular enterprise’s position in the investigated group of enterprises. The maximal and 
minimal values (variation range), the median and the values of the bottom and upper 
quartile are marked in the diagram for all selected indicators. Subsequently the values of 
indicators achieved by the particular enterprise are depicted and they are connected for a 
better illustration – in this way we create a line of the enterprise’s position. If the 
enterprise’s position line bypasses the standard zone, it can show disruptions of the 
enterprise economic security but also a situation when the enterprise achieves higher 
economic security than other companies. Thus, correct understanding of the meaning of 
deviations from the standard depends on a specific asset or indicator. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The investigated statistic group consists of 41 enterprises carrying out a similar activity 
classified as production of motor vehicles. However, their quantitative characteristics are 
different. The number of employees according to which the companies are divided into 
micro-enterprises, small enterprises, medium enterprises and large enterprises was taken 
into account. The Figure 1 shows the structure of the companies from the point of view 
of employees´ numbers. 
Fig. 1. Structure of the enterprises according to their size [13]. 
 
Fig. 1. Structure of the enterprises according to their size [13]. 
 
In the first step we acquired information from the financial statements which were used 
for calculating the financial and economic indicators according to the equation 1 – 11. 
Subsequently we determined the values of minimum, bottom quartile, median, upper 
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quartile and maximum for each indicator. The real values were transformed to the 
percentage ones due to the median which was assigned the value of 100 %. The Table 
1shows the transformed values of the variation range for the whole sub-category of the 
29.10.0 companies. 
 
Table 1. Variation range. 
 
Indicator Designation 
Variation Range 
Minimal 
Value in % 
Maximal 
Value in % 
Current Ratio I1 2.23 16 135.96 
Cash Ratio I2 13.78 11 643.63 
Inventory Conversion Period I3 0.00 41 188.62 
Receivables Conversion Period I4 0.00 1 724.73 
Liabilities Conversion Period I5 0.74 9 240.91 
Financial Leverage Ratio I6 1.10 316.55 
Self-financing Ratio I7 -296.28 297.30 
Cash Flow in% of Sales I8 -3 256.74 822.11 
Return on Equity I9 -6 110.60 31 457.16 
Return on Assets I10 -9 475.51 1 745.87 
Return on Investment I11 -9 369.06 1 726.26 
 
The Table 1 clearly shows the group of enterprises is remarkably heterogeneous. It is 
demonstrated by the wide variation range. The biggest dispersion of values is recorded in 
the indicator profitability of the shareholders' equity whose values move from – 6.110.60 
% to 31.457.16 %. Due to this fact we used also the classification of the enterprises from 
the point of view of their size for calculating the boundaries of the economic security 
(quartile range). The Table 2 depicts the boundaries of the economic security of the 
enterprise sub-class SK NACE 29.10.0 – the micro-enterprises, small enterprises, 
medium enterprises and large enterprises. 
 
Table 2. Boundaries of economic security. Q1= Bottom Quartile, Q3 = Upper Quartile. 
 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
Boundaries of economic security 
29.10.0 
micro-
enterprises 
small enterprises 
medium 
enterprises 
large 
enterprises 
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 
I1 41.64 266.50 31.75 169.61 56.29 763.63 97.41 102.59 80.36 111.10 
I2 60.30 192.31 73.24 176.99 55.97 479.83 94.35 105.65 73.66 110.02 
I3 0.00 452.04 0.00 599.07 0.00 305 247.67 93.34 106.66 42.34 168.33 
I4 40.27 243.83 27.86 292.22 20.02 149.96 96.39 103.61 79.44 238.41 
I5 56.96 314.80 63.29 362.12 56.18 351.79 87.80 112.20 90.14 533.72 
I6 52.85 141.89 58.17 151.92 19.20 130.36 86.16 113.84 88.71 107.00 
I7 24.10 199.92 35.66 179.78 -103.50 641.53 7.10 192.90 74.88 119.94 
I8 1.25 338.04 0.98 266.86 -170.51 403.09 84.03 115.97 33.45 167.59 
I9 39.85 294.72 18.99 385.61 41.48 370.70 169.37 30.63 90.32 123.86 
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I10 -9.82 256.42 -9.82 383.15 -419.73 530.33 85.08 114.92 72.02 133.02 
I11 1.42 253.54 1.13 301.54 -419.73 530.33 90.31 109.69 72.50 132.85 
 
The next step compares the economic security of a particular enterprise with the 
determined boundaries. When we assess the chosen enterprise economic security we 
compare its values of achieved indicators with the standard (quartile) zone. If the value 
of indicators is in this zone, the economic security of the X enterprise is maintained. If 
the values are outside of this zone it is necessary to consider the character of the particular 
indicator. If it is, e.g. the activity ratios, it is good if the value is as low as possible. On 
the other hand, the profitability ratios should achieve the highest values. The character of 
some indicators does not allow assessing directly their influence on the enterprise 
economic security and then we need a deeper analysis. 
One enterprise was chosen from virtually every group (the micro-enterprises, small 
enterprises and large enterprises). The number of medium-sized enterprises was too small 
to be able to carry out intercompany comparison. 
Firstly, this paper assesses the economic security of micro-enterprise operating in the 
region of Zilina. It was founded by one person and was registered in the Trade Register 
on 11th March 2014. The legal form is a Ltd. Company. Furthermore, it will be designated 
as X1 enterprise. The graphical depiction of the X1 enterprise’s position in the group of 
indicators, the so called line of the enterprise’s position is depicted in red colour – see the 
Figure 2. 
Due to the fact the selected indicators have absolutely different values we completed 
the results of the situation in the area of the X1 enterprise economic security by a table. 
The Table 3 shows the real values of the indicators in difference to the Table 2 where the 
percentage values regarding the median are depicted. 
Out of the selected group of indicators five are in the standard zone therefore we can 
say their values do not disrupt the X1 enterprise economic security. The value of the 
Current Ratio is moderately over the standard zone. The X1 enterprise is able to pay its 
short-term liabilities more reliably than other micro-enterprises. However, if the liquidity 
ratios were too high, it could inform about an inappropriate utilisation of the short-term 
assets. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Line of the enterprise’s X1 position. 
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Table 3. Comparison of X1 enterprise with the boundaries of economic security. 
 
Indicator Standard 
Zone 
X1 
Enterprise 
State of Economic 
Security 
Current Ratio 0.38 – 2.03 2.39 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Cash Ratio 0.99 – 2.39 2.39 Non-Disrupted, Upper 
Quartile 
Inventory Conversion 
Period 
0.00 – 107.37 0.00 Non-Disrupted, Bottom 
Quartile 
Receivables Conversion 
Period 
7.60 – 79.75 0.00 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Liabilities Conversion 
Period 
64.66 – 369.92 121.97 Non-Disrupted 
Financial Leverage Ratio 33.22 – 86.75 41.82 Non-Disrupted 
Self-financing Ratio 0.13 – 0.67 0.58 Non-Disrupted 
Cash Flow in% of Sales 0.10 – 26.34 33.71 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Return on Equity 2.51 – 51.07 71.52 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Return on Assets -0.45 – 17.55 41.61 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Return on Investment 0.07 – 17.55 41.61 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
 
The value of the indicator Inventory Conversion Period at the minimal level and at the 
same at the level of the bottom quartile does not enable any direct assessment of the X1 
enterprise economic security. We need additional information which can be acquired 
from the financial statements. It shows the X1 enterprise does not create any inventories 
and therefore this value can be considered safe from the economic point of view. 
When we assess the Receivables Conversion Period and Liabilities Conversion Period 
it is suitable to proceed parallel. As a matter of fact, they also express the payment 
discipline of the business partners and the X1 enterprise itself. It is suitable for each 
enterprise when the Receivables Conversion Period is shorter than the Liabilities 
Conversion Period. We can also say that from the point of view of the Receivables 
Conversion Period the X1 enterprise achieves above-standard values of the economic 
security compared with other enterprises. 
The indicators of profitability show the return of invested funds. If the values are 
positive, it means the enterprise achieves a profit, in an opposite case a loss. In all of these 
indicators the X1 enterprise achieves better values than other micro-companies; its 
economic security is of an above-standard level. However, it is also inevitable to take into 
account the fact that the standard zone is affected by a situation when more than one 
quarter of the micro-enterprises (6 out of 22) achieves loss. Therefore, in practice it would 
be necessary to check these results by another analysis which would be aimed e.g. at 
prognosis the future development or a deeper analysis of the cash flows. 
Secondly, the economic security of small enterprise was assessed. It was founded on 
21st February 2014 and is operating in the region of Bratislava. The legal form is a Ltd. 
Company. Furthermore, it will be designated as X2 enterprise. 
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Economic situation of this enterprise is in red numbers. It achieved losses in both years 
of its existence even its equity is negative. Due to this fact we can assume, that economic 
security of enterprise X2 is disrupted. The Figure 3 points up our assumption – the most 
of the X2 enterprise’s line position is situated outside the boundaries of economic 
security. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Line of the enterprise’s X2 position. 
 
The Table 4 shows the real values of the indicators in difference to the figure 3 where 
the percentage values regarding the median are depicted. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of X2 enterprise with the boundaries of economic security. 
 
Indicator Standard 
Zone 
X2 
Enterprise 
State of Economic 
Security 
Current Ratio 0.41 – 5.59 0.65 Non-Disrupted 
Cash Ratio 0.65 – 5.59 0.65 Non-Disrupted, Bottom 
Quartile 
Inventory Conversion Period 0.00 – 47.17 0.00 Non-Disrupted, Bottom 
Quartile 
Receivables Conversion 
Period 
21.73 – 162.73 0.00 Non-Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Liabilities Conversion 
Period 
48.38 – 302.95 323.04 Non-Disrupted, 
Substandard 
Financial Leverage Ratio 16.71 – 113.44 153.44 Disrupted, Substandard 
Self-financing Ratio -0.13 – 0.83 -0.53 Disrupted, Substandard 
Cash Flow in% of Sales -4.39 – 10.38 -253.79 Disrupted. Substandard 
Return on Equity 8.49 – 75.89 812.14 Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Return on Assets -8.89 – 11.24 -433.97 Disrupted, Substandard 
Return on Investment -8.89 – 11.24 -433.97 Disrupted, Substandard 
 
Out of selected group of indicators solely tree is in the standard zone therefore we can 
say their values do not disrupt the X2 enterprise economic security. The value of two of 
them – Cash Ratio and Inventory Conversion Period – is at the same level of the bottom 
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quartile. For this reason, we can say that economic security of X2 enterprise is non-
disrupted but threatened. 
When we assess the indicators of activity we can observe that from the point of view 
of the Liabilities Conversion Period the X2 enterprise achieves substandard values of the 
economic security compared with other enterprises. 
The indicators of profitability demonstrate significant differences. We need additional 
information from the financial statements to assuming them. It shows the enterprise X2 
achieves a negative economic outcome. In this case, the indicators of profitability should 
have negative value. Actually, value of Return on Equity is above-standard. This value is 
misleading. It does not mean the economic security is non-disrupted, it solely shows that 
both net profit and shareholder equity are negative. 
In the third, the economic security of large enterprise was assessed. It was founded 
on 3rd March 2011 and is operating in the region of Presov. The legal form is a Ltd. 
Company. Furthermore, it will be designated as X3 enterprise.  
The graphical depiction of the X3 enterprise’s position in the group of indicators is 
depicted in red colour, Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Line of the enterprise’s X3 position. 
 
 
However, the group consists of solely four large enterprises, their quantitative 
characteristics are different. The Figure 5 presents structure of large enterprises according 
to number of employees.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Structure of the large enterprises according to number of employees [13]. 
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The X3 enterprise is the smallest one. This is the main reason why their results are 
mostly marginal (10 from 11 indicators). 
The Table 5 shows the real values of the indicators and state of X3 enterprise’s 
economic security. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of X3 enterprise with the boundaries of economic security. 
 
Indicator Standard 
Zone 
X2 
Enterprise 
State of Economic 
Security 
Current Ratio 0.71 – 2.88 0.21 Disrupted, Substandard 
Cash Ratio 0.86 – 3.16 0.25 Disrupted, Substandard 
Inventory Conversion Period 4.94 – 23.44 29.98 Disrupted, Above-
Standard 
Receivables Conversion 
Period 
27.59 – 91.58 227.53 Disrupted, Substandard 
Liabilities Conversion Period 54.53 – 
325.50 
1 068.09 Disrupted, Substandard 
Financial Leverage Ratio 35.27 – 64.21 73.50 Non-Disrupted, 
Substandard 
Self-financing Ratio 0.31 – 0.65 0.08 Disrupted, Substandard 
Cash Flow in% of Sales 5.92 – 24.75 31.63 Non-Disrupted. Above-
Standard 
Return on Equity 12.32 – 16.52 13.80 Non-Disrupted 
Return on Assets 4.35 – 10.13 1.11 Disrupted, Substandard 
Return on Investment 4.46 – 10.21 1.25 Disrupted, Substandard 
 
We can observe that economic security is disrupted almost in every area of enterprise 
activity. Liquidity and Self-financing Ratio are low. Inventory Conversion Period is long. 
Although Receivables Conversion Period is shorter than Liabilities Conversion Period 
they are too long. Financial Leverage Ratio is high, but acceptable. Indicators of 
profitability are low, even it can be stated that the X3 enterprise does not use credit 
efficiently (Return on Investment is lower than Return on Equity). 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
The intercompany comparison by the method of the indicators´ variability can be 
utilised as one of the supporting tools of the risk management. It is possible to reveal the 
critical points which can disrupt the enterprise economic security by detecting the quartile 
range of the indicators typical for a certain economic activity and comparing the really 
achieved values in a certain enterprise.  
Due to a limited access to information about indicators characterising the activities of 
the companies in the selected sub-class, this paper has no ambition to carry out any 
comprehensive comparison of the companies by the method of the variability of 
indicators. Its aim is solely to draw attention to a relatively fast and cheap method how 
the companies are able to compare their economic strength with their competitors and to 
detect the state of their economic security. 
On the base of carried out assessment we can state that: 
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- the criteria of enterprise`s economic security based on financial risks are significantly 
influenced by the economic results (profit or loss) of enterprises included into statistic 
group, 
- informative ability of criteria is influenced by the amount of enterprises included into 
the statistic group, 
- it is very important to analyse the financial statements and other reports providing 
information about enterprise activities in assessing the status of a particular enterprise. 
Only this way it could be captured the relationship with other partial risks. 
If the enterprise wanted to carry out a complete analysis, it can use the services of those 
companies that deal with providing information for managing the business and 
entrepreneurial risks. However, there is a condition – to purchase the licence which can 
represent a high cost item for companies with a small number of employees and a low 
turnover. And just for such companies there is a solution – there is publicly available 
information in the Register of Financial Statements established by the Ministry of Finance 
of the Slovak Republic (as mentioned in this paper). 
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Chapter 9  
 
MARKETING COMMUNICATION RELATED TO CARRIER – 
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Communication with customers is an essential marketing process. By nature, it runs 
continuously, the content and form of communication are determined by its goal.  In terms 
of marketing, communication with customers during emergencies comes under crisis 
communication and as such is a part of public relations (PR). It all implies its goals as 
described e. g. in Jozef Ftorek´s definition: "Crisis communication is specific 
communication of a company or institution in emergency situations where the stability, 
security and/or reputation are compromised by emergencies or negative publicity. The 
goal of crisis communication is to prepare and release effective information or eliminate 
negative publicity in order to minimize the damage caused by the newly-emerged 
communication situation – crisis." [1].  
The process of communication with customers has its risks that can be defined as 
presumable amount of loss, damage and injury on protected assets upon the occurrence 
of a harmful effect [2]. We focus on partial risk of injury on protected asset - the good 
reputation of a carrier company in case of harmful effect occurrence - emergency 
situation. Protected asset in this case has specific characteristics of an intangible nature 
and its value cannot often be properly quantified. To calculate the goodwill of a company 
is quite difficult and several possible approaches can be used in regard to this matter. 
Purely economic/accounting approach is widely but not always used in the Czech 
Republic. Its display can be seen, for example, in reporting goodwill of the company 
among long-term assets on the balance sheet. As it is difficult to calculate business 
goodwill, so is the calculation of loss or injury and therefore the risk itself. Nevertheless, 
this issue should not be overlooked.  
Companies operating in transportation services may be affected by the same type of crisis 
as any other businesses. Emergency situations play a specific role among a wide range of 
possible communication situations. This includes both incidents as defined by Act no. 
239/2000 Coll., on the Integrated Rescue System, as well as accidents and threats defined 
e.g. by Act no. 266/1994 Coll., on Railways or Act no. 361/2000 Coll., on Road Traffic. 
Nowadays, carriers have prepared contingency plans for such situations. Within their 
framework or follow-up operational rules, the communication with customers 
(participants of emergency situations) is treated with care.  The basic objective of such a 
communication is to transfer all the information needed to minimize damage to the health 
and lives of people and property. In such situations the objective of crisis communication 
in the concept of PR, thus minimizing damage to the reputation of the company and 
negative publicity, recedes into the background. 
 
 
*Author: Dipl. Ing. Alexandra Dvořáčková. Czech Technical University in Prague. Děčín. Czech 
Republic. dvorackova@fd.cvut.cz. 
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However, in less serious cases, the above described objective of communicating with 
customers should have priority. In cases of poor communication with passengers’ 
companies of public transportation are more vulnerable to the negative impact on the 
reputation of the company regardless of the severity of property damage. These negative 
impacts are often underestimated. 
Typical situations with potentially high reputation risks are often related to limited or 
delayed operation due to imminent emergencies or situations that have just occurred, such 
as road accidents, infrastructure disruptions by natural disasters or technical failure. Such 
primary incidents give rise to temporary traffic restrictions which, in terms of marketing, 
can be seen as just other situations requiring emergency communication. Passengers often 
do not know the original cause of service restrictions and can assess their discomfort as 
unsatisfactory customer care on carrier´s part. Early and open communication with 
customers may have a major impact on long-term perception of the quality of services 
and the quality of the carrier itself. 
Communication with customers is also subject to measurement and evaluation as well 
as other business processes. Marketing uses many tools to measure the effectiveness of 
communication, both quantitative and qualitative. The predominant criterion for 
communication efficiency is the degree of achievement of expected communication 
objectives. Tools based on qualitative methods are becoming increasingly important in 
cases of communication with customers during emergencies. However, it is necessary to 
take into account psychological and ethical aspects when used and when results are 
interpreted.  
 
2. Background research 
 
2.1. Measurement and evaluation of communication 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of communication is one of the major problems of 
marketing. Measuring communication with customers as part of CRM (Customer 
Relationship Management) faces the same problems as the measurement and evaluation 
of PR activities. 
Especially in those cases where specialized PR companies and media agencies provide 
measuring services, their efficiency used to be evaluated in combination of several 
indicators that quantified provided services. Those included in implemented media 
outputs can be mentioned: 
1. Clipping: evaluation by number of articles or view posts; other indicators such as 
circulation, readership or article positon on the site may be also taken into account. 
2. AVE (Advertising Value Equivalent) compares the value of ‘editorial space’ with the 
price of the same amount of space in advertising. Basic information that this indicator 
reveals is how much less was needed to pay in comparison with paid advertising. It 
does not take into account either the tone of the message, not the media focus on the 
target group or other important aspects. However, it is easily measurable indicator 
and thanks to its financial character it can be conducted as an indicator measuring the 
effectiveness of communication. 
In cases where the communication takes place via electronic media (typically a 
website, Facebook, or Twitter), such measuring criteria are used which can be tracked 
very easily via electronic media. There are web analysis tools, even social networks 
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analysis tools. According to the portal w3techs.com that provides information on the 
usage of various types of technologies on the web and is updated daily, on January 14, 
2017 34.4% of the websites used none of the traffic analysis tools that are monitored 
there. The most famous tool is Google Analytics. It was used by 54.7% of all the websites, 
which is a traffic analysis tool market share of 83.4% [3]. 
Following indicators are observed most frequently, even though there can be set much 
more sophisticated indicators when using web analytics tools: 
1. Number of community members. 
2. Number of subscribers of RSS channel. 
3. Number of registrations in application or subscriptions to newsletter. 
4. Number of article views (Page view statistics). 
5. Number of comments. 
6. Number of links. 
7. Number of visits coming from links. 
8. Percentage of new and returning customers. 
9. Percentage of visitors in a particular segment. 
10. Percentage of visits that lasted long, medium and short period of time. 
11. Ratio vote on comments and information; "I like it" and "I do not like" (like / dislike 
rate). 
Relatively easy availability and cost efficiency of this type of indicator monitoring, 
results in their widespread use. In many cases, such monitoring is considered a 
measurement of the communication effectiveness.  
However, PR professionals point out that quantitative evaluation of communication 
output does not correspond with measuring the effectiveness of communication. This 
issue has long been dedicated to the International Association for Measurement and 
Evaluation of Communication (AMEC). On its website AMEC presents itself as the 
world's largest media intelligence and insights professional organisation, representing 
organisations and practitioners who provide media evaluation and communication 
research. AMEC currently has more than 150 members in 86 countries worldwide. 
AMEC's pioneering work in the field has included the development of the Barcelona 
Principles; Barcelona Principles 2.0 and bridge most recently the launch of the AMEC 
Integrated Evaluation Framework [4]. After a broad discussion AMEC has formulated 
the basic principles that should be followed when measuring PR activities. These so-
called Barcelona Principles were published in 2010 and in 2015 have been updated. 
Briefly, they can be summarized as follows by AMEC [5]: 
 
1. Principle 1: 
2010: Importance of Goal Setting and Measurement 
2015: Goal Setting and Measurement are Fundamental to Communication and PR 
2. Principle 2: 
2010: Measuring the Effect on Outcomes is Preferred to Measuring Outputs 
2015: Measuring Communication Outcomes is Recommended Versus Only 
Measuring Outputs 
3. Principle 3: 
2010: The Effect on Business Results Can and Should Be Measured Where Possible 
2015: The Effect on Organizational Performance Can and Should Be Measured Where 
Possible 
4. Principle 4: 
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2010: Media Measurement Requires Quantity and Quality 
2015: Measurement and Evaluation Require Both Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methods 
5. Principle 5: 
2010: AVEs are not the Value of Public Relations 
2015: AVEs are not the Value of Communications 
6. Principle 6: 
2010: Social Media Can and Should Be Measured  
2015: Social Media Can and Should Be Measured Consistently with Other Media 
Channels 
7. Principle 7:  
2010: Transparency and Replicability are Paramount to Sound Measurement 
2015: Measurement and Evaluation Should Be Transparent, Consistent and Valid 
In their supporting material ‘The PR Professionals Guide to Measurement’ the authors 
mention other examples of indicators that could be used meaningfully, such as: 
1. KPI (Key Performance Indicators):  a company sets these indicators itself so they can 
depict specific situation of the company, if possible, in relation to economic 
indicators.          According to AMEC Glossary KPIs must be defined to reflect 
objectives and strategy, and will be sufficiently robust for the measurement to be 
repeatable. Quantitative KPIs can be presented as a number, ratio or percentage. KPI’s 
tend to be: 
a. Quantitative indicators which can be presented as a number.  
b. Practical indicators that interface with existing company processes. 
c. Directional indicators specifying whether organisational performance is 
improving or not. 
d. Actionable indicators sufficiently in an organisation’s control to effect change. 
e. Financial indicators used in performance measurement and when looking at an 
operating index [7]. 
2. ROI (Return on Investment) measures the amount of return on an investment relative 
to the investment’s cost. It is a simple and clear indicator but in PR it faces a 
fundamental problem - it does not reflect those types of non-financial benefits such 
as increasing brand awareness and improved company's reputation with the public. 
3. Comparison of the values of selected indicators before and after the assessment of 
events / campaigns: It is obvious that these indicators are closer to the effectiveness 
of communication in terms of achievement of the objectives. Their practical 
application, however, is knowledge-intensive and time-consuming. 
This may also be the reason why, according to the results of some research studies, 
65% of small firms and 60% of advertising agencies in the Czech Republic do not deal 
with measurement of efficiency. The vast majority of cases where the efficiency 
measurement is used and is related to advertising campaigns [8]. 
 
2.2 Emergency situations in transport 
 
According to the Act no. 239/2000 Coll., on the Integrated Rescue System, an 
emergency is viewed as "harmful effects of forces and phenomena caused by human 
activity, natural effects and also accidents that threaten life, health, property or the 
environment and require rescue and relief work" [9]. When a crisis situation occurs, 
authorities may declare a correspondent state of emergency, i.e. during a time of natural 
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or human-made disaster, during a period of civil unrest, or following a declaration of war. 
It is important to realize that the term ‘crisis situation’ is often, even in the media, used 
incorrectly. In terms of crisis management, a road accident is not considered to be a crisis 
situation. Emergency situations arise in connection with impending situations or the ones 
which have already occurred. 
Emergency situations, for example in rail transport, are defined in § 49 of Act no. 
266/1994 Coll. on Railways. We differentiate serious accidents, accidents and emergency 
situations: 
1. Serious accidents in rail transport are collisions or derailments of rail vehicles which 
occurred during rail transport operations, causing death or injury of at least five 
individuals or extensive damage (within the meaning of the Penal Code). 
2. Accidents in rail transport are situations which occurred during rail transport 
operations, causing death, injury or significant damage (within the meaning of the 
Penal Code). 
3. Emergency is different situation that endangers or impairs safety, regularity and 
smoothness of rail transport, the safety of people and the safe operation of buildings 
and facilities or endangers the environment [10]. 
Railway transport covers not only rail transport as perceived by common passengers; 
it also includes metro, tram, trolleybus and cable car operations. Therefore, emergency 
situation in rail transport becomes a traffic accident in road traffic, if there is an accident 
on a level crossing or in case of an accident of a trolleybus or tram. 
Emergency situations in road transport are represented by serious accidents with 
consequent restriction of traffic on roads or disruption of infrastructure and traffic on it 
as a result of natural disasters, climatic phenomena or human action. Such diverse 
situations starting from traffic accidents with the need for time-consuming extrication 
work or with damage to infrastructure due to hazardous substance spill, landslide or 
floods and ending with dangerous but common black ice are included in the list. 
In terms of marketing communication with customers/passengers, emergency can be 
described as a situation when the range of transport and shipping services is temporarily 
limited. In a narrow sense, it is limitation due to unexpected events, which means that this 
approach would not include e.g. planned track closures. 
 
2.3  Communication with customers throughout emergency situations    
 
As mentioned above, efficiency is considered to be a level of achieving (or facilitation 
of achieving) a stated objective when it comes to communication with a customer. In the 
case of communication between a carrier and its customer (i.e. a passenger) during 
emergency situations, the objective is basically determined by the seriousness of the given 
emergency and the passenger’s involvement.  
1. The passenger is a direct participant in the emergency in the form of a mass accident: 
the basic objective of the communication is to transmit all information necessary to 
minimize damage to health and lives of people and damage to property. A secondary 
objective with a much lower priority may represent the target state when the passenger 
is convinced that the carrier took care of its passengers in the best way possible given 
the situation, and that the benefit of passengers was the key objective for the carrier. 
2. The passenger is influenced by consequences of an emergency without being a direct 
participant therein: in transportation, these include situations when the emergency led 
to temporary limitations of transportation and provided services (delays of trains on a 
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track afflicted by a traffic accident, diversion of the journey, or stoppage of metro or 
trolleybus operation due to disruption in electricity). In such cases, the communication 
objective is to limit any negative impact on reputation of the carrier by providing the 
passengers with information about the cause of the situation, about activities which 
the carrier performs in order to remedy the situation, and possible compensation for 
passengers. 
In these situations, the achievement of the above specified objectives of 
communication is measurable only to a certain limit. It is clear that even with these 
established objectives of communication, the utilized methods are not always based on 
quantitative data. It is the communication with passengers during emergencies itself that 
is the best evidence of the fact that purely quantitative data fail to hold sufficient 
explanatory power. The values of indicators, such as number of articles or views, are 
significantly increasing during emergencies, both in the case of articles in standard media 
or numbers of reactions and comments on social networks.  
The same applies to share ratios, such as the ratio of new and returning visitors, ratios 
of inquiries and complaints, etc. In analogy, also the value of AVE is increasing in an 
extreme manner during such situations, since it is influenced by the volume of media 
space given to the emergency and the representatives of the carrier. The examples of 
emergencies described in chapter 5 (number of contacts with customers during a black 
ice calamity or during the accident in Studenka) clearly show that these extremely high 
values during emergencies do not imply neither impact on reputation in any way, nor the 
customers’ opinion regarding the carrier’s company. 
As for the abovementioned indicators, we can use, for example, the number of viewing 
an article or a post, the number of comments, like/dislike rate and similar indicators. 
However, when interpreting the results, we have to bear in mind that these indicators only 
quantitatively characterize the reach of the carrier’s communication towards the 
customers, not its effect. In order to be able to assess, at least in an indicative manner, the 
impact on the good name of a company, also other indicators have to be taken into 
consideration – the tone of the messages, posts, comments and their sharing, e.g. by 
following the like/dislike rate while dividing the posts to positive and negative ones, etc. 
Such assessment is hard to automate, and it is therefore more expensive and time 
consuming. 
Another option for measuring negative impact of an emergency on the good name of 
a company is to compare the values of indicators such as ‘brand perception’ or ‘loyalty 
of customers’ before and after the given emergency. However, this option requires 
implementation of rather extensive marketing surveys. Especially in cases when the 
carrier wants to distinguish between the impact on its reputation caused by the emergency 
itself and the impact caused by unsuitable or insufficient communication, it is desirable 
to hire specialized companies to carry out these surveys.  
In such cases, the most suitable methods in view of their informative value are methods 
using focus groups or in-depth interviews. Yet these are methods which demand proper 
execution (it is essential that a professional – a psychologist performs them) and their 
subsequent evaluation. Besides these, especially in cases of serious emergencies, such 
survey focusing on customers’ attitudes towards the brand (carrier) may encounter ethical 
limitations right after the person experienced such traumatic situation. 
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3. Data description and methods 
 
This article includes the findings of preliminary surveys done in January 2017 as a 
precursor to anticipated research on the theme of end-user communication in 
transportation. The survey took the form of a loosely structured interview with 
representatives of selected public passenger transport companies in the Czech Republic. 
The respondents were organizations that provide nationwide railway transport, coach 
lines at the national and regional level, and, through the Czech Association of Transport 
Companies, municipal public transport companies as well. Of those solicited for 
participation, a total of 14 carriers agreed to take part in the survey, including 13 
municipal public transport companies and Czech Railways (České drahy, a.s.). Other 
railway carriers and coach transport agencies waved participation in the preliminary 
survey, but expressed interest in participating in the anticipated research. 
The interview consisted of 11 questions addressing issues of the use of social media 
for communication with end-users as well as measurement and evaluation of 
communications. Interviewees were competent representatives of the companies in 
question, primarily supervisors in the public relations, communications, or marketing 
departments, or, in some cases, top-level managers. Answers were recorded on a separate 
report page for each company and then collected into a comprehensive report. The 
answers were then supplemented with a content analysis of publicly available information 
for each of the respondent companies, e.g. web sites, social media profiles, annual reports, 
and relevant press releases. 
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1. Carrier communication channels – case study Czech Railways (ČD) 
 
The keystone of the public passenger information system used in special situations is 
the MIMO system, into which dispatchers enter information about closures (planned 
operational restrictions) and disruptions (unplanned operational restrictions) [11]. This 
information originates primarily from the rail transport infrastructure administrator 
(SŽDC) but processing and distribution is the responsibility of Czech Railways. The 
following inputs are entered into the system: the segment affected, cause, duration, 
affected trains, and comments. Each event is rated at a level of seriousness from the lowest 
(e.g. cases where just one track is open, resulting in delays) to the highest (complete 
cessation of operations on main lines). MIMO is an internal system, serving the 
dispatching administration, and is not primarily meant for public consumption. It is, 
however, a system that collects, in real time, all relevant data about anomalous events. 
Information from MIMO finds its way to passengers by three main routes: 
1. Directly. 
A fundamental role in direct communication is played by the electronic media. 
Information may be provided in whole or in part. The most comprehensive portal for 
travellers is the web site http://www.cd.cz/omezeniprovozu/, and a selection of the 
major situations appears in an orange box on the carrier’s main web site www.cd.cz 
and its mobile page m.cd.cz. Information may be provided selectively, in which case 
only travellers who are likely to be affected receive the information. In this case the 
information is filtered to users searching the web-based route planner IDOS, the route 
planner at cd.cz, or the Czech Railways mobile application, or is sent by email to users 
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who have registered for updates on certain segments. An example of an email 
announcing a disruption for a client who has registered for updates is shown in Figure 
1 (translated in annex). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example or report (translation in Annex 1). 
  
 
Another on-line method for informing about disruptions in operations is the official 
Czech Railways Twitter account, which is automatically fed information from the 
MIMO system – https://twitter.com/cdmimoradnosti/. 
A benefit of the use of electronic media is that the transfer of information is often 
automated, so it presents an effortless communications channel. The fundamental 
condition, however, is the willingness and ability of travellers to use these channels 
at a given moment. This potential drawback may be partially eliminated by the proper 
selection of technologies. For example, with the mobile application Můj Vlak, 
travellers can set their own notification options. If a traveller does so, he will receive 
updates throughout the journey about delays, closures, and disruption (as they happen) 
including measures taken (detours, alternative coach transport, etc.). Examples of 
disruption and closure alerts in real time via notification through the mobile 
application are shown in Figure 2. 
It should also be born in mind that this is a channel intended primarily for one-way 
communication from carrier to rider. In comparison to classic communication 
channels, however, electronic media is better suited to handle a situation when there 
are tens of thousands of people on trains at any given moment who need the fastest 
possible information. 
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An example of the marketing tool of advocacy, where loyal customers and fans 
promote a company, might be found in the Facebook profile @ceskedrahy01, the 
home of “Czech Railways – operational disruptions,” which bears the notice “This is 
an unofficial page of Czech Railways dedicated especially to updates in operations” 
(https://cs-cz.facebook.com/ceskedrahy01/#) [11]. An example of information for 
riders about a disruption in service is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Disruption and closure information as displayed on the application Můj Vlak 
(source Czech Railways 2017, www.ceskedrahy.cz) 
 
 
2. Through train personnel. 
This is the primary informational channel for travellers who are already on their 
way when a disruption occurs and are not momentarily using electronic 
communications channels. Train personnel obtain information in various ways: 
- mobile individual registers (POP), with which all conductors are equipped, receive 
automatic updates about disruptions [13], 
- mobile telephones, with which train personnel are also equipped. Notice of 
important disruptions is sent by text message (SMS) as shown in Figure 4. Train 
personnel can also get information through the mobile application Můj Vlak or the 
web site. Above all, a call can be made with the dispatcher directly. 
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Fig. 3. Announcement of a disruption in service via an unofficial profile on social 
media [12] (translation in Annex 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Informational text message about a disruption sent to train personnel (source: 
Czech Railways 2017, www.ceskedrahy.cz); translation in Annex 3. 
 
At the current time, Czech Railways is testing its own chat application for its 
operational staff. After tests conducted in August 2016 it appears that the system 
works on data networks dependably; if the signal is weak, the application can translate 
information into the form of SMS messages and send that way, which means that 
information about events on the line reach train crews and dispatchers within seconds  
[14]. 
In wagons equipped with intercom service, the crew announces available 
information about journey disruptions. Where an intercom is not available, the 
conductor walks through to make the announcement. Yet, even this information 
channel is subject to the limits of its human actors. It must be kept in mind that, in a 
disruption situation, train personnel may have other responsibilities related to 
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ensuring safety and minimalizing unwanted outcomes; informing riders in tense 
situations is often not the main priority. 
3. Through station personnel.  
The main actors in this scenario are staff at ticket windows and information booths 
in the railway station. When selling a ticket for a given segment, the agent will see 
adisruptions displayed in an orange box on his monitor. The ticket agent should open 
the warning and relay the information to the traveller. The information booth clerk 
would proceed in a similar fashion. This information channel is also susceptible to 
human limitations (e.g., the hurried pace at rush hour). Furthermore, it can only reach 
those riders who are at the start of their journey and are interacting with station 
personnel when a disruption takes place. It is of no use to riders who do not need to 
purchase a ticket (e.g., regular riders with some form of pass) and does not serve those 
who are already aboard. 
The primary channel for two-way communication is the Czech Railways contact 
center. In the event of a disruption, it serves as the front line for providing information to 
customers and is driven by their specific needs. In such cases, the most common form of 
communication is by telephone, although email communication is also used in connection 
with such events. It goes without saying that the contact center also provides information 
about transfers, fares, e-shop transactions, and so on. 
Some examples and quantitative date related to the activity of the contact center will 
serve to demonstrate the various types of disruptions and the reactions they evoke in 
riders:  
1. Long-term disruptions in quality of service: 
In 2015, major construction was being done on the railway network in the Czech 
Republic to maintain and modernize transport routes. This resulted in extensive re-
routing of traffic for all rail carriers. According to Czech Railways data [15] the 
contact center recorded more than 100 thousand calls in June 2015, roughly a 100% 
increase in volume from the same period the previous year. The daily average volume 
of telephone calls for this period was roughly 3,000 whereas at the end of 2014 it 
averaged 1,500 [16]. The contact center supervisor, Mr. Gregor, reports that a decisive 
impact was made by the long-term disruptions at that time. Riders asked primarily 
about transfers, delays, and replacement coach service. 
This sort of disruption has a high potential to damage the reputation and good name 
of a carrier. The comfort of the rider is affected, but from his perspective the causes 
are not so serious as to excuse the reduction in quality of service as it would be in the 
case of a fatality-inducing accident on the lines, for example. The willingness of the 
rider to tolerate a reduced quality of service also naturally decreases with the length 
of time that the disruption continues and the risk of customer dissatisfaction is 
perceptibly higher than in the case of isolated disruption events. In such situations, 
proper communication with riders is the deciding factor and represents the only way 
that a carrier can alleviate customer displeasure and possibly even prevent his flight 
to the competition with all of the risks of negative impact on the carrier’s reputation 
therein. 
2. Short-term disruptions caused by acts of God: 
 A typical cause of such disruptions is a natural disaster, which often intrudes into 
other areas of a rider’s life beyond the carrier’s services. The ice storm of December 
2014 is one example. Unfavorable meteorological conditions on December 1–3 
caused a collapse in public transportation across the country. Ice on the trolley lines 
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made electrical traction impossible, affecting roughly 100,000 commuters, according 
to data from the Ministry of Transport and Czech Railways [16]. There were roughly 
20,000 passengers stranded on 120 trains. The flow of information to these passengers 
was limited by overloaded telephone lines between train personnel and dispatchers, 
so even the train crews themselves often lacked information about measures to be 
taken or how long the situation was expected to last. The contact centre, as the 
information channel for direct communication with customers was able to test its 
capacity for immediate communication (by telephone conversation) and delayed 
communication (e-mail). At a time when the average daily calls were around 1,500, 
the call centre logged 4,000 calls on the first day of the calamity and 8,000 on day 
two; it received roughly 800 emails through info.cd and another 400 through emails 
addressed to the management of Czech Railways. A later evaluation of Czech 
Railways response to the calamity resulted in the hire of additional dispatch staff and 
the decision to adopt measures related to crisis communications. In 2015 the contact 
centre was moved to new, better equipped quarters and its staff was significantly 
increased. 
 From a marketing perspective, such situations present a high risk of reputation 
damage. The impact on customer perceptions depends on a number of factors – 
because the problem was caused by an act of God, riders may have a greater 
understanding for necessary restrictions or reduced services. This potential good will 
can be entirely expended, however, in cases where the rider has the impression that 
the carrier did not pay enough attention to his needs. This impression can be entirely 
subjective and can be influenced by appropriate communications. The ice storm 
demonstrated how vastly different riders ‘reactions were depending upon how well 
informed they were of the situation. Thus, the Czech Railways decision concerning 
its communication strategy can be assessed positively, both as to strengthening direct 
communication with customers (e.g. by expanding the contact centre capacity or 
utilizing social media) and as to strengthening technical means of transferring 
information from dispatchers to station and train personnel. 
3. Isolated short-term disruptions: 
 In transportation, such disruptions are most often caused by serious traffic 
accidents. A typical example might be the incident in Studenka on 22 July 2015, when 
a Pendolino train hit a lorry that had violated the right of way at a railway crossing. 
The accident left three dead and 17 injured some permanently. Material damages 
came to over 150 million Czech crowns. All rail traffic on the Suchdol nad Odrou – 
Jistebník segment was immediately stopped for roughly 13 hours, with 20 coaches 
providing alternative transport. According to Czech Railways data [15], [17] the event 
caused the delay of 126 trains for a total of 5,127 minutes. The Brno region dispatch 
office fed information to impacted staff in 1,500 calls totalling over 1,000 minutes, 
which is three or four times the usual load. The contact centre logged 5,300 customer 
calls relating to this incident (a daily average of 1,500 calls), of which 20 calls were 
with passengers sitting on the train involved in the incident. In addition, Czech 
Railways and the Moravian-Silesian Regional Fire Department set up a crisis hotline, 
through which they offered help and psychological support. Immediately following 
the accident, the carrier also set up a special hotline for those who had suffered injuries 
or damage, to enable damage claims to be made. On the very day of the accident the 
carrier also made public its terms for payment of damages, stating that it would honour 
damage deposit levels set by European legislation whether the payments correspond 
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to the injuries or damage caused by the accident or not and that Czech Railways would 
then collect any difference from the person who had caused the accident. 
This sort of incident does not present a great risk to the carrier’s reputation so long as 
the carrier is not clearly at fault and so long as it adheres to general rules of 
communication in crisis situations. Of prime importance is the release of timely, brief, 
and constructive statements in cooperation with the emergency services and the 
elimination of concrete measures to repair damages and mitigate consequences. In cases 
where the company is not as clearly free of fault as in the case above, there should be a 
timely, public attempt made to clarify matters through investigative bodies such as the 
Rail Safety Inspection. 
 
4.2. Issues arising from preliminary research poll 
 
In order to hold semi-structured interviews with 14 representatives of companies 
providing public passenger transport in the Czech Republic, 11 questions were prepared, 
which were thematically focused on using social networks for communication with 
customers and measurement and evaluation of the communication. 
It was found that all of the companies except one have their own profiles on some of 
the social networks that are used to communicate with customers. By far the highest 
proportion of the used social networks has Facebook. A Facebook profile is used by 13 
companies, one company is examining the possibility and appropriateness of setting up 
their own profile. Other represented social networks are Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and 
Google +. Four businesses have an Instagram profile, three carriers run an official 
company YouTube channel. Three companies have a Twitter profile and one carrier 
manages their own Google+ profile. 
Six carriers, who have their profiles on more than one social network, differentiate 
their content. An example might be the company Czech Railways. Their Facebook profile 
is used as a classic marketing tool that is content-oriented on entertainment, advertising 
and PR. The profile functions as a two-way channel; the carrier takes into account posts 
of users and replies to their inquiries. In case of complex queries, users are referred to the 
Contact Centre. Information about extraordinary events in traffic are not communicated 
on this profile; the carrier in this way reflects the existence of an unofficial Facebook 
profile called ‘Omezení provozu’ (Restricted traffic), which is run by the colleagues and 
fans of the company. The official Instagram profile of Czech Railways functions as a one-
way communication channel that is content-oriented on the company's image. In contrast, 
the official Twitter profile is designated exclusively for extraordinary events in traffic; 
information from the dispatcher system MIMO is automatically routed here. 
Twelve participating carriers said that they used social networks to inform passengers 
about extraordinary events such as traffic restrictions, traffic closures, substitute 
connections and the like. One of the carriers even has two official profiles on Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram, one of which is intended for marketing and PR content and the 
other profile passes current traffic information. Apart from this way, all of the carriers 
also give information about extraordinary events via their websites. The dominant method 
of announcing such events on the websites is in the News section, or in the section entitled 
directly Extraordinary events or Traffic restrictions. However, it is always on the 
homepage. Nine carriers also provide RSS feed on their websites. Two carriers said that 
customers interested to receive news through RSS can choose; RSS can be divided into 
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news, traffic information and commercial offers, or more precisely complete information 
or news, changes in traffic and extraordinary events. 
The management of social network profiles is predominately the responsibility of the 
marketing, communications or PR departments or the spokesperson. Information about 
extraordinary events is announced by staff from these departments in cooperation with 
operational divisions, such as operating control or a public transport department. In two 
cases, the information from the operating control are given automatically, in three cases, 
announcements also involve an IT department. 
These findings can be summarized so that social networks are currently considered by 
carriers a standard and commonly used communication channel. Carriers are aware of the 
undeniable advantage of social networks, which presents the possibility of quick and 
forthright announcement of important information. This is a positive finding as official 
profiles were not so widely spread on social networks recently. Some mentioned profiles 
were set up in 2016. Czech Railways, as the dominant railway carrier with a nationwide 
scope, established their official Facebook channel only in the second half of 2015. Until 
then, the sufficient form of electronic communication was considered the official website. 
Among others, the interviews also showed that a one-way nature of communication 
through a website was perceived as a kind of advantage. A fairly widespread reason for 
not promoting establishment of official profiles on social networks with a possibility of 
two-way communication sooner were concerns of the management about abuse (so called 
trolling) or at least about excess of complaints and hostile comments, which was seen as 
a risk to reputation and good name of the company. This attitude of the management was 
in some cases overcome only in the situation, where the absence of official profiles on 
social networks was perceived and presented by the public and media as a deficiency, so 
the risk of damage to the company's image by this fact was subjectively assessed as higher 
than in the case of hostile or unpleasant comments and posts.  
Regarding the latter topic of the research, i.e. the measurement and evaluation of 
communication with customers, the situation is not so positive. Only 9 carriers reported 
that they were evaluating communication with customers, four of which stated that it 
involved only evaluation of the communication concerning complaints and comments.  
Evaluation of communication by various information channels is carried in a minority 
of the participating companies. One carrier said that they evaluated communication only 
through conventional channels (personal involvement, telephone, email and complaints); 
one distinguishes communication between social networks and conventional channels 
during evaluation, three carriers use separate assessment for personal communication, 
call centres and hotlines, web and social networks without much distinction. 
Regarding the indicators used for the evaluation of communication, seven carriers 
mentioned the ratio of complaints and inquiries as the monitored indicator, and for three 
of the carriers, it was the only monitored indicator. Only two carriers stated that they were 
pursuing quantitative indicators such as the number of hits/views or the number of shares. 
One of them uses the like/dislike rate. Only one carrier said that they used web analytics 
tools (specifically Google Analytics). The relative ease of collection of this information 
on social networks apparently does not present an advantage for carriers, which would 
lead to their widespread use. 
The fact that measuring and assessing of customer communication do not mean a 
priority for managements of carriers is evidenced by the response to the question whether 
and how often the management receives information about the assessment of 
communication. The responsible departments in five companies present these data to their 
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management once a year, one carrier does so twice a year, and only in two cases does this 
happens once a month. The management of other carriers does not require this 
information.  
In neither case was it noted that communication with customers would have been 
systematically measured and then evaluated in case of extraordinary events in terms of 
impact on the reputation of the company. Collection of data quantifying communication 
with customers in the event of a crisis takes place in rare severe cases; see the example 
given in section 4.1 – black ice calamity in December 2014. There was an evaluation of 
these data at least at the level of sufficient/insufficient communication capacity, and based 
on this evaluation, measures to remedy the situation were taken. However, it cannot be 
evaluated as a continuous activity. 
One can assume that the risk of damaging the reputation of the carrier due to an 
extraordinary event is perceived rather intuitively by businesses. There is a total 
consensus on the fact that in cases of extraordinary events in traffic, which could 
consequently reduce the quality and scope of provided services, the customers – 
passengers must be informed about them. Setting of the passenger information system in 
these situations is, however, not usually perceived as a risk management tool of damage 
to the reputation of the carrier. It can be assumed that this risk is not generally considered 
to be serious. Its assessment and settlement occurs once in cases of large-scale 
extraordinary events with serious damage to health and property. During extraordinary 
events with less negative impact, which "only" make the journey unpleasant for 
passengers and reduce their comfort, a sufficient measure is considered one-way 
communication in terms of a plain timely transmission of information with an excuse and, 
if possible, via all designated channels. Two-way communication accompanied by 
systematic evaluation could, in fact, become at least a tool for monitoring, if not 
elimination, of the risk of damaging the reputation of the carrier.  
The question is, whether, at higher time, professional and hence financial demand of 
measurement of the effectiveness of communication with sufficient information value, 
the management of the carrier would even be interested in such measurement. Especially 
in the area of public passenger transport, the funding of which is not only based purely 
on market principles, companies must carefully consider the effectiveness of spent funds. 
Willingness to finance such measurements may then paradoxically increase in situations 
of prolonged decline in the number of passengers, which is reflected in the decline in 
sales. The management of the carrier then understands such measurements as one of the 
tools of analysis of causes, which is a prerequisite to a decision on how to remedy an 
unfavourable situation.  
An example might be Public Transport Company of Usti nad Labem, which has long 
been struggling with a decline in passenger numbers, as shown in the Table 1. 
In the last few years this company is trying to analyse the situation and propose 
possible solutions. There have been several passenger satisfaction surveys which included 
also questions whether passengers are satisfied with the awareness for changes in traffic 
and how much weight they attach to this matter when assessing their satisfaction with the 
carrier. In addition, the carrier has collaborated with universities in the processing the 
final reports that are focused on analysis of transport-performance and economic 
indicators of the company. It also had the economic and personnel audit handled. Among 
other changes it led to the need of establishing a new position of a spokesperson. These 
days the carrier is considering an appropriate way of measurement and evaluation of 
communication with customers both in normal operation and in emergency situations. 
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Table 1. Number of passengers of Public Transport Company of Usti nad Labem 
according to the methodology of the SDP (Czech Association of Transport Companies) 
[18]. 
 
 
Passengers in thousands per year 
 
Year Trolleybus  Bus  Total 
2001 31 063 23 226 54 289 
2002 30 545 24 331 54 876 
2003 28 945 22 725 51 670 
2004 28 470 22 205 50 675 
2005 28 092 21 874 49 967 
2006 27 441 22 871 50 312 
2007 29 238 23 080 52 318 
2008 31 768 20 000 51 768 
2009 32 075 19 318 51 393 
2010 31 392 19 873 51 265 
2011 30 935 20 151 51 087 
2012 28 260 18 831 47 091 
2013 26 499 19 308 45 190 
2014 25 196 17 965 43 162 
2015 24 457 16 413 40 869 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The risk of damaging the reputation of the carrier due to emergency situations in traffic 
and their consequences in the form of limiting or reducing services is reflected by carriers. 
It is not, however, usually attributed too much priority, so as businesses would 
systematically work with it in terms of identifying, analysing, monitoring and managing 
risks. One of the causes of this approach of carrier managements is difficult calculability 
of the protected asset, i.e. a good company reputation. This also implies a difficult 
quantification of risks.  
One of the tools for monitoring and analysis of this risk could be the systematic 
measurement and evaluation of customer communications. With the growing use of 
electronic communication channels, including social networks, possibilities to measure 
and evaluate the effectiveness of communication extend for businesses. There are more 
and more accessible methods of an almost automated monitoring of quantitative 
indicators of communication, including web analytics tools. The meaningful evaluation 
of customer communications during the emergency situations, however, needs more than 
quantitative data. It is necessary to supplement them in terms of assessing the impact of 
communication on the thinking and behaviour of customers. But this is time consuming 
and costly, and companies in the segment of public passenger transport currently does not 
consider the evaluation of the effectiveness of communication during extraordinary 
events a sufficiently effective action with immediate benefits. Determination of the 
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applicable metrics, which would not mean excessive staffing and financial burden, then 
represents a major challenge for the future. 
 
Annex 1 – translation of text in Figure 1. 
 
Date: 2017-01-07 14:00 
Subject: New disruption on track 011 
==================== 
Track 011 
Track name: (Praha – Kolin (both directions)) 
Segment: Uvaly – Cesky Brod – track 011 
Date and time: 7 January 2017 13:36 – 7 January 2017 15:36 
--------------------- 
Cause of situation: Technical defect on track 
Steps taken for long-distance transport: Operations severely restricted. Trains running 
on one of three tracks. Below this segment trains may be delayed 15 – 20 minutes. 
Steps taken for regional transport: Operations severely restricted. Trains running on one 
of three tracks. Below this segment trains may be delayed 15 – 20 minutes. 
Note: Operations severely restricted. Trains running on one of three tracks. SZDC is 
working on removing the problem. 
--------------------- 
Rule: Default – without further specification 
Affected trains: 
SC 509 Pendolino, R 982 Vysocina, RJ 74 Franz Schubert, RJ 79 Johann Strauss, R 983 
Vysocina, SC 506 Pendolino, EC 173 Hungaria, Rx 869 Spilberk, Rx 868 Spilberk, Ex 
129 Vsacan, EC 278 Dubius, EC 116 Praha, Ex 128 Vsacan, Ex 893 Sohaj, Rx 888 Jan 
Amos komensky, Ex 220 sulov, Rx 866 Macocha, Ex 221 sulov, EC 172 Hungaria, Ex 
142 Hutnik, SC 510 Pendolino, EC 117 Praha, Os 9334, Os 9335, Os 9330, Os 9331, Os 
9329, Os 8610, Os 9332, Os 9333 
--------------------- 
We apologize for any inconvenience in your travels. 
Czech Railways 
Passenger Transport Information 
Tel: +420 221 111 122 
E-mail: info@cd.cz  
 
Annex 2 – translation of text in Figure 3. 
 
Czech Railways – operational disruptions 
Track 190 Plzen-Horazdovice predmesti – Ceske Budejovice, segment Hluboka nad 
Vltavou – Sliv. Defect in traction line, transport disrupted until roughly 18:00. 
(like) (comment) 
Liked by Vit Simanek, Pelynek Asfodel and Jirka Svoboda 
Czech Railways – operational disruptions wrote: 
New | CD mobile web 
Riders can use the customer information hotline +420 840 112 113, where our operators 
will provide any information shown here. We apologize for any problems arising from 
the situation. 
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Czech Railways – operational disruptions wrote: 
Operations on the track were renewed without disruption. 
 
Annex 3 – translation of text in Figure 4. 
 
Disruption: Track 011 segment Uvaly – Cesky Brod, start 13:36, technical defect on the 
track, end 15:36 
SMS 14:00 
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Chapter 10  
 
RISK CONNECTED WITH COMMUNICATION IN CRITICAL 
SITUATION 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Crisis communication ensures the information of people about dangers. It manages 
potential problems, helps to reduce panic and protect the reputation of company. Mistakes 
in crisis communication mean the risk because they can cause panic, increase of damages 
on assets etc. The article deals with communication in the company before, during after 
crisis. It gives proposals how to improve communication skill and techniques to process 
crisis situations. 
 
2. Crisis communication 
 
Each company goes through several critical situations during its development. This 
equally regards private enterprises as well as public institutions. The size of an enterprise, 
or the period of existence of an enterprise, has no decisive influence on the presence of a 
crisis. Small enterprises can sometimes survive the crisis and sometimes the crisis 
destroys large companies with long-time presence in the market. There are a large number 
of reasons for the crisis onset and they will change alongside the development of the 
environment, but there is one thing they have in common: maximum time pressure that is 
brought about in case of the burdened company.  
Demands on tackling and averting the crisis are enormous. They require high level of 
professionalism, disproportional effort of people, many times they affect financial, 
material and innovative base of the company, and they verify good management practices 
as well as completely new practices. The final outcome is often unequal with the inputs 
expended.  
According to the survey of the Institute for Crisis Management in USA [1], most of all 
crises in the world, namely 33.47%, are caused by the management of respective 
companies, which is an alarming observation. Human factor cannot be underestimated 
and it is necessary to pay more attention to the stakeholders, even before the crisis onset, 
in the form of preparation of a quality crisis scenario. The imminent crisis can be pointed 
out well in advance by attentive employees who are experienced in the area of running 
their own business, or have experience from other similar companies. If the management 
is willing to listen and respond to the warnings, it can take effective corrective actions in 
order to attenuate or even avert the crisis. However, if the management underestimates 
these warnings, if it does not communicate with employees, or even imposes sanctions 
against them, then it responds to the crisis with delay, or it does not respond at all. It is 
exactly the incorrect communication of management in the workplace while dealing with 
a crisis situation that can escalate   
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tension and contribute to further damages. Acquiring communication techniques with 
internal and external stakeholder can mitigate the negative impact of the crisis and 
eliminate the impact of the crisis on the enterprise or the company. 
 
2.1. Communication in the organization 
 
Communication represents social interaction during which information is transmitted 
wittingly or unwittingly. The Latin origin of the word as such - communis - means 
common, this later derived into communicare, i.e. joining, making common and 
transmitting information. A significant share of working time of managers is represented 
by communicating. According to Sedlák [2], it is up to 75% of their working time that is 
dedicated to communication with other people. In order for the organization to function 
effectively, it is necessary to communicate properly on all levels of internal or external 
communication. Information that managers get or share comes from different sources and 
is destined for different stakeholders, whereas each group of stakeholders pursues 
fulfilment of its expectations.  
Kunz [3] claims that individual groups of stakeholders have very specific claims and 
requirements, whereas it is exactly the crisis in the company that can preclude them and 
make them complicated. Customers mainly expect the enterprise to deliver high quality 
of products and services, fast and correct clearance of potential complaints and warranty 
claims, observance of standards, no threats to their health or safety.  
Employees expect appropriate job titles, fair remuneration for their work as well as 
creation of such working conditions that will protect their health and safety. Similarly, 
they anticipate the respect for dignity of each employee. Owners as well as investors 
mostly put emphasis on their capital appreciation and the enterprise value growth, they 
also expect such management in the enterprise that will act professionally, transparently 
and will be fully engaged in their interest.  
The interest of suppliers is an early settlement of payments under agreed terms and 
conditions, a stable possibility of sales and supplies, honesty. A local community has its 
interests in relation to the enterprise as well; they mostly expect engagement and support 
of development of local communities. Their effort is to respect, dialogue and mutually 
favourable cooperation as well as provision and creation of more jobs, tax contribution 
and local economic impact. 
Incorrect communication of the management during the crisis can make the stated 
groups uncertain and they will rightfully feel threatened with regard to their legitimate 
interests. If the communication gets out of control, it becomes uncontrolled, causes 
damages, contribute to spreading false information, half-truths, defamation and panic 
increase. It often represents a pass on competition which can benefit from the situation. 
Incorrect communication during the crisis is then another component that contributes to 
termination of the company activities, or to the loss of the company reputation. Goodwill 
of the enterprise is created over many years, it helps its competitiveness, and it influences 
decision-making of customers. However, it can be irrecoverably destroyed over a short 
period of time. 
 
2.2. Necessity of crisis communication 
 
Not to leave things to chance is a very important step that the enterprise can take in 
peaceful time when the enterprise is doing well and problems classify as common, easily 
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manageable. Risk management includes also preparation of communication with each 
group of stakeholders, including communication with the public. As stated by Hvizdová 
et al. [4], the principle of public relations dwells in building good relationships of the 
enterprise with the public. It is based on creating a positive image in a defence against 
adverse information about the company. Public relations and crisis communication have 
the common base which is to protect the company goodwill before the crisis, but also 
during the crisis, to limit the impact of the crisis and to speed up the enterprise reputation 
recovery.   
Targeted activities of the reputation management, as stated by Zuzák and Königová 
[5], cannot be just passive activities, but must also include the following set of activities:  
- targeted formation and creation of reputation as part of the overall or marketing 
strategy,  
- identification of reputation and its changes,  
- corrections in reputation (influencing opinion) if there is a shift in the reputation 
development or a violation of the development due to a sudden negative event. 
Each crisis specifically influences and changes behaviour and reactions of people 
affected by it. Therefore, the company management that deals with common, routine 
situations in the enterprise does not have to be prepared for the increased demands in 
communication during the crisis. That is why the company management should have 
experts ready - crisis managers who will take control during the crisis in order to eliminate 
a negative impact of the crisis on the enterprise. This represents a usual part of risk 
management. 
Mika [6] points out the demanding character of the work and factors influencing crisis 
managers´ decision-making that need to be taken into account. A crisis situation can, for 
example, cause that communication between managers and other members of the 
enterprise which is usually without any problems can be marked by many disruptive and 
undesirable influential factors impeding the effective decision-making process.  
When communicating, it is important to consider the following facts: 
- increasing stress makes people less alert, underestimation or omission of important 
information can occur, 
- lack of clarity of information and pressure on their fast processing often leads to its 
incorrect interpretation,  
- emotional pressure imposed on crisis managers leads to limitation of their ability to 
accept new, adequate information, mainly information that is in contradiction with 
their or general expectation, 
- biological rhythms in conditions of long-term activities in demanding situations 
restrict flexible thinking of people, 
- a crisis situation requires a temporary limitation of certain needs of people taking part 
in the crisis solution as well as of those who are directly affected by the crisis, 
- there is a need to suppress or cancel currently less important tasks and activities and 
to focus on key issues, 
- long-term responsible work under physical and mental strain, under the influence of 
strong emotions, increases fatigue and decrease the ability to think reasonably and to 
decide.  
The stated factors point out that crises communication needs to be included as part of risk 
management. The aforesaid area is developing and is bringing new findings. 
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3.  Phases of crisis communication 
 
Elaboration of individual steps of crisis communication, authorization of persons 
selected to communicate with internal and external groups, represent a part of risk 
management. It is best to divide communication into phases of pre-crisis 
communications, crisis communication and post-crisis communication.  
 
3.1 Preparation of pre-crisis communication 
 
Experience of many crisis managers suggests that it is necessary to have a 
communication strategy ready before the crisis onset. Its basic items prepared before the 
crisis consist of what follows:  
1. Emergency plan which will consist of several crisis scenarios depended on possible 
sources of the crisis onset. Crisis scenarios need to be updated on at least yearly basis. 
It is recommended to have a list of current contacts in case of danger. 
2. Appointment of a spokesperson. Enterprises must have their spokespersons, so called 
communicators, who will inform stakeholders, mainly the media, in case of a crisis. 
Well-prepared spokespersons can acquire, by means of their appearance, a positive 
influence on individual groups of stakeholders, be it employees, customers, business 
partners, media or experts. Crisis communication manual of the company should 
include a description of powers and responsibilities of spokespersons. It is not 
necessary that the company chief executive is its spokesperson, it is important for a 
spokesperson to be available and interviews he or she gives must convince the media 
that he or she is a reliable and competent source of information. He or she should keep 
the media attention so the media will not try to obtain information from other sources. 
His or her appearance towards the media must be professional at all times and must 
harmonize strategic aspects of the enterprise with interests of the journalists. Several 
authors recommend that the company can have even more spokespersons available, 
if necessary and for the purposes of their turn-taking. It is then important to give 
uniform, coordinated information. Training of spokespersons should be often focused 
on unpleasant questions from individual stakeholders via conferences simulations and 
crisis tests.  
3. Establishment of a press and communication department. Communication department 
in the company should have staff trained for the work with the media and other 
stakeholders, both internal and external. From the view of technical equipment, it is 
important to have available phone lines, e-mail, and basic information about the 
company available on the internet, current contacts for representatives of local or 
international media, and a room where a briefing might be held if necessary. 
4. Communicate with individual stakeholders including the media on a regular basis. 
This rule has proved successful as help while building the company reputation in the 
course of several years. It belongs to the policy of honesty and transparency, it is built 
in good and bad times and it strengthens credibility during the crisis. One of the best 
ways how to send out positive signals with regard to the current affairs of the 
enterprise is behaviour in terms of corporate social responsibility. As mentioned by 
Kislingerová [7], loyal employees are often the most secure capital that is left to the 
enterprise in difficult times.  
5. Pay attention to the local media. Local regional TV news, local radio stations or local 
newspaper are often the source of information for national or foreign media. Even if 
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the objective of the company management is, for example, foreign media, it is not 
recommended to underestimate, ignore local media. Even if the interest of 
international media is later focused on different issues, the interest of local media in 
the latest news from the enterprise affected by the crisis will remain.  
6. Have questions regarding safety and protection elaborated. Provide enough 
information. 
It is easier to respond in stressful times extremely burdening the entire company 
management when pre-crisis communication is addressed correctly. Crisis 
communication follows from pre-crisis communication. 
 
3.2. Crisis communication  
 
Mikušová [8] defines the crisis as a basic unforeseen event that bears potential negative 
impacts that are dangerous for the organization, employees, products, services, financial 
conditions and reputation. Its solution lasts for a longer period of time and it is often 
necessary to invite external consultants. The crisis disrupts the ability of the enterprise to 
continue in its everyday operations. During the crisis, the organization must deal with the 
crisis as such and simultaneously respond stakeholders in its area. However, it is able to 
satisfy only certain groups in its area. If we observe successful organizations, we can see 
that they mostly satisfy the main groups of stakeholders that have a decisive influence on 
their operations. Requests for the crisis solution differ depending on whether it concerns 
customers, employees, owners, investors, banks, suppliers, local communities, state 
institutions or non-profit organizations. It is the interest of each group of stakeholders to 
make logical effort to cover their own risks. Their efforts depending also on the source of 
the crisis have different priorities. If the crisis initiator was, for example, a fraudulent 
conduct, the most significant groups in crisis will be employees and investors. If there is 
leakage of hazardous substance into the environment, non-profit organizations of activists 
protecting the environment, the local community and other groups will be interested in 
the company. If there is a breach of laws, the media, state authorities or competition, 
which benefits from the given situation, are interested in the enterprise.  
Enterprises sometimes underestimate stakeholders that, on the contrary, show little 
interest in the company and have little influence, thus those not involved or not directly 
informed. However, in the course of a certain phase of the crisis, such a group can 
mobilize and change dynamically. Groups of stakeholders’ exchange information about 
the enterprise that is dealing with the crisis, they form their opinions, and they draft their 
requirements. For crisis management it is therefore important to have individual steps 
approved by stakeholders with decisive influence. It is not necessary that a complete 
agreement is reached with regard to expectations of stakeholders and actions of a crisis 
team, a threshold approval will do. At the moment of the crisis onset, it must answer the 
following questions: 
- when the enterprise learnt about the crisis for the first time, 
- what steps it took, 
- how and who noticed / did not notice the first signals, 
- whether the crisis is a mistake of the organization, and other questions.  
Even though it is quite difficult to answer the aforesaid questions, there is a moral and 
economic obligation of the management to answer them. The public can often critically 
respond to the organization that found itself in crisis. A successful organization can 
involve its stakeholders in the process of revitalisation by getting an approval of inevitable 
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steps leading to its rescue, it communicates actively, presents a uniform version of events 
and a solution strategy. To detriment of enterprises, the management is not always able 
to anticipate and respond to the crisis onset. 
 
3.2.1. Crisis communication strategies 
The crisis disrupts the ability of the enterprise to continue in its everyday operations. 
Unlike the crisis, a problem is defined by a limited period of duration, without the interest 
of the public, without a threat to employees. According to Mikušová [8], the enterprise 
can adopt one of the four basic strategic approaches in relation to its stakeholders during 
the crisis: 
- stagnation (do nothing), 
- refusing approach to the crisis, 
- respond and defend itself at the same time, 
- transition to attack. 
Stagnation at the time the company should act, as every kind of passivity, will take its 
toll. Managers try to convince themselves and the others that there is no crisis in their 
enterprise and that only usual problems are concerned. They do nothing to solve the crisis. 
Zuzák and Königová [5] explain responses of the company management to the crisis by 
way of an example of a research carried out in 2002 by the German advisory company 
Ronald Berger in 130 large German, Austrian and Swiss enterprises. At first, it was the 
crisis suppression, later thorough execution of measures to eliminate it. Sometimes it is 
problematic for the inexperienced management to distinguish between problems and the 
crisis, mainly in its first phase. 
Refusing the opinion that the organization is undergoing the crisis is an approach of 
“apparent death”. Silence of the management during the crisis is perceived by 
stakeholders as confessing one´s guilt for the crisis onset, or as manifesting one´s 
arrogance. According to some authors, in cases of confidential nature or, for example, if 
a judicial follow-up is expected, the silence is the right strategy. Lawyers in the 
organization want to talk least in order to minimize legal liability. On the contrary, 
marketing managers want to regain the trust of consumers via provided information. If 
the media learns classified information from other sources, a strong breach of 
trustworthiness of the enterprise occurs. Mihok and Kádárová [9] hold the opinion that 
there is no confidential information during the company crisis that the company should 
be concealing. Those organizations that initiatively try to solve the crisis have higher 
success rate.  
In case the company decides to adopt the third strategy, i.e. to respond and to defend 
itself at the same time, the company spokesperson can attack the one who blamed the 
company for the crisis. The enterprise can blame an individual or an organization. The 
enterprise can take legal actions against “the plaintiff”, can disparage the amount of 
damages, can remind the public of previous successes of the organization, can downplay 
the organization liability for the crisis or it can also apologize. The following statements 
belong to the defence part: the crisis is a result of somebody else´s conduct and the 
management did not have enough information and that is why it did not take control over 
the matter as fast as desired. Everything the organization later does will be presented by 
the company spokesperson as a good intention of the organization. 
If the organization decides to adopt the fourth strategy, it does not leave the crisis onset 
to chance. This is a proactive behaviour. The organization is prepared for the crisis onset 
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in the future, it has the crisis scenario elaborated, the crisis team established as well as the 
spokesperson prepared as part of the pre-crisis phase. 
  
3.2.2. Phases of crisis communication 
At the time of the crisis onset, communication related to safety should be more 
sensitive than proactive. Provide enough information without putting too much emphasis 
on safety issues. Respond and communicate well based on honesty and transparency is 
the key to the crisis solution. On the contrary, a sign of professional incompetence is 
aggression and attacks on employees, journalists´ or competitors´ questions. According 
to opinions mentioned by Mihok and Paška [10], functions, tools, communication 
environment and other phenomena of communication process change significantly in 
crisis situations. Special rules based on flexibility and speed of a respond in everyday 
contact with customers and the media apply and become one of the decisive success 
factors in the time of the crisis. The enterprise that does not respond quickly in the time 
of the crisis and is not able to communicate will get to the point that there will be 
communication about the enterprise without the enterprise. This can deepen the crisis 
significantly. The crisis in the enterprise attracts the attention of the general public. 
Unpreparedness of the enterprise for such a situation will provoke criticism and difficult 
questions. The company management takes a chance of increasing potential damages by 
inappropriate measures instead of preserving them. The enterprise thus gets on the 
defensive. As stated by Remišová [11], the company representatives should not act 
arrogantly, should not devolve responsibility to unspecified subjects, or search for alibi 
for its unethical conduct. It is imprudent to, for example, hide the incident that gave rise 
to the crisis in the enterprise because true facts will be discovered after certain time and 
new lies or camouflage manoeuvres will cause more harm to the enterprise than the crisis 
as such. The organization management should be ready even for a potential apology to its 
clients. 
Problematic issues that the spokesperson needs to deal with while communicating with 
the media are pointed out by Vymětal [12]. These are efforts to find an absolute answer, 
to pretend compactness with the public opinion, sometimes questions regarding the 
spokesperson´s personal opinion, or to look for discrepancies. The spokesperson must 
often encounter searching for various constructions, speculations and contradictory and 
emotional information for headlines of front pages of newspaper. Effective 
communication with the media during the crisis should therefore consist of the following 
seven steps: 
- assessment of needs and limits of the media and own possibilities for the media 
relations, 
- creation of targets, plans and strategies for the media communication, 
- training of communicators, spokespersons for the media communication and direct 
communication with citizens, 
- preparation of clear, brief, targeted announcements and of a list of key persons, 
groups, enterprises and interests, 
- identification of the media activities and their target groups, provision of clear, early, 
visible, targeted announcements, 
- evaluation of announcements and procedures, reactions of the public, feedback and 
improvement. 
If the company decides to remain silent, it will make further development of the crisis 
situation more complicated. Not providing information to the media does not give the 
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company an opportunity to express its own opinion important for its stakeholders and 
subsequently the media is forced to look for alternative sources of news which will be 
less careful when considering their words than it would be useful for the enterprise. Often, 
room is left for other sources of information such as police, emergency services, false and 
inaccurate information may occur. It is this forethoughtful to be well prepared for 
communication during the crisis. As stated by Bednář [13], it is very important to pay 
attention to so called “toxic media” in the course of crisis communication. There is certain 
media that are unacceptable for majority of enterprises, commercial subject and 
politicians. This means it would not be suitable if references to the enterprise appeared 
there. It is necessary to be aware of such media and try to avoid it. Certain tabloid press 
belongs to this group, as well as publications focused on a very small group of readers, 
or publications focused on problems that do not correspond to the company approach.  
 
3.2.3. Post-crisis communication 
If the company manages to cope with the crisis, it is important not to forget and to 
maintain communication with stakeholders. The following should apply as a rule:  
1. To be proactive in communication that means to provide enough news on the recovery 
process of the company. To focus mostly on positive news, return of the company 
back to its normal operation. 
2. To organize a meeting with the media representatives. To call attention to new things 
that the company started to do, to get a positive response of the media on the company 
affairs. 
3. Not to forget the anniversary. To anticipate the interest of local, or national, media in 
termination of the big crisis and to communicate after its termination what was 
achieved, what target there was set for the company, how the company developed, 
etc., for example, after a period of 100 days, 6 months, one year, etc. To have ready 
materials, stories, everything that will be interested for target groups focused on the 
company. 
4. To be prepared for legal proceedings, judicial follow-ups after the crisis. Each entity 
that was somehow affected by the crisis of the enterprise can press for investigation, 
file complaints, and deal with its affairs seeking judicial remedies. It is therefore very 
important not to overlook, already during the crisis, inaccurate news spread by the 
media in the effort to achieve sensations regarding the affected enterprise and to write 
a letter to its editor with a request to correct inaccurate, misleading issues. According 
to Stanová [14], it is important to correct mistakes and faults immediately. It is 
necessary to announce that the enterprise did not provide an adequate answer and 
want to do it again in order to avoid confusion. It is important to call journalists as 
soon as it is discovered that an article is inaccurate. The enterprise has a right to kindly 
notify of inaccuracies and give reasons why the information is inaccurate. In the court 
proceedings, the enterprise often needs evidence that it was not silent and responded 
to inaccurate news immediately. 
5. To create own web newspaper where the company proactively responds to new issues 
in its surroundings. This represents an alternative to the news of the media which will 
be later spread. To provide more detailed information with as of the current date. 
6. As pointed out by Chalupa [15], to choose appropriate arguments for stakeholders in 
order to calm the situation after the crisis, i.e. to convince employees that the most 
difficult part is over and the enterprise remains a perspective employer, to provide 
160 
 
reasons to customers for restoring their confidence in products and services of the 
enterprise. This also applies to banks, suppliers and clients. 
 
4.  Data 
 
The subject of the research was a specific part of risk management that deals with 
elaboration of crisis scenarios with the view of the area of crisis communication. 
Secondary data was gathered from the best practices of domestic and foreign crisis 
managers working in various industries. The data are from companies: Johnson & 
Johnson, Texaco, Porsche, Slovnaft SpA., ZSE, SpA., Slovak Telecom, SpA [16-18]. All 
these companies have successfully managed the public relations and the communication 
with staff during a crisis situation. 
The aim was to comprehensively describe individual steps of pre-crisis 
communication, during the crisis and after the crisis and this way to provide instructions 
for the crisis management on responding during the crisis. Procedures of how to work 
with information and stakeholders mainly during the crisis are very similar, without 
distinct particulars with regard to various industries. Crisis communication has enormous 
strength that can help sustain and save values such as a functioning enterprise when 
applied appropriately during a demanding period of the crisis.    
 
5.  Methods 
 
For detection of frequent mistakes of managers at crisis communication, it was 
performed the critical analysis of documents of companies on courses of crisis.  They 
were identified mistakes, their causes and consequences of mistakes at crisis 
communications. The risk connected with the crisis communication is understood as the 
size of consequences for company (size of losses, damages and harms) normed to one 
year and percentage of total company property.  For serious risks´ sources (huge losses, 
damages and harms, it was prepared the risk management plan [19] for improving the 
crisis communication.   
 
6.  Results 
 
The company that proactively prepares itself for a potential onset of the crisis has 
communication with all key stakeholders incorporated and regularly updated in its risk 
management. It is because the company realizes potential risks that can emerge due to its 
ignorance of effective crisis communication as well as benefits of successfully managed 
crisis communication in all its phases. Risk management of the enterprise will first 
identify a risk in the risk assessment phase, which means that it describes in detail what 
risks there are in case of incorrect communication of the enterprise. Subsequently, it 
carries out analysis to discover mainly the sources of the identified risk. In the end, the 
assessment of the scope of the described risk takes place in order to take required actions. 
Table 1 shows the measures for improvement the crisis communication for priority 
risks connected with crisis communication. 
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Table 1.  Risk management plan for serious risks connected with crisis communication.  
 
Risk Source of risk The measures for reduction of risk 
Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Loss of 
company 
goodwill 
- negative media 
publicity,  
- defamation of the 
enterprise by its 
competition,  
- incorrect reactions of 
the company 
management, 
- excusing and 
disparaging mistakes 
and substantial 
breaches of laws by the 
company management, 
- neglecting public 
relations, 
- neglecting corporate 
social responsibility 
and others 
prevention in 
the form of: 
- public 
relations 
regularity, 
- notifications 
of planned 
and 
performed 
activities of 
corporate 
social 
responsibility 
to individual 
stakeholders  
- immediate 
response of 
top managers 
to negative 
publicity or 
defamation, 
- creating own 
web page for 
informing 
the public on 
current 
affairs taking 
place in the 
company 
- setting EWS in 
order to 
eliminate any 
breach of law 
by the 
enterprise,  
- immediate 
apology for 
mistakes and 
substantial 
violations, 
- inspection of 
such cases and 
drawing 
consequences 
for violators 
Incorrect 
reactions of 
management  
- long-lasting stress,  
- pressure imposed by 
the company 
management, -panic of 
customers, employees, 
- ignoring and 
concealing important 
information and others 
- preparation 
of pre-crisis 
communicati
on and crisis 
communicati
on as part of 
emergency 
plans 
- providing for 
more crisis 
managers for 
individual 
tasks, 
- selection of 
managers 
with 
resilience, 
ability to 
cope with 
stress and 
respond to 
crisis 
situations, 
- handing over 
important 
information 
providing for an 
interim manager 
with required 
experience, 
objectivity, 
flexibility and 
responsibility for 
the result, 
detached view 
and impartiality  
Loss of 
business 
partners 
(suppliers 
/customers) 
non-observing 
contractual terms and 
conditions and 
agreements, e.g.:  
- technical parameters, 
- ISO standards, 
- financial discipline and 
others. 
systematic 
character of 
creating long-
term and 
favourable 
partnership 
relations based 
observing 
contractual 
terms and 
conditions 
agreed with 
business 
partners  
searching for 
acquisition, 
global strategic 
alliances and 
corporations 
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on the win-win 
result 
Loss of end 
customers 
- -unknown and unsolved 
problem with a product 
or a service, 
- -missing feedback with 
regard to customers and 
their expectations and 
others. 
- regular 
monitoring 
of customer 
satisfaction 
with products 
and services, 
- providing 
service 
 
- investigating 
complaints, 
- staff 
trainings for 
successful 
work with 
customers 
 
providing for 
required 
innovations of 
products and 
services 
Threat of 
lawsuits 
- damage to customers, 
employees,  
- fatalities, 
- enterprise violating 
legislation, 
- enterprise providing 
incorrect information 
during the crisis and 
others 
- requiring a 
correction of 
an 
inaccurately 
described 
situation or 
causes of the 
company 
crisis in the 
media, 
- providing 
correct 
information 
regular 
monitoring of 
legal 
compliance in 
key areas of 
occupational 
health and 
safety as well 
as integrated 
management 
systems 
eliminating 
potential 
fatalities 
Loss of  
best (key) 
employees  
- pathological corporate 
culture, 
- tough bureaucracy, 
- managers informing 
against the company, 
- suspiciousness, 
- arrogance of managers, 
-internal fights within 
the workplace, 
- tolerating mobbing, 
- intimidation, 
- suppressing creativity, 
- withholding important 
facts in relation to 
employees,  
- low-quality personnel 
policy and others 
- zero 
tolerance of 
any 
manifestation 
of mobbing 
within the 
workplace, 
- application 
of 
whistleblowi
ng in case of 
employees 
 
- quality and 
motivating 
employment 
policy, 
- staff 
trainings, 
- elaborating a 
quality social 
policy  
 
- improving 
corporate 
culture, 
- creating 
corporate code 
of conduct 
with sanctions 
for its non-
observance, 
- supporting 
creativity, 
- transparency of 
the staffing 
process 
Loss of 
competitive-
ness  
- isolation from new 
streams in the area of 
the company core 
business, 
- no activity of the 
management in the area 
of innovations, 
- supporting 
innovative 
thoughts, 
- investing into 
science and 
research 
 
- purchasing 
licences, 
- new 
technologies 
- innovations, 
- new products, 
services, 
service, 
- entering new 
markets, 
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- satisfaction with the 
achieved state, 
- stereotypical behaviour, 
- creation of so called 
- “protected area” via 
lobbing and various 
secret deals 
 
- diversifying 
risks 
 
 
As pointed out by several authors [20, 21], existing corporate culture and the way crisis 
management communicates with employees play their role during the crisis onset. 
According to Markidan [22] “Crisis communication should always be centred around 
your customers, and what you've done, are doing, and plan to do to make things right for 
them.” 
Enterprises understand more and more that it is important not only to elaborate an 
emergency plan but also a code of conduct. However, it is necessary to put the code of 
conduct as such into practice as a set of values, principles, behaviour, expected moral 
attitudes. The code of conduct includes principles that the organization observes in its 
behaviour related to its partners, i.e. employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers and 
the like. The code of conduct usually includes moral standards expected of the company 
employees. These could relate to the matters such as: conflict of interests, giving and 
accepting gifts, polluting environment, health and safety, sexual harassment. The crisis 
often attacks the enterprise quickly and without previous warnings and the response to it 
is usually stress and shock. It is exactly in the crisis situation when the corporate culture 
is examined. If the corporate culture is firm and strong, positively focused on similar 
objectives, it will be positively reflected in the response to the crisis. In those enterprises 
where the corporate culture was purposefully created and formed, where there were no 
contradictions and requests of employees were met, the corporate culture becomes a 
stabilizing element in the course of the crisis. On the contrary, if the corporate culture is 
superficial only, or it is unstable or weak, its very essence is uncovered during the crisis 
and destruction occurs. This could result in creating groups that follow different interests 
and objectives. In the time of the crisis, personal and group antagonisms are brought to 
light, some employees deal with the situation by quickly leaving the enterprise, passivity 
in negotiations occurs, or high level of aggression of employees is shown.  
  
7.  Conclusion 
  
The crisis represents reality of the business entity that is best dealt with by preparing 
for its onset. Honest, clear and transparent communication of the enterprise with every 
group of stakeholders before the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis is one of the 
ways how to survive it. It is experience that can help the enterprise recover its reputation, 
get its customers back and maintain loyalty of its own employees. The enterprise that 
managed the crisis can obtain valuable experience and continue in further existence, can 
create values for the society. Crisis communication should therefore be part of emergency 
plans of companies. 
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Chapter 11  
 
BUSINESS PROCESSES AND THEIR MAPPING AS BASE FOR 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT AND MAP OF RISKS 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In the context of corporate activities, we repeatedly face situations where it is 
necessary to monitor individual business processes from a risk perspective. Typical 
examples of such situations may include: 
1. Making a risk map as a basic tool for risk management in the company. It is 
understandable that by activity and specific focus of the company, the processes, the 
resulting individual risks as well as their severity could be different. By severity we 
mean the possible probability of risk (i.e. the likelihood of harm) and its possible 
impact. 
2. Management of the specific type of risk. For certain types of risk, e.g. credit risk, 
market risk, currency risk etc. the business process map is just an auxiliary tool. On 
the other hand, for managing other types of risks, especially from the operational risk 
category, an accurate view of business processes, their risk characteristics and 
context is absolutely necessary. 
3. Business Continuity Management (BCM) and crisis management. By using the 
mapping of business processes, it is possible to determine which processes are crucial 
(critical) to the running of the business and must be secured in case of emergencies. 
For use in BCM and crisis management it is necessary to determine the characteristics 
of a critical period, the maximum allowable downtime (MAD), the possible impacts 
of failure, etc. for individual processes, as will be discussed below. 
  
2.  Background research 
 
For the definition of risk, we refer to Smejkal, Rais [1]. The risk could be understood 
as: 
1. Probability or possibility of loss, fail. 
2. Variability of possible outcomes or uncertainty of their achievement. 
3. Deviation of actual and expected results. 
4. Probability of any result different from the expected outcome. 
5. Situations where the quantitative extent of a phenomenon subject to a certain      
probability distribution. 
6. Danger of negative deviations from the target (pure risk). 
7. Danger of wrong decision. 
8. Possibility of loss or profit (speculative risk). 
9. Uncertainty associated with the development of the asset (investment risk). 
 
 
*Authors: Dipl. Ing. Martin Svítil, Ph.D. Expobank CZ, Praha, martin.svitil@seznam.cz, 
Assoc. Prof. ,  JUDr., PhDr.  Ivo Svoboda, Ph.D., Vysoká škola regionálního rozvoje, s.r.o., 
Praha, dr.svoboda.ivo@seznam.cz 
167 
 
10. Median of a loss function. 
11. Possibility that a specific threat exploits specific vulnerabilities of a system. 
According to Smejkal, Rais [1] the risk management usually includes: 
1. The analysis of risk(s).  
2. The selection of countermeasures.  
3. The analysis of cost / benefits. 
4. The implementation of countermeasures. 
5. The testing (the comprehensive screening) of countermeasures. 
In this paper we mostly deal with credit risk and operating risk. The credit risk is the 
risk of loss due to the inability or unwillingness of the contractor to meet the agreed 
contract terms. From the perspective of the lender we see the credit risk as the risk of 
default of the borrower in the way that the borrower fails to meet its obligations, thereby 
causing loss to the creditor. The operating risk (as classified by Cipra [2]) contains the 
risk of the transaction (losses resulting from errors in the execution of operations in 
accounting, settlement etc.), operational risk management (management activities of 
front-in, middleware and back-office, especially fraudulent, criminal and unauthorized 
conduct, money laundering, transactions over the limit, lack of control etc.) and, finally, 
risk of systems (errors in computer programs, mathematical models for data, system 
downtime, etc.) 
For Business Continuity Planning (BCP) we refer to Smith and Sherwood [3] “The 
objective of the business continuity planning exercise is to ensure the recovery in an 
acceptable time frame of the business as a whole, following an incident which causes 
major disruption to business operations.” In the same paper Smith and Sherwood [3] 
recommend to execute the Business impact analysis (BIA) and to identify critical 
business functions and operations.     
Gibb, Buchanan and Shah [4] define the role of Business Continuity Management 
(BCM) “Business continuity management is concerned with identifying and managing 
the risks which threaten to disrupt essential business processes, minimising the effects of 
these risks and ensuring that recovery of a process is achievable without disruption to the 
business. BCM is more than just disaster recovery - while disaster recovery is a reactive 
activity, BCM is also about trying to prevent disasters occurring in the first place”. We 
agree absolutely with this statement, especially with the last sentence. This is why our 
research is aimed both at the risk management as well as BCM and crisis management. 
The importance of the BCM is recently increasing. E.g. Herbane, Elliott a Swartz [5] see 
a „possibility of a role for BCM that can be more integrated with the more conventional 
strategic activities of a firm “and get „mission-critical strategic role “.  More about BCM 
and BCP it is given for example by Herbane, Elliot a Swartz [6], Ernest-Jones [7] and 
Gibb and Buchanan [8]. More about BIA for example by Goldberg [9]. The basics of 
actual techniques and tools for process mapping are well described e.g. by Keller and 
Jacka [10] (primarily from the audit perspective). They propose the use of specialized 
worksheets (questionnaires), including in particular the name of the process, its objective, 
risks of the process, key controls, event for beginning and ending, input + sources, output 
+ customers, measures of success. Alternatively, the summary of job duties of individual 
employees is included too. 
 
3.  Data description and methods 
The subjects of research were two companies and their business processes. It was (1)  
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a medium-sized company in the financial sector, with roughly 150 employees. The 
company provides various financial services, using sales offices covering the entire 
territory of the Czech Republic. (2) Small universal bank with roughly 250 employees in 
Czech Republic. 
In both cases the activities such as approving transactions, their processing and 
management, enforcement etc. (i.e. Back - office) are concentrated at the headquarters, 
performing these processes for all the sales offices. 
The aim was to analyse and describe the procedure of mapping activities (processes) 
running in the enterprises and to provide recommendations for such mapping procedure. 
A procedure of collecting empirical data in the parts of the enterprises, assess them 
according to criteria of verifiability and relevance was used. The application of method 
of induction was subsequently carried out to extend the conclusions to the entire 
enterprise. 
 
4.  Results 
 
For the above situation, tracking business processes from a risk perspective, it is 
effective to map business processes and create a map of business processes from the 
perspective of risk.  The basic requirement is such a selection of criteria and procedures 
for the mapping of processes that makes the resulting process map not too detailed and 
therefore too large for planned uses, but also allows the map contain all relevant processes 
from the point of view of risk. The number of processes, in which all activities of the 
company is segmented, could be considerably influenced during the mapping process. 
The primary criterion for mapping is the affiliation of the processes with different 
departments or divisions of the company. The analyst executing the mapping procedure 
usually goes through the standard (normal) and occasional (extraordinary) activities of 
every department and tries to describe it in the form of individual processes, usually in 
conjunction with the head or authorized employee of each department. The individual 
activities are allocated from the overall picture of the function of the department. 
Additionally, to recently used mapping techniques and tools as described e.g. by Keller 
and Jacka [10], we needed to rather expand the range of information, because our 
mapping of processes should be used (as above) for a wider than just an audit inquiry. So 
we added some more information into the questionnaire, which are important from our 
perspective and for our use of material. As the main criteria for the breakdown 
(separation) of activity into individual processes we include the following components: 
1. Periodicity of the process: some activities, typically e.g. reporting, some control 
activities, maintenance and adjustment, etc. are carried out (or at least should be 
carried out) periodically. Usually the activities with different periodicity belong to 
different processes. For other activities the frequency is variable. The big advantage 
here is the experience of employees in the department who are involved in mapping. 
2. A critical period of the process, i.e. the period during which process should be 
executed 
3. The maximum permissible period of malfunction / downtime (sometimes referred to 
as MAD = Maximum Allowable Downtime): How long is the complete outage of the 
process allowable without affecting the functioning of society. 
Maximum Allowable Downtime = the point in time after a significant interruption at 
which the product or process can no longer be inoperable. 
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Sometimes the term MTPoD is used too: Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption = 
the point in time after a significant interruption after which an organization’s viability 
will be irrevocably threatened if product and service delivery cannot be resumed. 
This is crucial information, especially for BCM and BCP. Let’s mention for example 
the bank: if the making of new contracts with clients (e.g. opening new accounts etc.) 
would be prevented for several days, it would certainly be very unpleasant for the 
bank, especially in terms of reputation and loss of potential gains from new contracts 
and from new customers. But if, however, the bank would be for several days unable 
to pay deposits to clients, the impact would be much worse. In addition to the huge 
reputational risk, legal actions from customers (e.g. because of the loss of profit, etc.) 
could be launched. And with a high probability the bank would be exposed to 
sanctions from the regulator. 
4. Personnel: how many employees usually perform the process, what number of them 
is required to ensure the basic operation of the process (e.g. if it is needed to relocate 
to an alternate site or work from home etc.) 
5. The necessary technical equipment: what hardware and software is usually used, 
which HW and SW is required to provide at least basic functionality of the process 
for a limited time. It is closely related to the number of employees mentioned above: 
it can be assumed that almost every employee will need a PC or a workstation with 
some software equipment, data access, and possibly other essentials (printer, Internet 
access ...). The question is also equipping people with portable devices (laptops, smart 
phones) - the higher, it is obviously easier to find a solution to crisis situations if the 
usual working place is not available. 
6. The possible effects of process failure (structured): usually comes up later, with the 
creation of map of processes and sorting of the processes into critical / non-critical - 
see below. 
All activities of the department can therefore be divided into individual 
processes.  Affiliation of the processes to individual departments or divisions of the 
company is the primary criterion, but not a dogma. In the practical implementation of 
process mapping it is useful to focus not only on the formal definition of department / 
division, but in conjunction with the employees to pay attention to the practical 
functioning of enterprise. Moreover, as stated for example by Neumaierová [11] (p. 50): 
"In most cases, the organizational structure, such as mentioned in the annual reports, 
reveal little about the actual style of management of the company. Only the allocation of 
the company employees in various functional specializations or fields in which the 
company conducts its business plans is described. But you can learn only a very little 
about the processes taking place in these organizational structures of these organizational 
charts." [translated by M.S.] If this view is respected and taken into consideration, it is 
possible to successfully map the processes in the organization that uses other than 
traditional hierarchical organizational structure. 
There is also the possibility to exclude some individual activities / processes from the 
mapping process, that takes place within the enterprise across departments / divisions, 
and include them into the process maps separately. An example of such a process may be 
all the necessary activities related to AML (Anti - Money Laundering). In financial 
institutions, several departments are usually involved on AML (esp. risk management, 
compliance, legal and internal audit) and it may therefore make sense to monitor this 
process separately, instead of being classified under all participating departments are 
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therefore occur four times in the process map. It has much to do, of course, with the way 
the process of AML is organized in the company. 
In case that the standard method of the mapping comes to too high and thus difficult-
to-treat number of processes, there is the alternative to perform a primary selection 
processes directly at the primary mapping. This selection process should be configured 
to include only such processes to the map, with which the risk is or potentially may be 
associated. Such primary selection allows you to speed up and simplify the process of 
mapping and treating the data. On the other hand, it is logically associated with a risk of 
missing out a process that could show up to be danger, or (more commonly) turns out to 
be associated with other danger process. 
If the standard mapping method attains such a number of processes with which it is 
possible to work further effectively, the selection of critical processes follows as a next 
step. In essence, this is a process very similar to the BIA (Business Impact Analysis).  
The basic criterion for the selection of critical process is the severity of possible 
impacts of the interruption (loss) of the process. The impacts are usually evaluated in 
several categories, namely: 
1. Financial impact: this includes e.g. the loss of revenue, loss of profit, reducing CF, 
restrictions on the ability to collect receivables, increase financial obligations or the 
inability to make appropriate financial reports. 
2. Impact on customers: the negative impact on company with regard to customer 
opinion and / or customer satisfaction, can lead to loss of customers. 
3. The impact on third parties (employees, suppliers, shareholders / partners ...): the 
negative impact on company with regard to opinion and / or satisfaction of third 
parties, could lead e.g. to leave of important staff, disputes with employees or unions 
and similar organizations, the threat of a strike, etc., to the loss of suppliers, 
management changes etc.  
4. The operational impact: the inability to provide services for internal customers, i.e. 
other departments within the company. May lead to inability to meet the objectives / 
deadlines, the accumulation of pending work, the need to intervene in the processes / 
systems, to loss of productivity, the ability to limit cooperation with third parties. 
5. Legal / Regulatory Impact: negative impact on legal / regulatory environment can lead 
to non-compliance with external regulations (laws), regulatory requirements and 
consequently the legal penalties (fines or - in extreme cases - up to the withdrawal of 
its banking license, etc.). 
6. Reputation impact: a negative impact on the image / brand of the company or its 
reputation. 
In some categories it is possible to estimate the impact of interrupting of processes 
quantitatively or calculate it directly, usually in financial volume. In other cases, the 
impact may be quantitatively estimated only very roughly, or it is completely impossible 
(typically e.g. a reputation impact, where it can be extremely roughly to estimate what 
percentage of clients and potential clients could learn about a possible problem, etc.). The 
used scale and extent of degrees of quantitative evaluation depends, of course, on the 
individual processes, but also on the size and strength of the company, which processes 
we map. For example, for a small company the possible level of fines imposed by 
regulator or other authority in the millions of CZK could be liquidating. On the other 
hand, for large bank a fine in the same amount would represent a relatively less significant 
impact, the more important it could be related to her reputation risk. 
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In case of impossibility or unsuitability of the use of quantitative indicators, it is 
possible to qualitatively assess the possible impacts, e.g. on a scale limited / moderate / 
strong / disastrous. 
Example categorization of interruption of processes in a financial institution is given 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Example of categorization of interruption of processes in a financial institution 
[GE Money]. 
 
Category of 
impact 
4 3 2 1 0 
Disastrous High Middle Low No impact 
Financial 
impact 
Loss higher 
than 1 000 000 
USD 
Loss higher 
than 500 000 
USD and lower 
than 1 000 000 
USD 
Loss higher 
than 250 000 
USD and lower 
than 500 000 
USD 
Loss lower than 
250 000 USD 
No 
financial 
impact 
Impact on 
customer 
Affects more 
than 10% of the 
relevant 
customer base 
and / or matter 
requires 
notification 
more than 10% 
of the customer 
base 
affects more 
than 5% and 
less than 10% 
of the relevant 
customer base 
and / or matter 
requires 
notification 
more than 5% 
and less than 
10% of the 
customer base 
affects more 
than 1% and 
less than 5% of 
the relevant 
customer base 
and / or matter 
requires 
notification of 
more than 1% 
and less than 
5% of the 
customer base 
affected less 
than 1% of the 
relevant 
customer base 
and / or requires 
no notice to 
customers 
no impact 
on 
customers 
Operational 
impact 
Excessive 
accumulation of 
transactions / 
work; 
degradation of 
internal 
controls; 
unavailability of 
suppliers 
Accumulated 
work requires 
the deployment 
of additional 
personnel; 
Internal controls 
are being met, 
but are not 
respected 
deadlines; 
Suppliers are 
working with 
limited capacity 
Accumulated 
work requires 
the deployment 
of additional 
personnel; 
Internal controls 
are being met; 
Services or 
information 
from suppliers 
are delayed, but 
does not affect 
operation 
Operation is not 
affected 
Operation 
is not 
affected 
Legal / 
Regulatory 
impact 
Criminal 
sanctions and 
heavy fines; 
necessary 
investigation, 
the results of 
which are 
Potential to 
cause criminal 
penalties and / 
or fines; may 
lead to 
investigation on 
the basis of the 
Less legal risk 
increasing the 
possibility of an 
audit; coupled 
with the 
observation in 
the 
No Legal / 
Regulatory 
impact 
No Legal / 
Regulatory 
impact 
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presented to the 
Board and on 
the basis of 
which it 
adopted a 
corrective 
action plan; It 
includes matters 
requiring 
immediate 
attention 
(MRIA), 
matters 
requiring 
attention 
(MRA), or their 
equivalents; the 
company faces 
severe 
penalties, loss 
of licenses and / 
or ability to 
function 
adopted plan of 
corrective 
measures; by 
the regulator is 
recommended 
or required 
additional 
reporting 
investigation; 
there is no need 
reporting or 
corrective 
action plan 
Impact on 
reputation 
Significant 
negative impact 
on the 
Company's 
reputation; 
escalation on 
the corporate 
level and 
generate 
negative 
publicity 
Leads to 
negative media 
coverage at the 
national level 
for a long time; 
long-term 
problem for the 
company's 
image; affected 
Corporation 
(Group) 
Leads to 
negative media 
coverage at 
regional or local 
level 
Unlikely to 
media coverage 
on any market 
No impact 
on the 
Company's 
reputation 
 
Typical examples of critical processes in financial institutions may be: 
1. Maintain the communication and awareness of the key persons in the company (and 
outside the company, if needed) 
2. Allow clients the access to their assets (esp. withdrawal from bank accounts, drawing 
of contracted loans, etc.). 
3. Ensure the physical security of assets and functionality of IT security 
4. Monitoring repayment of liabilities and other obligations from clients / debtors / 
business partners, early warning if they are not met and enforcement actions, where 
the risk of delay exist 
5. Implementation of necessary legal steps in accordance with the deadlines in the 
context of legal proceedings (e.g. a timely application to the bankruptcy proceedings, 
filing of complaints, suggestions and appeals, reactions to the proposals of the other 
parties, etc.). 
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6. Ensure the compliance with statutory obligations (e.g. the protection of personal data, 
etc.). 
7. Provide the reporting and control activities, whose failure to comply could result in a 
sanction from the regulator or other institutions 
8. Receipt and registration of incoming mail / messages in data mailbox and response 
to, if the risk of delay exists 
An important part of the selection of critical processes is also a consideration of 
succession of the processes. If a process is recognized as a critical, we logically have to 
evaluate as critical all the preceding processes (if any), which create the necessary 
conditions and prerequisites for the original process. The danger of the primary selection 
of the processes during the mapping is evident here: some processes, not critical 
individually, but essential for other critical processes, can be omitted in the primary 
selection. 
Some critical business processes may depend on external processes or conditions 
outside the surveyed enterprise and may be impossible for the company to influence. In 
such case, a situation like this has to be reported in the map of critical processes and taken 
into consideration within the follow-up. This is usually done within the framework of 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) and creating a Business Continuity Plan (BCP), 
as the company looks for alternative providers of critical services or goods, it creates a 
reserves etc.  
The most obvious prerequisite for application of the process map is a regular update. 
Usually it deems necessary to upgrade or check the validity of the process map at least 
once a year. However, the update rate may vary depending on the type of business, 
number and severity of processes like. 
Of course, it is necessary to perform the update of process maps, selected critical 
processes and links whenever there’s the significant change of the way in which the 
company operates (e.g. after a change of legislation), its internal structure and functioning 
(e.g. the extension of the activities of the company in a different industry) or when the 
Business process Reengineering was executed, as described i.e. by Řepa [12], as a 
fundamental change to the nature of the business process from the beginning. 
 
5.  Conclusion and recommendations 
 
With proper selection of criteria, the mapping of company processes can bring 
universally applicable map of critical processes within the company, along with its 
expected impacts and other important information. 
We especially recommend paying attention to following essential prerequisites for the 
successful mapping of processes: 
1. Correct setting of the mapping process, that makes the resulting process map not too 
detailed and therefore too large for planned uses, but allows the map contain all 
relevant processes from the point of view of risk. 
2. The proper criteria to breakdown all the activities in company’s departments to 
individual described processes 
3. Cooperation with key employees of each department 
4. Correctly set selection of critical processes  
5. Proper mapping of succession of the processes 
6. Corresponding updates of process map, both periodic and ad hoc if needed 
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The resulting process map is then applicable to risk management in company as a 
whole, for the management of a particular type of risk (especially the operating risks) and 
for Business Continuity Management (BCM) and crisis management. 
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Chapter 12  
 
A MENTAL DECISION RISK MODEL: THEORY AND EVALUATION* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of chapter is:  
- to draw attention to the importance of monitoring the evaluation of individual parts 
of project proposal, and also to the review of way of solution of any assigned critical 
values exceedance and to the complete excluding the conditions endangering the 
project integrity, 
- to draw attention to the weak points (smoothing down the time series of unexpected 
conditions) by the deterministic evaluation of parameters,  
- to propose an alternative method for the evaluation of any decision criterion, or for 
data simulating.  
More detailed explanation follows and is linked to the critical interpretation of relation 
(1), given below for practical applications. Technical-economic work is exposed to 
various influences. Further, the influences are identified as benefits, losses, risks, threats 
etc. [1]. For strengthening or diverting such influences, the management is responsible. It 
addresses process management, acquisition management, usage or removal control, 
design of technical work etc. The management target is to achieve a sustainable and 
competitive performance. The risk analysis and continual thorough risk assessment are 
essential for the conceptual design and evaluation of technical-economic variants.  
To express risk management process mathematically, the total risk R is the sum over 
set of individual risks ri, where individual risk is computed as the product of potential 
losses li, and probabilities p(li); the integrated risk is considered 
The total risk of project is written as 𝑹(𝒊) = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑖  𝑝(𝑙𝑖). Loss is expressed in 
financial units or a verbal description of the outcomes. A helpful survey is given in the 
introduction of papers [2, 3]. For example, to support the simulation of buildings 
designing there are many tools, but it is a lack of simple tools that can support the initial 
set of goals in the early phases of design and promote the dialogue between 
representatives of non-professional users and professionals in housing cooperatives, such 
as architects, contractors and consultants. Jensen and Maslesa [4] proposed the RENO 
EVALUE, a tool for targeted planning as a holistic qualitative tool for determination of 
objectives and, what is perhaps even more important, the tool for clarifying the 
expectations as a part of initial dialogue and decision-making process.  
Subsequently, the management can choose different strategies for work with risk [3] 
and formulation of individual solutions´ evaluation, selection of decision methods and 
measures´ monitoring. The decision operates traditionally with chosen factors F1, F2, ..., 
Fi, ..., Fm and it has assigned to their evaluations [h1, h2, ...hi, ..., hm]. The matrix for  
 
*Authors: Assoc. Prof., Dipl. Ing. Petr Dlask, Ph.D., Czech Technical University in Prague, 
Praha, Czech Republic, dlask@fsv.cvut.cz;  Assoc. Prof., Dipl. Ing. Václav Beran, Ph.D., D.Sc., 
Assoc. Prof., Dipl. Ing. Ivana Faltová Leitmanová, PhD., University of South Bohemia, České 
Budějovice, beran@jcu.cz; leitman@ef.jcu.cz 
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assessment [h] is subsequently used for the calculation of total evaluation U. It is applied 
for the comparison of variants, alternatives, and the feasibility of various controlling 
measures etc. The presumption is the existence of significance wj for the 
individual decisional factors Fi of assessment criteria. The resulting evaluation is 
determined by the matrix product  
 
U=[w]∙[h]T                                                         (1) 
 
where 1≤ i ≤m. This calculation is also known as MCDA (the multi-criteria decision 
analysis) of problem. Evaluation may take for decision factors Fi various practical forms. 
We can see the discrete evaluation value as scalar for real number of solitary cost 
evaluations, and as vectors (multidimensional evaluation), as matrix of probability 
densities, i.e. as a set of time series (process flow simulations in time), or as also a fuzzy 
set etc.  
The problem solving the modern decision making nature is multidimensional. A new 
solution requires the complexity, sustainability, technical-economic (T-E) progress, 
efficiency, security, risk evaluation etc.  Suitable examples might be documents of United 
Nations: Agenda 21 [5] and Rio+20 in [6]. Major reasons for the relatively slow progress 
are complicated aspects of topic, conflicting interests and many other factors. 
Nevertheless, the essential problem can also be seen as a bottleneck that is in the actual 
theory.  
It is advantageous to use a hierarchical graph for the description of structures´ 
evaluation. It detects the factual structure of criterions´ evaluation. The interpretation of 
constant U, in its internal structure, enables monitoring the weak and strong points of 
assessed solution. It thus opens the way for the evaluation of variants including the 
subsequent modifications. Generally, the supporting terminology is from the ISO/IES 
standard risk platform. For the needs of evaluation, it uses the IEC 31010: 2009 Risk 
management – Risk assessment techniques [7]. The chapter deals with a modified 
assessment tool based on the Monte Carlo simulation and a tree structure of evaluation 
criteria. 
For both, the ongoing work and the right interpretation of explanation it is appropriate 
to define some terms: 
- project feasibility – it is the project realisation assessment regarding to real conditions, 
- critical value – it is the value beyond which the project is not feasible, 
- scarce events – it denotes events with sporadic occurrence due to the external 
influence, 
- project solver –  it is a tool for calculation and integration of final project evaluation, 
- decision process – it is decision based on criteria F and evaluation of technical-
economic indicators xi, (T-E), 
- transfer function – it is the conversion of xi   set to ui set; data to utility,  
- risk (management) – it involves the identification, assessment, and prioritisation of 
risks, 
- risk – it is the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO 31000) [7], 
- risk management process – it is the monitoring and reviewing the risk. 
Extensive information about category risk, also terminology concerning and legislation, 
is given in IEC 31010:2009 - Risk Management - Risk Assessment Techniques [7], and in 
ISO/Guide 73:2009 – Risk management – Vocabulary [7]. 
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2. Background research and motivation – the process concept  
 
Let us engage in a formal summation for the general purpose – i.e. a description of the 
factual problem. Let us refer to members (elements, components) of solution structure 
(A1, A2,..., An) and about links Kij among them. Important for process structure, there are 
the components (elements, …) of physical (material) reality labelled as set A (described 
mostly by using nouns for commodities, assets, …). The interrelations between these 
elements are changes or progressions (mostly labelled as K expressed by the verbs 
describing doing, performing action, …). In most practical descriptions we deal with 
structures that proceed in time. In other words, we create a dynamic time dependent 
structure.  
Let us express such a structure organizational chart Gorg= (A, K). The more advanced 
description of reality focuses on effects of risk (Gorg| risks) or occurring phenomena, and 
more. We may speak about process structures influenced only sparsely as (Gorg|sparse 
phenomena), etc. The Gorg establishes some value network and enables analysis by 
visualizing sets of relationships and the dynamic of the process in prospect. For a 
hierarchical (tree) structure and the evaluation of projects, it is used SW called PREV – 
Project Evaluation [8]. The software PREV is based on two steps: generator of tasks; and 
solver of tasks that is a scenario based on risk analysis and risk decision making. 
The generator of tasks uses the superposition principle for decomposition from the 
total (difficult) complex view to the detailed (simple) view. The entry data create the basis 
for the generator of tasks which will then create the initial calculating structure for the 
evaluation of new project. The data quality (correctness) comes from the nature of 
accessible information for the expert evaluation by means of SW application interface. 
The internal SW – solver works further with the generated structure. Work with the 
solution concept asks necessarily to define the monitoring mechanisms, which appraise 
and check the evaluated structure and inform about the occurrence of critical data for the 
whole project structure (more in [8, 9]). Besides the structure of the decisional criterion, 
it is necessary to work with the structure (hierarchy) of evaluation. The chosen method 
comes from deterministic evaluations for u1, u2, ..., um. The historical data are mostly 
related to timeline [-t, 0] and factual sources are mostly hard data xi as measurements, 
statistics, expert knowledge, research reports etc.  
The relation of xi → ui (hard data towards utility or benefit) requires the transfer function 
f(xi) for decision-making in environment, which is exposed to risks. In such a case it is 
necessary to know the transfer function between the benefits/utility and risks for each t in 
the past. This can be denoted as h(ui). Data oriented to the future [0,t] are the data 
generated by the simulation model. A schematic distinguishing idea is: 
REAL DATA FROM THE PAST –  t 
↓ 
CURRENT MOMENT OF TIME 
↓ 
                                                      DATA SIMULATION OF FUTURE +t           
                                                                                                                                                              (2)                                                       
       Series {X} of [-t, 0] → Creation of model → Forecasting series {X} of [0, t]. 
 
178 
 
Data describing the past have only limited validity. Such data demonstrate the features 
of past and tells us about the past, they help us to understand the past infrastructure, 
technology, organisation, etc. Any new solutions have to be carriers of new added values. 
New solutions for implementation industry need to be reflected in both, the existing and 
the future infrastructure, which also involves the future macroeconomics conditions. 
Therefore, "model-making" simulated data are the basis for decision-making.  
It is appropriate to mention the interaction of macroeconomics – framing the national 
infrastructure – and microeconomics as based on enterprises and their management. 
Macro– and micro– relations are relatively reliable if external influences are stable. 
Difficulties arise if the external, unexpected risks are affecting the development structure. 
More macroeconomic examples are offered in more popular mode in the Taleb book [1]. 
On the other hand, many examples are tied in with microeconomic factors and 
applications; mostly in areas such as technical design, environmental impacts, medicine 
etc.; an example is given in [2]. 
Conditions for sectors are differentiated in terms of technology used and as well as in 
management perspective. The global environment may also change the conditions and 
risks in each country. Table 1 shows the possible terms for assessing the approach of 
authors in [10]. These authors refer to possible terms for assessing the level of risk in 
construction projects. 
 
Table 1. View of evaluation [10].   
 
Macro Mezzo Micro 
Country Project Management 
Industry Enterprises Organization 
 
This chapter basically deals with risk processes. The approach focuses on technical-
economic risk (T-E). Risks anchored in microeconomics and macroeconomics has long 
been elaborated especially for the consequences which impact on the efficiency of farm 
businesses and national economies. Technical processes have a closer impact, and risks 
are defined more clearly. Economic risks characterize accidents, disasters operation of 
technical equipment, for example database Health and safety at work of the Eurostat [11]: 
- costs per fatality range between approx. € 0,5 million and 3 million Euro for EU 28,  
- costs per serious injuries comprise a range of ca. € 880,000 (between € 80,000 and € 
950,000). The range of monetised slight injuries amounts to almost € 65,000 (between 
€ 220 and € 66,000).  
Comparison of countries reveals, in most cases, the accident components. The EU 28 
[12] indicated for the year 2014 a total of 3,739 fatal accidents at work; the Czech 
Republic 118. An accident in the economy is an economy of scale and consequences. 
Table set out in the Annex allows structural insight into the statistics of accidents in 
industry. Work related, non-fatal accidents, are presented by increasing index 9-10. The 
Eurostat is working with the value impact of 3,176,640 accidents at work for year 2014. 
The EU-OSHA – European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, presents in [15] data 
as costs of work-related injuries and illness. These data are more substantial. In the EU-
27 in 2007, 5,580 accidents at the workplace resulted in death and 2.9 % of the workforce 
had an accident at work that resulted in more than three days of absence, Figure 1. 
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Additionally, approximately 23 million people had a health problem caused or made 
worse by work across a 12-month period. 
 
Fig. 1. Standardised incidence more details in Table given in Annex. The rate of accidents 
at work per 100,000 workers [12]. 
 
As an idea indicating the comparative problem scope was judged to be the most 
methodologically sound, these kinds of events are reported in Australia 2008/2009 as 
worth 4.8 % of GDP, in the Netherlands 3.0 % of GDP [13]. 
The economic risks are working of course within their own terminology. The causes 
are rooted in the technical area if they are traceable. If they are not traced, then economic 
disciplines use the wildcard term - uncertainty. 
The model, which captures the shifts in investment demand, has been introduced by 
Baker et al. as variables around uncertainty [14]. Although, the standard economic theory 
explains the demand for capital in response to the user cost of capital and technology, the 
composite model captures the various dimensions of uncertainty, namely uncertainty as 
perceived by firms, financial markets and investors. In addition, the composite indicator 
is less "boisterous" than some of its component. 
Although, a series of papers deals with qualitative and quantitative risk assessment, 
much less papers dealing with the risk identification are available. Salah and Moselhi 
introduced a developed method for identifying risks [15]. They define a matrix of 
responsibility for risk distribution among project participants, and they introduce a 
method for qualitative and quantitative evaluation of each item using the fuzzy logic and 
fuzzy probabilistic theory. 
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Lack of capacity, which would inhibit response to the existence of faults and failures, 
stresses the need to assess this resistance and its management, which can, however, be 
overcome according [16] by identifying and taking account the resistance factors, 
whereby in this context the developed model is significant in that: 
- all uncertainty is relatively important in the business, and is certainly significant in 
terms of actual resistance factors and their values, 
- the analytic hierarchy process is used for ranking the relative importance of business 
processes and factors of resilience is a process similar to human reasoning in general,  
thus determining the values of variables is based on fuzzy pairwise comparison matrices 
with balanced decision making fuzzy groups. Finally, the accuracy of coefficient is based 
on the support of FTOPSIS software. 
Projects aim at developing the new products, simultaneously they are full of 
uncertainties, which are caused not only by a chaotic surround, but also by scarcity of 
resources and strong competition. Screening the projects for development of new 
products that are competitive and have high potential market share is the most important 
business. For the effective implementation of this process, the authors [17] present a 
method of fuzzy multi-criteria group decision, i.e. a model called the project selection 
model potential (PPSM), which can serve as a decision-making mechanism to help 
businesses choose their projects in an uncertain environment. 
Any incident data base for the EU 28 is affected by the diversity of national 
methodologies. These result from legislative differences and definitions of categories, etc. 
Comparisons are therefore of a limited nature. Interesting information connects the 
structure of economic activities to non-fatal and fatal accidents in EU28, 2013 [18]. The 
highest fatal activities are in the Construction and Manufacturing industries, followed by 
Transportation and Storage, Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Fatal and non-fatal accidents at work by economic activity, EU-28, 2013 [11, 12].  
 
Risk analysis and decision making requires other statistical approaches than those 
already known classically. Especially rare phenomena (catastrophes) are in a T-E 
environment difficult to evaluate. There are insufficient data for such methods. Decision 
makers who are involved in catastrophic events use experts to evaluate risks and 
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consequences, and these are available in [19]. In this context subjective assessments are 
a natural part of decision process. Consequently, the Bayesian statistics seems to be 
suitable, since it offers a range of powerful tools utilising the concept of subjective 
probability which is, according to a Bayesian, a measure of a person's degree of belief; 
substantial contribution to the development has been done by a number of authors.  One 
of the leading personalities of the discipline is Savage and already in 1954. This chapter 
attempts to contribute to a theory of how a decision maker may bring logic and system to 
their use of expert assistance. 
The need for concerted action activities going beyond the national dimension is, with 
the given uncertainty, even more acute. One example which can serve here is the 
DynoTRAIN project, which was implemented under the 7th FP, in order to unify 
important open points in the technical specifications for the interoperability of the trans-
European rail system and consequently capability to contribute to a "European" 
standardization. Reducing the cost of operating the process of assessing the dynamic 
properties is necessary for permission for entry into service according to an EU report 
Licciardello et al. [20], it requires to be in the form of quantitative results of experimental 
evaluation processes running through dynamic properties following the standard EN 
14363 [21]. 
 
2.1 Input data and decisions and modification of decision method – MMM model 
 
Most input data for decision making have their origin in measurements. Measurements 
are interrelated with some methodologies and devices. There exist a range of units, 
definitions, institutes that are responsible for control, time sequences of measurement, 
juridical correctness, and availability for users etc. Such time series {X𝑖 } have an 
improved background support and have mostly a better validity. The transformation (to 
be taken as process, method, model, theory, ...) to utility can be in general written as 
 
{{X𝑖 }
𝒈(X𝑖)
→    {U𝑖}}                                               (3) 
 
where {X𝑖 } ... are measured data; time series for the criteria Fi , 𝑔(X𝑖).. is a transfer 
(process, tool, way, function) of measured data to utility, within  defined critical values 
(min, max), {U𝑖} ... are utility time series of criteria Fi . 
The approach presented is dedicated to evaluation of risk. A transfer process ℎ(U𝑖) is 
required to facilitate relation 
 
{{U𝑖 }
𝒉(U𝑖)
→    {R𝑖}}                                             (4) 
 
where  {R𝑖} … are risk time series of risks based on utilities U𝑖 , ℎ(U𝑖).. is a transfer 
process of utility data to risk data series.  
Relations (3) and (4) give ability to get to decision criteria F1, F2, … corresponding 
time series {R1}, {R2}, ... . Each time series contain in themselves the significance of the 
component. Risk is expressed in financial units, and therefore {R1}, {R2}, ... are additive 
ones for individual periods (years).  
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The criteria F(·) are understood as independent components. Very often there are risk 
associated decision models based on the relationship (1) or on its modifications. The 
calculations, which are reduced to aggregate technical-economic time series {Xi}, 
provide as a result simplified information – smoothed time series or simple averages etc. 
Such an approach addresses the suppression of internal information of series. The 
approach proposed in (2) and (3) keeps the information content of time series available 
and changes it only by its form and nature to risk, volatility, uncertainty, reliability etc. 
If time series for decision making, gained in the past, are only partially valid for future 
technical-economic judgements, it is the role of experts to adapt them for further use. This 
means amenable to simulation of risk consequences, probab1ity evaluations, damage 
costs etc. An example of data implementation is presented in Table 2 to illustrate 
measurements obtained and the symbolism used. 
 
Table 2. Measured data and example for theoretical background. 
 
Variant 1 Variant 1: data series {Xi} for criteria i = 1, 2, 3  
↓Criteria;       Measurements in years  -t → E(Xi) σ(Xi) t-10 t-9  t-2 t-1 
F1 criterion and measurement series 
{X1} 
E(X1) σ(X1) 
x1,t-
10 
x1,t-9 … x1,t-2 
x1,t-
1 
F2 criterion and measurement series 
{X2} 
E(X2) σ(X2) 
x2,t-
10 
x2,t-9 … x2,t-2 
x2,t-
1 
F3 criterion and measurement series 
{X3} 
E(X3) σ(X3) 
x3,t-
10 
x3,t-9 … x3,t-2 
x3,t-
1 
 
Variant 1 Variant 1: data series {Xi} for criteria i = 1, 2, 3 
↓Criteria;       Measurements in years  -t → 
E(Xi) σ(Xi) 
t-
10 
t-9 
t-
8 
t-7 
t-
6 
t-5 
t-
4 
t-3 t-2 t-1 
F1 – Investment (mil. €); time series 
{X1} 
96.20 19.0 99 100 90 120 70 110 60 105 87 121 
F2 – Durability (Years); {X2} 26.20 11.3 25 22 30 17 15 30 10 50 23 40 
F3 – Local acceptability (+,...,-); {X3} 6.00 1.7 8 5 7 4 6 7 6 5 9 3 
Note: input measurement of technical-economic data for decision criteria F1, F 2, F 3. 
 
For some decision processes, if expert correction is necessary, the recalculation or 
prognosis is justified. An example is: the mean E(X1) = 96.2 in Table 2 is a surrogate of 
measurements {X1}. The dynamic properties of time series are then only figuratively 
apparent from σ(X1). Such surrogates in decision making are used frequently. Simplicity, 
however, it is paid for by the loss of information (time linkage, the substantive conditions 
etc.). 
In the presented approach, we focus on preservation of properties for their transmission 
to utility and risk series quantification. If relations (3) and (4) are implemented on the 
mentioned basic series {X1} of measurements, the F1, so investment, series {u1}, {r1} 
enable more transparency for this decision criterion. Illustrative data of recalculation 
results are shown in Figure 3. A similar calculation is necessary for the criteria F2, F3. 
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Obviously at this point, it is necessary to note that there exist a number of decision-
making methods. An approach differs for example according to dimension of criteria (the 
number of criteria). Let us be reminded – a one-dimensional decision (1D) criterion 
operates only on the basis of e.g. price or cost, profit, payback time, net present value 
(NPV), etc. 
Multidimensional decision methods – (nD) are linked to the relation (1); however, in 
practice a time factor is omitted. The method, proposed here prefers to maintain the 
dynamic properties of time series for all hierarchical levels. 
We call this approach the Modified Multidimensional Model (MMM); it works with 
the relationships (1) and (2), and it retains information data gathered in the original time 
series. The main aim of MMM is to preserve the informational substance of measured T-
E indicators. In the example: F1 – Investment (mil. €) in Table 2 is transformed by g(X) 
to U1 –  Investment utility and by h(U) to R1 Investment Risk. Data are shown in Figure 
3.  
Both newly mentioned indicators in Figure 3 are modified to deterministic evaluations. 
The used approach based on g (·) and h (·) may be carried out in practice in more 
demanding forms. Recall that modifications, regulation, management activities, are in 
their origin actions or processes. They aim is to improve existing conditions. The results 
are new evaluated states, for example: benefit, utility, risk, etc. 
The process in that case is understood in more general sense as a causal relationship. 
Its purpose may generally fulfil software needs, expert group or executive administration 
etc. The data for Figure 3 was transformed by means of experts. The expert group 
proposed the shape of functions g(X1) and h(U1). 
 
2.2 Short interpretation of results 
 
The interpretation of result measurements is given in Figure 3 and it is developed on 
this basis by input data – time series {X1}. These time series data are adapted for further 
use (decision making) and preserve the time factor. As a convenient supporting result 
there are proposed qualitative sub-indicators U1 - utility and R1 - risk. Both indicators 
preserve the dynamic properties of the original - default - time series {X1}. Aggregation 
without preserving the dynamic properties is contained in the report referred to in the 
Table 3. Loss of ability to watch deeper dynamic properties is balanced with simplicity 
and clarity. The dichotomy, involved in deciding whether aggregate information content, 
is more useful than the dynamic of time series, and it remains as a challenge for every 
decision-making body. 
 
Table 3. Indicator F1 – example, extension of indicators. 
 
Indicator Value 
Total investment in period (-10 ... -1), (mil. €) 962.000 
Total utility units acquired 31.300 
Total risk expected (mil. €) 58.000 
Risk per investment of mil. € and Year  (%) 6.029 
Utility per investment unit (%) 3.254 
 
184 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Modification of time series measurement F1 to U1 – Utility and F1 – Risk. 
 
The same procedure is further addressed for more decision factors. Figure 4 shows 
another example of grouping decision criteria (F1, ..., F4). The decision maker is interested 
in evaluations for amalgamated evaluations (F1 and F2) mentioned in Figure 4 as an 
aggregation of second hierarchical level (F1 and F2) ̶ Project solution and as (F3 and F4) ̶ 
Economic solution.  
The proposal (Example 1 in Fig. 4) shows the time dependent sequence (the horizontal 
axes) and decision criteria structure (vertical axes).  
 
3. Description of data methods used 
 
The assumption of expert evaluation is that the basic information is embedded for 
decision factor Fi in evaluation Ui. The basis of a credible Ui evaluation rests on past data 
(on physically measured data or statistical data) and in terms of future, it is somewhat 
misleading. The reality of decision making is that it focuses only on the future.  
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Fig. 4. The risk is embedded in evaluation of element bridge deck; V1, V2, V3 are the 
variants of construction solutions. The proposal shows time dependent sequence and 
decision criteria. Example 1.    
 
Decision making disposed for a future interval [0,τ] requires an enrichment of past 
statistics by expert judgements regarding the future development. It is better talk about a 
dynamic model of expected future changes. In other words, it is necessary an expert 
model, which offers a prospective evaluation series for decision factor i for interval [0,τ] 
and time series [ui1, ui2, …, uiτ]. The basis of such information is an adapted time series 
substitute [xi1, xi2, …, xiτ]. Only hereby are the calculated (meaning as simulated, 
evaluated by experts) particular xiτ plausible. The mentioned concept is illustrated in the 
example in Figure 3. The context of example is one single construction element, the 
bridge deck. The evaluation of four decision criteria F1,...,4 enables supplementary 
measures of statistical dispersion (variance, standard deviation, interquartile range etc.). 
Such a procedure leads to a reduction in informative content of the source information. 
On the other hand, the series [xi1, xi2, …, xiτ] contain for example known risk, 
uncertainty etc. Bold thinking about the incidence of unexpected risks and their 
unexpected occurrence is appropriate. There is a poor level of reliable data on one site, 
and on the other it appears a quantity of unexpected unknown events. The paper [6] 
vividly recounts the problem and it speaks about black swans and data for post facto 
explanations without an existing statistical background. We may agree with Nafday [6] 
…the likelihood of an event is usually estimated by using frequency of past similar events 
in event-tree methods but the likelihood for black swans cannot be estimated due to the 
lack of event knowledge and observed data. Expert opinions and subjective beliefs are 
also of minimal use since these are tainted by biases and constrained by finite human 
history and life span, which provides just a miniscule window to observe sparse events. 
More is also provided in [5]. 
In this context, the flow of needs is evident. Specifically, it is necessary to improve the 
simulation methods and an implantation of experts´ doubts into utility evaluations xiτ  
uiτ. For management decision there are necessary further transformations to risks uiτ  
riτ.  
The techno-economics applications have close ties to timelines. Information content 
provided may be significantly damaged by changes such as, the reduction values on 
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average values, prognostic fitting curves and so on. On the other hand, it is objectively 
necessary to take into account the full range of decision criteria F1, F2, ... . In any case, it 
is necessary to accumulate information from different sources in accordance with 
decision criteria. An example is given in Figure 3, where the concept shows criteria F1, 
F2, F3, F4 and their four-time series {X1}, {X2}, {X3}, {X4}. Aggregations are there 
designed to the middle level of decision tree, and is formulated as (F1F2) ̶ Project 
solution and modifies the series to [{X1}{X2}] evaluation. The amalgamation of 
(F3F4) gives Economic solution evaluated as series [{X3}{X4}]. The whole variant – 
Bridge deck – evaluation is obtained in a similar way. 
The calculation methods are a mechanism that is preserving or disrupting the nature of 
initial information saved in the {X1}, {X2}, {X3}, {X4}; measured time series. Data are 
carriers of information. For calculation and T-E recommendations we use the simulation 
PREV (Project Evaluation). Software facilitates: assessment procedures; comparisons of 
assessments measured or evaluated by experts; corrections for improvements; and 
analysis of hierarchy of existing evaluations. The proposed tree structure and software 
support help to perceive past reality and expected tendencies. The possibility of collapses 
is part of reasoning for actual and future decisions. The illustrative input data are evident 
from the bottom in Figure 4. The evaluation of base–node of criteria is given in Table 4. 
Schematic occurrence of unexpected events is given in Figure 5. Extreme evaluations 
are placed outside the expected range 〈?̅?𝑗 + 𝑗; ?̅?𝑗 − 𝑗〉. For the labelling of what are and 
what are not unexpected events, it is appropriate to establish a definition level beyond the 
expected range. 
The scheme of simulation for basic nodes is inserted in Figure 5. The vertical values 
that deviate away from the selected band are very danger and manageability is burdened 
with the costs consequences for each xi. 
The generation of the evaluation tree in Figure 6 is based on the data of Example 1 in 
Table 4. Important values for the Base Nodes: design costs, durability, investment time 
series are the inputs {Xi}t for risk oriented decision-making or factual series {Xi} based 
on cross sectional data series relevant to a single time point (or interval), costs, operating 
costs per year. The values 999 indicate the calculated value (final evaluation). The 
extension or modification of the decision tree structure is in the hands of project 
management. In this case also the phase of transformation to deterministic evaluation 
values, ?̅?𝑖𝑗 and ij. 
The scheme was also presented before in Figure 3. The presentation discusses the 
extension of the measured input structure. The applied approach eliminates weights and 
works with the transforming functions. This procedure is applied over the entire hierarchy 
of the decision tree. The transition towards creation of a simulated time series is in the 
hands of the solver or researcher.  
 
4. Results and analysis of outputs – example 
 
In this part, the attention is focused on the extension of evaluations and some aspects 
of current practice in decision-making mechanisms respecting the risk. Data for decision-
making are based on empirical data, i.e. real measurements. The proposed approach aims 
to rehabilitate the information contained in measured data for higher levels of decision-
making tree structure and time horizons (decision life cycle). It is useful to point out the 
distinction between the time series inputs {Xi}t for risk oriented decision-making and the 
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factual series {Xi} that are based on the cross sectional data series relevant to a single 
time point (or interval) and series of measurement or expert judgements. 
 
Table 4. Description of project data (structure of the evaluation tree with main node, 
middle and base nodes) – Example 1. 
 
L
ev
el
 
It
em
 I
D
 
P
a
re
n
t 
ID
 
W
ei
g
h
t 
w
ij
 
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 
𝑥
𝑖𝑗
 
S
ig
m
a
 
ij
 
T
it
le
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
0 0 -1 999 999 999 Bridge deck  Construction variant  
1 1 0 0.3 999 999 Project solution Project technology 
1 2 0 0.7 999 999 Economic solution Purchase, operating costs 
2 3 1 0.4 7.75 1.192 Design costs Design costs 
2 4 1 0.6 7 2.017 Durability Project duration 
2 5 2 0.5 7.3 1.46 Investment costs Bridge deck costs 
2 6 2 0.5 6.6 1.32 
Operating costs per 
year Operating costs 
Note: number 999 indicates the calculated values (final evaluation). 
 
 
Fig. 5. The scheme of simulation with sparse (unexpected and unacceptable) events. 
Highlighted values are outside the main simulation zone of the expected simulation data 
flow (acceptable range). 
 
Fig. 6. The structure of project nodes (decomposition to levels of project evaluation). 
 
The solution or the application is applied to the tree-decomposition of project 
evaluation criteria [23], which offers the standard calculation methods for example FTA 
(Fault Tree Analysis [24]), TOPSIS [25] or appropriately a type of the MCDM method 
[26]. The evaluation of the FTA tree allows the determination of conditions creating the 
fault situations. The structure of decision tree may be limited to simple methods 
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mentioned formerly, before application of MCDM or extended methods which works 
with time series on all levels of hierarchy tree. Multidimensional methods prefer, at least 
till now, weighting as a transformation tool. The evaluation of particular nodes, and 
elementary parameters are implemented there as: 
wij - evaluation of weight of node (element) i on the decomposition level j significance), 
ij – standard deviation of evaluation of node (element) i on decomposition level j     
              (specified size of dispersion), 
?̅?𝑖𝑗  – evaluation of node (element) i on decomposition level j. 
Defined values are applied on the nodes of the criteria tree, which are named as: 
- main node (general node), 
- middle nodes, 
- base nodes. 
All the parameters wij, ij, ?̅?𝑖𝑗 are embedded in Base Nodes. The evaluation of the 
aggregation weights wij is defined for Middle Nodes. The top Main Node does not contain 
any evaluation parameter. 
 
𝑋𝑘,𝑗−1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1                                           (5) 
 
where: Xk,j-1 is node (element) on level j–1, n  is number of nodes on level j, wij is 
evaluation of the weight of node (element) i on the decomposition level j (significance), 
?̅?𝑖𝑗  is evaluation of node (element) i on decomposition level j. 
The range of element evaluation is appropriately defined into the closed interval for 
example 1 to 10 (according to the evaluation methodology). With defined parameters 
there operates the aggregating calculation. The evaluation of the end-nodes parameters 
makes it possible to obtain two basic methodological approaches: 
- ensure an adequate amount of experts, 
- simulate pattern of evaluation, which has defined parameters. 
The approach No. 1 requires a group of individual experts. The calculation demands a 
sufficient count of experts with professional knowledge. The second approach No. 2 is 
not so demanding in terms of range/number of experts, but requires the right parameter 
settings for creating a simulation pattern. The parameters for simulation must be validated 
by competent estimation (calculation). We are referring to the acquisition parameters 
mentioned before as wij, ij, ?̅?𝑖𝑗 . 
Both approaches in evaluation of end nodes conceal the possibility of sparsely 
occurring values (unusual values, unusual events...). The reasons for their existence can 
be different. In the case of approach, No 1. It may be an (actual person) expert with: 
- poor knowledge, 
- incomplete knowledge, 
- misleading knowledge, 
- dishonest intent, 
- misunderstanding of the facts and the assignment. 
The danger of these sparse values increases with the number of experts (evaluators). 
In the case of simulation approach No. 2, all these aspects are associated with the human 
factor category and are eliminated down to a single evaluation (estimation) or to a 
parameters dependent simulation pattern. The simulation pattern is software generated 
and it is not burdened by human influences and other negative consequences. For the 
values that are beyond the acceptable risk area (mentioned on Figure 5, Example 2), we 
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are required to implement according to reports about appearance of sparse events. The 
result is the risk assessment, labelling the situation as unacceptable and consequently the 
designated variant solution as inadmissible. 
The data for Example 2 are described in Table 5. This is a different type of project 
compared with Example 1. The main node is describing an investment project of a 
Residential house (RH03). The second hierarchical level is named Facade and 
Doors/Windows; details are in Figure 7. The evaluations of base nodes are created on the 
statistical data (real measurements). The solution of Example 2 is in foregoing section. 
 
Fig. 7. The tree structure for project of Residential house (RH03), Example 2. The tree is 
generated according to data described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Description of project data (structure of the evaluation tree with main node, 
middle and base nodes) – Example 2. 
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0 0 -1 0,15 999 999 Residential house RH03 
1 1 0 0,6 999 999 Façade 
2 2 1 0,45 7 1,5 Project F 
2 3 1 0,55 6 2 The cost mater. F 
1 4 0 0,4 999 999 Doors/Windows 
2 5 4 0,3 6 1,3 Project DW 
2 6 4 0,7 7 2 The cost mater. DW 
 
 
5.  Results and evaluation 
 
The approach mentioned in the previous parts is applied to Example 1 (Bridge deck). 
The example is aimed at selecting the most appropriate technical-economic standards in 
a design project. For illustration there is chosen a decision about the best convenient 
variant of Bridge deck. Assuming that it is necessary to improve the collection of experts’ 
judgements or, input data which are not satisfactory for validation into the future. The 
final pattern of input data is incomplete (high differences, poor quantity of judgements, 
etc.). For evaluation of project tree, it is chosen the second simulation approach (see Part 
4, ad 2) on the basis of already existing inputs completed with new information (such as 
statistics, studies, and additional expert evaluations). The results of simulation for node 
Design costs we can follow on Figure 8. For comparison there are given the results in a 
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common chart with evaluation, which show the presence of sparse events (example is 
given in Figure 9). The simulated evaluation is aggregated according to formula (2) into 
the higher Middle nodes to the General node depicted on Figure 6.  
 
Fig. 8. Evaluation of Bridge deck – simulation results. On the level 80 % we can read 
evaluation Good (8.31). On the level 50% we can find evaluation satisfactory (7.53). 
 
 
Fig. 9. Simulation of evaluation for project part Construction costs with sparsely events. 
 
In the Figure 10 we can see a simulated-evaluation with limit 3% occurrence of 
unexpected events. The further question that can be posed is: how significant is this when 
the final evaluation reaches a higher occurrence of the unexpected events than 3%.  
The practical impact of the given example should be seen in the fact that the occurrence 
of sparse events influences the evaluation only minimally in this particular case (see the 
difference in Figure 11). However, it is not possible to be content with this statement and 
it is necessary to search for the causes of their occurrence. The reason is to gain warning 
signals for evaluators or for other causes stated in section 4, with more in [27]. 
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Fig. 10. Comparison simulation of evaluation. Simulation with/without sparsely events 
(data series YES/NO). 
 
 
Fig. 11. The final evaluation of the project parts in the case of sparse events: YES/NO. 
 
In Figures 12 and 13 there are the results of simulation with different frequency of 
occurrence of unexpected events. The initial precondition was that the occurrence of 
unexpected events has a massive impact on the final evaluation of design project. This 
initial assumption has not been confirmed. 
In the final evaluation of Example 1, Table 6, we see that there are a large number of 
unexpected evaluations for evaluated element Design costs. The evaluation of project 
shows in the 10% evaluations occurrence of unexpected events that is written as X10% = 
7.2190. In the case, when the part “Design costs” is theoretically absolutely eliminated 
by unexpected events is the final evaluation X100% = 6.3603. Verbal description for X100% 
is Better average and for X10% is Satisfactory. The project with this verbal description is 
acceptable, but from the point of view of unexpected events (risk) it is absolutely 
unacceptable. 
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Fig. 12. Comparison simulation with different number of unexpected events. There is  
10%, 20%, 50% occurrence of the unexpected events in element Design. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Comparison of the final evaluation of the project part. The occurrence of the 
unexpected events is gradually 10%, 20%, 50%, 100%. 
 
Table 6. Final evaluation with different number of sparse events (unexpected events). 
 
Final project evaluation  
Without sparse events for Design costs 7.3155 
With sparse events for Design costs  3% 7.2890 
10% 7.2190 
20% 7.1199 
50% 6.8352 
100% 6.3603 
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From this reason, we implement at evaluation of Example 2 the costs considering the 
risk. From historical data the evaluation in Table 4 is performed and then implemented 
the project tree in Figure 7. After simulation we get progress in evaluation for base nodes, 
middle nodes and main node of the project. Simulation of the parameters for Project 
Facade and Material of Facade we can see in Figures 14 and 15. 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Simulation of evaluation for Project Facade with highlighted non-acceptable 
peaks of evaluations. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Simulation of evaluation for Material of Facade with highlighted non-acceptable 
peaks of evaluations. 
 
The non-acceptable peaks highlighted in Figures 14 and 15 are interpreted as 
unexpected events. In the next step, it is necessary to transform the dimensionless 
evaluation to the risk costs and to financial units. It is necessary to define a transformation 
function with which graphic interpretation is presented in Figure 17, the used source code 
is available in Figure 16. 
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Function EvalRisk(AEval As Double, 
APositive As Boolean) As Double 
EvalRisk = 0 
If APositive Then // part for positive value 
If (AEval > 0) And (AEval <= 0.5) Then 
EvalRisk = 200000 
ElseIf (AEval > 0.5) And (AEval <= 1) 
Then 
EvalRisk = 230000 
ElseIf (AEval > 1) And (AEval <= 2) Then 
EvalRisk = 300000 
ElseIf (AEval > 2) And (AEval <= 3) Then 
EvalRisk = 400000 
ElseIf (AEval > 3) 
 
EvalRisk = 500000 
End If 
Else // part for negative value 
If (AEval > 0) And (AEval <= 0.3) Then 
EvalRisk = 100000 
ElseIf (AEval > 0.3) And (AEval <= 2) 
Then 
EvalRisk = 220000 
ElseIf (AEval > 2) Then 
EvalRisk = 300000 
End If 
End If 
End Function 
 
 
Fig. 16. Source code of the transformation between evaluation and risk costs. 
 
In Figure 17, there is presented an illustrative source code of the transformation 
function between a dimensionless evaluation and risk costs (in financial units). In the 
transformation function there are defined two parts. The first one pays attention to the 
positive values of evaluations and the other deals with the negative values of evaluations. 
Intervals of evaluations for positive values was defined by a specialist as (0;0.5, (0.5;1.0, 
(1.0;2.0, (2.0;3.0, (3.0;). Intervals for negative values are defined as (0;0.3, (0.3;2.0, 
(2.0;).  
Figure 18 gives the graphic relation between dimensionless evaluation and risk costs. 
Risk costs over the limit for unexpected events and under a defined limit are visualized 
in Figure 18. 
The last step in calculation of risk costs for the project is the creation of the frequencies 
and distribution function to the risk costs, Figure 19. The level of reliability is defined as 
P = 0.8. The value of risk costs on a defined level of reliability is XP=0.8 = 200000Eur. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Let us focus on the decision making process which is based on knowledge embedded 
in some ex post data. The evaluation (based on knowledge as the statistical 
characterisation, correlation, etc.) represents the core of useful information for current 
decision making about techno-economic processes or other T-E future activities. The 
chapter as such presents two stimuli.  
The first one is an idea about information content of time series based on measurement 
of original techno-economic process data. The data series can be transformed to utility 
and subsequently to risk or other streams through the process of evaluating indicators. 
The decision factor Fi is proposed to be calculated and evaluated as a three dimensional 
quantity (variable) – value, utility, risk. The method proposed avoids weighting indices 
and recommends the transfer function as a more general tool.  
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Fig. 17. Scheme of the transformation scale between non-acceptable peaks and risk 
costs. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Graphic representation of non-acceptable peaks in financial units. 
Transformation is realized by the risk costs transformation function. 
 
The second stimulus is to open up the question about validity of decisions based on 
simplified decision-making evaluations without a time factor ̶ it is incorporated into the 
proposed approach, as an important part of all long-lasting processes.  
Implementation for the multidimensional decision making is given in Example 1 and 
Example 2. The first example deals with conversion of techno-economic units: to utility 
and risk by means of transfer functions (avoiding use of probabilities or weights). 
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Fig. 19. The cutting of risk costs - final calculation for the entire project and defined 
confidence levels. 
 
The second example proceeds with simulation and usage of the past, historical data as 
a precondition for framing data for the ex ante decisions. 
It is matter of fact that the implementation and correct use of past data for decisions 
valid in the future is often overestimated. However, all the decision applications will 
operate in the future. It remains that the decision methods with long life require more 
sophisticated methods and computer support.  
The horizontal time axis in most decision situations is running in long time unit t 
(weeks, months, years) and the decision making process is running in time τ˂˂t (hours, 
days). 
The dichotomy in description of the factual elements distinguishes the past versus the 
future. This view is an advanced challenge to currently used methods and calculations. 
Development and decision making of technical-economic processes is very diverse. It 
extends to raw materials, energy, and labour allocated over time. In terms of development 
the modern society is an open society. This means modern solutions and associated 
activities (processes) are in fact non- linear, and not in equilibrium states.  
Project security evaluation is applied on many levels of business management. Correct 
decisions lead to savings on all types of resources linked to time stretch and personnel 
impacts. The introduction of the appropriate methodology for the evaluation does not 
signify a result, however, to improve T-E security, risk recognition and implementation 
of early timed security measures. The application examples demonstrate that the 
occurrence of distinctively negative expert estimates lead only to a small distinction in 
the final evaluation. The rationally thinking evaluator, however, cannot be content with 
such a conclusion and should look also for the causes behind the occurrence of critical 
and danger sparse events.  
 
Mathematical symbols used in text 
 
Fi ...verbal description of decision criteria i, 
U ... utility of a technical-economic solution, 
w    vector of weights of technical-economic decision factors, 
h ... vector of evaluation of decision criteria 
197 
 
{X𝑖 } ... are measured data; time series of criteria Fi, 
𝒈(X𝑖).. is a transfer (process, tool, way, function) of measured data to utility, 
{R𝑖} … are risk time series of risks based on utilities U𝑖 , 
𝒉(U𝑖).. is a transfer process of utility data to risk data series, 
{Xi}t .. are time series inputs for risk oriented decision-making,  
{Xi}s .. is factual series based on cross sectional data series to a single time point (or 
interval). 
 
Annex 
 
Number of non-fatal and fatal accidents at work, 2014, details in [11].  (*), (persons) 
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Chapter 13  
 
THE RELIABILITY EVALUTION OF ASSEMBLY LINES USING 
MODELS* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A significant case of discontinuous devices with relatively high failure rate are the 
automatic assembly lines for the mechanical and electrotechnical production of 
components and devices. The failure rate of an assembly process has an impact on the 
economic efficiency of the line. For typical assembly operations are used modular units, 
they are arranged in a one-lane or multi-lane automatic line with a fixed or variable 
attachment. Each assembly node includes an assembling work station, component feeder, 
and conveyor where the semi-finished product moves on and the information system that 
registers fault modes such as binary signals from the sensors. The failure rate is affected 
by the line construction, operator skills and scrap rate of supplied components. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the components' scrap rate and 
the assembly line’s downtime period in relation to its performance. The formulations of 
the relative performance are shown graphically for clarity. Based on experimentally 
identified data about the node failure rate and also the whole line, which are being 
registered by monitoring and information system, the work is further focused on 
mathematical-statistical evaluation. It is necessary to obtain the most accurate 
approximation of activity duration distribution and downtime duration from the 
histograms of relative downtime frequency for a typical assembly node and the line for 
cumulative relative activity frequency in different periods of running-in stage of the line, 
and simulate its behaviour in various modes and in more complex arrangements [1]. 
 
2. Background research and solution concept 
 
The paper extends into the following areas: 
- reliability and failure rate of machines, 
Reliability is a significant characteristic in real setting. With complexity of the device, 
and with number of components the risk of failure occurrence is increasing. 
Reliability can be enhanced by control measures, replenishment of the automatic 
machine and implementation of maintenance works [1-5]. 
- mathematical-statistical reliability evaluation, 
Reliability of individual automatic machines and assembly lines is described on the 
basis of mathematical probability theory. As a characteristic of reliability we define 
as a time of seamless operation and resumption of operability using the distribution  
 
 
 
*Authors: Dipl. Ing. Miloslav Linda, Ph.D., Dipl. Ing. Gunnar Kűnzel, Dipl. Ing. Monika 
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function and probability density function. The most commonly used are experimental, 
Weibull, Gamma, normal and log-normal probability distribution. When applying the 
exponential distribution, there is an advantage of using the Laplace transform and the 
theory of Markov processes for modelling automatic machines with reserve [6-8]. 
- design of automatic manufacturing systems, 
It contains variant configuration of technological lines in various fields, optimizing 
storage capacity of feeders, control of technological processes using computers and 
behavioural simulations of the proposed system [9-11]. 
- sensors, measuring systems and software, 
To record the failure rate and reliability, it is necessary to address a selection of 
suitable sensors with double-value signals (e.g. optoelectronic, inductive, capacitive) 
and the circuits for the integrated measuring system that is part of the assembly line 
[12-13]. 
Using appropriate software enables us to collect and continuously process data about 
the node failure and the whole line failure. For behavioural simulation is convenient to 
use i.e. an interface Scilab Xcos for dynamic calculations and statistics [14-15]. 
The assumed reliability solution of the line is based on block diagram of a simple serial 
line, equipped with control and measuring system (Fig. 1). From the available data 
registered in the form of tables we plotted histograms of relative frequency of both the 
assembly node period and the assembly line period, and also the downtime duration. 
Based on identification methods we determined the distribution function and probability 
density, provided that a superposition of two exponential probability distribution. The 
possibilities of using this methodology are set out in conclusion [1]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the automatic assembly line part [1]. 1 – a component feeder, 2 
– an assembling work station, 3 – control and measuring system, 4 – conveyor, V1, V2 … 
Vn – output signals for registration of the failure modes. 
 
3.  Data description 
 
Data were repeatedly obtained during the operation on a real assembly line (Fig. 1). 
Mean values are shown in Tables 1 - 3. 
Table 1. The relative frequency values of the assembly node's activity period. 
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Number of tacts (-) Relative frequency of activity period (-) 
0 0.34 
100 0.15 
200 0.09 
300 0.06 
400 0.05 
500 0.025 
600 0.03 
700 0.015 
800 0.019 
900 0.025 
1000 0.015 
1100 0.013 
1200 0.013 
1300 0.014 
1400 0.015 
1500 0.015 
 
Table 2. The relative frequency values of the whole line's activity period. 
 
Number of tacts (-) Relative frequency of activity period (-) 
0 0.035 
5 0.015 
10 0.016 
15 0.013 
20 0.011 
25 0.009 
30 0.01 
35 0.008 
40 0.009 
45 0.007 
50 0.005 
55 0.004 
60 0.003 
65 0.0025 
70 0.0025 
 
Table 3. The relative downtime-frequency values of the assembly node and the relative 
downtime-frequency values of the whole line. 
 
Number 
of tacts (-) 
Relative frequency of downtime 
periods of the assembly node (-) 
Relative frequency of downtime 
periods of the whole line (-) 
 
0 0.025 0.07  
1 0.045 0.09  
203 
 
2 0.075 0.092  
3 0.06 0.087  
4 0.09 0.084  
5 0.1 0.07  
6 0.095 0.06  
7 0.09 0.056  
8 0.085 0.05  
9 0.065 0.043  
10 0.07 0.037  
11 0.03 0.031  
12 0.025 0.025  
13 0.02 0.023  
14 0.017 0.02  
15 0.025 0.018  
16 0.013 0.015  
17 0.014 0.012  
18 0.006 0.01  
19 0.003 0.014  
20 0.003 0.014  
 
4.  Methods 
 
4.1. Analysing the effect of scrap rate on the automatic line performance 
 
In case that we assess the automatic assembly lines V1 (pc.min
-1) only by the number 
of correctly assembled products per unit of time, we obtain a simple relation (1) 
 



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t
q
T
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1
1 )1(
60
,                                                                                                       (1) 
 
where: Tt (s) - a tact time of the line, qi - a probability of serving a defective component 
from i-th feeder (it corresponds with the scrap rate), m (each) - a number of assembled 
components, coefficient 
tT
60
 - represents a theoretical performance of the line Vt, provided 
that there is a good product in each tact, coefficient (1-qi) - represents a probability of 
serving a good component from i-th feeder. To illustrate the impact of the components' 
scrap rate, we use relative performance Vr (-) (2) for a simplified case when the scrap rate 
of all components is the same  
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In case the defective components cause stopping the line, the performance decreases 
due to downtime periods. Downtime is characterized by the mean time Tp (s). Then the 
line performance (3) will be  
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where: k - the number of components of the assembled product (-). 
Dependence of the relative performance on the number of assembled parts (4) is  
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Downtime period is determined largely by the operator. It consists of time required to 
identify the fault location from defective component and of time required for its 
elimination. Increasing performance is possible only by shortening the tact time Tt. While 
the complexity and cost of the line increases, simultaneously the performance does not 
increase permanently but stabilizes at the limit value (5) 
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4.2. Experimental determination of failure rate. 
 
As already mentioned in the part 3, the control and measuring system are a part of the 
automatic assembly line. Because the tact time is short, it can be considered as a unit of 
time for formulation of periods of activity as well as downtime periods in discrete form 
(by number of tacts). Defining the concept of the line allows us to segment, in a suitable 
manner, a reliable line model. Recording the failure rate of the states provides us with 
data which, when processed by a computer, were arranged in histograms (Fig. 7 - 10), 
they show a distribution of the activity and downtime periods for each tact. These sets of 
values are illustratively demonstrated in different histograms in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3. Mathematical-statistical analysis of experiments 
 
High failure rate of assembly lines allows obtaining a relatively smooth course of 
cumulative relative frequency. Furthermore, the described techniques are based on these 
waveforms and their approximations by statistical functions based on analogy with the 
transition characteristics of physical systems. This identification approach is known from 
management theory. 
For approximating the distribution of the line's activity period, after a goodness of fit 
test of multiple waveforms with distribution functions, the best appears to be the 
superposition of two exponential functions of probability distributions with different 
mean periods of activity. Analysis of the assembly process enables us to create a certain 
interpretation of the obtained waveforms. Error-free operation of each assembly node 
depends on two independent quantities - on scrap rate of assembled components, and on 
failure rate of the line. 
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Distribution function of superposition of two exponential distributions (6) is in a form 
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is probability density (7). It is a three-parameter distribution, of which the distribution 
function is formally identical to the transient characteristics of two parallel blocks with 
unit amplification (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of parallel blocks of I. order (s - Laplace Transform Operator). 
 
With inverse Laplace transform during a unit step response on the input, we achieve 
an analytical expression of the transition characteristic in a form 
 
 )e-(1 K+ )e-(1 K=Y(t) 21
T
t
-
2
T
t
-
1                                                                                 (8) 
 
After implementation of K1+K2=1 we obtain a formal compliance with equation (7) 
K1=c1; K2=1-c1. The analogy also applies to the constants. In equation (7) are T1, T2 mean 
periods of activity, in equation (8) it regards to time constants. 
For approximating the distribution of downtime periods would be appropriate to use i.e. 
Gamma distribution but even better conformity can be achieved when comparing the 
cumulative relative frequency waveforms of downtime periods with transient 
characteristics of dynamic systems of I. order, connected in series (Fig. 3) with different 
time constants. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the higher-order system. 
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Transient characteristic of system of II; order is (9) 
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The time constants T1, T2 are again corresponding with the mean periods of time of 
individual tasks during downtime period. This analogy again allows the use of 
identification methods of management theory. There is clearer concept of physical causes 
of observed processes. It is interesting that with complexity of the assembly node, the 
order of distribution function is increasing. 
 
4.4 Reliability of automatic machines 
 
Reliability of automated production machines can be examined on the basis of 
reliability of individual machines, which the production system consists of. For the most 
important reliability characteristics the machine operation will be considered as a random 
period-alternation of failure-free operation τ1, τ2 ... and periods of operability restoration 
Θ1, Θ2 … Operational and organizational downtime is excluded. To describe the 
reliability we use a mathematical apparatus of probability theory [2], [5], [8], [15] which 
defines the essential reliability characteristics of the machine as shown on Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Machine characteristics in terms of failure-free operation. 
 
A random variable  - the period of operability restoration leads to an expression of 
the machine properties after its failure. We assume that after operability restoration, the 
device is in its default condition. During the period of operability restoration, we carry 
out the repairs of mechanisms and machinery equipment, and replacements of parts, and 
in extreme cases, even replacement of the entire machine by an equivalent machine. By 
analogy we can define the characteristics of continuous random variable . 
Distribution function (10) 
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Probability density (11) 
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The probability N(t) (12) does not implement a restoration in time t 
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The intensity of restorations μ(t) (13) (the analogy of failure intensity of λ(t)) 
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Mean time of operability restoration (14) 

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If the random variable τ (resp. Θ) has an exponential distribution, the failure rate is 
defined by the constant λ and the intensity of restorations by the constant μ. This operation 
of machines can be described by Markov processes [1], [2] which substantially facilitates 
all the calculations of the dynamic alternation of failure-free operation and the period of 
machine's operability restoration. When evaluating a production system, we are interested 
in the effect of machine's reliability on the workplace performance, and in finding out 
reserves of the production system's performance, and in the level of utilization of 
workplaces for a machine restoration (resp. the adjusters' restoration). These problems 
can be solved by using an experimental data from operation, preferably solved using a 
mathematical model. A formation of the model, and its implementation on PC, will be 
shown on a specific case.  
Task: Determine the absolute probability distribution, and other reliability 
characteristics of the production system, consisting of two machines where λ=0.1 hr-1 and 
μ=1 hr-1. Determine the actual performance Vs of the system if only one setter is available. 
The theoretical performance of each machine is in the Vt=650 PPH
-1 (pieces per hour) 
and d=14 hrs (two-way operation). We expect an exponential foundation τ and Θ. 
Formulation of a mathematical model: The system of automatic machines n is in time 
t at the state k if a fault occurs in the machine ( nk 0 ). 
In view of the assumptions given, the system's behaviour can be modelled by the 
homogeneous Markov process, which is sometimes referred to as a birth-death process 
and can be also used outside the field of technology. Using the markings common in the 
literature [3], [15] it is possible, for the absolute probability distribution of a Markov 
process' states, to formulate Kolmogorov system of differential equations (15) 
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where the initial probability distribution is defined in line with usages and practices (16). 
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After reaching values of λ0, λ, μ we get the system of (17) 
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Using a Laplace transform where we introduce (18) 
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This system can be solved analytically e.g. using determinants (Cramer's rule), and an 
inverse Laplace transform, or a PC simulation e.g. in Scilab Xcos. For limited probability 
distribution (steady state in t=∞) is π0=0.820; π1=0.164; π2=0.016, which can be proven 
by the inverse Laplace transform, and it can also be documented on graphical waveforms 
of absolute probability distribution a0(t), a1(t) and a2(t)), as seen in part Results. 
The mean value of the examined Markov process is generally given by relation (19) 
[3, 16] 
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For dissipation applies (20) 
 
                                                                                                (20) 
The mean performance of the system Vs for two shifts is determined by using a limit 
probability that can be determined in relation (21) 
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where: Vt (PPH
-1) - theoretical performance of one machine, d (hr) – operation time. 
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Block diagram on Fig. 5 shows a computer model structure of three first-order 
differential equations system for a simulation of time waveforms of the absolute 
probability distribution as well as waveforms m(t) and σ2(t) of a random process. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Block diagram in Scilab Xcos. 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
Achieved results are shown in form of graphs and relevant comments. From them it 
follows: 
1. An impact of line's relative performance in proportion to the number of assembled 
components with different scrap rate according to equation (2) shown in Fig. 6. The 
performance also decreases at low values of q, considerably when medium 
complexity products are introduced. 
2. An impact of line's relative performance in proportion to the number of assembled 
components k (q - parameter) for the line's tact period Tt=6 s and Tp=30 s (downtime 
period) according to equation (4), is shown in Fig. 7. 
After implementation 
t
p
T
T
a   it is possible to draw a dimensional graph Vr=f(a,k) for 
parameter qi (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Histograms of the relative frequency of activity period as well as downtime periods 
of the assembly node and the whole line are shown in Fig. 8 - 11. A dimensional graph 
of performances Vr proportional to downtime period ratio and to the tact time and also 
to the number of assembled parts, a) q = 0.01 and b) q = 0.02 
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Fig. 6. Dependence of the line's relative performance Vr on the number of assembled 
parts. (q – scrap rate parameter). 
 
 
Fig. 7. An impact of line's relative performance in proportion to the number of assembled 
components when 5
t
p
T
T
 for parameter q. 
 
3. The assembly line was observed in different modes under this procedure. The unstable 
mode is the line's running-in period and staff training. During the mode stabilization, 
there is both the distribution function’s order reduction (the number of mean periods 
of time), and also a value change of the mean periods of time of both the activity and 
downtime periods. Fig. 14 shows three cumulative frequencies of the line's activity 
period, obtained in different periods of the lines running-in stage. 
The course A represents putting the line into service, B is from a period after ending 
the running-in stage and C is a course after a year of service. A reduction of the mean 
time of activity is explicable by a substantial decrease of the failure proportion of the 
assembly facilities, yet the failure rate of defective components varies negligibly. 
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Fig. 8.  Histogram of the assembly node. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Histogram of the whole line. 
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Fig. 10. Histogram of downtime periods for the assembly node. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Histogram of downtime periods for the whole line. 
 
4. From the histogram of relative frequency of the line’s activity period (Fig. 9) it was 
derived a course of the cumulative frequency of line's activity period (Fig. 12). From 
the histogram of relative frequency of the assembly node’s downtime period (Fig. 9), 
was drawn a course of the cumulative relative frequency of the assembly node’s 
downtime period (Fig. 13). 
The assembly line was observed in different modes under this procedure. The unstable 
mode is the line's running-in period and staff training. During the mode stabilization, 
there is both the distribution function’s order reduction (the number of mean periods 
of time), and also a value change of the mean periods of time of both the activity and 
downtime periods. Fig. 14 shows three cumulative frequencies of the line's activity 
period, obtained in different periods of the lines running-in stage. 
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The course A represents putting the line into service, B is from a period after ending 
the running-in stage and C is a course after a year of service. A reduction of the mean 
time of activity is explicable by a substantial decrease of the failure proportion of the 
assembly facilities, yet the failure rate of defective components varies negligibly. 
 
 
Fig. 12. The course of cumulative relative frequency of the line's activity period. 
 
 
Fig. 13. The course of cumulative relative frequency of the assembly node’s downtime 
period. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  Courses of the cumulative relative frequency of the line's activity period in 
different running-in stages. 
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5. In part 4.4 we created a model of production system reliability, consisting of two 
independent machines. For specified parameters was implemented a computer model 
in Scilab Xcos [17] in accordance with the block diagram in Fig. 5. For specified 
parameters were stated time waveforms a0(t), a1(t) and a2(t) (Fig. 15) of an absolute 
probability distribution with a marking of steady values. On Fig. 16 are graphs of 
mean values m(t) and σ2(t) of monitored random process with respect to time. 
Calculation of mean performance Vs for two shifts can be determined from the 
Table 4. 
 
Fig. 15. The time waveforms a0(t), a1(t) and a2(t). 
 
Fig. 16. The graphs of mean values m(t) a σ2(t). 
 
 
Table 4. The calculation of mean performance Vs. 
 
i (-) πi (-) dV(2-i) (-) dV(2-i)πi (-) 
0 0.820 18200 14924.0 
1 0.164 9100 1492.4 
2 0.016 - - 
Σ 1.000 - 16416.4 
 
In accordance with results in Table 4 Vs=16416.4 pieces per two work shifts. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
When designing the line, the economic effectiveness is important in addition to a 
technical and technological solution. It is necessary to determine the theoretical 
performance of the line so as to achieve the desired real performance. It is also necessary 
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to determine the length of the line and appropriately set the tact time of the line. Most of 
these problems can be solved using the results of experiments during prototype testing of 
the individual modular assembly nodes. 
Monitoring the settling of cumulative relative frequency of activity period in different 
periods of the line’s running-in stage is important to establish the terms and conditions of 
testing when the line is handed over to the customer. When the line is submitted to the 
operation, all the parameters should be stabilized. The performance of the line depends 
also on staff training. This usually requires to pass and entrance exam by the customer 
later, when there is a sufficient period of time from the line's installation. The stated 
methodology can also be used when designing more complex lines where some of the 
operations are backed up. In this case, to describe their activities we use probabilistic 
approach by so-called Markov process. The system of differential equations is then 
advantageously addressed by the Laplace transform. 
The system of three first-order differential equations expressing the absolute 
probability distribution of a production system with two independent machines (for 
specified parameters) was addressed by using a PC model in the Scilab Xcos 
environment. Time waveforms are showing particular layouts of reliability distribution 
of a production system including the mean value and dissipation of a random process. 
Table 4 enables us to state the mean performance of the machines during production time. 
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Chapter 14  
 
SIZE OF HAZARD DEPENDS ON DATA FILES EXTENT 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Sizes of risks for human society depend on sizes of hazards cause the disasters and on 
the vulnerabilities of public assets. Due to the human population increase and the increase 
the number of interconnected complex systems and technologies the human system 
vulnerability to disasters is increasing and this causes large losses, damages and injuries 
to public assets at great disasters origin. Therefore, in connection with the protection of 
humans and the development of human society there is very important the occurrence of 
extreme disasters.  
The impacts of extreme phenomena usually cause the huge losses, damages and 
injuries to the public protected assets, which are: the human lives, health and security; the 
property (material and immaterial values); the public good (welfare); the environment; 
and also the infrastructures and technological facilities, which are for the humans the life-
giving assets because they providing the energy, water, food, services etc. 1.  
For the extreme phenomena we now use the designation: 
- the Black Swan,  
- the Royal Dragon, 
- atypical disaster or atypical accident,  
see e.g. the papers given in book 2.  
The detailed study of disasters 3 processed for improving the safety of complex 
technological facilities as nuclear power plants and big chemical plants documents that 
the extreme events occur sparsely and irregularly; and their mean return periods in Central 
Europe are between 420 to 460 years. With regard to this reality, their occurrence cannot 
be revealed by tools of classical mathematical statistics by help of data only obtained 
from instrumental disasters monitoring; the data and methods using for prediction have 
not sufficient power to distinguish them; i.e. they seem as unpredictable (unforeseen) 
phenomena.  
The extreme disasters occurrence has been explained by several theories, e.g. the 
theory of largest values 4, theory of extreme values 5, theory of evidence 6, theory 
of possibility 7, complexity theory 8 and the theory of options 6, 9. ). For description 
of their occurrence in practice they are at present also used the methods based on 
conditional probability, expert methods for capturing the knowledge uncertainties and 
Bayes' theory. On the example of earthquakes, for which the authors compiled the wide-
ranging data files (catalogues, isoseismals maps, maximum earthquake intensity maps, 
seismotectonic maps etc.) for the last 1000 years for the whole Central Europe and 
adjacent areas 3 , it is shown that it is more one reason for explanation of sudden big 
earthquake origin at present.  
 
 
*Authors: Assoc. Prof., RNDr. Dana Procházková, PhD., D.Sc., RNDr. Jan Procházka, Ph.D., 
Czech Technical University in Prague, Praha, Czech Republic, prochazkova@fd.cvut.cz 
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The results show that the big role plays the length of disaster observation period from 
which we use the data for determination of maximum expected disaster. When we use for 
the prediction the data from too short time interval we cannot obtain the correct size of 
maximum expected disaster, and then we may erroneously talk on extreme event, even 
though equally large disaster occurred in past, sometimes even nevermore.  
 
2. Findings on disasters and on disaster management aim 
 
Data on disasters are important for technological practice, because we need to build 
the safe facilities and safe infrastructures. For earthquakes and other natural disasters in 
broad vicinity of Central Europe we derived at preparation of terms of references for 
building the complex technological facilities the mean return periods 420 - 460 years, 
which is in harmony with the values used by Swiss Re 10-12. From this reason we use 
long time series of disasters, i.e. also the historical data that are not as precise as present 
instrumental one but allow understanding the occurrence of great disasters that occur 
seldom and irregularly.  
Analyses of many databases of disasters 3, 13, 14, show the general knowledge that 
extreme phenomena occur rarely and irregularly, which affects the technical-
methodological ways of prediction 3, 15. From the detail study of disasters, it follows 
that each disaster is the product of some process being in the Earth or in the human society 
that are understand as open systems of systems 1. Due to the dynamic development of 
this human system the processes have been changing in space and time, which resulted 
in disaster parameters changes. This reality causes that assumption of mathematical 
methods for prediction (requiring the stable process) is not quite fulfilled. 
Because we have not enough knowledge on this domain we need to take into account 
the existence of uncertainties, namely random and knowledge; just knowledge 
uncertainties of ongoing physical processes in the Earth and its surrounding are the causes 
of our incompetence to predict the origin and size of extreme disasters. We will show this 
reality on the data set for earthquakes because authors have good data set for last 800 
years; the data set has been very carefully collected for ensuring the protection of complex 
technological facilities in Central Europe; i.e. for the determination of their terms of 
references, rules for designing, building, construction, operation and pulling off critical 
conditions if they occur.   
Omission of historical data leads to incorrect terms of references used for building the 
complex technological facilities, as shown Fukushima accident 16, 17.   
For protection of humans and other public assets on which the human security and 
development are dependent we need to perform qualified disaster management, the 
demands of which are summarised in 1. For this purpose, we determine the disasters´ 
characteristics and regimes (especially we interested in prediction of maximum expected 
disaster sizes and their occurrence probabilities), so we might be capable to apply correct 
countermeasures in advance; the given aspect is especially important in case of complex 
technological facilities that present problem for their vicinity.   
     
3.  Determination of size of maximum expected disasters for ensuring the   
     technological facilities safety 
 
The task dealing with determination of maximum possible or maximum expected 
disaster for solution of problems in real practice, in detail described in works 1, 3, 10-
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12 is of principal importance for both, the safety management and the insurance domain. 
Therefore, the attention has been paid to this domain for a long time.  
The methodology development in time progressed conformable with the knowledge 
development, roughly by the following way: 
- maximum expected disaster size = size of maximum observed disaster in historical 
period,  
-  maximum expected disaster size = size of maximum observed disaster in historical 
time + certain correction on the indeterminateness (random and knowledge 
uncertainties) or on the reality that extreme disaster has not had to occur yet. The 
correction always depended on experience and knowledge of assessor, 
-  maximum expected disaster size = disaster size that corresponds to intersection of 
graph showing the disaster frequency occurrence with the disaster size axe.  
Challenges to this method mainly consisted in reality that results of such assessments 
might be distinctly physically impossible in some cases, 
-  maximum expected disaster size = result of methods for extreme value determination 
1, 3, 10-12.  
Extreme value determination is widely used in many disciplines, such as earth 
sciences, structural engineering, finance, traffic prediction, geological engineering and 
biological sciences. Applications of method for extreme value determination usually go 
from the Gumbel distribution 5 that is a particular case of generalized extreme value 
distribution.  
The applications for earthquakes and other disasters for needs of terms of references 
for nuclear power plant site locations authors started in 80s of last century and step by 
step they were spread for building the other complex technological complexes; the real 
values are in the safety documentation of these complexes. In practice connected with 
complex technological facilities 1, 3, it was successfully tested the following relations: 
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in which: Rt =(I0  I0i)  is the probability that the size of disaster I0  does not exceed the 
size I0i in the time interval t; Pt (I0  I0i) is the probability that the size of disaster  I0  
exceeds  the value I0i ; P is defined by the equation (2); T is the disaster observation time 
interval; n is the observed disaster number; I0min is the minimum disaster size (from which 
the catalogue is homogeneous; it represents the data set homogeneity limit); and I0max is 
the maximum disaster size in the given region.  
It means that the relations hold for intensities from interval   I0min   I0    I0max. Parameter 
β is determined using the numerical parameter bc from the cumulative frequency equation    
 
log Nc = ac – bc Io ,                                                                                                       (3) 
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in which Nc is the cumulative frequency of disasters,   I0 is the disaster size,  ac and bc are 
numerical parameters calculated for intensity interval I0min   I0i    I0max. It holds β = bc ln 
10. The mean value of return period η for the disaster with the intensity of I0   is equal to 
time t for which it holds the relation Rη = 0.633(expressing the probable mean value of 
normal distribution). 
The impacts of disaster on the territory and on the complex technological facility depend on 
the type of disaster and on the vulnerability of given assets; real data are shown e.g. in quoted 
works of authors. 
From the safety reasons we in practice use the conservative deterministic approach for 
all disasters because the theory of extreme values is based on the following assumptions:  
- the conditions that prevailed in the past, need also to apply in the future, 
- the largest observed phenomena in a given time interval are independent,  
- the largest phenomena size in a given interval will be the same in the future as in the 
past. 
It is necessary to note that these assumptions are not in reality fully veridical 1, 3, 13, 
15, 18, which influences the results of predictions of large (extreme) disasters.   
In practice, according to the theory of extreme values   there are determined two quantities 
the return period and the annual probability of non-exceedance by which the disaster 
hazard is determined.  
4.  Data on earthquakes in broad vicinity of Central Europe used for research 
 
The earthquake is a physical phenomenon that is a result of certain dynamic processes 
in the Earth´s interior. It originates by a sudden release of mechanical energy in the 
Earth’s interior. During the earthquake there are originated irreversible deformations in 
the earthquake focus and from the focus there are emitted seismic waves (longitudinal 
and transversal).  
Outside of earthquake focus the earthquake predominantly manifests by seismic waves 
and we observe them in the form of vibrations of the Earth’s surface of a different size 
that from a certain intensity cause the harm on human lives and health, property, 
infrastructure and environment, and the stronger ones caused huge harms.  
With regard to present knowledge the total energy of seismic waves is expressed by 
the relation 
 
  
 
in which S is the surface through which the seismic energy flows from earthquake foci,   
is the time for which the seismic energy flows and ε is a flux of seismic energy for which 
it holds the relation  
 
ε = e · ν dΩ, 
 
in which e is the seismic energy density, v is the progressive wave velocity and dΩ is the 
cross-section of the ray tube. 
The model of seismic energy spreading from earthquake focus is expressed in the form  
 
En = E0 e
-d Dn Dn
-c ,                                                                                  (4)                  
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in which E0 is the seismic energy emitted from the earthquake focus, En is the seismic 
energy in the hypocentral distance Dn for which it hols  
  
Dn = (rn
2 + h2)1/2                                             
 
where h is the focal depth, rn   is the epicentral distance), c and d are numerical parameters; 
d is the seismic energy attenuation coefficient and c is the numerical parameter, the value 
of which depends on the geometry of real problem.  
The relation between seismic energy En and macroseismic intensity In in the broad 
vicinity of Central Europe according to 18  is given by relation    
 
log En = 12.40 +1.13 In.  
 
The seismic energy attenuation derived for the Bohemian Massif conditions is 
expressed by relation (4) with parameters:  c = 2.8; d = 0.061; derivation is in 18.   
For the qualitied determination of seismic terms of references for complex 
technological facilities in broad vicinity of Central Europe there were ensured: 
- qualified data sets (earthquake catalogues, isoseismal maps, epicentre maps, maps of 
maximum observed intensities, 
- detailed study of strong events, 
- delimitation of focal zones, 
- determination of geological, tectonic, geophysical and seismotectonic features  
3.  
The form of isoseismals (scenarios of earthquake impacts) in the epicentral zone 
depends on the fault-plane mechanisms of earthquake, and in distant zone on material 
properties of Earth´s crust in which the seismic waves are spreading; the boundary 
between these zones is given by empirical relation    
 
ir    2.5 h ,  
in which ir is the isoseismal radius in km and h is the focal depth in km. Sizes of 
isoseismal surfaces depend directly on the earthquake size and on the focal depth and 
indirectly on the intensity attenuation 18. 
Seismic (earthquake) regime is the set of relations among the earthquakes in a given 
focal region. One of the basic relations is an empirical function describing the earthquake 
frequency distribution by earthquake size: 
 
log N = a – b S,  
 
where N is the number earthquakes with size S, a and b are numerical parameters. This 
relation has the same form as equation (3) but the numerical parameters differ because 
simple and cumulative frequencies are not the same 18.  
If we need to consider data on historical earthquakes, we need to use the intensity I ( 
MSK-64) as the measure of earthquake size; details and relations with other measures are 
for example in publication 18.  
The types of dependences of relation Nc(I0) given by equation (3) shown in Figure 1 
authors derived on the basis of investigation of 87 focal zones, Comparison of ten graphs 
shows that earthquake intensity intervals and observed maximum earthquake sizes are 
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very different.  It is also seen that the numerical values of graph slopes b are different, 
which cause the differences in parameter β and through this parameter it also influences 
the maximum expected earthquake size that is determined by help of  Pt (I0  I0i) and Rt 
=(I0  I0i ), equations (1) and (2).  The differences in maximum expected disaster sizes 
cause the differences in seismic hazard, namely not negligible as show the data in 3.    
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of observed types of distributions occurrence frequency on earthquake 
intensity - log Nc = ac – bc Io.  
 
The numerical values of parameters ac and bc describe the seismic regime of individual 
focal regions; i.e. because they vary in a broad interval it is evident that the seismic 
regimes of focal regions in Central Europe are not the same. Apart from in one focal 
region they also depend on the calculation method 3, which also influences the results 
connected with application of equations (1) and (2), in which we use the numerical value 
of slope. 
Findings from the seismic regime of focal zones research in broad vicinity of Central 
Europe are in harmony with results from other world parts, which is documented by 
comparisons given in 3. Their summarisation is:  
- the seismic regime of each focal zone is variable in time and space, 
- the seismic regime has a certain prevailing character in each focal zone, 
- the seismic regime is well described by the Benioff´s graphs which expresses the 
dependence of released earthquake energy on time in a given focal zone 
 
∑𝑖 Esi
1/2 = f(t),  
 
where Esi is the seismic energy i-th earthquake and t is the time.  
The Benioff´s graphs (example is in Figure 2) indicate that the tectonic stresses are 
released usually after a prolonged period of inactivity, either in the form of one very 
strong earthquake or in group of several stronger shocks with comparable size. In one 
focal area both forms often are observed 3,18.    
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The active periods (i.e. the interval characterised by release of great seismic energy) 
in all focal areas have not the same duration (e.g. in the Eastern Alps active and quiet 
periods take several centuries), and they do not happen at the same time in all focal 
regions (particularly not in neighbouring focal areas).  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of Benioff´s graph – South Eastern Alps. 
 
Detailed studies of Benioff’s graph in broad vicinity of Central Europe 3, 18 showed 
that in some time interval the seismic energy releases in the form of one very strong 
earthquake and in another one in the form of several middle size earthquakes.  This 
physical fact shows that at determination of seismic hazard we need to consider data from 
time intervals with duration of several centuries so the result may have the acceptable 
credibility. The other characteristics of real seismic regimes of individual focal zones that 
also influence the seismic hazard of real localities for the followed region are given in 
works 3, 18.  
On the basis of above mentioned data we determine the seismic hazard of site under 
account by the following procedure: 
- on the basis of catalogue, we determine the set focal regions the strong foci of which 
can threaten the site – due to earthquake characteristic in Central Europe 18 we need 
to consider all earthquake foci in distance 400 km from the site under account, 
- on the basis of all earthquakes from these focal regions we calculate parameters of 
cumulative frequency distribution according to relation (3) for selected observation 
period T, 
- by application of formulas (1) and (2) we determine the sizes of maximum expected 
earthquake in the followed region for time intervals t, e.g.  t = 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 
200 …years on the 95% credibility level, 
- considering the maximum expected earthquake size for given time interval, the 
attenuation curve between the possible earthquake focal zone and the followed site, 
considering the shortest distance between the earthquake focal zone and the followed 
site we obtain the result;  the real attenuation curves for 16 directions are summarized 
in  3.   
On the basis of other parameters influencing the earthquake size in a real site (e.g. 
anomalies in intensities, Earth´s structure anomalies, tectonic features etc.) we prepare 
224 
 
the seismic terms of references as input data for designers of complex technological 
facilities. After proposal of design we test seismic vulnerability of facility to the 
maximum expected earthquake.  
During the operation of complex technological facility we regularly test its resilience 
to earthquakes and after some accident we also realised complex walk downs in facility 
with aim to check if its safety is on required level 1,  3. For reader information the 
described procedure is in harmony with demands  19 and with demands of complex 
technological plans land use planning that are in the SEVESO directive. 
 
5. Data and method used for research 
 
For our research we used earthquakes from the author´s earthquake catalogue that is 
completed to 2015 and contains the earthquakes since 400 AD. 
It is reality that the data in the used earthquake set have not the same homogeneity 
boundary in the history; in broad vicinity of Central Europe the homogeneity boundaries 
are:  
- 6 MSK-64 in last 200 years, 
- 6.5 MSK-64 in last 400 years, 
- 7 MSK-64 in last 800 years. 
The main characteristics of investigated region are:  
- the earthquake epicentres distribution in investigated region for  I0 ≥ 5 MSK-64 and 
last 800 years is shown in Figure 3,  
 
 
Fig. 3. Earthquake epicentres with intensity I0  5º MSK-64 occurring in last 800 years. 
 
- the earthquake focal zones delimited according to seismic, tectonic, geological, 
gravimetric and geomagnetic characteristics by the methods that are in great detail 
described in 3 are in Figure 4.  
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Fig. 4. Focal zones in Central Europe important for seismic hazard.  
 
The seismic hazard assessment is based on analytical function expressing the 
occurrence of strong earthquakes based on theory of extremes; equations (1) and (2). For 
calculation there need to be use data from specified region and specified time interval; 
from the physical reasons usually from the region defined by circle with the centre in a 
given site and with radius more than 100 km.  
In practice there are used: the deterministic approach considering the stable earthquake 
occurrence rightfulness and from safety reasons the most adverse (bad) conditions; and 
the probabilistic approach considering the random uncertainties in earthquake occurrence 
and their statistical evaluation –  there are used median, median + ; the comparison of 
both ways based on real data is in 1, 3. In case that we show in next paragraph the 
deterministic approach results are given.  
Seismic hazard values go on from determination of maximum expected earthquake 
size value calculated with help of equations (1) and (2). They have been calculated for 
many localities in Central and Eastern Europe in which they are located the complex 
technological facilities.  
On the basis of their values and real conditions in place of siting and its vicinity there 
are determined:  
- vulnerabilities and possible risks for public assets and complex technological facility 
itself, 
- terms of references for complex technological facility etc.  
Because the maximum expected earthquake size value is very important for the seismic 
hazard value in real place we show its dependency on the data range; the other sources of 
seismic risk values variability are possible to find in 1.        
 
6.  Variability of seismic hazard values with data range 
 
To show the dependence of seismic hazard value on the data range we select locality 
in Central Bohemia.  Using the formulas (1) and (2) and the procedure described above 
we calculate the maximum expected earthquake size value, from which we go on at 
determination of seismic hazard values for localities in Central Bohemia; i.e.:  
- by application of formula (1) we determine the earthquake sizes for time intervals, 
e.g.  t = 50, 100, 200 …years on the 95% credibility level, 
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- considering the intensity attenuation curve between possible focus and site and the 
distance between focus and site equals to 300 km we determine the site seismic hazard 
for selected time intervals.  
In presented research we use the data from different observation periods:  
- T = last 100 years, 
- T = last 200 years, 
- T = last 300 years, 
- T = last 500 years, 
- T = last 800 years.  
Figure 5 shows the curves calculated on the basis of data from the last 100 years. The 
curves describe the probability of occurrence of earthquake of sizes  6 – 10.5 MSK-64. 
The predictions of maximum expected earthquake size value estimations are for times t 
= 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000 and 10 000 years.  
We can see that the 5% credibility level line crosses the probability curves of non-
exceedance of intensity value at intensity values:  
- 9 MSK-64 for t = 2 years, 
- 9.9 MSK-64 for t = 5 years, 
- 10.4 MSK-64 for t = 50 years, 
- 10.5 MSK-64 for t = 100 years and further time intervals.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Assessment of maximum expected earthquake size by help of data set from 
observation period T = last 100 years and predictions for t = 2, 5, 10…   years that 
determined the seismic hazard in sites in Central Bohemia. 
 
Considering the intensity attenuation curve 3 and the distance of 300 km, the 
intensity decrease is 5.5 °MSK-64; i.e. in the Central Bohemia (e.g. also in Praha capital) 
the seismic hazard prediction for time interval: 
- t = 50 years is 4.9° MSK-64, 
- t = 100 and more years is 5.0° MSK-64.  
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Figure 6 shows the curves calculated on the basis of data from last 800 years (T). The 
curves describe the probability of occurrence of earthquake of sizes  6 – 11.5 MSK-64. 
The maximum expected earthquake size value estimations are for times t = 5, 10, 20, 50, 
100, 200, 500, 1000 and 10 000 years. We can see that the 5% credibility level line crosses 
the probability curves of non-exceedance of intensity value at intensity values:  
- 10.7 MSK-64 for t = 5 years, 
- 11.3 MSK-64 for t = 50 years, 
- 11.4 MSK-64 for t = 100 years, 
- 11.5 MSK-64 for t = 500 years and further t.  
Considering the same intensity attenuation curve and the distance of 300 km, the 
intensity decrease is 5.5 °MSK-64; i.e. in the Central Bohemia (e.g. also in Praha capital) 
the seismic hazard for time interval: 
-  t = 50 years is 5.8° MSK-64, 
- t = 100 years is 5.9° MSK-64, 
- t = 200 years and higher t is 6.0° MSK-64.   
 
Fig. 6. Assessments of maximum expected earthquake size by help of data set from 
observation period T = last 800 years and predictions for t =5, 10, 20, …  years that 
determined the seismic hazard in sites in Central Bohemia. 
 
Table 1 shows the numerical results for more observation periods T. We see that: 
- the longer time interval t is, the higher maximum expected earthquake size (i.e. the 
seismic hazard base value) is, 
- the longer observation period T is, the higher maximum expected earthquake size (i.e. 
the seismic hazard base value) is, 
- the relation between the seismic hazard base value H and earthquake observation time 
interval T is roughly given by relation  
 
  H = (10.3750.003) + (0.0010.0003) T,  
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 i.e., at large earthquake observation time interval    T the increase of H has been 
slowed.   
Critical evaluation of numbers in Table 1 shows that for complex technological 
facilities it is necessary to use the correct values of both quantities, i.e. T and t. The value 
of t is important for the life cycle of facilities and the value T is important for the safety 
reasons. 
From practical reasons it is very big difference if we build the complex technological 
facility with life cycle 60 - 100 years with regards to maximum expected earthquake size 
value estimations 10.4 MSK-64 or 11.4 MSK-64; i.e. if the site seismic hazard value 
for determination of seismic risk for site in Central Bohemia (including the Praha capital) 
is 5 MSK-64 or 6 MSK-64. 
 
Table 1. Maximum expected earthquake sizes that create base for determination of 
seismic hazard in Central Europe; T – observation period, t – time for which prediction is 
done. 
 
Data T\t 50 100 200 500 1000 10000 
6 - 10.5 100 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
6 - 10.5 200 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
6.5-
10.5 300 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
6.5-
10.5 400 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
7 – 
11.0 500 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
7 - 11.5 800 11.4 11.4 11.45 11.5 11.5 11.5 
 
Considering the requirements of EUROCODE 8 included in building standard 20, so 
in the cases of intensities I  5 MSK-64 we have from safety reasons at designing, 
construction and operation of complex technological facility to do the correction for 
seismic loads (which leads to rise of cost of facility construction). In other words, the 
given results mean that when we take into account the seismic hazard: 
- calculated on data from the past 100 years, so we do not have to do the correction for 
seismic loads, i.e. they are not additional costs on facility construction, 
- calculated on data from the past 800 years, so we have to do the correction for seismic 
loads and costs on facility construction increase.  
Real data show that the costs for ensuring the complex technological facility safety in 
the second case are two times higher 3.     
 The experience from practice and the precautionary principle suggest for the latter 
solution. This is confirmed by results obtained from Japan in connection with nuclear 
power plant Fukushima accident 16; for Fukushima NPP safety it was used data on 
tsunami since 1890 and for Onagawa NPP since 840, and therefore, the Onagawa NPP  
withstands the earthquake and tsunami without serious problems and the Fukushima NPP 
was destroyed by the tsunami. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
Security and development of humans depend on the way by which the humans manage 
the disasters, i.e., how they know disasters and with what quality they perform the 
preventive, mitigating, responding, and renovation measures and activities. For obvious 
reasons it goes on establishing the maximum expected sizes of real disasters, with which 
the humans need to count on their protection, which means ensuring the protective 
measures not only for the human individuals, but for all the essential public assets.  
On one side, many mathematicians and theoretically efficient experts trying to predict 
the major phenomena on the basis of sophisticated theories. However, at predictions of 
sizes of great phenomena they are using the data files from the past 10 to 20 years, with 
the substantiation that these data are very precise. At the origin of disaster with size 
greater than they calculated, they talk about the extreme phenomena, which call by names 
of mystic figures that invoke fear.  
Otherwise, to the problems of today's world they are accessing the engineers who 
create and care for public assets in the territory, i.e. their task is to create works that are 
safe (i.e. even at their critical conditions they do not destroy themselves and their 
surroundings) and for their life cycles they fulfil the required functions in the certain level 
of quality. Therefore, the engineers calculate with: the existence of disasters, the sources 
of which are inside and outside the facility and with the human factor; and the reality that 
available resources, forces and resources are always limited. In the design, construction 
and operation of works they go from the system nature of world. They give the care to 
general and specific knowledge and experience, and they lean on real data.  
Present work shows by help of data on earthquakes, as it is important to consider in 
practice the data on disasters from the historical times, even if they are not as accurate as 
the data of last years. Neglecting the data on major historical phenomena, causes that they 
are not established sufficiently effective protective measures ensuring the facility safety.  
Consecutively, in the origin of great phenomena there are occurred great losses of human 
lives, damages and injuries to the other public assets. 
Finally, it is necessary to note, that even when the precautionary approach associated 
with the use of long time series of disasters is used, it could not be overestimated the skills 
and capabilities of humans, because it is the reality that the great planetary phenomena 
disturb the processes in sub-systems, and by that they are changing their regimes for 
shorter or longer time period (such as the earthquake in Indonesia on Dec. 26, 2004 or on 
March 11, 2011 in Sendai.        
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Chapter 15  
 
ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CONVENTIONAL TOOLS 
FOR ANALYZING AND ASSESSING OF RISK IN CONTEXT WITH 
DYNAMIC RISKS* 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Firstly, it is necessary to unify the issue of risk nomenclature. The risk definition may 
be introduced in connection with different branches, such as economy, human health, 
environment etc. As it was mentioned in foregoing chapters, the general definition of risk 
is: the measure of unfavourable events with unacceptable consequences. The study is 
focusing on the problems of dynamic risk assessment. In this connection it is necessary 
to define this type of risk. The dynamic risks have an occasion in the surrounding changes 
(political, industry, economy etc.) of evaluating system, but also inside of this system. 
These risks may affect a large number of individuals and their threat is an irregularity. 
Risk management and decision making under risk is a complex issue, especially in 
situations in which there are rapid changes due to external and internal factors that may 
influence the system functioning positively and negatively influence. A human being is 
able to identify, analyse and assess the risks leading to their minimization or complete 
elimination. If the risks and sources of danger are constantly searched for and evaluated, 
precautions that may reduce the overall level of risk are generated.  
Specific risk scenarios for a specific system may in some cases be repeated and their 
scenario may be predictable. These scenarios of dangers, however, can be affected by 
many other factors that are not easily predictable, whether it is a human decision or 
situations with which man has not yet met (new technologies, waves of migration, etc.). 
The classical model of hazard scenarios and risk level may be in these conditions 
significantly changed.  
This may not always happen only at extreme situations, affecting the entire country or 
region. It may be a significant event that will affect the individual elements of critical 
infrastructure locally, enterprises and their functionality, etc. It is not possible to rely 
solely on management of known risks, which are usually predictable. It is necessary to 
assess the threats and risks, which are dynamic and although their significance may not 
be great, they can, in some cases, under the effects of other factors become very serious 
risks. Meaning and principles for managing of these risks are, therefore presented below. 
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2.  The importance of dynamic risks 
 
Currently the development of new technologies, materials, chemical substances and 
mixtures, as well as changes related to unexpected phenomena (drought, extreme heat, 
waves of migration, political conflicts, etc.), are a source of new threats and hazards that 
the current society is not properly ready for. Risks which the society encounters can be 
divided and characterized on the basis of different approaches. One of these approaches 
is the division of risk into static and dynamic. Static risk is defined as a possible loss, the 
causes of which do not originate in the economy, but for example due to losses caused by 
natural phenomena. The current problem is how to assess the dynamic risks. Approaches 
and methods for risk assessment are often focused on the statistic risk and a negative 
factor is also application of outdated data.  
Dynamic risks are caused by changes in the reporting system in the area (political 
changes, industry and economy), but also inside the system. These risks may affect a large 
number of individuals and their big threat is their irregularity [1]. They can become so-
called black swans for the whole system and its consequences can be fatal [2, 3]. Dynamic 
risk assessment is most often applied to describe the process of a changing (dynamic) 
environment within which the development of the system itself is described. The urgency 
of dealing with dynamic risks, their changes and the impact on functional systems are 
dealt with not only from the economic point of view [4, 5].  
A man often perceives the risks which he is aware and which he can identify. Methods 
for identifying the risks in connection with a particular process are detected on the basis 
of knowledge from the perspective of the evaluator or external entity. We must not, 
however, forgot other risks, that can significantly affect the process.  Three main 
strategies are currently selected which are generally known in risk management. They are 
information, safety and preventive measures, and discursive strategies. The security 
strategy is also known as a strategy of robustness and adaptability, especially when a 
method of constant monitoring of the situation, adequate knowledge and research of 
emergencies are chosen, providing alternative sources and measures to maintain the 
function of the affected system. Discursive strategy is based on building the measures to 
ensure the certainty and reliability through the reduction of uncertainties, clarify facts 
related to the origins and effects of risks, engagement of the parts concerned, vigilance 
and responsibility [6, 7]. The strategies and approaches mentioned appear to be 
insufficient for the problems in question, as is highlighted in the following text. 
 
2.1. Approaches to dynamic risk management 
 
This approach is applied in many areas where there are varying conditions, for 
example, during the year. Examples are studies [8-10], which reported that these 
conditions may, in the normal application of quantitative assessment and risk 
management, give rise to errors and distorted data. The importance of the dynamic 
approach to risk management is occasional especially in the areas of effective prevention 
[8]. This approach is able to take into account a new perspective on risk and early warning 
signals and systematically evaluate the related risks.  
One of these approaches is the Dynamic Risk Management Framework (DRMF), the 
aim of which is to highlight, describe and implement the needs related to improving and 
updating processes related to risk management. DRMF uses two methodologies in the 
context of hazard identification. The first is the Dynamic Procedure for Atypical 
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Scenarios Identification (DyPASI), arising from the project of EC iNTef-Risk [12]. The 
aim of this method is to create a complete risk assessment process, the creation of 
scenarios accident events, which differs from conventional expectations [11, 12, and 13]. 
The second approach is the dynamic risk assessment (Dynamic Risk Assessment 
(DRA) using the Bayes Theorem (1), based on abnormal situations and figures about 
accidents [19].  
 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) =
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)𝑃(𝐵)
𝑃(𝐴)
=
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)
𝑃(𝐴)
 
 
where are A and B are events in sample space. The meaning of the dynamic approach to 
risk assessment finds application not only in the prevention of accidents but also in the 
prediction of upcoming events, both positive and negative [12]. The importance of this 
approach is described, for example, in [14].  
The application of this approach is explained using the case of a support system based 
on geographic information, which is used for the analysis of natural disasters and their 
modelling time. The aim is to provide the most accurate basis for population protection 
acts such as the evacuation of residents. It also enables the modelling and monitoring of 
environmental risks and impacts [15]. The application of dynamic risk assessment within 
the Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) method using systems such as Accident 
Dynamics Simulator-Information Decision and Action in Crew (ADS-IDAC), which is 
able to dynamically simulate various events such as the threat of a blackout. This system 
is chosen in such complex areas as energy and other critical infrastructure elements [16, 
17].  
Human reliability and neglect of certain obligations are a general major threat. The 
human factor is described as the sum total of human abilities and characteristics which 
may have a significant impact on the assessed system both in terms of efficiency and 
productivity. A man is capable of creative thinking and can react promptly to the situation. 
The most common cause of errors is stressful situations. However, it can happen even in 
another extreme situation that a person makes mistakes, if there is a complete absence of 
the stress factor throughout its operations, which may be based on monotonous activities 
which can lead to omission of important steps [18].  
The system of dynamic risk assessment is able to monitor, detect, assess and propose 
and apply subsequent measures as was indicated in [39]. This system is based on the 
method of safety assessment by the following equation:  
                                                                                                
 
where RNew is the current risk level and ΣrfNew is the sum of scores signed to new risk 
factors discovered by the assessing, and where ΣrfOld is the sum of scores assigned to old 
risk factors of Rcurrent that are no longer discovered by the assessing, and where riNew is a 
new risk increment based on a combination of the new risk factors, and where riOld is an 
old risk increment based on a combination of the old risk factors [39]. 
The European Commission also highlights the importance of risk management by the 
dynamic approach in real time [40]. It refers to new research which combines two 
different techniques leading to threat identification and risk assessment within one 
dynamic process being assessed. The choice of this approach enables information updates 
(1) 
(2) 
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and risk assessment, which are subsequently used for precise calculations corresponding 
to the real situation. 
 
2.2. Methods of analysis and modelling of dynamic risk 
 
Methods of assessment and risk analysis are in many cases based on the risk 
assessment of static risks. As stated in [19], the main drawback of the traditional 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is the inability to update the risk over time for 
developing conditions. The techniques used in this evaluation determine the probability 
of occurrence of a specific event and determine the potential loss of life caused by 
undesirable events.  
Therefore, for dynamic risk assessment, models based on methods of the tree and flow 
diagrams or other calculation methods such as the Bayes theorem [20-23] are used. 
Among the models allowing a description of the behaviour of dynamic phenomena in 
time are the Markov models, the Dynamic Event Logic Analytical Methodology 
(DYLAM), providing an integrated framework for explicit handling of time, the 
procedural variables and system behaviour, further, the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis 
Method (DETAM) tracking the time-dependent evolution of a hardware device status, the 
values of process variables and the state of the operator during the development of a 
scenario [21]. The methods mentioned are based on the development and description of 
an event through the logical Event Tree Diagrams (ETA). This diagram enables to create 
a logical view of the relationship between the causes and effects. In [22], the authors 
applied this method to create a complete scenario of risk and in [23-26] the authors used 
this method for the analysis of traffic safety, etc. The "butterfly" approach mentioned is 
chosen especially in situations where it is necessary to make immediate decisions based 
on events changing in time. 
In real time, the monitoring of these risks is necessary, especially from the perspective 
of the implementation of effective preventive measures. An early and effective 
identification of process faults is crucial in the prevention of major accidents. In this case, 
for example, principal components (PCA) or the method of the probability factor (GLR) 
or multidimensional detection and fault diagnosis techniques [5, 27-30] are applied. 
These methods have been created for specific systems and processes (oil industry). The 
possibility of identifying risks within the dynamic processes can be based on these 
methods. Compared to the traditional static risk assessment, Dynamic Risk Assessment 
(DRA) has a lot of advantages, such as uncertainty quantification (FTA method, etc.) 
which may lead to improvements in the accuracy of risk calculations in real-time. By 
constant updating of the information, risks can be assessed better and thus also managed 
better. Thanks to an early identification of abnormal risks, it is possible to respond to 
them in a suitable way [30-35]. 
 
2.3 Software for simulation of development and impact of risks 
 
Currently, there is software which seeks to work with a dynamic environment and with 
associated risks. However, this software has mainly been developed for the assessment 
of economic risk and the related optimization processes within the enterprise system. An 
example is the Risk Dynamic Analyser (RDA), which is intended for regular or 
immediate risk analysis in operation. The software is able to analyse risks in the process 
and highlight them in advance, so that they can be averted in time or the rate can be 
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reduced [21]. The Czech Republic has also developed new programs and software that 
allow dynamic simulation, which is a tool for optimizing and improving business 
processes.  The aim is to increase the utilization capacity, increase the flow and speed up 
production time, reduce inventory and work in process, optimal configuration of facilities, 
equipment and operating personnel, increase competitiveness. The software is especially 
applied in the field of logistics and risk identification in economy enterprises [22-25]. 
The very frequently used software tools for modelling emergencies in the CR, 
especially in terms of releases of hazardous substances, include the TerEx (Terrorist 
Expert) program and the freely available ALOHA software. Other programs suitable for 
the modelling of hazardous substances are, for example, ROZEX Alarm (CR), Phast (NR) 
EFFECTSGIS (NL), RMP Comp and [26-31]. The total impact analysis (leakage, 
evaporation, dispersion, fire, explosion, vulnerability) can be further evaluated using the 
following software tools: WHAZAN, PHAST, SAFETI; RISKAT; EFFECTS / 
DAMAGE, RISKCURVES SOCRATES, Chemical Accident Index - an index of toxicity 
(CEI), IAEA -TECDOC - 727, FlUIDYN [32, 33]. 
The software products focused on the calculation of risks in projecting, industry and 
the environment include, for example, RMPlanner, HazardReview, Risk Radar, 
FaultrEASE, Cegis FaultrEASE, AgRisk, SiteSafe, BOSS, DNV Risk Management 
Software, EQUIS - Environmental Quality Information System RBCA, in the financial 
and business areas, then COBRA, Algo Suite Solutions, Quantum Sierra, Sierra Treasury, 
Sierra ASP, CORA - Cost-of-Risk-Analysis, financial Software Lattice, STP, SunGard, 
DATA. Furthermore, there is software created for specific areas of tools for calculating 
risk in the areas of pipelines (Bass-Trigon Software, BOSS) hydrology (HFAM, 
HYDRON, HYDRA) and the like [34-37]. Currently, a large development of information 
technology is available to many software products, resulting in risk assessment. Software 
products are based on physical models of varying complexity, which can result in 
obtaining inaccurate and unreliable results. Most of the existing software tools can be 
used only to evaluate certain type of cases. 
 
2.4 Dynamic risk in context with so called black swans 
 
Risk analysis and assessment should not overlook risks with very low probability 
which may seem to be improbable for the evaluator. Taleb in his book [40] discusses the 
so-called false sense of security. It is likened to the life of a turkey that is fed, which gives 
it a sense of satisfaction and safety without realizing that in the end it will be the main 
course at dinner. The same is true even for the man who does not perceive the risk, does 
not realize it or ignores it. It could be caused by the fact that the threats are known or 
previously do not occur in this process. However, it does not mean that similar cases have 
not already occurred in the same or similar processes. In these cases, it could be neglected 
and the warning signals may not be perceived as well as the subsequent manifestation of 
threats.  
Also, the threat assessment and the preventive measures must be applied in accordance 
with reality (e.g. not expect a tsunami from the ocean in an inland state). Therefore, it is 
important to determine when risk assessment and so-called limits of acceptability and the 
implementation of risk could cause serious damage [1].  Identification and analysis of 
black swans is a very complicated problem, which is discussed by many experts [41, 42, 
43, and 44]. It is the need for finding a combination of the warning signs, early detection 
and rapid response. Continuous monitoring of signals could be suitable as prevention of 
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their ignorance and re-examination of the already existing events, which can lead to 
timely preventive measures for the threats of black swans or at least mitigate their impact. 
There are recommended general approaches that include the possibility of forming 
hypotheses and the application of a combination of risk analysis methods. As seen above, 
the issue of the dynamic risk and so-called black swans is not only associated with 
accidents in industrial processes but it could appear at different levels (individual, 
company, locality etc.), which means individual and society risk.  With regard to the 
current rapid development of society and the changes that are happening, there has been 
a search for possible ways and methods which would help to increase prevention and the 
prediction of threats that are particularly dynamic. 
 
3. Data 
 
The problem situation for this study was a model municipality with 3000 habitants 
with fictitious infrastructure. This type of municipality was chosen as a typical system 
without special crisis planning and experience with solving undesirable events, especially 
in context with dynamic risks. As a model problem situation, a non-periodical cultural 
event with more than 250 attendees was dealt with. This cultural event was organized for 
the first time. It was a short term event (5 hours of preparations, 2 hours of performance, 
and 3 hours of cleaning after the event). The most danger parts are the phase of 
preparations and then especially the phase of the performance. Risk assessment included 
the connections of this system with the surroundings, historical experience not only from 
this municipality, undesirable events, current state, available preventive measures of the 
integrated emergency system, etc. Data collection is recommended from the local 
documents, methods, legislative, expert experience, etc. Due to the fact that there was a 
lot of data, it was necessary to choose suitable methods and approaches for the assessment 
and evaluation of the problem.  
 
4. Materials and methods 
 
It is necessary to choose suitable approaches and methods for dynamic risk assessment 
as was found out during the analysis of the current state. Also, methods based on the 
combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach were chosen. Due to this fact, the 
methods were chosen in accordance with the common practice and were proposed with 
the aim of an easy and effective monitoring of the development of a specific situation. 
These methods are based on the systematic approach, which is compatible with risk 
engineering methods for solving the problem. 
 
4.1. Systemic approach 
 
This approach was chosen because of its comprehensive and integrated approach, 
which helps to achieve an objective manner to get the optimal process. The basic 
attributes of the system approach are: 
1. The definition of the area of interest. 
2. The approaches to problem solving. 
3. The assessed specifications of the area of interest. 
4. The definition of methods for analysing the considered area. 
5. The ethical standards and compliance with them. 
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What is important is the assessment of properties and the entity and its binding 
(internal and external) with the ongoing processes that positively or negatively affected 
the system under evaluation. The systematic approach is also implemented in methods of 
risk engineering and therefore these methods were chosen to match the requirements of 
the individual attributes and assist to fulfil them. Selected methods are listed in the 
following chapter. 
 
4.2 Risk engineering methods 
 
Qualitative methods are the first step in risk analysis by which the identification of risk 
sources is done and the probability of occurrence of a specific phenomenon and losses is 
determined. The methods are based on the deterministic approach and it is suitable to 
complement them by another risk analysis like the quantitative method [46]. The method 
suitable for the identification of risk is, in cases of dynamic risk events, primarily the so-
called tree diagram analysis with a logical division. Using these methods, it is possible to 
detect possible risks and their causes, which can have undesirable consequences leading 
to the disruption of the process or system. Due to this fact, the following methods have 
been chosen:  
1. Fault Tree Analysis, FTA, which analyses the causes of undesirable events using 
logical gates. FTA could be applied as a quantitative approach with calculation of the 
probability of causes [47]. Other methods which are applied in the first step of analysis 
– risk identification, are also Check List Analysis, What if Analysis. These methods 
are able to determine the area of interest and closely specify the elements which are 
evaluated.  
2. Quantitative methods are suitable for detailed analysis of the whole process. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapters, one of these suitable methods is another one based 
on the tree diagram analysis. Event Tree Analysis, ETA, which analyses the final status 
of undesirable events after the initiatory event. The methods mentioned are applied in 
the area of risk and safety engineering and together with other methods they will be 
used for dealing with the risk of damage occurrence and its prevention.   
 
5.  Results 
 
Based on the analysed methods, the methodology of dynamic risk assessment with 
application on the real system as autonomous units has been proposed. The reason why it 
is necessary for these systems to do this assessment are processes that are realized in these 
whole systems and that are influenced by external and internal environment.  These 
systems have dynamic progression and specific manifestation. These processes could be: 
- short-term 
- long-term 
- periodical 
- repeated without periodicity 
- random 
These long-term processes or periodical events could be thoroughly analysed and 
suitable preventive measures could be proposed for them to reduce or eliminate the risk 
of undesirable events occurrence. However, the processes should be influenced by other 
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factors and processes, which may significantly change their course in a positive or 
negative manner. With regard to these facts, methods aiming to monitor the manifestation 
of dynamic risk were chosen and applied within the proposed methodology.  
 
5.1. Systemic approach application 
 
In context with the chosen approaches and methods for dynamic risk assessment, it has 
been evaluated that it is necessary to choose the common approach in the first step. Other 
methods are chosen based on this method. A systemic approach is suitable for these 
requirements and it is a suitable choice for solving the determined aim because it is 
created logically and with a step by step methodology.  A systemic approach by the author 
of [48] is created using twenty attributes, divided into five subgroups (Figure 1). The 
attributes, which are defined in connection with the solution, are characterized in the next 
part and the categorization has been created by the author mentioned. 
 
Fig. 1 Attributes and subgroups 
 
Attributes should be different with respect to the problems being solved. Their 
assessment and registration are also important as they make it possible to unify the 
approach to solving specific problems such as the dynamic risk assessment in this issue. 
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5.2. Application of risk engineering methods 
 
To assess and join the various attributes, risk engineering methods were chosen. These 
methods help to identify threats and risks. However, this approach allows a relatively 
rapid application and thereby creates risk scenarios for their identification. As was 
mentioned in part 4, the chosen methods include the Event Tree Analysis and the Fault 
Tree Analysis to identify potential threats. The approach is shown in Table 1 and the 
method in Figure 2.  
 
Table 1. Example of subgroups of systematic approach of authority unit (municipality). 
 
Subgroups Attribute Characterization 
Area of interest centre of culture 
reconstruction  
cultural event (> 250 people) 
Approaches to problem 
solving 
multifunction centre, non-
periodical events with > 
250 people, safety 
measure 
included in crisis plan, 
internal safety measures, 
accessibility, duration of the 
event, another event at the 
same time etc. 
Specifications of the area 
of interest 
city centre, traffic, objects 
of interest 
road with high density of 
traffic, petrol station, bus 
station, shops, river 
Methods for analysing 
the considered area 
qualitative risk analysis 
methods 
What if, ETA, FTA 
Ethical standards and 
compliance with them 
Legislation local regulation 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of the ETA method application 
 
The end events are indicated by letters A-E, the characteristics of which are set out in 
Table 2. In some cases, there may be the same ending element more than once, and 
therefore the aim of this indication is to clarify and simplify the results interpretation. 
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Table 2. Example of impact assessment in context with ETA. 
  
Impact Significance 
A 
Highly dangerous event with risk of injuries, life and property 
damage 
B Dangerous event with risk of injuries and property damage 
C Risk of small injuries and property damage 
D Risk of inadequate safety measures 
E Function of safety measures 
 
In the second case, the FTA method was applied with the aim of controlling the origin 
of risk. The FTA method is suitable in cases after known events and their impact. It is 
possible to find the root events which are responsible for these damages. It is then possible 
to control the right procedure for creating the risk scenarios by the ETA method. The FTA 
method could be applied with a qualitative approach. This method is applied with the 
logic knots of AND and OR. It is possible to apply the Caused and Consequences 
Analysis (CCA) known as the butterfly method. In this case, it is also possible to use the 
Caused and Consequence Analysis with the so-called butterfly approach. The ETA 
method is used to create the risk scenarios and estimate the possible consequences in case 
of the threat realization. Specifically, the possible effects of undesirable events related to 
the processes which occurred during the evaluated system. 
After the application of these methods, it is suitable to create the risk registration. In 
this register, notes are the elements of the assessment system and threats and risks which 
are connected with them. The structure of this register is similar to the register in OSH 
with the application of the elements of the FMEA method and the Check List analysis 
(Table 3). The register is suitable for controlling known and appropriate threats connected 
with them. The periodical control is highly important for prevention of risk and for 
detailed creation of risk scenarios.  
 
Table 3. Example of risk identification by Check List. 
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fatal 
injuries 
    
layout of security 
guards, choosing  
conflict 
individuals 
regular 
during 
performa
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management 
of security 
guards, 
security 
guards 
+ 
numerous 
injuries 
    
+ 
property 
damage 
    
+ 
thefts     + 
cancelled 
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+ 
terrorist 
attack 
individual/ 
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fatal 
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guards, choosing 
conflict 
individuals, 
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mass 
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individuals with 
symptoms of 
disease, 
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health care 
services, 
monitoring of 
health situation 
in and around the 
city 
management, 
health care 
service 
- 
fall of 
subjects 
human 
factor/ 
mechanical 
damage 
numerous 
injuries, 
fatal 
injuries 
    layout of security 
guards, control 
before and 
during 
performance, 
cooperation with 
police services 
Regular 
before 
and after 
performa
nce 
management 
of security 
guard, 
technical 
management, 
maintenance 
+ 
fire 
human 
factor/ 
technical 
failure 
serious/ 
fatal 
injuries, 
property 
damage 
    layout of security 
guards, control 
before and 
during 
performance, 
cooperation with 
firefighting 
services 
management 
of security 
guide, 
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fire service 
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on 
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fatal 
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property 
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    layout of security 
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before and during 
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firefighting and 
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+ 
 
The creating of the register as a database of threats, risks and near misses (almost 
undesirable events) including the measures and responsibilities should be based on the 
areas of interest and sources of threats (Table 4). 
This database allows the identification and monitoring of threats and risks in various 
areas which occurred or may occur with respect to the assessed entity. In the register, 
preventive measures and responsibilities are also determined by the guarantors. 
Determining responsibilities and creating the overview also helps to capture a broad 
portfolio and provide the ability to minimize identified threats. The assignment of 
responsibilities must be performed in accordance with the local regulations. If it is 
necessary to choose more responsible persons, it is important to define the affected areas 
with respect to their inclusions. 
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Table 4. Example of threats and risk database by their source. 
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10/1993 
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cement of 
security 
guard Manage-
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cultural 
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intentional 
damage 
damage of 
equipment 
and 
security 
measures 
fall of 
decoration 
and 
injuries of 
20 
attendees 
06/1975 
security 
intervene-
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more 
security 
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sector 
distribution 
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sacks 
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patrol, 
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before 
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construction, 
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rescue 
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cultural 
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manage-
ment 
 
snow 
calamity 
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damage 
serious 
injury of 
employee,  
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performa-
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budget 
financial 
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of cultural 
centre 
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5.3. Results evaluation 
 
The above mentioned practices respond to the results of the current state where, apart 
from the stationary risks, it is more and more frequent for dynamic ones to appear. The 
reason could be: inadequate attention to warning signals, ignorance of the newly 
introduced process and inexperience with this process, insufficient analysis of internal 
and external factors that has impact on the evaluated objects of interest/ entity, not placing 
the responsibilities of competent persons, ignoring past events and near misses etc.  
The reasons mentioned are related to the risk of the so-called black swans. Therefore, 
the methodology of the dynamic risk management was designed in accordance with the 
requirements for minimization and prevention. These requirements could include: 
secondary measures for planning the creation of a functional communication network, 
investigation of any undesirable event or near misses incl. their causes, monitoring events 
in similar systems, sharing the gained experience with the common guidelines and local 
regulations etc. 
The solution method is based on the comprehensive and dynamic complexity of 
assessing the risks with regard to the source of threats and the related risks. Applying this 
method is useful for the systems and processes that may be affected by external factors 
or processes without periodicity. It therefore represents for example businesses or 
municipalities and other local authorities. Of course, changes and further applications 
depend on the input data and the time period of the evaluation with respect to the size of 
the system. The whole principle of using the systematic approach which is also part of 
risk engineering methods remains unchanged. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
Dynamic risk management is a difficult task that cannot be solved using only one 
method of risk analysis. As in the prediction and reduction of highly improbable events 
called Black swans [1], it is necessary to follow a few basic rules. It is the perception of 
the threats and risks as probable, which must be registered in the related system. An 
example is the risk register, which should be conducted, reviewed and updated only at 
regular intervals such as once a year but also with every change that occurs and is 
associated with the evaluated systems (e.g. business, municipality or region). In this 
register, records of incidents and threats that have occurred or almost occurred should 
also be maintained. In the case of OSH, they are, for example, the records about the near-
misses [38]. It is not only the OSH where such abnormal situations should be recorded 
and kept in mind by employees.  
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The next step is to monitor the events retrospectively which have already occurred in 
history and may not be directly related to the event system being evaluated. The 
knowledge of this information may help in the identification of threats and risks, their 
assessment and implementation of appropriate preventive measures. In the case of 
dynamic risk, the knowledge of the period in which they occur is also important. This 
may be the known threats and risks. For example, an enterprise focused on agricultural 
activities has the highest productivity in the season but out of the season, the production 
is reduced as well as the number of employees. Threats and risks for these periods are 
different and their approximate interval duration is known. In these periods, the monitored 
threats and risks vary. If they are continuously monitored, they can also be detected early 
and as negative factors that could significantly increase the threats and risks. The paper 
presented the current approaches, methods and software tools that can be applied to 
control the dynamic risks in complex systems like municipality. It depends on the 
individuality of each system which has its own distinctive characteristics and must apply 
these methods and approaches adapted. The solving of this problem is currently focused 
on the possibility of dynamic risk management of risk within the local government. The 
aim is to increase efficiency in risk management, strengthening prevention, reducing or 
preventing adverse events and the ability to support preventive obligations and liability. 
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Chapter 16  
 
SUPER PROCESSES FOR MANAGEMENT OF RISKS IN 
TERRITORY AND IN TECHNOLOGICAL ENTITIES DIRECTED TO 
HUMAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The main goal of all human effort is ensuring the human life, i.e. all human needs, 
interests, and wishes. Human needs, interests and wishes are fulfilled by intangible and 
material goods that have a utility value. Unfortunately, in the world it is not just a human 
society, but also other systems, which are not subordinated to the human society. 
Therefore, the conflicts originate: human vs. the environment; technology vs. the 
environment; human vs. technology; human vs. human, human vs. PC etc.  Because the 
human kind is based on its education, as well as in the present case, it needs to realize 
that, in a given situation it needs to be based on knowledge, which have been accumulated 
by science and historical experience of life, which shows that it is a limit for the human 
activities, which could not be exceeded, in order to prevent the destruction of mankind.  
Christianity and Eastern philosophies perceived rightly that the human basic problem 
is the answer to question: „How to live?” The question connected with the existence of 
human in today’s civilization runs: „How is human going to exist?” It is necessary to state 
that, for example, in minds of humans the relation between human and human society 
towards the nature still means the domination and exploiting of natural resources for 
the sake of satisfaction in their needs.  But from the view of knowledge and experiences 
it is necessary for the humans to realize that they are not the rulers of the Universe and 
they should, by their status, participate on securing the existential conditions for both, 
themselves and the future generations, which requires certain behaviour and certain 
responsibility for their manners and activities. 
The strategy of sustainable development is comparable to other systems of values, 
which do not have a terminal form (e.g. the system of human laws and freedom). It is 
heading towards the securing the highest possible quality of life for the present generation 
and towards the creation of preconditions for quality life of following generations and 
with being conscious of fact that ideas of future generations concerning the quality of life 
can be different from ours. 
From this reason the UN defined the strategic goal for human society “safe human 
system” in 1994 [1], consecutively the EU defined “safe community” in 2004 [2]. The 
present knowledge [3] shows that it is necessary to care on both, the public assets (human 
lives, health and security; property and welfare; environment; critical infrastructures and 
technologies) and their interfaces that are realised by natural and by human made linkages 
and couplings by help of various flows. Precisely, the interfaces among assets are the 
causes of permanent increase of vulnerability of present world, and therefore, today the 
management of entities in the world is based on the system concept [3-5].  
 
* Author:  Assoc. Prof., RNDr. Dana Procházková, PhD., D.Sc., Czech Technical University in 
Prague, Praha, Czech Republic, prochazkova@fd.cvut.cz  
249 
 
The present world we understand as the set of open mutually interconnected systems 
that dynamically develop in time (the system of systems). Its foundation stones are: the 
environment; the human society; and the technological system [3, 4]. These principal 
systems and another systems and their sub-systems have own targets that they realise by 
help of internal processes. It is reality that all results of some of these processes are not 
positive for the humans, and therefore, we denoted them as disasters 3, 4.  
Owing to existence of such phenomena, the humans need to try to create the favourable 
conditions for life. From the logical reasons, the humans need to direct their protection 
against phenomena that have the huge impacts on them and also on the assets that they 
need for the life. In this context the term “risk” is used and it is defined as the rate of 
probable size of disaster impacts on humans, namely directly or indirectly through the 
public assets on which the humans are dependent [4].  
From reason of human development, it is necessary to apply the strategic management 
to each important entity (state, territory, object, organisation) directed to the long-term 
sustainability, which on our knowledge means the targeted work with risks of all kinds. 
Therefore, the risk is now the dominate concept of our society. It is connected with 
complex phenomena, conditions or factors: uncertain natural hazards, technological 
accidents and other disasters [3]; uncertainties that are in science and technology findings 
and their action on health and quality of human life human vulnerability and lack of 
consistent explanation of living sorrows and their sense; and also with the human play 
with fear, chances and opportunities [3-5].    
For quality human life it is necessary both, the co-existence of mentioned essential 
systems and the provision of humans needs that in hierarchical Maslow pyramid 6 
(needs: physiological, security; social; sociable assertiveness, self-realization).  
From this reason, the humans need to consider at management: the system 
interconnection of living assets; mutual interconnections among many open systems; and 
development dynamics vs. human ways of problem solutions.  
The human hierarchy of problem solution has the levels: technical; operative 
(functional); tactic; strategic; and politic. For general aims´ reach, the goals on all levels 
need to be targeted in same direction and to be co-ordinated 3-5.  With regard to 
different development of structural open systems in the world, there is necessary to expect 
the conflicts, and therefore, the human needs to monitor the changes in the world and to 
be prepared the originated conflicts to solve in time 3, 5. 
Basic tools of human society for provision of needs there are: correct control of human 
society (from urgency reason, the problem solving is divided in [3] to:  
- management of security and development, 
- emergency management, 
- crisis management), 
- good asserting the knowledge and exercises at negotiation with risks directed to public 
interest respecting [4, 5].  
In this respect, the big roles prove to managerial and engineering disciplines that have 
capability to ensure the human existence, human security and the potential for human 
development [4].    
 
2. Summary of findings on advanced management, processes and their risks 
 
As it was said above, the world is dynamically developed in time and space that is 
manifested by different processes that are inside and across of its structural systems. The 
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different phenomena, having the various sizes, are the products of these processes. These 
phenomena cause the changes that have often highly unacceptable impacts on humans, 
namely directly or indirectly over the public assets that humans need for quality life and 
development. This reality causes that the accent is put on the management type called 
“disaster management” in which considering all disasters is denoted as „All Hazards 
Approach “[7]. 
 
2.1. Disasters as processes outputs 
 
Among the disasters, we classify the phenomena that cause damage, losses and harms 
to humans and other public assets on which the humans are dependent. These phenomena 
are the results of five different processes in the human system that represents the world 
[3]. The results of processes: 
- running in and out of the Earth are: natural disasters (earthquake, floods, drought, 
strong wind, volcanic activity, land slide, rock slide etc.); epiphyte; epizootic; land 
erosion; desertification; fundament liquefaction; sea floor spreading etc. 
- running in the human body and in human society are:  unintentional: illnesses; 
epidemic; involuntary human errors etc.; and intentional: robbery; killing; 
victimization; religious and other intolerance; criminal acts; terrorist attacks; local 
and other armed conflicts, bullying; religious and other intolerance; criminal acts such 
as: vandalism and illegal business, robbery and attacking, illegal entry, unauthorized 
use of property or services, theft and fraud, intimidation and blackmail, sabotage and 
destruction, intentional disuse of technologies, such as: improper application of 
CBRNE substances; data mining from social networks and other cyber networks used 
for psychological pressure on a human individual etc. 
- connected with the human activities are: incidents; near misses; accidents; 
infrastructure failures; technology failures; loss of utilities; etc. 
- that are reactions of the Planet or environment to the human activities are: man-made 
earthquakes; disruption of ozone level / layer; greenhouse effect; fast climate 
variations; contaminations of air, water, soil and rock; desertification caused by 
human bad river regulation; drop of the diversity of flora and fauna (animal and 
vegetal) variety; fast human population explosion; migration of great human groups; 
fast drawing off the renewable sources; erosion of soil and rock; land uniformity etc. 
- connected with inside dependences in the human society and its surrounding 
separated to: natural: changes in stress and movements of territorial plates; changes 
in water circulation in the nature (environment); changes in substance circulation in 
the nature (environment); changes in the human food chain; changes in the planet 
processes; changes in the interactions of solar and galactic processes; and human 
established: the failure of human society management (organizational accidents 
caused by: mutual improper behaviour of an individual or groups of individuals as 
illegal migration of great groups of people; incorrect governance of public affairs - 
as: corruption, abuse of authority, the disintegration of human society into intolerant 
communities; and failures in organization of education and upbringing etc.); the 
failure of correct flows of raw materials and products; the failure of correct flows of 
energies (harmful is e.g. blackout); the failure of correct flows of information; the 
failure of correct flows of finances etc.;{word “correct“ means the way in benefit of 
human interest, i.e. given by legislation}. 
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The disaster list shows that disasters, according to the process, the product of which 
they are, have very mixed physical, chemical, economical, biological, social or cybernetic 
nature/basis. This mentioned fact is a clincher from the view of safety, because the 
preventive measures need to be targeted to the nature of disaster for the sake of being 
effective. Definitions, features and impacts of disasters are listed in the works [3, 8-10]. 
Generally, it stands that the disasters have certain characteristic features, which are the 
origin of impacts causing the damages, losses and harms to the important assets, links or 
flows and that from the human point of view, because this is de facto the only thing in 
which a human is interested (human aim is to make human to survive). Among the 
impacts it belongs e.g. vibration; directed fast air, water or soil flow; damage to a stability 
and cohesiveness of rocks and soil; displacements of materials; outburst of liquids; 
anomalies in the temperature etc.  
The impacts effect directly or vicariously through links and flows of human system. 
Humans, thanks to their intellect, deliberately create the resilience of areas, buildings, 
infrastructures and technologies against disasters. They do with a help of both, the choice 
of elements, links and flows and their interconnection; and the specific preventive 
measures and activities until the specific disaster extent (which is given by human 
knowledge, abilities, financial and technical possibilities etc.) [3]. It makes why the 
impacts of interconnections in the system (interdependences) appear only with beyond 
design disasters, which by their extent lays above the border size of disaster against which 
the humans systematically provide resilience [3]. Understandably, there is a big 
difference - rich technically developed and quality managed countries or organizations 
(generally entities) have the threshold of assets resilience set higher that the counties with 
a lower standard.  
Disasters cause or from certain extend cause damage, loss and harm on assets, i.e. they 
are the reasons of situations falling on a human and that is why human has to handle with 
them. By the reason of big variety of disasters, the arising situations classified as “the 
emergency situations” have either the same or highly specified impacts. The relation 
between a disaster and an emergency situation is the relation “cause-consequence” [3]. 
This relation is not simple because the intensity (destructiveness, severity, criticality, 
cruelty) of emergency situation in a given place is predetermined not only by the size of 
disaster but also by the local vulnerability of assets, failure of implemented protective 
systems (e.g. the system of warning in the area, security mechanism etc.) which were 
created for increasing the assets resilience, the humans’ mistakes during the response etc. 
[3, 5, 8]. 
 
2.2. Danger, hazard and risk 
 
In domain connected with the disaster management, there are three terms that are by 
given way interconnected. They are not often distinguished in spoken language, which 
leads to misunderstanding at critical moments, and by this to huge harms. In professional 
terminology they have exactly the given sense, and therefore, we here deal with them; it 
goes on terms: danger, hazard and risk. 
Danger marks the conditions of human system at which the origin of harms on protected 
assets has the high probability (it is almost sure that the harm will origin) [4], i.e. the term 
marks the rate of conditions.  It means that it goes on mark of possibility of origin of 
harm, loss or damage of one or more assets. The danger is predetermined by substance 
properties that are in facility, object or territory and by properties of processes that are 
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running in facility, object or territory. It is immediate, if the course uncontrollably goes 
to the disaster origin that causes the emergency situation; and it is creeping, if the course 
goes to disaster origin inconspicuously and without clear-cut precursors [4]. The danger 
for human means both, the big phenomena (e.g. natural disasters, industrial accidents, 
environmental or social disasters) and the seemingly small phenomena from the daily life 
(slump of snow, icicle or roofing from roof, rough pavement etc.) [4].  
Hazard marks the disaster potential to cause the harms, losses and damages on 
protected assets in a given site that is prescriptively determined. It goes on prescriptive 
measure of danger that is connected with the given disaster. For the strategic planning 
needs, the centennial disaster is often considered, i.e. the hazard is size of disaster that 
occurs once in hundred years, or professionally exactly, the disaster size that has return 
period 100 years; at special buildings and facilities it is considered from safety reasons 
the hazard, which is connected with thousand years’ disaster or ten thousand years’ 
disaster [4].   
Risk connected with a given disaster is the probable size of damages, harms or losses 
on protected assets that originate in given place at origin of disaster with size of 
normatively determined hazard, which is normalized to the certain territory unit or 
number of individuals and the time unit [4]. The difference between risk and danger is 
the following: the danger is specific (it denotes the topical conditions) and the risk is only 
expected opportunity.  
The humans ensure the protection of human society and populated territory against the 
risks by the way that for each disaster they determine the certain size (so called design 
disaster). They perform the preventive measures to design disasters and by which they 
ensure so the possible risk size may be acceptable. The problem arises if disasters with 
size greater than design disaster occur, because great damages, harms and losses origin 
as the consequence of failure of man-made technological systems 3-5, 10. 
 
2.3. Process management and risk management 
 
The entity (territory, object, plant, state etc.) governance has been developed during 
the history [3]. At the beginning of the 20th century, the methods of scientific management 
were introduced. After the Second World War, the start-up of development of 
impoverished countries was need, which meant to ensure the fast recovery of businesses 
and areas. For this purpose, it was needed an initiative of wide inhabitant mass and more 
dynamic way of management. Therefore, the special management was introduced (this 
type has been still used for solving the critical situations). Its fundament is the 
management of processes; the process is mutual interconnection of partial sets of actions 
(mechanisms) by which the set of events is under way.  
The mentioned management type presents the targeted management (programmes are 
split into projects which are further divided into processes; each process manifests itself 
under the project coordination – new types: project management; and process 
management). The characteristic feature of this management type [11] is the orientation 
on: the priorities and the use of planning; the methods of setting the goals; and the 
initiative of managers / leaders. 
From the 70s of last century: it comes in useful the employee participation in the 
management, profit and ownership; and the demands on a qualification at all professions 
have been increasing. The beginning the 90s is characterised by: the wide usage of 
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automate and office technics; the flexible manufacturing system; telecommunication and 
informatics. 
Reforms in the public governance, i.e., marking by the transition from the bureaucracy 
management to the targeted management, i.e. the project management based on process 
management, were the response to the big problems in the EU regional policy, and they 
were being started-up by the Maastricht treaty in 1989 [12].  
At present, the goal of project management of entities from both, the profit and the 
non-profit (public) sector, is ensuring the safe entities with sufficient development 
potential, and therefore, it is strategic, proactive and systemic [3]. However, it is 
necessary to consider that it is not possible to use the same criteria for the management 
of public and private sectors, because e.g. the human protection, the education and 
research need the investment without consideration of profit. The main differences 
between public and private sectors are:  
1. A difference in goals. In the public sector that is represented by municipalities and 
regions, the profit or another gain for any legal or physical person is not the main goal, 
but the main goal is the public interest and its procuration. 
2. Legislation. The public sector has a greater connection to justice, which leads to 
significant constraints in domain of decision making. It is caused by the need to 
respect and satisfy the duties and the principles of governance, to respect the elected 
bodies, the adjustment and the position of state organizational units, rights and duties 
of their employees, requirements on financial and property management, etc. 
3. A profit absence at public sector has consequences that some benchmarks and 
indicators, which are used in private sector for support of more quality management, 
are not possible to use. 
For both mentioned sectors, however, it holds that it goes on the process management, on 
which all stakeholders are participated. The process management leans on the partnership, 
it is based on negotiation with risks and at the decision making it goes from the variant 
assessment on the basis of qualified criterion [12]. 
Currently, the three types of project management are used [3], i.e.: 
1. New Public Management. 
2. Total Quality Management (TQM). 
3. Common Assessment Framework. 
In our conditions, the Total Quality Management (TQM) is used [3, 12]. For its success 
the ISO standards 9000, 14000 etc. had been set up. The TQM approach consists in the 
requirement that all employees, from the plain employee up to the top management 
employee, are participated in the process of quality improvement. The process of quality 
improvement (i.e., in its top level it goes on de facto on integral safety increase) comes 
from the impulses which come from customer/citizen needs. 
The TQM comes from the assumption that the stable quality of products and services 
cannot be ensured by commands, supervision, partial programmes, organizational or 
economic measures, but it can be reached by seeking, measuring and evaluating of causes, 
why the productivity and quality do not improve [3]. De facto it goes on certain safety 
culture (in the other words it is a way of application of measures and human activities). 
Attention is focused on processes ongoing in the entity. At the TQM implementation, 
they are taken into account the entity specifics, because all measures need to reflect the 
structure of entity from the reason of efficiency [3, 12]; it means they shall be site specific. 
The modern management, which leans on the project and process management, uses 
the general process (Problem Solving Process) that is the part of best-practice (i.e., the 
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best experiences) and it is worldwide used [13]. It goes on the process that is universal 
and it exceeds the problems of project and the project management; it involves ten points: 
problem identification; problem definition; analysis of present conditions; looking for 
causes; definition of target; proposal of solutions; solution selection; solution validation; 
realization; and evaluation. 
In real practice, we distinguish three common management levels, which are needed 
to be harmonized. The strategic level determines the basic development directions, from 
which it follows: which processes are necessary to modify or create; which organizational 
changes are necessary to perform; and where to obtain know-how, financial sources, etc. 
The tactical level helps to sort activities, which are necessary for realization of long-term 
intentions. It looks for answers on questions:  how to set up the processes; in which 
condition to maintain processes; and how the processes need to cooperate mutually. The 
operational management decides about the real allocation of sources in the process 
(human, technological, financial) and also about the execution of appropriate activities in 
the range of adjusted processes (how to perform the real operation). An effort is to ensure 
the knowledge transfer and skill transfer among workers.  
The organisation can reach a competitive merit when it harmonises all three 
management levels. The aim is to achieve the state when the processes are defined and 
managed on the basis of strategy and the operational management does not mean only 
response to emergency conditions or other types of faults. The processes are improved on 
the basis of knowledge coming from the operational management. New findings coming 
from the management processes are then quickly reflected into the strategy and they 
invoke the next important change connected with the business development or another 
entity development.  
The process management is based on the principle of integration of activities into the 
integral processes. It means that the partial operations are necessary to integrate. The 
processes are controlled by process teams. Each process team controls the processes on 
its level and it distributes the tasks which lead to aim achievement to subordinate groups. 
At the same time all process´ teams shall be motivated to achievement of optimal 
outcomes, and all management levels shall follow the final goal at achieving the particular 
aims. Within the process management, two management systems exist, namely, the 
functional one and the process one, which create the more complex management. 
Processes for safety support need to be followed in each entity [3, 5, and 16]. Modern 
management types, which are the project and process managements, are only successful, 
when they properly deal with risks, which are inherent to human system and also to each 
its sub-system. If the risks are not properly managed, so it will not be possible to reach 
successfully targets, and therefore, the project feasibility is assessed in advance. The 
importance of risk role is caused by the matter that on the risk mastering it is dependent 
not only the project price, but overall successfulness of total project. Thus, it is needed, 
so that each project may own specific structure, risk separation and way of financing that 
corresponds to its character. Risk management deals with the risks in process, which shall 
be a part of each project and that shall run from the very beginning, because only by this 
way it can respond to originated risks. 
From the logic thinking it follows that the risks have various sources [3, 5, 8, and 16] 
and they depend on: disasters; local vulnerabilities; methods of management and coping 
with risks; and they occur on the side of all stakeholders. For achievement of 
understanding the stakeholders and following the risks´ reductions, it is necessary 
properly to work with risks, it means to choice the right concept for the risk management 
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(five concepts exist in the risk context [5,16]); risk identification, risk analysis and 
evaluation [4], to correctly decide about risks and to perform the right risk allocation 
including  the risks´ coping and the risks´ negotiation to stakeholders; to get over the 
risks; and to introduce the permanent monitoring,  in which if necessary to apply the in 
advance prepared corrective measures [5]. 
The correct outputs for needs of proper management according to the TQM are the 
following: 
1. The risk assessment document – it contains information about the appropriate risks. 
2. The list of top risks – it contains the list of selected risks, the solution of which demand 
big claims on resources and time. 
3. The list of retired risks – it serves as the historic link for decision making in future. 
The technique of only risk management from the reason of economic handling with 
forces, resources and funds formally before work with risks reviews both, the risk 
management and the trade-off with risks in the context of benefits and costs on the 
outputs. 
On the basis of present knowledge, the orientation to the process management leads 
to: 
- better understanding and greater integration of entity, 
- continuous management of linkages among the individual processes, 
- stress on: comprehension of requirements and their fulfilment; needs to consider the 
processes from the viewpoint of added value; run into increase of performance and 
effectivity; and permanent putting forward the processes on the basis of their 
efficiency.  
 
3. Data used at determination of super processes for risk management in   
    dynamically variable world  
 
For determination of supper processes for risk management in dynamically variable 
world we use data on both, the risks´ sources and the risk management procedures 
directed to human safety that are used in present practice.  
In the first case, we use the detailed data on disasters and the results of studies of 
disasters that are in special projects, e.g. Switzerland - the PLANAT project, US – FEMA 
projects, Canada, the Netherlands, EMA (Australia), OCHA, the Czech Republic, IAEA, 
OECD, UN etc. – all real references (over 1000) are given in [3-5].  
In the second case for some disasters (floods, earthquakes, chemical accidents, 
epizootic, epidemic, electro-energy net failure, industrial accidents, traffic accidents etc.), 
we use practical experience with tried-and-true tools for management and getting over 
the risks; e.g. the plans for risk reduction for more than 5000 accidents and failure of 
networks [9]. These data are in further paragraphs. 
Because for practical purposes, there are necessary good technical solutions based on 
recent findings and experiences and correctly aimed governance of public assets 
supported by legislative with sufficient legal force, finances, qualified human personnel 
and material base, these data are also followed  
 
3.1. Knowledge on risk, risk management and risk engineering 
 
The fundamental facts on nature, principles, methods and tools of risk management 
and trade-off with risks, i.e. recent knowledge from management domain, entity structure 
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(role of interfaces among the human system assets and human system sub-systems), errors 
at decision-making and management are given in works 3-5, 8, 9, 10, 14, and 15. Their 
summary is: 
1. The principles for work with risks are: to be proactive; to think through possible 
consequences; correctly to determine the priorities of public interest; to think on 
overcome of problems; to consider the synergies; and to be alert. 
2. The principles of work with risks come out from the stipulated demands that the risk 
management task is the safety increase, i.e. to find the optimum way how the 
evaluated significant risks may be reduced on demanded socially acceptable level, or 
to preserve the determined safety level. From this reason, the following facts need to 
be respected: 
- reduction of risk is practically always connected with increasing the costs,  
- risk management needs to be led by effort to find the boundary to which it is 
endurable to reduce the risk, so the spent costs might be socially acceptable,   
- on the basis of just given facts, it is necessary in each real case to establish the 
requirements that output from trade-off with risks needs to be fulfilled,  
- at real trade-off with risks, the stipulated requirements need to be kept and in case 
their non-observing, the reasons need to be given.  
Because the territory and each technological objects or facility are the complex 
systems of systems (set of open and mutually interconnected systems of various 
nature [3, 5]), it is necessary to consider the safety of whole complex, called the 
integral safety. For this purpose, it needs to work with an integral risk. The integral 
risk is influenced by reality that each followed entity has a range of protected assets 
of different nature that are interfaced by internal links and couplings created by flows. 
Because the goals of assets are not always the same, it is necessary to expect the 
conflicts. At several conditions (caused by occurrence of special disaster with size 
greater than design one, which creates the boundary value that assets withstand such 
disaster without greater losses and damages), low assets´ resilience and interfaces 
among the assets are the causes of another conflicts. Therefore, the entity integral risk 
also depends on the hazards from disasters of all kinds (natural, technological, social, 
financial, economical, legal etc.) that can threaten the entity; the disasters affected 
not only the individual assets but also their links and couplings, which lead to the 
cascade failures.  
For correct assessment of entity risk, it is important to consider all disasters that can 
damage the entity, and properly to determine the sizes of hazards connected with 
individual disasters. The risk connected with each disaster is probable size of losses, 
damages and harms on the entity for hazard connected with the design disaster 
divided to area unit and one year. The crucial is the correct determination of hazard 
connected with the design disaster. Both, the performed entity safety reports audits 
and the inspections after the entity accidents or failures, revealed that in evaluated 
cases: some possible disasters with potential to disrupt the entity were not considered 
at risk determination directed to the entity safety; and several faults in determination 
of correct value of hazard connected with design disaster were found (e.g. data from 
too short time interval on disaster, too limited knowledge).  
From the practical reasons it is necessary to consider that the entity risk connected 
with the given disaster does not represent only the direct losses on assets but also the 
indirect ones; the indirect losses are caused by: delays or errors in response, cascades 
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of failures caused by synergic and cumulative effects, which are caused by linkages 
and couplings among the assets; and by domino effects.  
Due to the entity structure their risk is the integral risk that is expressed by following 
formula 
 
 
 
where: H is the hazard connected with the considered disaster; Ai  are the values of 
assets, i = 1,2, ..., n that are considered in connection with complex technological 
facility safety, where n is the number of monitored assets; Zi  are the vulnerabilities 
of assets taken under account, i = 1,2, ..., n;  F is the loss function; Pi  is the occurrence 
probability of i-th asset damage – conditional probability; O is the vulnerability of 
safeguard measures; S  is the size of followed territory / facility; t is the time that is 
measured from the origin of harmful phenomenon in facility; T  is the time for which 
losses arise; and    is the return period for the given disaster. 
Because the loss function F form is not known, we use for determination of total risk 
(i.e. the integral risk) the scheme given in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Flowchart for determining the risks for the strategic management of safety; A 
– assets and Z losses, damages and harms to the assets; Description: 1-the human 
lives and health, 2- human security, 3 - property, 4 - the public welfare, 5 - the 
environment, 6 -  infrastructures and technologies, P – private. 
 
Onward, the problem is complicated by reality that the world is in dynamic 
development, i.e. both, the entity conditions and the risk sources are changing in time. 
Moreover, there is necessary to respect that the risk and safety are not complementary 
quantities – it holds that the risk reduction leads to safety increase but at the same risk 
value the safety can increase if humans perform special measures or at their behaviour 
use special manners following from correct safety culture.     
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Owing to differences in individual disasters nature, the countermeasures for assets´ 
protection being effective to one disaster, are not effective to another and even can 
increase vulnerability some of them; i.e. the countermeasures effectiveness depends 
on real entity and its disaster -  see the rules given in Figure 8 in chapter 1.    
Therefore, at solution of practical tasks connected with both, the entity safety and the 
entity risk, it is necessary to consider that risks are normal and for the entity safety 
it is necessary to apply not only the risk prevention measures and activities 
determined on the basis of correct intent and correct data and methods, but also: the 
safety culture by which the human behaviour in the entity and its vicinity is targeted 
to safety; and the tools that reduced losses and damages if some important disasters 
occur. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare the qualified response for important risks 
realizations, such as: the risk management plans for both, the entity and the entity 
vicinity for all relevant risks; the continuity plans for survive of important complex 
technological objects and facilities; and the operational crisis plans for both, the 
complex technological objects and facilities and their vicinities. 
3. Process model for work with risks is shown in Figure 5 in chapter 1.  
4. The risk management is the complex process that needs knowledge, experiences and 
skill from many fields. In detail, it is described in Figures 6 and 7 that are given in 
chapter 1.  It is necessary to perceive the fundamental separation of tasks among the 
professionals (Risk determination), the decisive sphere (Decision Making) and the 
executive sector, i.e. engineers, technical workers and first responders (Risk Control 
and Mitigation) and also role of public. If decisive sphere does not respect the public 
interest correctly or if it has not enough knowledge or sources, the organizational 
accidents occur earlier or later. 
5. The risk management is targeted to building the safe world. For this we perform the 
measures and activities during the prevention, preparedness, response and renovation, 
Figure 2.  
 
Fig. 2. Time sequence of phases in which the measures and activities for defending 
the risks are performed.  
 
6. From the viewpoint of ensuring the human needs, namely including the human 
survival at critical situations, the four phases of each entity investigation are 
important:  
- in-depth knowledge of entity (protected assets, possible disasters, vulnerabilities), 
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- determination of risks, determination of concept of optimising the measures and 
activities in entity for getting over the expected risks, 
- determination of weaknesses in management and trade-off with risks and in 
determination of measures of response and responsibilities for case of occurrence 
of great damages, losses and harms on protected assets, e.g. caused by lack of 
finances, knowledge, technology etc.; at least it is necessary to process the risk 
management plans for important risks, 
- constitution of capability and preparedness to ensure the survival of humans and 
critical technologies at critical situations (crisis plans, continuity plans). 
7. Present knowledge shows that it is not enough to manage the risks of individual 
disasters but it is necessary to understand and to manage the processes that product 
the disasters. Due to dynamic world development, the processes originating the 
disasters also change, and therefore, the attention to them is logical. Safety 
management concept formed at certain time on the basis of integral risk is not 
sufficient and it is necessary continually to adapt it to changes that are caused by 
internal and external processes by help of proactive targeted integral risk 
management. 
8. The aim of all processes for risk management is the safe world. This management 
type is called the safety management. Its process model is in Figure 3. The safety is a 
set of anthropogenic measures and activities, which lead to ensure the followed entity 
security and development. Since the world is dynamically changing, so the 
management of safety of critical installations is focused on priorities. In the first place, 
it means the application of All Hazard Approach [7], determining the hazards posed 
by individual disasters, and according to the assessment of size of threat from real 
disasters and vulnerabilities of a site and of critical installations against real disaster 
the separation of disasters into the following groups: the disasters, which cannot have 
impacts on critical facility; disasters that have only an acceptable impacts on critical 
facility, for which we use the designation “relevant disaster”; disasters that have on a 
critical facility only impacts that are manageable at origin by prepared prevention and 
mitigation measures, for which we use the designation “specific disaster”; and 
disasters that have an unacceptable impacts on the critical facility and, therefore, it is 
necessary to carry out essential preventive measures in the field of technical, 
organizational, legal and educational and it is necessary to have the possibility to 
activate all of the resources and the means to cope with their impact and jump-start 
further development, for which we use the designation “critical disaster”. The last 
mentioned disasters have the potential to cause extreme emergency situations and for 
their defeat it is necessary to use the tools for crisis management. To achieve the 
desired level of safety it is necessary well to manage and properly to decide. Good 
management and good decision making is possible only when we have relevant data 
and when we use relevant tools. The term “relevant data” means: to be correct (it is 
known their size and accuracy); to have explanatory power for the problem (i.e. to be 
validated). The data files need to be representative (i.e.: complete; contain the correct 
particulars; have a sufficient number of particulars; the particulars need to be spread 
homogeneously throughout the reference period and need to be validated. In the 
application of models, random and epistemic uncertainties in the data need to be 
properly considered.  
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Fig. 3. Process model for ensuring the security and development.  
 
9. Present advanced management of socio-technological entities is based on the 
processes management; details are in Annex.  Model for entity safety management in 
time 5 is shown in Figure 4. It is necessary to coordinate six processes: 1 - concepts 
and management; 2 - administrative procedures; 3 - technical matters; 4 - external 
cooperation; 5 - emergency preparedness; and 6 - documentation and the investigation of 
accidents. The main processes are further divided into sub processes:  
i. The first process consists of sub processes for: the overall concept; achieving the 
intermediate objectives of safety; leadership / management of safety; the safety 
management system; personnel staff including the sections for: human resources 
management, training and education, internal communication / awareness and 
working environment; review and evaluation of the implementation of fulfilment of 
objectives in the safety.  
ii. The second process consists of sub processes for: identify of hazards from potential 
disasters and risk assessment; documentation of procedures (including work permits); 
management of change; safety in conjunction with contractors; and supervision of 
product safety.  
iii. The third process includes the sub processes for: research and development; design 
and mountings; inherently safer processes; technical standards; storage of hazardous 
substances; and maintenance of integrity and maintenance of equipment and 
buildings.  
iv. The fourth process includes the sub processes for: cooperation with the administrative 
authorities; cooperation with the public and other stakeholders (including the 
academic institutions); and cooperation with other facilities.  
v. The fifth process includes the sub processes for: planning of internal (on-site) 
preparedness; facilitate the planning of external (off-site) preparedness (for which it 
corresponds the public administration); and the coordination of the activities of the 
departmental (resort) facilities at ensuring the departmental emergency preparedness 
and at response.  
vi. The sixth process has sub processes for: processing of reports on disasters, accidents, 
near misses and other learned experience; investigation of damages, losses and harms 
and their causes; and the response and follow-up activities after disasters (including 
lessons learned and information sharing).  
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Fig. 4. Model of management of critical complex facility safety; black block – 
concept for specification of important processes of critical complex facility; dotted 
line – feedback 1; broken line – feedback 2; dashed line – feedback 3; full line – 
feedback 4 
 
Coordination of processes is targeted at ensuring the safe complex facilities under the 
conditions of normal, abnormal and critical (Figure 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Concept of entity safety and its main parts. 
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10. Only at known and frequent disasters the risk level perceived by humans is near to 
real risk level. At infrequent and low known disasters the humans perceive the risk 
level as shadowy and remote. Perception of risk is also influenced by further factors 
– e.g. at activities that we perform voluntarily (mountaineering, ski jumping etc.) we 
consider the insignificant level of risk. The risk acceptability is the result of 
comparison of several types of acceptability – technical acceptability (reliability and 
complexness of technologies, machines and devices), economic acceptability (costs) 
and socio-political   acceptability (general risk perception).  
Generally, it is possible to say that acceptable risk is determined on social and 
knowledge base, and that the social, economic and political factors are considered 
during the risk level determination. It also means that level of acceptable risk is not 
same for all countries.  
Because the required level of safety is possible also to reach by special education, 
installation of warning systems, it holds that acceptable risk level is not safe risk level 
at which the probable losses and damages are negligible.  
11. According to the theorization of present philosophers the risks have in society the 
objective and subjective features, and moreover there are not out of culture and value 
connections (in this direction they are not pure scientific problem and they need to be 
considered also from viewpoint of civic involvement). Even, if the modern society 
enforces the indolent strategy of insurance and reimbursement, it is not possible to 
rely on it fully because some risks can affect the core of social system, which it is 
truth for some security risks.  
Against scientism of security politics nothing can be say to the extent that we prove 
to be reflexive, which means to reveal consequences of individual activities and we 
do not yield to illusion on opportunity of perfect solution.  Reliance on experts (and 
institutions) can induce the reduction of capability to participate actively on solution 
and to finish the separation of private and public (which manifests as inherent risk on 
which the expert opinion fails).  According to professional concept all participants 
(i.e. all interest groups) have duties and responsibilities at trade-off with risks. 
From this reason the humans need to have possibility to participate in decision-
making, to manifest their needs and opinions, namely without fear from punishment. 
It is necessary to involve many humans (in spite of great costs in the process 
beginning) and to try accomplishment of consensus.    
Problem comes in professional matters in which the ground documents are based on 
evaluations that are complicated and for current humans non-understandable. The 
decision-making in these cases is often influenced by the lobbies of various groups 
that strive on commission.  
From this reason it is necessary so that: all evaluation procedures need to be lean on 
legislative; the selection criteria need to be directed to publicly aims and need to be 
transparent at decision with regard to dispositional sources, forces and means of 
public administration. In practice we use risks of several types: partial if we consider 
one asset; integrated if we consider several assets and the total risk is the aggregation 
of individual assets risks; and integral (systemic) if we consider more assets and total 
risk includes also indirect impacts on assets that are caused by linkages and couplings 
in system.  
12. The assignation of real work with risks in good governance is given to person or 
organisational part that is well prepared for such work. This approach is possible only 
in organization with qualified process management in which activities and measures 
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are applied on knowledge base, namely matter-of-fact and from management domain 
(i.e. the activities are mutually interconnected, no errors in communication, each 
participant knows what to do and how to do).  
Because, it does not exist the general consensus on formulation of problems of 
sustainability of welfare of human society in context with system utilities, each problem 
solution is provisional, because it continually balances among the rival interests and 
society goals (if they are stipulated). It is difficult to give explicit decision on problem 
owing to the alternating decision process character [3]. During the decision, the following 
dilemmas are solved: relation between risks and profits (often greater benefit for human 
means greater risk for ecosystem); time conflict between needs of present and future 
generations; and social conflict (relation of needs of individuals and the society). It is 
difficult to solve inverse problems owing to the systems´ complexness. If some symptoms 
connected with risks are stipulated and sorted out, the new symptoms will emerge. From 
this it follows that the real approach to sustainability management by help of risk 
management needs to be iterative, interactive and adaptive [3, 4].  
The aim of complex management is to ensure at each situation the protection of human 
lives and security, property, environment, infrastructures and technologies that are 
necessary for human survival. It means always to ensure: 
- the mobilisation and co-ordination of all national sources (energy, labour force, 
production capacity, food and agriculture, resources, telecommunications etc.),  
- the co-ordination of such activities as notification system, warning system, rescue system 
and first responders´ system, which reduce the disasters’ impacts and supporting the state 
administration activities and adherence of legal rules.  
The planning types that form fundamental methodical tools of individual mutually 
interconnected management types need to create the base in which all given aims are 
embedded [4, 5]. 
For reaching the human society aims, i.e. security and sustainable development, the 
mutual combination of measures and activities is necessary at vulnerabilities´ reduction, 
resiliencies upgrade and adaptation capability; all public assets in detail and in complex 
need to be respected. The present tool based on knowledge and experiences means to 
apply on all management levels to implement the proactive safety management system 
based on work with risk respecting above mentioned knowledge; especially: All-Hazard-
Approach, Defence-In-Depth strategy, interdependences, time and space variability [3-
5].  
 
3.2. Categories of causes of risk management failures 
 
From the critical analysis of emergency up to critical situations in human system, in 
detail described in [10], it follows that: 
- the cause of critical situations are the organisational accidents that are connected with 
a human factor; especially with the phenomena as corruption; abuse of power; 
suppress of the public interest; low respect to knowledge and engineering experiences; 
and low professional level of management, 
- the organisational accident consequences are: government default; technologies 
failures; infrastructure failures; research failure; social system failure; decay of human 
society into intolerant groups; increasing number of impoverished people – seniors, 
dossiers, jobless – problem young people who are out of work and without education; 
disturbances of daily civil protection human needs; disturbance of daily civil 
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protection, human security and public welfare; disuse of technology, space 
militarization.  
From this reason we pay the attention to these phenomena that cause the disturbance of 
social relations, public welfare and human security [10] – Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Phenomena that cause the disturbance of social relations, public welfare and 
human security. 
 
Domain Defects leading to critical situations 
Top governance The domain management: is predetermined to political and military 
aspects; is short of human dimension and gives low support to the EU 
inhabitants;  does not governed on the basis of qualified data processed 
by qualified methods; is often determined by fixed ideas without real 
assessment of their realisation; is based on image that all is stationary 
and it does not respect dynamic development of world that means to 
prepare possible extreme scenarios and measures for human’s survival; 
and is not realised on the principle “Safety management system for 
system of systems”. 
Technical domain In domain: no standards and norms for underground and high-rise 
buildings with regard to human security and public welfare; missing 
essential services provided to the citizens; scenarios for decision-
making are prepared only by simulation without verification with use 
of real data – sometimes scenarios used were derived for different 
conditions, i.e. conditions of technology transfer were not fulfilled; no 
norms and standards for interoperability; no standards and norms for 
co-operation of diverse systems; no co-ordinated emergency plans on 
all levels (EU-wide to regional) – all must be on professional level 
respecting knowledge and experiences, continuity and contingency 
plans. 
Organisational 
domain  
In domain:  missing the effort directed to reduction of weakness (low 
number of resources, contamination of environment, work price, 
unemployment) and to use of strength (qualified technician 
population); no effective tool against to corruption, power disuse, 
lobbying etc.;  missing the support of co-operation on mutual partner 
principle;  missing base for mutual understanding and mutual co-
existence; no effective international teams of first responders; no base 
for close co-operation of first responders; no norms and standards for 
interoperability.  
Knowledge  domain In knowledge base used for decision-making: missing systematic 
respect to present world nature – dynamic open system of systems; low 
effort directed to collection of qualified data on disasters and on lesson 
learned from responses to extreme disasters; underestimation of 
disasters at disasters´ management; neglecting the creeping disasters as 
ground water stores, contamination of human food chain etc.; no 
qualified disasters´ scenarios for decision making. 
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4. Methods used for determination of super processes for risk management in  
    dynamically variable world 
 
The outputs of our task are created by application of methods as: the critical analysis 
and critical evaluation of knowledge that is gathered in professional publications and 
summarized in foregoing section; consideration of experiences from everyday life; logical 
interconnection  of knowledge; classification of obtained facts; synthesis of obtained 
facts; application of methods of creative thinking and expert judgement (panel discussion, 
brainstorming, Delphi method, criticality assessment etc.) on data as:   
- risk nature and features, 
- risk scenarios change in time and space, 
- risk management change in time and space; special attention is paid to management 
failures, 
- trade-off with risks change in time and space; special attention is paid to failures 
caused by incorrect or insufficient measures. 
 At individual investigations the analytical and heuristic methods [15, 16] are used.  
The results from own direct research are based on: systematic investigation and 
evaluation of disasters and accidents in technological objects and facilities; judgement of 
impacts of real accidents on technological objects and facilities; simulations performed 
by the risk engineering methods (What, If and Fishbone [16]); and performed professional 
inspections in real technological objects and facilities.  
The aim of inspections was the determination of main deficiencies in complex technological 
facilities. For this aim it was used the special checklist, which was compiled according to the 
technique described in [5]. Its form for i-th disaster is shown in Table 2. All mentioned data 
were critically considered and synthetized according to the principles of strategic process 
models [3-5, 14], i.e. by help of procedure that is in agreement with procedure described 
in famous works as [17-22].   
 
Table 2. Identification of deficiencies for i-th specific disaster, i.e. disaster that can have 
important impacts on entity and its vicinity, i = 1, 2, ..., n, i.e. assessment of criticality 
rate of viewpoint of application of All-Hazard-Approach and Defence-In-Depth. Safety 
rate = 1 – criticality rate [5]. For assessment of criticality it was used the value scale 0-5 
[5] was used (0-negligible, 1-low, 2-middle,3-high,4-very high,5-extremely high) and the 
median of values determined by inspection members (usually 5-7). 
 
 Question Assessment 
of 
criticality 
Reasons  
of 
criticality 
i 1. Has the technological object or facility to incorporate 
the principles of inherent safety, i.e. safe design? 
  
 2. Has the control system of a technological facility 
(SMS) set the basic control functions, alarms and the 
response of the operator set up so that the 
technological facility in normal (steady) state? 
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3. Has management system (SMS) instrumentation 
(built-in safety instructions) and relevant physical 
barriers, which at derogate from the normal state to 
keep technological system in a good condition, i.e. 
they prevent the occurrence of unwanted 
phenomenon?  
The operation is successful, when, after the 
occurrence of the abnormal state the technological 
facility will return to normal as a result of resilience or 
after the application of corrective measures (clean-up, 
repair, replacement of parts). 
  
4. Has management system (SMS) for the case of loss of 
control, i.e. critical conditions measures for 
emergency response that mitigate impacts on 
technological facility system and ensure the capability 
to return to a normal state?  
Operation of a technological object is successful, if it 
is a good continuity plan  ensuring that the 
technological facility shall ensure all the necessary 
tasks. 
  
5. Does management system (SMS) for the case of loss 
of control, i.e. supercritical (beyond design, extreme) 
conditions the measures for: 
- maintaining the operability of the technological 
system following its repair and maintenance, 
- and measures to ensure the protection of public 
assets (people, the environment and other assets) in 
the surroundings of technological facility? 
  
 
 
5.  Advanced principles of risk management and risk engineering 
 
With regard to knowledge [3, 4, and 23] the present possibilities of human society for 
dealing with risk are: 
- part of risk is reduced, i.e. by preventive measures the risk realisation is averted in 
advance, 
- part of risk is mitigated, i.e. by purpose-built measures, activities and by preparedness 
(warning systems and another measures of emergency and crisis management - 
response personnel, response systems, material, technical and finance reserves) at 
response to risk realization reduce the impacts or avert the unacceptable impacts, 
- part of risk is re-insured, i.e. the insurance ensures the cover of possible loses and damages, 
- part of risk for which there are prepared procedures and resources for response and 
renovation; i.e. the reactive measures and activities ensure the human survival, the 
territory protection, the situation stabilization and the renovation, 
- part of risk for which there is prepared contingency plan; i.e. the reactive measures 
for suppress of critical unforeseeable situation (contingency plan) for case if non-
controllable or too costly or low frequent risks occur.      
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To this it is joined the distribution of risk defeating among all stakeholders [3]. The 
distribution in good governance is performed according to rule that all stakeholders have 
responsibility for the risk defeat and that the defeat of a real risk is assigned to a subject 
the preparedness of whom is the best. 
The key concepts of present engineering directed to human safety derived in [16] are 
the following: 
1. The approaches are based on risk – the work intensity and documentation is adequate 
to risk level. 
2. The professional approach is based on reality that only the critical attributes of quality 
and the critical parameters of process are considered. 
3. The problem solution is oriented to critical items – the critical aspects of technical 
systems ensuring the consistence of system operations are followed and managed. 
4. Verified quality parameters are included in the project proposal. 
5. The accent on quality engineering procedures – it needs to be proved the accuracy of 
selected procedures under given conditions. 
6. The aim of a safety upgrade – permanent improving the processes with a use of 
analysis of the root causes of malfunctions and failures. 
For respecting these items there should be used relevant data sets and only verified 
methods that provide outputs with a designated testified competence. Because in the 
group of cases there is not well coped with vagueness in data, in practice there are used 
the procedures designated as good practice procedures / good engineering practice 
procedures. Modus operandi procedures in individual domains go on that on the basis of 
experience lead to a good result. The given procedure is used in cases in which there was 
not approved any unified procedure. It is often used at measurements in laboratories, 
negotiation with humans etc. 
Owing to a lot of factors, including the human factor, influencing the problem solving 
at real conditions exist; and these factors are not only random but also epistemic, the 
measures, activities and procedures denoted as good engineering practice are typical for 
engineering disciplines. 
Good engineering practice (good engineering procedure) is then defined as a set of 
engineering methods and standards that are used during the life cycle of technical system 
with the aim of reaching the appropriate and cost- efficient solution. It is supported by fit 
documentation (conceptual documentation, diagrams, charts, manuals, testing reports 
etc.). 
In a given context the engineering expertise is the expression of the capability to:  
- apply the knowledge of mathematics, science and engineering, 
- propose and realize experiments, 
- analyse and interpret data, 
- propose components or the whole system according to requirements and under the 
frame of realistic limitations identify, formulate and solve engineering problems, 
- ensure the effective communication, 
- comprehend the impacts of engineering solutions in a broader context, 
- use the advanced tools and methods in engineering practice, 
- adhere professional and operational responsibilities and ethics, 
- lead the interdisciplinary team.   
Most of the demands give above is directed to correct the human factor negative 
manifestation.  
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From given facts it follows that all considered engineering types are multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary disciplines, and therefore, they use very various methods, tools and 
techniques because the safety management targets cannot be reached only technically and  
or by mastery, but the methods, tools and techniques respecting the data logic, 
technological, financial, managerial and decision-making needs to be used, because their 
integral part is the decision-making over technical problems, human factor, costs and time 
planning. 
The special attention of advanced risk management and risk engineering targeted to 
the human safety is targeted to the technological objects and networks that are in principle 
the socio-technological systems. According to  knowledge concentrated in 5  it is 
necessary to   use the following principles:  
- the risk is followed and considered during the given system whole life cycle, i.e. at 
sitting, designing, building, operation and putting out of operation, and eventually at 
territory bringing in original condition,  
- the risk determination is directed to user’s demands and to the level of provided 
services, 
- the risk is determined according to the criticality of impacts on facility processes, 
provided services and on assets that are determined by public interest, 
- the unacceptable risks are mitigated by tools according to technical and organisational 
proposals, by standardisation of operating procedures or by automatable check-up.    
The advanced risk engineering directed to human system safety respects the co-
existence of systems with different nature (SoS), and so fulfils present demands of 
humans [3]. To prepare groundwork it is necessary to combine analytical methods with 
expert judgement by which we remove vagueness in data. The problems that we need to 
solve in this consequence consist in acquisition of knowledge and in assignment “who is 
expert”; the last mentioned problem was broadly discussed in world conference 
ESREL2011 23. For the first problem solution we need systematically to monitor 
human system and obtained data process by qualified methods 14.     
 
6. Super processes for management of risks in dynamically variable world 
 
It needs to be noted that in the real world we work at ensuring the safety of critical 
facilities with the non-trivial problems, i.e.: several protected assets, the objectives of 
which are sometimes conflicting. The assets vary in time and space; and the human 
system, in which the assets are, is in dynamic development. 
 
6.1. Design of super processes  
 
As above said, for ensuring the entity safety, the priority risks need to be considered. 
The negotiation with risks comes out from the present possibilities of human society and 
it consists is separation of trade-off with risks into several parts containing the measures 
and activities for given risk part control. The measures and activities of individual parts 
differ in time application. Their goals are mentioned in section 5.  
As it was said above, the present knowledge shows that due to dynamic world 
development it is not sufficed to control the risks connected with individual disasters, but 
it is necessary to manage the processes that produce the disasters (the scientists have been 
trying to do tis since 50s of last century – e.g. technical polygons round the faults with 
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which great earthquakes are connected - Kamchatka, Central Asia, California etc.). It 
means that the complex view is necessary. 
Taking into account the nature of world, i.e. many open mutually interconnected 
systems having the proper goals that end up in conflicts from time to time, it is logic that 
human reaction needs to be also the process that is controlled in space and time. On the 
basis of logical interface of knowledge and experiences from practice by help of strategic 
planning principles there are proposed two super processes for management of risks in 
time and space. The first one is for ensuring the safe territory and the other one for 
ensuring the safe technological objects or facility. These super processes ensure the 
continual control of risks. 
For ensuring the safe territory and safe public assets it is necessary to apply the super 
process that consists from five processes (Figure 6): 
1. The process for obtaining the sufficient knowledge on territory includes: 
determination of assets in territory; determination of territory parameters and assets 
characteristics in the extent of land-use planning documentation; and determination 
of list of disasters that affected the territory (the input list of disasters being under the 
term All-Hazard-Approach is in [10]). 
2. The process of risks assessments and risk controls  includes: the determination of 
hazards for all disasters that can have impacts on the given territory and their return 
periods; determination of vulnerable sites in territory and vulnerability of public assets 
with regard to determined sizes of hazards (ways of hazard determination are e.g. in 
[4, 5]); determination of design disasters (normative determined disaster size);  
determination of impacts of disasters on territory and assets (it is suitable to determine 
the normative impact scenarios for design disasters); determination of integral risks 
for all important disasters (i.e. to consider the both, the direct disaster impact on assets 
and the indirect disaster impacts on assets through the linkages and couplings among 
the assets); put the work with risks. 
3. Process of evaluation of quality of risk management and trade-off with risks includes: 
judgement of levels of effectiveness of prevention, preparedness, response and 
renovation with regard to integral risks connected with important disasters; 
determination of critical points in risk management and in trade-off with risks and 
determination of these points criticalities with regard to integrity and effectiveness of 
applied measures and activities and their control (i.e. it goes on the reveal of sources 
of possible organizational accidents); proposal of corrections for high critical points. 
4. Process of determination of safety management includes: determination of measures 
and activities for points with high criticalities and their implementation in the frame 
of short-term, middle-term and long-term realization plans, namely including the 
responsibilities for realization and sources for realizations; introduction of safety 
culture on the level of assets, assets´ management and on the territory safety 
management (from top management to individual citizens) [3, 5,14]; and 
determination of response procedures to emergency situations with demand that at 
each response to critical up to extreme situation there are  solved the human survival 
and the continuity of critical objects, facilities and infrastructures. 
5. Process of preservation and upgrade the safety includes: systematic formation of 
capability to perform early and effective response to critical situation, to ensure the 
renovation and continuity of services in territory; determination and implementation 
of strategic programme for safety increase in time including the monitoring the 
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effectiveness of processes for risk management and trade-off with risks; regular detail 
assessment of territory safety every 10 years; and immediate territory safety 
judgement after critical situation occurrence.   
 
Fig. 6.  Structure of super process for risk management and trade-off with risk for profit 
of safe territory and safe public assets. The numbers denote the feedbacks that need to be 
realised if problems occur. From the economy reasons the firstly the feedback 1 is applied, 
and only if it fails the feedback 2 etc. 
 
Because the dynamic development of world it is necessary to monitor the territory and to 
have prepared the procedures for correction of unfavourable situations. From economy 
reasons it is necessary firstly to use the cheapest procedure that feedback 1 in Figure 6 
shows; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge harms immediately it is used the 
feedback 4, which means the change of territory safety concept. In each case denoted by 
feedback some of adjusted processes change:  
- in case denoted by feedback 1, it is pursued the change of process of territory safety 
management (e.g. they are change the rules for territory safety management, the 
allocation of roles of participated persons, management priorities etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 2, it is pursued the change of process of evaluation of 
quality of risk management and trade-off with risks (e.g. they are changed the ways 
of risk control in territory, separation of tasks of trade-off with risks among the 
participated persons, priorities for risk management and trade-off with risks, 
allocation of means for measures leading to risk reduction – it does not only rely on 
response but more on prevention etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 3, it is pursued the change of process of evaluation of 
risk assessment (e.g. they are introduced the further criteria for risk assessment, the 
value scale is transformed, they are considered the contributions to integral risks from 
further linkages and couplings among the assets that were revealed as originators of 
huge damages, losses and harms on public assets etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 4, it is pursued the change of process of knowledge on 
territory (they are added and introduced into practice new findings, e.g. into the set of 
risk sources are added the further harmful phenomena that were revealed as the 
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sources of huge damages, losses and harms on public assets, the size of disasters 
criticalities changes, the size of assets´ vulnerabilities changes etc.).        
For ensuring the safe technological objects or facilities (or more precisely socio-
technological entity because each such entity was invented and set up by humans) that 
are located in real territory it is necessary to apply the super process that consists from 
four processes (Figure 7):   
 
Fig. 7. The structure of super process for risk management and trade-off with risks for 
profit of safe technological entity during its life cycle and its safe vicinity. The numbers 
denote the feedbacks that need to be realised if problems occur. From the economy 
reasons the firstly the feedback 1 is applied, and only if it fails the feedback 2 etc. 
 
1. Process of siting, designing, building and construction of technological entity 
(building, facility, network) includes: assemble of data on territory and its assets in 
which technological entity might be located in the extent of land-use planning 
documentation; assemble of data on disasters affecting the territory, their hazard sizes 
and their impacts character (the input list of disasters being under the term All-
Hazard-Approach is in [10]); determination and judgement of integral risk, and 
determination of vulnerability of the technological entity against to disasters affecting 
the territory and the estimation of integral risk increase after technological entity 
realization; entity siting, designing, building and constructions with regard to site 
risks, technology risks and human factor risks with the respecting the Defence-In-
Depth principle (in detail described in [5]) and the trade-off with risks connected with 
linkages and couplings between entity and its vicinity; and determination of way of 
technological entity safety management in time during the technological entity life 
cycle (documentation: preliminary safety report [5]). 
2. Process of preparation and start-up of permanent operation of technological entity 
(building, facility, network) includes: tests of functional capability of individual 
buildings, facilities and devices and elimination of revealed sources of technical and 
organizational risks; semi operation during which the risks connected with linkages 
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and couplings (realised by different flows realizing at operation) inside and outside 
the entity are traded-off; trial operation during which the risks connected with 
linkages and couplings (realised by different flows realizing at operation) inside and 
outside the entity are traded-off; realization of proposal of safety management of 
technological entity (processing the preoperational safety report and proposal of  
operational safety report [5]); and start-up of permanent operation. 
3. Process of safe operation of technological entity (building, facility, network) during 
the life cycle includes:  installation of operating procedures for normal, abnormal and 
critical conditions, safety culture, risk monitoring process; programme for upgrade of 
safety in time and procedures for continuity plan realization at critical conditions 
(operational safety report [5]); adjustment of optimal maintenance of buildings, 
facilities and devices; establishment of regular inspections of buildings, facilities and 
devices and rules for implementation of early repair of detected defects on buildings, 
facilities and devices, especially those important from safety reasons; modernization 
of buildings, facilities and devices; regular audits of safety of technological entity and 
its impacts on vicinity, which including the judgement of safety culture level, and 
realization of measures for getting over the detected important risks and for removing 
the sources of organizational accidents; and early response to critical situations and 
ensuring the continuity of technological entity operation after repair  [5]. 
4. Process of close of technological entity (building, facility, network) from operation 
and recovery of territory for new use includes: determination of sources and 
responsibilities for measures and activities that are necessary for remove the entity 
(building, facility, and network) and decontamination works; remove of buildings, 
facilities and networks from the territory; performance of decontamination of 
territory. It goes on the process on which it is often   forgotten in practice as the 
brownfields show, and therefore, it needs to be followed during the whole 
technological entity life cycle.  
Because the dynamic development of world it is necessary to monitor the technological 
entity and to have prepared the procedures for correction of unfavourable situations. It is 
also necessary to consider that each technological entity has limited life cycle, and 
therefore, for preservation of conditions for human security and development it is 
necessary to forestall to depreciation of territory. From this reasons there need to be 
prepared procedures and corrections in each technological entity for averting the 
unfavourable situation.  From economy reasons it is necessary firstly to use the cheapest 
procedure that feedback 1 in Figure 7 shows; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at 
huge harms immediately it is used the feedback 3 that means the change of safety concept. 
In each case denoted by feedback some of adjusted processes change:  
- in case denoted by feedback 1, it is pursued the change of technological entity safety 
management process (e.g. they change demands of public administration on operation 
of technological entity, rules for technological entity safety management, priorities in 
technological entity safety management – Figure 8 shows that often it is necessary to 
solve conflicts between security of public assets and the number of products, etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 2, it is pursued the change of process of preparation and 
start-up of permanent operation of technological entity (e.g. they change ways of 
revealed risk management and trade-off with revealed risks and further trial operation 
is performed, allocations of trade-off with risks among participants, priorities in risk 
management and in trade-off with risks, allocation of means for  
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Fig. 8. Basic conflict in the management of technological entities from safety reasons 
(details in 5). 
 
measures leading to risk reduction - it does not only rely on response and more means 
is given for prevention etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 3, it is pursued the change of process siting, designing, 
building and construction of technological entity (e.g. they are considered further 
sources of risks, introduced further criteria for risk assessment, changed the value 
scale, considered the further contributions to integral risk from linkages and couplings 
among the assets that were revealed as sources of great losses, damages and harms on 
public assets etc.).  
Due to dynamic world development it is necessary regularly to evaluate in each territory 
the co-existence of territory and all technological entities located in it, because it is 
necessary to preserve the conditions in territory that enable the safe life of future human 
generations. At finding the significant problems it is necessary to find sources, forces and 
means for removing the important impacts on future territory conditions and future 
generations. It is necessary to determine the measures, sources for their realizations and 
responsibilities for their implementation, in the frame of public interest it is necessary to 
use all resources for performance of remedy in acceptable time horizon.  
 
6.2. Deficits that reduce the effectiveness of super processes 
 
The interface of processes for works with risks during the time, in individual parts of 
super processes is logical and today has support in many legal rules, norms and standards. 
The present problem is that it is not required the logical interface of different sectors that 
is very exigent. It needs the co-operation of specialists from many fields, which needs the 
common terms, mutual understanding, common effort at finding the consensus etc. that 
are missing. This reality confirms the results obtained for: 
- energy infrastructure in [24, 25], 
- drinking water infrastructure in [26, 27],   
- transport infrastructures (road, rail, subway, air) in [28-36], 
- communication, information and cyber infrastructure in [37-39], 
- finance infrastructure in [40], 
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- supply chain infrastructure in [41-43], 
- emergency services infrastructure in [44], 
- public administration management in [45, 46] 
and other studies that are in many other publications, which are in the CVUT archives 
[9]. The same shows the deficits given in Table 1. These facts reveal big deficiencies in 
work with the risk, namely in details and in whole processes. 
The results of accidents investigation and inspections that were performed in twelve 
complex facilities: bulk power station; metro station; important central bus station; air control 
operation facility, airport; waterworks facility; big chemical plant; hazardous material storage 
facility; important highway bridge; important road tunnel; important artificial lake; and nuclear 
power plant [9, 47] revealed the main causes of organizational accidents in domains, e.g.:  
- old style of entity management concept, 
- old style of entity safety management (omission of system structure, human resources 
qualification, low safety culture), 
- omission of some disasters, too simple risk assessment, low level of safety 
documentation in investigated technological object or facility operation control, 
- insufficient control of individual processes and sub-processes, 
- insufficient technical standards and norms, 
- low level of cooperation among sectors in entity (e.g. delay and errors in information 
transfer at important facts), among other entities including the public administration, 
- missing or low level plans for on-site and off-site preparedness, 
- no documentation on near misses and on investigation of damages, losses and harms and 
their causes and on the response and follow-up activities after disasters (including lessons 
learned and information sharing).  
With regard to results given above the super processes´ correct applications are good 
prevention of organization accidents. However, it is clear that the super processes 
application fulfils the expected targets only if all processes on lower hierarchical levels 
will be correctly applied and will be meaningfully interconnected and co-ordinated. It is 
necessary to note that problems connected with good application of both super processes, 
inhere in reality that neither present professional education nor present legislation do not 
require the connectivity of actions and measures that are important for success of super 
processes. The next problem is that partial processes contain sub-processes that are not 
interfaced in reality or their interconnections are insufficient as shown results of accidents 
investigation, failures of networks and conclusions from inspections of safety 
documentations mentioned above.  
From above mentioned reasons it is necessary to introduce in education the branch of 
knowledge on management of hierarchically interconnected processes in vertical and 
horizontal structure and to prescribe the mandatory discussion of specialists responsible 
for management of individual sections from the level of sub-processes, over processes up 
to sub-processes, namely with participation of public administration and general public. 
The discussion needs to follow the public interest and to be performed by the suitable 
method of risk engineering on several professional levels (according to participants´ 
knowledge); the method needs to ensure the fair-mindedness and correctness; for 
professional discussion the more stages Delphi method [16] is suitable, according to 
experience the panel discussion [16] is unsuitable because at its use the special interest 
groups (lobby) can have chance.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
Because the ideal of today’s world designated as  “the safe community” can be, 
according to the current knowledge, reached only by ensuring the human system integral 
safety, it is necessary not to be afraid of new conceptions and new objectives and to start 
constructing the complex system safety management in the communities and other 
entities concentrated on all the known disasters including the corruption and other 
phenomena belonging to organizational accident category which is ready to transform if 
there is the occurrence of new risks along with a mutual respect of coexistence of various 
systems. As always, the problem is in humans, i.e. how to force them, so they may 
consider the public interest, mutual help and similar values as the top value of individuals. 
It is necessary to pay attention to safety culture which means that humans in all their 
roles (manager, employee, citizen or the victim of a disaster) keep the safety principles, 
i.e. they behave in a way that they don’t cause a realization of possible risks and when 
they become the participants of risk realization they need to contribute to the effective 
response, stabilisation of the assets and their renovation and to initiating of their further 
development. It is true that the complex of attitudes, speculations, norms and values 
existing in the community which is the reflection of a way of how the community is 
managed, i.e. these are the general principles of dividing of the power and responsibility, 
the managing principles and a certain relation between the stress on a work results, 
authority, human care, keeping the safety principles and ensuring the function of the 
community. 
The effective culture of safety is the basic element for the safety management. It 
reflexes the safety conception and originates from the values, attitudes and actions of the 
head managers of a community and from their communication with all the involved. It is 
an obvious obligation to actively participate on the solution of the safety questions and to 
promote among the others involved keeping of the authorized legal directives, standards 
and norms. The rules of safety culture must be elaborated into all the actions of a 
community. Their basis isn’t the concentration on the delinquents’/mistakes originators’ 
punishment but on the lesson from the mistakes and on instituting the corrective measures 
so that the mistakes couldn’t be repeated or so that the rate of their occurrence was 
reduced. 
On the basis of present knowledge, the world needs to be understood as the open 
system of systems and for security and development of humans the human communities 
(villages, municipalities, regions, states, association of states etc.) need to work well with 
risks. The work with risks targeted to human security and development is necessary to 
realize by super processes that are defined above. These super processes´ correct 
applications are good prevention of organization accidents. 
Due to world variability in space and time there is necessary regularly to evaluate the 
conditions of co-existence of territory and all technological entities located in it from the 
viewpoint of human safety. Interconnection and co-ordination of super processes has not 
capability to ensure permanent territory safety and human safety, but it at least reduces 
the number of sources of organizational accidents by which it reduces the costs of human 
society on elimination of damages caused by technological accidents and infrastructure 
failures. For ensuring the correct interface and co-ordination on individual hierarchical 
levels, there is necessary to develop knowledge on knowledge uncertainties that are 
sources of risks that suddenly emerge, which of course influences the effectiveness of 
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super processes, and causes unpleasant surprises to humans in the form of extreme 
disasters occurrence.  
 
Annex 
 
On the basis of present knowledge, the technological (correctly socio-technological) 
facilities and infrastructures are open systems of systems, i.e. the sets of mutually 
interconnected open systems [3]. Each of these systems is made up from elements and 
interconnections among elements; the interconnections are set up by linkages among 
elements and by flows of different nature (material, energy, information, finance etc.) 
among elements.  
The human, as a system developer, ensures that socio-technological system fulfils 
given tasks (it produces commodities or it furnishes a service) by using the logical 
linkages and the couplings set up by flows. Apart from the required interconnections, 
there can occur under certain circumstances the unacceptable interconnections, which 
lead to a lesser or higher damage of system. Such system damages cause that the system 
does not fulfil tasks and furthermore it endangers itself and its vicinity. Therefore, at 
present the technological facilities and infrastructures are made up as secured or safe 
systems.  
On the basis of work [3], the safe system is constructed as the system that is ensured 
against all internal and external disasters including the human factor, i.e. to all harmful 
events and so that at its critical conditions it may not endanger itself and its vicinity (i.e. 
the place in which people live). It means that the safety is the system property, which is 
put above the system dependability. Therefore, the parameters which determine the 
system quality are arranged into the following order: 
- safety, i.e. the system capability to precede the critical system conditions (active 
safety uses the elements of control; passive safety uses the elements of protection) 
and even at its critical conditions does not endanger its vicinity, 
- dependability, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions under the 
given conditions in the given quality and in the given time interval, 
- availability, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions at the 
occurrence of process that uses the given function, 
- integrity, i.e. the system capability to provide the time correct and valid report on 
system faults, 
- continuity, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions without 
disruption at the process initiation,  
- accuracy, i.e. the system capability to ensure the required system behaviour in the 
required range. 
At the complex socio-technological systems that have the form “systems of systems” 
the other parameter of quality is supplemented, namely the interoperability as the 
interconnected systems capability to carry out the required tasks in required quality 
correctly and in-time in a given place and time.  
As was said above, the safety is a set of measures, which are performed by human with 
goal to ensure the safe system, i.e. also the system security and human security in 
dynamically variable conditions of present world [3]. Origination and operation of the 
safe system is substantially more exigent on knowledge, sources, forces and means, and 
therefore, in current practice the secured systems are mostly used. If needed, these secured 
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systems are replenished by the organizational measures, which ensure the protection of 
public assets, when these systems endanger themselves and their vicinity [3, 48].  
The secured system is understood as the system that is secured against all internal and 
external disasters including the human factor, i.e. to all harmful phenomena. In 
comparison with the safe system, the secured system can endanger itself and its vicinity 
under its critical conditions. With regard to human security, it can only be operated under 
certain conditions – so called limits and conditions [3]. 
As it is mentioned above, the secured systems involve commonly used technological 
systems, which can damage themselves and their vicinities under certain conditions. From 
this reason we follow their special property, i.e. the criticality. This quantity is 
consistently related to size of impacts of function losses of system or system of systems 
targeted to fulfilment of certain goals for society [3]. According to this work, the 
determination of criticality in the territory of serviceability goes out from: the possible 
disasters´ hazard analyses; consideration of territory and system vulnerabilities; and from 
consideration of mutual interconnections among partial systems in the territory, i.e. 
vulnerabilities of whole system of systems. At criticality determination they are 
considered the following assets: public; technological system; territory; and the State, and 
the following questions: 
1. How does the facility or infrastructure react to certain types of disasters?  
2. How is the facility or infrastructure robust, resilient and rubbery? 
3. How the behaviour of facility or infrastructure can be improved? 
4. What management mechanisms in the sense of control are suitable? 
5. What rules can be used for the self-regulatory or tolerable deflections? 
6. Which parts of facility or infrastructure are critical? 
For ensuring the safety, including the functionality, dependability and stability of 
facility or infrastructure, it is necessary to know certain threshold – the criticality, which 
determines the conditions at which the system of systems focused on certain targets´ 
fulfilment, does not ensure expected functions in a required time, in a required site, and 
in a required quality. Therefore, with regard to results of analyses of: important and 
dangerous faults and failures; losses and damages caused by system malfunctions; 
external disasters´ impacts; failures of mitigating measures; reactions of substances in a 
given facility; leakage or discharge of substances (pipelines) etc., the limits and 
conditions of facility or infrastructure are determined [3, 48]. 
Limits and conditions are tools for safety management of these technological facilities. 
Their observance ensures the safe operation of technological facility. They are the set of 
positively defined conditions, for which it is proven that the technological facility 
operation is safe. The appropriated set includes data on permissible parameters, 
requirements on operation capability, setting the protection systems, demands on the 
workers´ activities and on the organizational measures leading to the fulfilment of all 
defined requirements for design operation conditions [3, 48]. 
For ensuring the safety, i.e. also the reliability and the functionality, the control system 
of given technological facility or infrastructure needs to keep the determined physical 
quantities (parameters of appropriate subsystems) on values determined in advance. 
During the process of regulation, the control system changes the conditions of individual 
controlled systems by bearing upon the efficient quantities, with aim to reach the required 
state of whole system. In terms of integral safety [3], the following properties of control 
system are pursued in the order:  
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- level of observance of established operation conditions and prevention of damaging 
(unacceptable) impacts on the system itself and its vicinity, 
- functionality (level of satisfaction of required tasks), 
- operability, i.e. level of fulfilment of required tasks at normal, abnormal and critical 
conditions, 
- operation stability, i.e. level of observance of established conditions during the time, 
- inherently included resilience to possible disasters. 
From above mentioned facts it follows that management and control systems 
determine quality and performance of systems. They have decisive influence on safety, 
and therefore, their following factors are considered: responsible autonomy; adaptability; 
integrity; and meaningfulness of tasks. Because the human behaviour is not deterministic, 
the main characteristics of considered systems are: the emerged properties; non-
determinist behaviour; and complex relations among the organizational targets. People, 
maintenance, renewal and changes decide about each followed system. From the 
engineering viewpoint the followed systems are characterized by structure, hardware, 
procedures, surround, information flows, organization (problem of organizational 
accidents) and interconnections among the mentioned items [3]. 
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Chapter 17  
 
CONCLUSION WITH PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF WORK 
WITH RISKS CONNECTED WITH PROCESSES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Publication „Risks of processes and their management“ is issued on the ground of 
significantly supplemented findings given in papers collected in collections 1-4. Papers 
in question from the domain of management and cope with risks containing the original 
results from series of sectors, are here processed by uniform procedure, so they clearly 
may show the ways   for control of risks in fields to which matter-of-factly belong. Such 
facts´ processing enables to generalize the cognition and to perform general proposals for 
improvement of work with risks of processes.  
Present book contains seventeenth chapters separated to fife special parts, which are 
professionally and logically interconnected. The overview of their results is in the 
following section.  
 
2. Summary of chapters´ content 
 
The first part is the introduction to problems of risks.  It is created by one-chapter 
Outline on risk, risk management and trade-off with risks that summarizes the present 
findings on risks, risk managements and fight with risks. It works with key words: 
disasters; hazard; risk; risk management; risk engineering; complex system; processes; 
variability of processes; variability of risks; system monitoring.  Author abstract is: 
Disasters damage the humans and other public assets that humans need for life. The risk 
is a measure of losses, damages and harms that the disasters cause. For human safety and 
development, we need to negotiate with risks, so their impacts might not disturb the 
conditions in the world that humans need for life. For this purpose, special types of risk 
management and risk engineering are used in the practice. Present knowledge and 
experiences show that realisation and size of risks depend on the properties of disasters 
that are the results of processes that are going in our world. Due to world dynamic 
development, the processes are varying, and therefore, we also need to control the risks 
in this context. This reality needs new approaches in risk management and in risk 
engineering. 
The second part deals with risks connected with selected processes. It contains ten 
chapters, i.e. chapters 2 – 11, which the authors processed by uniform way and on the 
same insight to risk. For individual chapters we give the key words and abstracts prepared 
by the chapters’ authors.   
The second chapter Risks of drinking water failures works with key words: drinking 
water supply; failure of supply; distribution network disruption; contamination. Authors´ 
abstract is: The chapter describes the impacts of drinking water supply in  
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Central Bohemia region if the failure is caused by two different origins, i.e. by: the 
disruption of distribution network; and contamination with toxic substance in one of 
drinking water source.  
The third chapter Risk management directed to safety of metro control systems works 
with key words: transportation system; metro; system of systems; risk management; 
safety; security; metro safe operation. Authors´ abstract is: Risk management directed to 
safety is very important for transportation systems operation. Transportation systems in 
the context of various modes are meant as systems of systems, cyber-physical systems 
related to informational technologies and socio-technical systems related to human 
aspects. We concentrate to the urban guided transportation management system, based on 
knowledge on metro system in Praha. The critical assets and priority risks are given for 
both, the technological domain and the cyber one. 
 The fourth chapter Evaluation of risks in transportation of items works with key 
words: container; multimodal transport; risk; smart container. Authors´ abstract is:  The 
development of trade has created higher demands on transport in terms of quality, speed, 
capacity and safety. During the securing process of goods, all means of transport that are 
to be used as well as any anticipated risks must be assessed. It is important to design all 
measures to mitigate the risks. The contribution lists the types of risks that might incur 
during the transportation of goods, and, in addition, usable methods of securing goods. 
Furthermore, the contribution provides an account of methods of protection against 
damage (safety) and theft (security).  The individual measures are drawn from 
characteristics of the transport modus that is used in the logistics chain. For this reason, 
the contribution compares characteristics of individual types of transportation and very 
risky situation which can occur in unlikely occurrence, but with critical impact, too.  
The fifth chapter Economical and technical evaluation of machinery enterprise and 
system risks connected works with key words: rating; evaluation of machinery 
enterprises; financial (quantitative) method; non-financial (qualitative) method; small and 
medium enterprise (SME); experiment. Authors´ abstract is:  This chapter focuses on the 
current condition of economic and technical evaluation of small and medium enterprises 
with the use of domestic as well as international rating, emphasising the sector of machine 
industry. There is a need to get an objective tool for enterprise evaluation in the 
complexity. The task and aim of the work is to create functional practically applicable 
rating evaluating model of enterprise´s quantitative and qualitative data including creation 
of methodology for their domestic and international comparison. It was based 
on research. The functionality of academically suggested model including the 
methodology was tested by benchmarking in the time period of years 2009 - 2011 using 
the statistically validated financial data from the file of 21 anonymous domestic small and 
medium enterprises (next also „SMEs “), which operate in the field of machinery 
industry. Discovered results were compared by the benchmarking with the esteemed 
Rating of SME - the product of the company CCB – Czech Credit Bureau, a. s. from the 
multinational group CRIF, whose concrete calculation and methodology are its own 
know-how and a trade secret. The suggested model is more easily calculated using the 
less input data while providing high accuracy against the SME Rating. In conclusion of 
the article there is also an overview of risks connected with the subject and a proposal for 
their minimisation.  
The sixth chapter Risk assessment of project of implementation of video tolling for the 
fee collection system within the roads network of the Czech Republic as a part of 
regulatory impact assessment works with key words: regulation, risk, roads, tolls, video 
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tolling.  Authors´ abstract is: The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is a tool to 
support decision-making. The aim of the RIA is to determine the best option to achieve 
the objective of a rulemaking activity while minimising the potential negative impacts. 
The paper presents the RIA procedures and methodology from the view of the risk 
assessment, which is an obligatory part of each RIA. Specific application of the RIA risk 
assessment is presented on the case study of the project of implementation of the video 
tolling for the fee collection system within the roads network of the Czech Republic. The 
risk assessment consists of these parts: risk identification, evaluation of probability of its 
emergence, assessment of the potential impact on the proposed solution (probability and 
severity).  
The seventh chapter Employees fluctuation risks and how to measure them works with 
key words: fluctuation; employee; human capital; job satisfaction; risk. Author´ abstract 
is: The aim of this chapter is to show risks of employees’ fluctuation. In 2016 there is one 
of the lowest unemployment rates in the history of Czech Republic and companies are 
trying to preserve and prevent their key employees from moving to another employer. 
One of the tools which could help reduce this risk is providing additional education and 
qualification with laying great emphasis on most valuable and essential personnel. 
Process of selecting right employees, identification of unsatisfied employees and 
evaluation of provided courses should be important part of human resources management. 
The eighth chapter Assessment of economic security in enterprises works with key 
words: risk, economic analysis, enterprises´ economic security, method of variability of 
indexes. Authors´ abstract is: The economic security is a state in which the economy of 
an object, whose security should be assured, is not faced by risks and threats which could 
significantly reduce (or are reduced already) their efficiency necessary to meet the basic 
functions and objectives. The main aim of the enterprise management should be the 
identification of the micro- and macro environment changes affecting the tangible and 
intangible sources of the enterprise economic security and the implementation of 
measures that allow achieving the defined objectives of an enterprise efficiently and 
effectively. One of the possible approaches to identification of risks affecting the 
enterprises´ economic security is an intercompany comparison. The chapter submits the 
theory of this risk identification method and the framework of indexes characterizing the 
criterion of enterprises´ economic security on the base of financial risks.  
The ninth chapter Marketing communication related to carrier – customer relationship 
in emergency situations works with key words: carrier-customer relationship; emergency 
situation; marketing the communication; effectiveness; risk; risk monitoring; risk 
analysis. Author´ abstract is: The chapter deals process of information transfer at with 
the emergency transport in terms of marketing communications. It focuses on 
communication related to carrier – customer relationship and provides examples of usable 
communication channels. It briefly describes the basic types of emergency situations in 
traffic and defines them for basic communication objectives, and in that context it also 
touches upon problems in measuring the effectiveness of communication. 
The tenth chapter Risk connected with communication in critical situation works with 
key words: communication, critical situation, stakeholders. Author´ abstract is: The issue 
of communication in a critical situation and its management represents a consistent part 
of emergency plans of companies which have decided not to ignore potential threats and 
which prepare themselves for a possibility of the emergence of the crisis. It is one of the 
proactive techniques and is based on the best experience of business entities that have 
already successfully managed the crisis. As people influenced by the crisis react similarly, 
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crisis communication involves mostly common characteristics, regardless of the 
economic sector in which the company operates. The present article analyses pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis communication techniques. Their successful management makes it 
easier to overcome stressful times by crisis managers as well as by other stakeholders. 
The eleventh chapter Business processes and their mapping as a base for business 
continuity management and map of risks works with key words: BCM (Business 
Continuity management), business processes, map of risks. Authors´ abstract is: The 
chapter deals with mapping of business processes from a risk point of view, in such a way 
that the final overview of the processes is useful for creating maps of risks, management 
of selected risks (especially operational risk) as well as for BCM (Business Continuity 
Management) and crisis management. The essence of the solution is the choice of criteria 
and procedures for mapping processes, so that the resulting process map was not too 
detailed and therefore too large for other planned uses, but also that contains all relevant 
processes from the point of view of risk. The primary criterion is the affiliation of the 
processes to individual departments or divisions of the company, further the frequency of 
the process, the critical period, the maximum allowable downtime (MAD), the possible 
effects of failure of the process (structured), etc. With proper selection of criteria and 
procedures arises universally usable map of risk processes.   
The third part concentrates to theoretical and methodical aspects connected with 
selected activities performed in the frame of negotiation with risk, namely software tools. 
It contains four chapters, i.e. chapters 12 – 15, which authors processed by uniform way 
and on the same insight to risk. For individual chapters we give the key words and 
abstracts prepared by the chapters’ authors:   
The twelfth chapter A mental decision risk model: theory and evaluation works with 
key words: mental model; simulation; risk; risk management; sparse phenomena; 
volatility; uncertainty; reliability. Authors´ abstract is:  Risk, uncertainty, and other terms 
have today much space and attention among thought-provoking intellectual constructs 
ranging across all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (HSS). Physics, as a 
branch of science has been pre-occupied with relating the material objects, in space and 
time, for the last two centuries. The interest in this area appears to be primarily due to 
practical applications for rare events with high impact and large scale consequences. 
These mentioned events are particularly dangerous for technical-economic processes. 
Such examples can be found in critical infrastructure, energy production, chemical 
production, supply chains etc. Mental models devoted to risk can help to create a better 
understanding of reality and to help to more accurately reality simulation. The practical 
benefit is the efficient decision making probability increase which helps to avoid the risk 
underestimation. 
The thirteenth chapter The reliability evaluation of assembly lines using models works 
with key words: assembly line, reliability, scrap rate, Scilab Xcos, step response. Authors´ 
abstract is: This paper focuses on the impact of scrap rate on performance of automatic 
assembly lines. Relations of relative line performance and a number of assembled 
components, and the ratio of line timing to median downtime at certain scrap rate are 
presented graphically. The automatic assembly line is equipped with measurement and 
information system that provides sufficient data on failure rates and reliability of lines. 
Mathematical-statistical evaluation uses identification method of control theory in Scilab 
Xcos which is based on analogy with step responses of physical systems. The paper aim 
is analysis and evaluation of reliability of automatic assembly lines.  
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The fourteenth chapter Size of hazard depends on data files extent works with key 
words: risk; disaster; hazard; data file extent; extreme theory application.  Authors´ 
abstract is: Sizes of risks for human society depend on sizes of hazards cause the disasters 
and on the vulnerabilities of public assets. Due to the human population increase and the 
increase the number of interconnected complex systems and technologies the human 
system vulnerability to disasters is increasing and this causes large losses, damages and 
injuries to public assets at great disasters origin. Therefore, the prediction of extreme 
disasters´ sizes is of interest to experts who plan, built and operate technological facilities, 
or ensure the civil protection. Prediction is currently being carried out on the basis of 
mathematical methods as mathematical statistics working with random uncertainties, and 
more recently on methods based on the theory of extremes and on further more advanced 
theories (as chaos theory, complexity theory and the theory of options) that, in addition 
to random uncertainties can express a part of knowledge uncertainties, helping to identify 
the occurrence of extreme atypical disasters that afflict the human community irregularly 
and rarely. On the basis of results for prediction of great earthquakes calculated by authors 
for real data file from Europe, the authors show how the prediction of great earthquakes 
depends on the data files extent, and how it affects the safety of technological facilities.  
The fifteenth chapter Assessment of capabilities of conventional tools for analysing 
and assessing of risk in context with dynamic risks works with key words: risk, dynamic, 
management, system, assessment. Authors´ abstract is: Risk management is an essential 
part of maintaining the functionality of systems, such as for example company, 
constituent of state administration or local government. Individual steps of the 
management can generate effective, preventive and safety measures which, also depends 
on the experience and knowledge of the main evaluate manager and his team of experts. 
It is necessary to maintain the objective approach and considering all possible risks arising 
from the entity activities.  However, a situation can arise when all scenarios associated 
with the ordinary activities and events that at the first sight seems to be almost without 
risk are not taken into the account, but their impact could be very significant. These are 
associated with so-called dynamic risks, the manifestation’s rate of which and the severity 
are changing in time. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the importance and possible 
ways of managing the dynamic risks. 
The fourth part proposes two super processes, by help of which the humans can 
reduce or mitigate the risks that are connected with originators of organizational 
accidents, i.e. they are under human control. It contains one broad chapter, Super 
processes for management of risks in territory and in technological entities directed to 
human security and development that works with key words:  security; development; 
safety; risk; risk management; process; super process; process management; territory; 
technological (socio-technological) entity (object or network. Author´ abstract is: On the 
basis of present knowledge, the world and each its entity (natural, social and 
technological) makes up the set of open and mutually interconnected systems. In these 
systems the processes are always under way that makes up the ground of dynamic 
development of both, the individual systems and their complexes. With these processes it 
is connected the occurrence of phenomena that harmed the humans and the territory in 
which the humans live. From this reason, the humans since their origin have been trying 
to comprehend harmful phenomena, to discover their causes and later also to manage the 
risks connected with them. Present tried-and-true management is based on management 
of processes, and therefore, the target of present paper is to determine the super processes 
for management of risks in territory and in technological entities directed to human 
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security and development. To this purpose it is performed the synthesis of verified 
knowledge and experiences from work with risks. On the basis of experiences from 
professional inspections and from analyses of accidents and failures of technological 
entities, there are given the most frequent causes of organizational accidents, i.e. bad 
applications of one or more processes that belong to followed super processes. The 
chapter proposes two super processes, the correct applications of which are the best 
prevention of organization accidents.  
Last part is this conclusion, i.e. the present chapter, which summarizes the results and 
gives the proposals for improvement of work with risks connected with the processes, 
which are given in next sections.  
 
3.  Uniform evaluation of findings given in foregoing chapters 
 
The first chapter shows that findings on risks´ originators, risks´ impacts, risk 
management and getting over the risks are today a lot.  They are systematically followed 
in branch called “risk engineering”. The topical engineering measures and activities need 
to be correctly applied in right time and site in practice.  From this reason, it is important 
the education of humans in which they will be teaching how to diagnose the priority risks 
and the ways of getting over them in domain of prevention, preparedness, response and 
renovation. It is also necessary to teach humans how to perform the correct safety culture 
in a given entity.  
The data in the second chapter shows that the very great care needs to be directed to 
distribution of drinking water in the territory. It is shown that the drinking water network 
and its operation can be disturbed by great number of phenomena. The impacts of some 
disturbances (e.g. contamination of drinking water by high hazardous chemical or 
biological agents) are very critical, i.e. they lead to human lives losses and to damages of 
human health and other public assets. From this reason, all concepts of urban development 
of human settlements need to contain the tools for ensuring the safe infrastructure for 
drinking water distribution.  
From the third chapter it follows that in Praha metro system, the critical assets and 
priority risks are in both, the technological domain and the cyber one. The selected cyber 
risks are studied in detail and some countermeasures are proposed. It is also shown, that 
there is available neither tool nor standard, which would specify the procedure for security 
practices in this specific field of cyber systems. They are used the standards from the 
industry sector that do not contain the railway specifics.  
The fourth chapter is concentrated to problems connected with transportation of goods. 
It shows the overview of phenomena that damaged the supply chain of goods at its 
transportation. It goes on disasters of different types and also on human errors, namely 
both, the intent ones and the unintentional ones.  In detail, they are followed the human 
failures that are very important sources of risks at goods transportation. For improvement 
of supply chains safety in the domain of transportation, they are proposed the special 
mode measures. These measures need to be systematic, interfaced and met by all 
participants of supply chain.  
The topic of the fifth chapter is concentration to risks in economic domains that 
seriously threaten the competitiveness and goodwill of businesses. For business risk 
assessment, they are used three models that differ by approach to risk. By help of 
appurtenant formulas of models, they are determined the business capabilities in trading-
off with expected economic risks. The comparison of obtained values for 21 SME shows 
288 
 
that the method The Domestic Rating KMEP provides the verified results with an average 
accuracy of 95 %. 
The sixth chapter concentrates to risks connected with tolling the fee collection on 
roads. It follows partial risks from domains: legal, economic and politic. For their 
estimation it uses the current verbal classificatory scales for determination of occurrence 
probability and size of impacts on the State at risks realisation, however, the transfer of 
verbal scale to finances is not given. The results for six different possibilities of tolling 
the fee collection are given in the risk matrixes form. On the risk matrixes data, the order 
of tested variants of tolling the fee collection is determined. The lowest risk is connected 
with the variant of tolling the fee collection based on video detection system. 
The seventh chapter objects are the risks from the human sources domain. The data on 
selection of human sources for businesses are processed by heuristic analysis. On 
obtained results, it is determined the variant for selection of human sources that has the 
lowest risks from the view of business stability. For estimation of variant, the index 
method is used. Results based on real data show that the work with risks in the human 
source domain is the key item for stability and competitiveness of each business. The 
critical item is the scale by which the indexes are defined. 
The eight-chapter goal is to trade-off with risks that are important for the business 
economic safety. It goes from the economic characteristics of 41 businesses in the Slovak 
Republic. The sizes of their economic risks are determined by values of indicators that 
are used at the business management. From results, it follows that the management of 
business economic security need to be performed on the correct risks values.  Because 
the determination of correct risks values requires the complex economic analysis of 
business that is timely and costly exigent, it shows the use of benchmarking method, the 
results of which are sufficient in many cases.  
The ninth chapter is concentrated to risks in the communication domains at critical 
situations at roads and railways. It gives the basic principles of communication, and on 
real examples it shows the communication failures at critical situations.  On real data from 
the Czech Republic, they are revealed the possible sources of risks that have potential to 
create the emergency situations or increase their severity. Among the losses caused by 
followed risks, it also includes the loss of carrier reputation. For carrier reputation losses 
reduction, it is recommended to carriers, so they might stop the underestimation of 
communication at critical situations. It is shown that right information transfer at traffic 
accidents is very important process that reduces the losses and damages connected with 
the traffic accident. To perform the correct response, it is required to ensure “correct 
person obtains correct information at correct time”.  This shows the importance of 
marketing connected with the emergency situation, i.e. the negotiation with appurtenant 
risks for support of benefit of both, the public interest and the carrier profit. 
The tenth chapter target is concentrated to crisis communication in businesses. On real 
examples, it is shown the necessity of proactive approach in this domain.  On the basis of 
real data from businesses, the sources of relevant risks in appurtenant domains are 
determined. For successful work with these risks, it is given the risk management plan. It 
contains the measures for trading-off with risks if the appurtenant risks are realised. 
The eleventh chapter target is the problem of credit risk and operating risk in 
businesses. For medium-size companies, the appurtenant risks are mapped. For their 
overcoming, it is compiled the business continuity plan.  The core of correct risk solution 
is the correct selection of criteria and the correct way of determination of processes that 
can cause the phenomena that can seriously damage the business.  
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The 2 - 11 chapters are in appurtenant problem domains performed by professional 
approach that is used at the integral safety management [5]. They contain the answers on 
research, methodical and practical questions at risk management that are targeted to 
territory safety and especially to critical facilities and networks safety. They give the real 
measures leading to: the elimination or reduction of risks; risk management targeted to 
safety increase in transportation; risk management aimed to conservation of business 
competitiveness; reduction of cyber threats; protection of humans and property; and 
successful trading-off   with further phenomena that threaten the Europe security and 
safety. They contain analyses of real events, models, case studies, examples, graphs, 
possible scenarios of impacts of failure of technological and organizational processes 
with the accent on examples of risk management in practice.  
The authors of above considered chapters clearly or latently follow the integral safety 
concept in the human system [5]. They give the system characteristics and problems of 
management of safety in a given system, and ways of problems´ solutions in considered 
system based on present knowledge of science and especially information technologies. 
In chapters, there are new findings from theoretical application domains which work with 
terms as risk, risk management, disaster, safety etc. It enables to couple the basic 
theoretical and methodological foundations for complex safety management, and further 
to propagate the methodical and methodological apparatus for ensuring the individual 
safety aspects, and   particularly the application of system measures in the practice.  
The twelfth chapter deals with problems of decision-making at determination of 
models by which the reality is depicted at building the technological and social entities. 
It goes from reality that each used entity model has certain limitations that cause the entity 
failure at conditions that were not considered in the entity design; it verifies the assertion 
given in 6, 7. From this reason, it is necessary at the selection of entity model to adhere 
the certain principles that specify the way of trade-off with risks.  Therefore, the economic 
risks might be followed not only in the entity building but also in future, when as a 
consequence of conditions change, it will occur the failures in economic domain that will 
have also impacts in technological and social domains. It describes several software, 
which supporting the decision-making at the entity design selection. On real case, bridge 
deck, it compares the results of simulations according to used software in practice; the 
risk of each design is measured by finance expenses that exceed the expected costs. The 
most suitable procedure naturally seems the procedure based on integrated risk (sum of 
economic and technological risks) determination, in which it is used the mathematical 
algorithm MCDA (the multi-criteria decision analysis), probabilistic approach and the 
assumption that the risk is manifestation of knowledge uncertainty (vagueness). 
The thirteenth chapter is related to the domain of automatisation of management of big 
technological entities. It presents the approach in which it is unlimited belief in good 
software. It propagates the Scilab Xcos software that is based on advanced knowledge 
that considers the Markov´chains, the Kolmogorov equations and probabilistic behaviour 
of   systems. With regards to knowledge given in 7, this approach really enables to 
maintain the technical system reliability at normal conditions and to curb the random 
deviations caused by changes of internal conditions. It does not consider the external 
disasters, and therefore it has not capability to trade-off with all possible risks. Therefore, 
in practice, it might be supplemented by risk management plan or on-side and off-side 
response plans.    
The fourteenth chapter shows that at determination of risk connected with a certain 
disaster, it is necessary to use the correct data on input parameters, i.e. on the hazard size 
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and on real vulnerabilities of assets in site, in which the risk is determined. On real case 
for earthquake, it is shown that the hazard size substantially depends on the time interval 
from which the data are considered. If we perform the assets´ protection on the incorrectly 
determined risk value, so sooner or later it is possible to expect huge losses and damages 
on public and private assets; e.g., it shows the consequences of several medium 
earthquakes in central Italy in last years (there were damaged new buildings because at 
their design the big historical earthquakes occurred in region were not considered). This 
knowledge is based on detail disaster research that shows that great phenomena occur 
sporadically and very irregularly, e.g. data in 8.      
The fifteenth chapter deals with the capability of individual risk engineering methods, 
and mainly the appurtenant software products, at determination of risks of processes that 
change in time. It gives the theory based on the famous Bayes theorem and the basic 
equation for assessment of entity safety in a given time interval.  The practical assessment 
is performed by the systemic approach, however, only for classic methods for risk 
assessment, i.e. for those for which the software is gettable.  The results confirm the 
conclusions that owing to the world dynamic variability, it is necessary to monitor the 
each entity conditions as the open system of systems, and according the obtained facts to 
change the tools for management and trade-off with risk 7.   By other words, the classic 
methods for risk assessment, especially those in which the results are outputs of some 
software algorithm without logical thinking, have not the capability to express the risk 
values in the dynamic world. 
The sixteenth chapter reacts on present findings on dynamic world development that 
manifests by changes of processes, which are the originators of phenomena that are the 
risks´ sources. Because the human factor at decision-making is one of important risks´ 
source, it proposes two super processes for management of human activities. Their 
adherence reduces the origin the organizational accidents and it ensures the quality 
management and trade-off with risks. 
Used uniform view on risks in different partial domains enables to compare the 
approaches, methods and key procedures connected with work with risks. It removes the 
dissimilarities that are in many publications caused by disunity of terms or indistinctly 
determined aim of work with risks.  Therefore, it can be said that aims of works with risks 
are same in all human activities domains, it is necessary to ensure the safety of activity or 
entity, i.e. the building, human settlements, sector, territory or the State; thence they 
respect the public interest.  
The experience from practice obtained at assessment of disaster impacts on entities 1-
4, 7-9  and above mentioned facts show that at work with risks a lot of deficiencies occur, 
e.g. : 
- in many entities´ concepts, on which the risks or activities connected with 
management or trade-off with risk, it is not considered the system nature, 
interconnections of individual systems, existence of some internal and external 
disasters and changes in time and space (usually only direct selected disaster impacts 
are considered). It proves series of famous failures of technological and social entities, 
e.g. recent finance crisis that affected the majority of world, 
- continually, the managers, technicians and scientists have great confidence in power 
of software that were really processed on theoretically well-founded models, but are 
not based on sufficient amount of real data describing the behaviour of followed entity 
during  the sufficient time interval length; i.e., the appurtenant software can just 
contain the measures for adaptation of entity behaviour to changes in time and space, 
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and therefore, the have not capability to avert or mitigate great disasters impacts  that 
are beyond their designs.  From the risk engineering knowledge, such entities need to 
have emergency plans, continuity plans and operational crisis plans for protection of 
assets being in the entities vicinities,  
- for risk assessment there are often used indistinctly determined criteria and 
classificatory procedures from which the real size of losses and damages on public 
and private assets is not recognizable (on risks they often adjudicate administrative 
and politicians who have low knowledge on risks and their impacts, or they have not 
real responsibility), 
- at risk determination, it is often neglected the accent on use of relevant data and 
relevant methods; i.e. only exceptionally it is performed the judgement of 
representativeness and validity of data sets and sensibility of methods used for data 
processing, which in practise is manifested by errors in both, the risk determination 
and the measures for risks suppress,  
- at ensuring the entity security and development, it is often considered to partial risks 
and exceptionally the integrated risks are considered. The integral (systemic) risks are 
considered only singularly.   
 
4. Proposal of measures for improvement of management and trade-off with risks  
 
On the basis of above given facts and knowledge, the proposals for improvement of 
control of risks connected with the processes need to come out from our findings, 
experiences and logical thinking, they are the following: 
- reconnaissance of important assets in real entity and its vicinity, the safety of which 
is the target, 
- determination of disasters that can have unacceptable impacts on the studied entity, 
their possible scenarios at different conditions in and out of entity; it means to 
consider the possible occurrence of several disasters mutually interconnected 
(amplification of impacts by bad maintenance, cascade effects), 
- determination of processes that have capability to cause to happen the worse 
scenarios; determination of their criticalities and occurrence probabilities, 
- evaluation of risks connected with processes with different scenarios, and mainly 
those that have capability to cause to happen the worse scenarios, 
- judgement of human capability at copping with risks, namely critical ones, according 
to human possibilities and tools that are to disposal; the CBA is important tool, 
- to perform correct decision on measures for coping with risks that were selected as 
important, 
- to select the correct procedures suitable for given site  for measures application in this 
site at prevention, mitigation and response (none of measures is suitable for all sites 
9),  
- to determine correct procedure of realisation of measures of all kinds – technical, 
organizational, finance, legal and human sources, 
- to ensure the prompt performance of measures, 
- to introduce the monitoring that will follow the effectiveness of accepted measures 
and ensure the prompt correction measures. 
From above concept it follows that the high quality work with risks represents the 
process which is challenging on knowledge, real data and time, and therefore, it requires 
the relevant interface of: 
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- deep findings and experiences, 
- independent decision-making and management for public interest benefit,  
- quality implementation of measures, 
- support from all participants. 
In case of lack of time, detail data or professionals the method based on comparison 
of entity safety level with another paradigmatic entity is possible to use. Benchmarking 
is the method of systematic comparison of processes, organizational structure, products 
and power of a given entity with other globally successful entities with aim to reach the 
excellency. It usually uses at risk management at cases if the goal is ideal and according 
to the good practice principles, it is suitable to manage the risks as the best operators in 
the given sector   carry out it.  
It is important continuously to consider that for whole human society welfare, the risks 
need to be managed in benefit of public interest, i.e. human security and development. 
From epoch of F. Taylor, the founder of scientific management and his successor H. Fayol 
10, 11, the basic functions of management are not changed; the management goes on to 
lead (executors of management are people) the controlled organization or organizational 
part to prosperity and efficiency, and some change in this direction has not been predicted.  
During the time, they have been changing the methods, the techniques and tools, how 
manage and lead, i.e. coordinate the human working activities so they may be performed 
effectively and efficiently. The social, technical, economic and globalization changes are 
reflected into changes of management of businesses and regions.  This trend is permanent 
and it will also continue in the future. It induces the need of new development strategies 
based on smart technologies, new ways of work with risks, use of mutual active 
interactions among the research and business communities at creation and dissemination 
of knowledge. The successful development is more and more complex and depends on 
level of trade-off with risks in all entities.  
In all entities, it goes on achievement of conditions at which the entity has the 
capability to dampen famous and foreseeable internal and external disasters that can 
damage some entity elements (or whole entity). It mainly goes on preservation of entity 
structure, entity stability, entity reliability and entity behaviour that is in harmony with 
entity mission, i.e. strategic targeted direction. It goes on level of entity stability and on 
its primary and secondary adaptation. In harmony with this mission, it is possible the 
entity safety management to structure and to define as:    
- domain of management of relatively self-reliant (independent) activities with aim 
preventively to precede the risks or to minimize the risks consequences if risks realize,  
- institutional set of subjects – actors ensuring the safety in regions, businesses that are 
from state administration and private entities,  
- use of methods, procedures, directions, standards, norms and tools of management 
including the special methods and technologies for institutional (team) co-operation 
of individual actors ensuring the entity safety,  
- systematic, functionally arranged, recurrent cycle of interconnected activities with the 
accent on permanent improvement of trade-off with risks which leads to entity safety 
upgrade.  
The human security and entity development depends on level on which we trade-off 
with risks in processes that are round us; if we are capable existing and foreseeable risks 
to identify, to analyse, to assess and to control, i.e. effectively manage.  The appurtenant 
sources – human, finance, information and time would be also the motive power of 
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positive human society development. But they can be limited factor or even by destructive 
factor if they are missing. 
Generally, it is necessary to improve the safety culture and human learnedness on risks 
of citizens, administrators and politicians on all levels as the organizational accidents 
problem 7 shows.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
As it was several times said, the world conditions permanently change, which means 
that the assets´ vulnerabilities and the processes being under way in the world also change. 
From this it follows that disasters´ characteristics and their impacts’ scenarios also 
change. The consequence is the transformation of both, the risks´ rates and the human 
communities’ possibilities. It means that each measure for tame of risks is provisional, 
and therefore, the humans’ measures and activities need to be adapted to situation on the 
basis of lessons learned from critical situations. By research and increasing learnedness, 
the humans need furthermore to make up their capability to survive the extreme disasters 
that they are not identified in advance by present tools.  
Safe world for humans can be only arranged by right work with risks. It is necessary 
to select proper concept on which we determine, manage and defeat the risks. In all cases, 
it is necessary to understand the world and each its entity as open system, to consider 
changes in time and space and proactively to solve problems. In cases, in which we 
neglect given facts from any reasons, we need to prepare the regime measures for fight 
with emergency up to critical situations.  
The present book is synthetic source of knowledge for further development of integral 
safety concept in human system and for management of risks targeted to safety of both, 
the territory and the critical facilities, i.e. for human security and development. It may be 
useful for students of profile branches as the source of current findings in this domain. It 
also contributes to improvement of professional level, systemic thinking and behaviour 
in safety domain. It has all setups to be profitable part of library of many security 
professionals in theoretical and application spheres.  
Finally, the author indicates that she would not evocate the impression at readers that 
she approves only her works because in this chapter she mainly uses the references to her 
works. She declares that she respects all professionals who work with risks in theoretical 
and practical spheres as the quotations in her books demonstrated; the reason of situation 
in this chapter is that her works are processed on one general concept od work with risks; 
references to other sources would require to explain the interfaces, because these sources 
describe the problems by other words, though concept principles, management and trade-
off with risks are consistent.  
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